# Acquittal: Multiple Dying Declarations should corroborate to convict the accused and the accused should be heard before sentencing

- Link: https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/
- Published: 2026-11-18T14:16:31+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

Contents

 * [Appellant and impugned order challenged](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#appellant-and-impugned-order-challenged)
 * [Factual matrix](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#factual-matrix)
 * [Other courts verdicts](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#other-courts-verdicts)
 * [Core legal arguments of appellant vs respondent](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#core-legal-arguments-of-appellant-vs-respondent)
 * [Ratio Decidendi](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#ratio-decidendi)
 * [Directions issued](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#directions-issued)
 * [Important Paragraph](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#important-paragraph)
 * [Conclusion](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#conclusion)
 * [Resources](https://section1.in/acquittal-multiple-dying-declarations-should-corroborate-to-convict-the-accused-and-the-accused-should-be-heard-before-sentencing/#resources)

**Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil – Versus – The State of Maharashtra – Criminal Appeal
No. 118 of 2018 – 2026 INSC 1196 – 5 November 2026 – Atul S. Chandurkar, J.**

[https://www.sci.gov.in/view-pdf/?diary_no=391072017&type=j&order_date=2026-11-05&from=latest_judgements_order](https://www.sci.gov.in/view-pdf/?diary_no=391072017&type=j&order_date=2026-11-05&from=latest_judgements_order)

##### **Appellant and impugned order challenged**

The appellant, the mother-in-law of the deceased, challenged the judgment of the
High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, which reversed her acquittal by the Sessions
Court and convicted her for an [offence punishable under Section](https://section1.in/custody-death-or-station-death-if-the-death-takes-place-inside-the-police-station-the-accused-persons-should-be-punished-for-the-offence-under-section-302-ipc/)
302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, sentencing her to rigorous imprisonment for 
life and a fine of ₹25,000/-, in default one year rigorous imprisonment [paras 1,
9].

##### **Factual matrix**

In April 2005, the deceased, the wife of the appellant’s son, suffered severe burns
at the family home and died five days later. The prosecution alleged that four accused—
the husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and brother-in-law — jointly committed
the offence, with two recorded declarations attributing the restraining of the victim
to two accused, the pouring of kerosene to the [appellant](https://section1.in/sentence-modified-into-section-304-part-ii-deceased-died-when-appellant-fired-in-the-open-sky-in-a-marriage-ceremony-though-unfortunate-but-having-no-enmity-and-intention/)
and the lighting of the fire to the father-in-law, while the medical case history
recorded that the deceased himself stated the appellant set her alight [paras 2–
9].

##### **Other courts verdicts**

The Sessions Court [acquitted all four accused](https://section1.in/juvenile-justice-act-2015-though-offences-pocso-and-murder-have-been-proved-accused-acquitted-based-on-procedural-illegalities/)
of all charges. The High Court’s Aurangabad Bench retained the acquittals of the
three co-accused and of the other offences, but accepted the medical case history
against the appellant, convicted her under Section 302 IPC and imposed life imprisonment
with fine [paras 9, 10].

##### **Core legal arguments of appellant vs respondent**

The appellant argued that convicting her alone of an independently committed murder
on the strength of the defence version was contrary to the charge of joint action
framed against four accused and caused prejudice since no separate substantive charge
under Section 302 was framed; that with the co-accused acquitted the common intention
case could not stand; that only one of three materially inconsistent dying declarations
was accepted and that too without corroboration, a witness (the person who extinguished
the fire, took the victim to hospital and was present when the history was recorded)
not being examined without explanation; and that [Section 106 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/fact-discovered-and-recovery-mahazar-witnesses/)
could not fill gaps in the prosecution case. The respondent-State supported the 
High Court’s reliance on the medical case history and on the appellant’s unexplained
failure to account for the deceased’s burns [paras 14–18, 19–27].

