# All about sanction and approver

- Link: https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/
- Published: 2023-07-17T10:18:52+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

Contents

 * [Analysis](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#analysis)
 * [Part-I (Revolving around section 197 of the code)](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#parti-revolving-around-section-197-of-the-code)
 * [A study of sanction](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#a-study-of-sanction)
 * [Principles of when sanction necessary](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#principles-of-when-sanction-necessary)
 * [Analysing federal court judgment](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#analysing-federal-court-judgment)
 * [40. The above decision in State of Orissa (supra) was followed (incidentally by the very same author) in K. Kalimuthu vs. State by DSP and Rakesh Kumar Mishra vs. State of Bihar .](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#40-the-above-decision-in-state-of-orissa-supra-was-followed-incidentally-by-the-very-same-author-in-k-kalimuthu-vs-state-by-dsp-and-rakesh-kumar-mishra-vs-state-of-bihar)
 * [Judgment which discussed all previous decisions](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#judgment-which-discussed-all-previous-decisions)
 * [Part-II (Revolving around grant of pardon)](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#partii-revolving-around-grant-of-pardon)
 * [79. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that there was no violation of the procedure prescribed by Section 306(4)(a) of the Code. Thus, we answer the second issue against the appellants.](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#79-in-view-of-the-above-we-are-of-the-considered-view-that-there-was-no-violation-of-the-procedure-prescribed-by-section-3064a-of-the-code-thus-we-answer-the-second-issue-against-the-appellants)
 * [Part-III (Revolving around the merits of the case qua culpability of each of the appellants)](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#partiii-revolving-around-the-merits-of-the-case-qua-culpability-of-each-of-the-appellants)
 * [As regards A-1](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#as-regards-a1)
 * [“………”](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#)
 * [Offence of conspiracy not sustained](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#offence-of-conspiracy-not-sustained)
 * [Conviction for false evidence not correct](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#conviction-for-false-evidence-not-correct)
 * [Section 73 Evidence Act](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#section-73-evidence-act)
 * [Conclusion](https://section1.in/all-about-sanction-and-approver/#conclusion)

**A. SRINIVASULU vs. THE [STATE REP. BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE – CRIMINAL APPEAL](https://section1.in/who-can-prefer-the-appeal-against-acquittal-in-the-case-initially-registered-by-state-police-later-transferred-to-cbi-investigation-is-left-open-to-decide-in-a-suitable-case/)
NO. 2417 OF 2010 – June 15, 2023.**

##### **Analysis**

28. We have carefully considered the rival contentions. For the purpose of easy 
appreciation, we shall divide the discussion and analysis into three parts, the 
first dealing with the contention revolving around Section 197 of the Code, the 
second dealing with the correctness of the procedure adopted while granting pardon
under Section 306 of the Code and the third revolving around the merits of the case
qua culpability of each of the appellants before us.

##### **Part-I (Revolving around section 197 of the code)**

##### **A study of sanction**

29. There is no dispute about the fact that A-1 to A-4, being officers of a company
coming within the description contained in the Twelfth item of Section 21 of the
IPC, were ‘public servants’ within the definition of the said expression under Section
21 of the IPC. A-1 to A-4 were [also public servants](https://section1.in/ponmudi-minister-case-as-per-section-131ep-c-act-1988-the-person-holding-the-properties-on-behalf-of-the-public-servant-should-also-liable-to-explain-the-source/)
within the meaning of the expression under Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act. Therefore,
there is a requirement of previous sanction both under Section 197(1) of the Code
and under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, for prosecuting A-1 to A-4 for the offences
punishable under the IPC and the PC Act.

30. Until the amendment to the PC Act under the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment)
Act, 2018 (Act 16 of 2018), with effect from 26.07.2018, the requirement of a previous
sanction under Section 19(1)(a) was confined only to a person “who is employed”.
On the contrary, Section 197(1) made the requirement of previous sanction necessary,
both in respect of “any person who is” and in respect of “any person who was” employed.
By the amendment under Act 16 of 2018, Section 19(1)(a) of the PC Act was suitably
amended so that previous sanction became necessary even in respect of a person who“
was employed at the time of commission of the offence”.