##### **Ratio Decidendi**

A conviction [must be based on the charge framed; on this record, the prosecution could not rebuild a four-accused joint-action case into a different murder case against the mother-in-law alone, and doing so without a separately framed](https://section1.in/quash-to-frame-charge-under-section-306-ipc-court-must-check-for-the-part-of-the-accused-in-causing-the-suicide-carefully-since-the-main-person-is-not-available-for-cross-examination/)
substantive charge caused actual prejudice. Where [dying declarations](https://section1.in/disbelieving-dying-declaration-both-dying-declarations-were-said-to-have-given-to-the-interested-witnesses-and-not-properly-proved/)
materially differ, each must be assessed for reliability, voluntariness, the maker’s
condition and surrounding circumstances, and a reversal of acquittal cannot rest
on an uncorroborated declaration when a material witness is not examined without
explanation. [Section 106 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/test-identification-parade-not-proved/)
operates only after the prosecution lays a sufficient evidentiary foundation pointing
to the accused’s involvement, and an absent or implausible explanation cannot create
that foundation. The failure to hear the [accused on sentence before reversal of acquittal](https://section1.in/acquittal-gunshot-witnesses-might-have-already-planned-to-frame-the-accused-since-they-know-the-accused-owned-licensed-weapon/)
was a further procedural infirmity under Section 386(a) CrPC, though the acquittal
made separate relief unnecessary [paras 14–18, 19–25, 26–27, 28–30].

##### **Directions issued**

The appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment was quashed, the appellant was acquitted
under Section 302 IPC and directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless required
in any other case; no other [directions to authorities or lower courts](https://section1.in/suo-moto-guidelines-common-practice-and-procedure-in-criminal-trials-all-over-india/)
were issued [paras 29, 30].

##### **Important Paragraph**

3. To bring home the charge against all the accused, the [prosecution examined](https://section1.in/during-a-criminal-trial-the-counsel-appointed-by-the-victim-takes-over-the-prosecution-from-the-state-prosecutor-examine-the-same-in-the-light-of-the-legal-provisions/)
Dr. Ajit Pathak at Exhibit-29 as PW-1. He was working as Associate Professor at 
the Civil Hospital. He stated that he had conducted the post-mortem examination 
of Sunitabai on 15.04.2005. He opined that the victim had suffered 90 % burns and
that the [cause of death was ‘Septicemia due](https://section1.in/section-304-part-ii-ipc-though-cause-of-death-is-due-to-injuries-no-intention-found/)
to thermal burns’. The [post-mortem report](https://section1.in/reversal-of-conviction-though-post-mortem-report-indicates-the-death-was-unnatural-and-murder-cannot-be-ruled-out-but-since-no-direct-eye-witness-to-the-incident-the-link-of-causation-between-the-acc/)
was at Exhibit-27. The father of Sunitabai, Subhash Patil was examined at Exhibit-
36 as PW-2. He stated that Sunitabai was his second daughter and that she was married
with A1. His daughter had [narrated certain incidents](https://section1.in/evidentiary-value-of-fir-first-version-of-the-incident-narrated-by-police-witness-has-to-be-treated-as-fir-and-the-subsequent-information-lodged-by-the-informant-is-hit-under-section-162-cr-p-c/)
of ill-treatment after which a meeting was held between members of both the families.
In the said meeting, Al had given a written assurance that he would not ill-treat
his wife. He further stated that on getting information that his daughter had suffered
burn injuries, he along with his relatives rushed to village Vinchur. His daughter
had been admitted in the Civil Hospital where she stated that Al and A4 had tied
her hands and legs by a rope while the appellant had poured kerosene on her person
and she was set on fire by A2. He identified the thumb impression of Al on the stamp
paper wherein a written assurance of good treatment was recorded. The same was at
Exhibit-37.

**Charges**: 14. Admittedly, all the [accused had been charged for committing an offence](https://section1.in/homicide-not-amounting-to-murder-though-the-accused-shot-the-deceased-but-the-weapon-firearm-was-not-brought-for-the-purpose-of-committing-an-offence-in-the-liquor-party/)
punishable under Sections 498A, 342, 302 and 406 read with Section 34 of the Penal
Code. In this appeal, we are [concerned](https://section1.in/section-451-cr-p-c-petition-for-disposal-return-of-property-cannot-be-filed-directly-by-invoking-article-226-without-invoking-section-451-cr-p-c-before-the-concerned-court/)
only with the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code as
all accused were acquitted of the other offences. The relevant charge framed under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code against all the accused reads
as under:

“Thirdly, that you accused Nos. 1 to 4 in furtherance of your [common intention](https://section1.in/common-intention-on-facts/),
at the same date, time and place, did commit the murder of Sunitabai w/o Shamkant@
Dhanraj Patil, intentionally or knowingly causing her death by pouring kerosene 
on her person and set her to fire and that you all thereby committed an offence 
punishable under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and within
my cognizance.

The charge indicates that in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused,
they had intentionally or knowingly caused her death by pouring kerosene on her 
person and setting her on fire. The High Court by the impugned judgment maintained
the acquittal of A1, A2 and A4 of all the charges but convicted the appellant, A3
alone for the [offence punishable under Section](https://section1.in/even-in-a-case-where-the-final-report-of-the-police-under-section-173-is-accepted-and-the-accused-persons-are-discharged-the-magistrate-has-the-power-to-take-cognizance-of-the-offence-on-a-complaint/)
302 of the Penal Code. The legality of this outcome deserves consideration.

15. The High Court has sought to support its conclusion in convicting the appellant
alone under [Section 302 of the Penal Code](https://section1.in/accused-were-permitted-to-leave-the-court-without-any-formal-order-of-release-or-even-without-taking-a-bond-under-section-88-of-the-code/)
by referring to the defence statement of all the accused that when the unfortunate
incident occurred, only the appellant, A3 and the victim were present at home. On
this basis, the High Court proceeded to hold that since it was admitted by the accused
that it was only the appellant, A3 who was with the victim, it was clear that she
alone had poured kerosene on the victim and had set her on fire. It is required 
to be stated that the defence raised by the accused was in response to the charge
framed against all of them. The charge was that A1 to A4 in furtherance of their
common intention, at the same date, time and place had caused the death of the victim
by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire, thus, committing an offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. There was no
independent charge framed under Section 302 of the Penal Code against any of the
accused. Hence, to hold that the defence raised by the accused that as the appellant,
A3 was alone present at home with the victim was sufficient to convict her under
[Section](https://section1.in/section-420-ipc-the-contention-that-since-charge-sheet-has-been-filed-the-present-appeal-is-to-be-dismissed-was-rejected/)
302 of the Penal Code would amount to making out a new accusation with which the
appellant was never charged. It would have been a different matter altogether if
an independent charge under Section 302 of the Penal Code simplicitor was also framed
against the appellant, A3. The case of the prosecution was always that of involvement
of all the accused in furtherance of their common intention. Now, convicting only
one of them in the absence of any independent charge would definitely be prejudicial
to the appellant, in the facts of the [present case](https://section1.in/how-sanctioning-authority-shall-examine-the-case-presented/).

**Out of four accused, three were acquitted and [confirmed by the High Court only A3 is convicted](https://section1.in/conviction-confirmed-for-opening-false-account/)**:
18. In the present case too, we are faced with a similar situation. Of the four 
accused tried for the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal
Code, the acquittal of three out of said four accused was maintained by the High
Court. The appellant, A3 alone has been convicted for the substantive offence punishable
under Section 302 of the Penal Code, a charge that was never framed against her.

**Appreciation of multiple [dying declaration](https://section1.in/disbelieving-dying-declaration-both-dying-declarations-were-said-to-have-given-to-the-interested-witnesses-and-not-properly-proved/)**:
19. Notwithstanding this position, we have independently assessed the evidence on
record. The present is a case where there are three [dying declarations](https://section1.in/disbelieving-dying-declaration-both-dying-declarations-were-said-to-have-given-to-the-interested-witnesses-and-not-properly-proved/)
on record. The Sessions Court discarded all the [dying declarations](https://section1.in/disbelieving-dying-declaration-both-dying-declarations-were-said-to-have-given-to-the-interested-witnesses-and-not-properly-proved/)
as they were not consistent with each other. The High Court, however, accepted the
[dying declaration](https://section1.in/recall-on-dying-declaration-laws-jan2024/)
at Exhibit-56 while discarding the other two at Exhibits-44 and 48. In _Jagbir Singh_(
supra), this [Court considered the presence of multiple dying declarations](https://section1.in/dying-declaration-no-stereotypical-approach-can-be-adopted-by-courts/)
including those that were inconsistent with each other. It was held that each case
was required to be decided on its own facts after carefully examining the entirety
of materials as well as the circumstances surrounding the making of different dying
declarations.