31. The case on hand arose before the coming into force of the Prevention of Corruption(
Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act 16 of 2018). Therefore, no previous sanction under Section
19(1) of the PC Act was necessary insofar as A-1 was concerned, as he had retired
by the time a [final report was filed](https://section1.in/in-cross-case-or-case-in-counter-the-i-o-has-to-file-both-the-final-reports-before-the-jurisdictional-magistrate/).
He actually retired on 31.08.1997, after 7 months of registration of the FIR (31.01.1997)
and 5 years before the filing of the [final report](https://section1.in/closure-report-and-further-investigation-entire-settled-propositions-explained/)(
16.07.2002) and 6 years before the Special Court took cognizance (04.07.2003). But
previous sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act was required in respect of A-
3 and A-4, as they were in service at the time of the Special Court taking cognizance.
Therefore, the Agency sought sanction, but the Management of BHEL refused to grant
sanction not once but twice, insofar as A-3 and A-4 are concerned.

##### **Principles of when sanction necessary**

34. The argument revolving around the necessity for previous sanction under Section
197(1) of the Code, has to be considered keeping in view the above facts. It is 
true that the refusal to grant sanction for prosecution under the PC Act in respect
of A-3 and A-4 may not have a direct bearing upon the prosecution of A-1. But it
would certainly provide the context in which the culpability of A-1 for the offences
both under the IPC and under the PC Act has to be determined.

35. It is admitted by the respondent-State that no previous sanction under section
197(1) of the Code was sought for prosecuting A-1. The stand of the prosecution 
is that the previous sanction under Section 197(1) may be necessary only when the
offence is allegedly committed “while acting or purporting to act in the discharge
of his official duty”. Almost all judicial precedents on Section 197(1) have turned
on these words. Therefore, we may now take a quick but brief look at some of the
decisions.

##### **Analysing federal court judgment**

36. Dr. Hori Ram Singh vs. The Crown [1939 SCC OnLine FC 2] is a decision of the
Federal Court, cited with approval by this court in several decisions. It arose 
out of the decision of the Lahore High Court against the decision of the Sessions
Court which acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections 409 and 477A IPC
for want of consent of the Governor. Sir S. Varadachariar, with whose opinion Gwyer
C.J., concurred, examined the words, “any act done or purporting to be done in the
execution of his duty” appearing in Section 270(1) of the Government of India Act,
1935, which required the consent of the Governor. The Federal Court observed at 
the outset that this question is substantially one of fact, to be determined with
reference to the act complained of and the attendant circumstances. The Federal 
Court then referred by way of analogy to a number of rulings under Section 197 of
the Code and held as follows:-

> “The reported decisions on the application of sec. 197 of the [Criminal Procedure Code](https://section1.in/bail-ability-of-section-3513-of-the-bharatiya-nyaya-sanhita-2023-do-colonial-era-notifications-survive-the-new-criminal-procedure-code/)
> are not by any means uniform. In most of them, the actual conclusion will probably
> be found to be unexceptionable, in view of the facts of each ease; but, in some,
> the test has been laid down in terms which it is difficult to accept as exhaustive
> or correct. Much the same may be said even of decisions pronounced in England,
> on the language, of similar statutory provisions (see observations in Booth v.
> Clive . It does not seem to me necessary to review in detail the decisions given
> under sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code which may roughly be classified 
> as falling into three groups, so far as they attempted to state something in the
> nature of a test. In one group of cases, it is insisted that there [must be something in the nature of the act complained](https://section1.in/to-prosecute-the-medical-practitioner-complainant-must-show-the-doctor-lack-the-necessary-skill-for-performing-the-operation/)
> of that attaches it to the official character of the person doing it: cf. In re
> Sheik Abdul Khadir Saheb ; Kamisetty Raja Rao v. Ramaswamy, AmanatAli v. King-
> emperor, KingEmperor v. Maung Bo Maung and Gurushidayya Shantivirayya Kulkarni
> v. King-Emperor. In another group, more stress has been laid on the circumstance
> that the official character or status of the accused gave him the opportunity 
> to commit the offence. It seems to me that the first is the correct view. In the
> third group of cases, stress is laid almost exclusively on the fact that it was
> at a time when the accused was engaged in his official duty that the alleged offence
> was said to have been committed [see Gangaraju v. Venki , quoting from Mitra’s
> Commentary on the (criminal Procedure Code). The use of the expression “while 
> acting” etc., in sec. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (particularly its introduction
> by way of amendment in 1923) has been held to lend some support to this view. 
> While I do not wish to ignore the significance of the time factor, it does not
> seem to me right to make it the test. To take an illustration suggested in the
> course of the argument, if a medical officer, while on duty in the hospital, is
> alleged to have committed rape on one of the patients or to have stolen a jewel
> from the patient’s person, it is difficult to believe that it was the intention
> of the Legislature that he could not be prosecuted for such offences except with
> the previous sanction of the Local Government”