**Conviction solely based on the deposition PW.7 who [recorded the statement](https://section1.in/observation-of-honble-high-court-that-once-the-police-recorded-statements-of-the-doctor-and-pw-4-the-statements-of-pw-4-and-the-doctor-before-the-court-became-meaningless-is-contrary-to-sect/)
of victim**: 21. It is material to bear in mind that while convicting the appellant
under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the High Court [disbelieved the dying declarations](https://section1.in/disbelieving-dying-declaration-both-dying-declarations-were-said-to-have-given-to-the-interested-witnesses-and-not-properly-proved/)
at Exhibits-44 and 48 as well as the oral statements made by the victim to her father
Subhash Patil, PW-2 and Bhatu Patil, PW-6. The High [Court has based the conviction of the appellant](https://section1.in/section-391-cr-p-c-if-no-questions-put-to-the-witnesses-or-lead-evidence-the-appellate-court-has-no-obligation-to-allow-application-filed-under-section-391-cr-p-c/)
solely on the deposition of Dr. Prashant Shinde, PW-7 and the statement of the victim
as recorded in the medico-legal case papers at Exhibit-56. Thus, the material factor
to be considered is whether the [statement recorded](https://section1.in/delay-in-recoding-statement-of-witnesses-impact/)
below Exhibit-56 by Dr. Prashant Shinde is sufficient to overturn the acquittal 
of the appellant and convict her under Section 302 of the Penal Code.

22. When the examination-in-chief of Dr. Prashant Shinde, PW-7 is perused, he states
that on 10.04.2005 one Vishwas Patil had brought the victim at the Civil Hospital.
He had recorded the history of the patient and had mentioned the same on the medico-
legal case papers. He, thereafter, obtained the thumb impression of the patient 
thereon. He further states that at about 1.40 p.m. the police had arrived at the
Civil Hospital for [recording the statement](https://section1.in/section-27-iea-mere-exhibiting-the-disclosure-statement-to-the-io-is-not-sufficient-but-the-io-must-give-description-about-the-conversation-while-recording-disclosure-statements-in-evidence/)
of the victim. After examining her and finding that she was conscious and able to
give her statement, an endorsement to that effect was put on the police papers. 
The statement of the victim was thereafter recorded. At its conclusion, the victim
was again examined and on noting that she was conscious and able to give her statement,
an endorsement on the [statement recorded](https://section1.in/section-27-iea-mere-exhibiting-the-disclosure-statement-to-the-io-is-not-sufficient-but-the-io-must-give-description-about-the-conversation-while-recording-disclosure-statements-in-evidence/)
was put (Exhibit-44). This witness further states that at about 2.15 p.m. on the
same day, the Special Executive Magistrate, PW-5 had come for recording the patient’s
statement. After again verifying the status of the patient, her statement (Exhibit-
48) was recorded by the Special Executive Magistrate.

**Vishwas Desle who admitted the victim in the hospital was not examined and not
explained by the prosecution**: 23. When the history of the patient as recorded 
by PW-7 is considered, it is seen that the same was endorsed by one Vishwas Desle.
He had brought the patient to the Civil Hospital as stated by PW-7. Pertinently,
Vishwas Desle was not examined by the prosecution. In the cross-examination of the
[Investigating Officer](https://section1.in/in-cross-case-or-case-in-counter-the-i-o-has-to-file-both-the-final-reports-before-the-jurisdictional-magistrate/),
PW-8, he admitted that during the course of investigation, it was disclosed that
Vishwas Patil, who was a Police Patil, had extinguished the fire and he was the 
first person to go to the house of the accused. He had also admitted the victim 
in hospital. His statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 had been recorded. There is, however, no reason furnished for non-examination
of this material witness, especially, when he was the first [person to have gone to the house of the accused](https://section1.in/i-o-has-the-power-to-delete-accused-persons-in-the-final-report-but-i-o-is-expected-to-serve-a-notice-upon-the-complainant/),
extinguished the fire and thereafter, admitted the victim to hospital. This factor
weighed with the Sessions Court. The High Court, however, despite acknowledging 
the fact that Vishwas Patil had gone to the spot of the incident after the victim
was burnt and had taken her to the hospital, proceeded to observe that his non-examination
did not have any adverse effect on the case of the prosecution. In our view, Vishwas
Patil was definitely a material witness since he was the first person to go to the
house of the accused, rescue the victim and thereafter bring her to the hospital.
Even according to the Medical Officer, PW-7 he was present when the patient’s history
was noted on the case papers at Exhibit-56.

**Dying declarations not corroborated with each other**: 24. We may, thus, observe
that since the High Court found that the dying declarations at Exhibits-44 and 48
were not consistent with the dying declaration at Exhibit-56, it ought to have looked
for some corroborative material while accepting the dying declaration at Exhibit-
56, especially when the burn injuries were to the extent of 94% as per PW-7. It 
is here that the examination of Vishwas Desle, who was present when PW-7 noted the
patient’s history on Exhibit-56 would have been material. He was, however, not examined.
Thus, Exhibit-56 without any corroboration cannot be the sole basis to reverse the
acquittal of the appellant and thereafter convict her alone.

**Appreciation of dying declarations**: 25. It was the case of the prosecution since
inception that all the accused in furtherance of their common intention had caused
the death of the victim by pouring kerosene on her person and setting her on fire.
The charge framed was under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. 
In the dying declarations at Exhibits-44 and 48, it was asserted that the victim’s
husband, A1 and her brother-in-law, A4 had tied her hands and legs by a rope after
which the appellant, A3 had poured kerosene on her person and A2 had set her on 
fire. A similar narration can be found in the dying declaration at Exhibit-48. Both
these dying declarations, however, have been discarded by the Sessions Court as 
well as the High Court. This finding has not been assailed by the prosecution. It
was also specifically deposed by PW-2, the victim’s father as well as PW-6 that 
Sunitabai had told them that her hands and legs had been tied by A1 and A4. During
the course of investigation, the prosecution had seized an empty plastic can, partially
burnt cloth pieces and a partially burnt piece of rope. Here, Vishwas Desle would
have been a material witness to prove the presence of the burnt piece of rope with
which the victim was allegedly tied. The High Court, however, while proceeding to
accept the [dying declaration](https://section1.in/in-dowry-death-cases-prosecution-has-to-prove-the-initial-burden/)
at Exhibit-56 did not indicate as to why the case of the prosecution in terms of
the charge framed below Exhibit-8 was not liable to be accepted. It is material 
to note that common intention was attributed to all the accused and they all were
charged for the offence punishable under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34 
of the Penal Code. However, it is only the appellant, who has been convicted by 
the High Court under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The appellant’s conviction was,
therefore, required to be supported by convincing evidence. It also ought to be 
borne in mind that the victim was stated to be aged about thirty years when the 
incident took place while the appellant was stated to be aged sixty years. According
to the High Court, it was the appellant alone who poured kerosene on the victim 
and also set her on fire. The difference in the age of the victim and the appellant
was also a relevant factor to be considered especially while reversing the appellant’s
acquittal.

**Absence of explanation by the accused regarding the victim’s burn injuries**: 
26. The High Court has attached considerable importance to the absence of any explanation
being furnished by the appellant as regards the manner in which the victim suffered
burn injuries. This, according to the High Court, was a major factor that worked
against the appellant as she was stated to be alone with the victim at home when
the incident occurred.

**Initial burden & Section 106 IEA**: 27. The provisions of [Section 106 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/test-identification-parade-not-proved/),
1872 would come into play only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden
pointing to the involvement of the concerned accused. It is only when the prosecution
has led evidence, which if believed would sustain a conviction that the absence 
of a plausible explanation by the accused could be a factor against such accused.
We may in this regard refer to the decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court
in _Anees vs. The State Govt. of NCT_ wherein it was held as under:

“42. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court while maintaining the conviction
under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the IPC, reversed the order of acquittal
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and convicted the accused under
the said provision and [sentenced them to imprisonment for life](https://section1.in/rape-case-santosh-gurung-vs-state-of-sikkim-s-c-quashes-life-sentence-based-on-broken-circumstantial-evidence/).

 * Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the [court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/section-138-trial-procedure/)
   in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application
   to [criminal cases](https://section1.in/understanding-the-police-report-investigation-and-magistrates-duties-in-criminal-cases/).
   The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus
   lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified
   by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act.

44. [Section 106 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/in-npds-cases-confession-is-hit-under-section-25-indian-evidence-act/)
cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence
of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used
to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving
all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution
from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically
within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden on the accused
to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence
of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves
enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate
burden. So, until a _prima facie_ case is established by such evidence, the onus
does not shift to the accused.”

**In the absence of the initial burden being discharged by the prosecution herein,
we are not inclined to accept the reasoning of the High Court in this regard by 
relying upon Section 106 of the Act of 1872.**

**High [Court did not hear the accused on sentencing](https://section1.in/madras-high-court-settled-that-confession-could-be-used-in-favour-of-the-accused-to-reduce-the-sentence-is-sudalaimani-overruled/)**:
28. Another material infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court is that
after convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the
Penal Code, the appellant was not heard on the quantum of sentence to be imposed
upon her. After reversing the appellant’s acquittal, the High Court ought to have
heard her in this regard as required by Section 386(a) of the Code. The record indicates,
however, that the appellant was not heard on the aspect of sentence. This Court 
in _Ramkrushna Prahllad Dongardive Vs. The State of Maharashtra_ has considered 
the aforesaid aspect in detail. However, since we are of the view that the High 
Court was not justified in reversing the appellant’s acquittal, nothing much would
turn on this aspect. As the aforesaid position is obvious from the record, it has
been referred to.

##### **Conclusion**

**Innocence is enhanced**: 29. After considering the entire material on record, 
we are more than satisfied that the Sessions Court was correct in holding that in
view of inconsistency in the three dying declarations, the appellant was entitled
to the benefit of doubt. The High Court, while considering an appeal against acquittal,
ought to have given due consideration to this aspect before proceeding to reverse
the judgment of the Sessions Court. The presumption of innocence in favour of the
appellant was in fact enhanced by her acquittal by the Sessions Court. The view 
taken by the Sessions Court could not be said to be either perverse or illegal as
held by the High Court. The dying declaration at Exhibit-56 was accepted by the 
High Court without any corroborating evidence being available. The judgment of the
High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained.

**Acquitted**: 30. For all the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the High Court
passed in Criminal Appeal No.63 of 2008 on 28.09.2017 is quashed. The appellant 
is acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code. The 
appellant be set free forthwith, if not required in any other case. The Criminal
Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

##### **Resources**

– Judgments Cited

    – Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1963) — Supreme [Court authority](https://section1.in/pmla-cognizance-under-pmla-special-court-can-take-cognizance-only-by-way-of-complaint-filed-by-the-authority-authorized-on-this-behalf/)
on reversal of acquittals and on joint action by identified/unidentified participants,
distinguished by the Court [para 16–18]

– Acts and Sections Involved

    – Indian Penal Code, 1860

        – Section 302 — Punishment for murder

        – [Section 34 — Acts done by several persons](https://section1.in/pmla-pc-act-prosecuting-the-person-accused-of-an-offence-under-section-131e-of-the-pc-act-as-well-as-for-an-offence-under-section-3-of-pmla-would-not-amount-to-double-jeopardy/)
in furtherance of common intention

    – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

        – Section 386(a) — Powers of [appellate court](https://section1.in/reversal-of-acquittal-appellate-court-cannot-reverse-the-acquittal-on-fresh-appreciation-of-evidence-and-without-recording-any-illegality-error-of-law-or-of-fact-in-the-trial-court-judgment/)
on appeal against conviction

    – Indian [Evidence Act](https://section1.in/fact-discovered-and-recovery-mahazar-witnesses/),
1872

        – [Section 106 — Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge](https://section1.in/section-106-iea-appellant-did-not-provide-satisfactory-explanation-either-for-injury-marks-found-on-the-deceased-wife-though-this-fact-was-within-the-special-knowledge-of-the-accused/)

[Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil vs. The State of Maharashtra 391072017_2026-11-05](https://section1.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Sau.-Kamalbai-Waman-Patil-vs.-The-State-of-Maharashtra-391072017_2026-11-05.pdf)
[Download](https://section1.in/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Sau.-Kamalbai-Waman-Patil-vs.-The-State-of-Maharashtra-391072017_2026-11-05.pdf)

### Further Study

 * [Digest and a study recall on dying declaration](https://section1.in/recall-on-dying-declaration-laws-jan2024/)
 * [How to mark documentary evidence? FIR is a public document and also a dying declaration](https://section1.in/fir-is-a-public-document-and-also-a-dying-declaration-and-hence-it-shall-be-treated-as-substantive-piece-of-evidence-and-admissible-u-s-321-evidence-act-1872/)
 * [Dying declaration: section 32 – Whether dying declaration can be treated as statement or confession if maker survives? Yes.](https://section1.in/whether-dying-declaration-can-be-treated-as-statement-or-confession-if-maker-survives/)
 * [Dying Declaration: Appreciation of evidence of dying declaration is explained](https://section1.in/appreciation-of-evidence-of-dying-declaration-explained/)