37. It is seen from the portion of the decision extracted above that the Federal
Court categorised in Dr. Hori Ram Singh (supra), the decisions given under Section
197 of the Code into three groups namely (i) cases where it was held that there 
must be something in the nature of the act complained of that attaches it to the
official character of the person doing it; (ii) cases where more stress has been
laid on the circumstance that the official character or status of the accused gave
him the opportunity to commit the offence; and (iii) cases where stress is laid 
almost exclusively on the fact that it was at a time when the accused was engaged
in his official duty that the alleged offence was said to have been committed. While
preferring the test laid down in the first category of cases, the Federal Court 
rejected the test given in the third category of cases by providing the illustration
of a medical officer committing rape on one of his patients or committing theft 
of a jewel from the patient’s person.

38. In Matajog Dobey vs. H.C. Bhari [(1955) 2 SCR 925] a Constitution Bench of this
[Court was concerned](https://section1.in/section-451-cr-p-c-petition-for-disposal-return-of-property-cannot-be-filed-directly-by-invoking-article-226-without-invoking-section-451-cr-p-c-before-the-concerned-court/)
with the interpretation to be given to the words, “any offence alleged to have been
committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
duty” in Section 197 of the Code. After referring to the decision in Dr. Hori Ram
Singh, the [Constitution Bench](https://section1.in/constitution-bench-on-p-c-act-question-of-law-on-absence-of-evidence-of-complainant-direct-or-primary-evidence/)
summed up the result of the discussion, in paragraph 19 by holding: “There must 
be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty; the
act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable,
but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance
of his duty.”

39. In State of Orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh vs. Ganesh Chandra Jew [(2004)
8 SCC 40], a two Member Bench of this Court explained that the protection under 
Section 197 has certain limits and that it is available only when the alleged act
is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely
a cloak for doing the objectionable act. The Court also explained that if in doing
his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection
between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be
a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant of the protection.

##### 40. The above decision in State of Orissa (supra) was followed (incidentally by the very same author) in K. Kalimuthu vs. State by DSP [(2005) 4 SCC 512] and Rakesh Kumar Mishra vs. State of Bihar [(2006) 1 SCC 55].

##### **Judgment which discussed all previous decisions**

41. In Devinder Singh vs. State of Punjab through CBI [(2016) 12 SCC 87 28], this
Court took note of almost all the decisions on the point and summarized the principles
emerging therefrom, in paragraph 39 as follows:

> “39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions are summarised hereunder:
> 39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an honest and sincere officer 
> to perform his duty honestly and to the best of his ability to further public 
> duty. However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit crime.
> 39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have been committed by public servant
> in discharging his duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so far 
> its official nature is concerned. Public servant is not entitled to indulge in
> criminal activities. To that extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly
> and in a restricted manner.
> 39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has exceeded in his duty, if
> there is reasonable connection it will not deprive him of protection under Section
> 197 CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine whether there is reasonable
> nexus between the act done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down such
> rule.
> 39.4. In [case the assault made](https://section1.in/whether-i-o-has-to-file-final-report-even-after-comes-to-the-opinion-that-there-is-no-case-made-out/)
> is intrinsically connected with or related to performance of official duties, 
> sanction would be necessary under Section 197 CrPC, but such relation to duty 
> should not be pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be directly and reasonably
> connected with official duty to require sanction. It is no part of official duty
> to commit offence. In case offence was incomplete without proving, the official
> act, ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply. ….”

42. In D. Devaraja vs. Owais Sabeer Hussain [(2020) 7 SCC 69], this Court explained
that sanction is required not only for acts done in the discharge of official duty
but also required for any act purported to be done in the discharge of official 
duty and/or act done under colour of or in excess of such duty or authority. This
Court also held that to decide [whether sanction is necessary](https://section1.in/whether-sanction-is-necessary-at-the-stage-of-direction-under-section-1563-cr-p-c-case-referred-to-larger-bench/),
the test is whether the act is totally unconnected with official duty or whether
there is a reasonable connection with the official duty.

49. On the basis of the above observation, it was contended by the learned counsel
for the respondent that any act done by a public servant, which constitutes an offence
of cheating, cannot be taken to have been committed while acting or purporting to
act in the discharge of official duty.

50. But the above contention in our opinion is far-fetched. The observations contained
in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) are too general in
nature and cannot be regarded as the ratio flowing out of the said case. If by their
very nature, the offences under sections 420, 468, 471 and 120-B cannot be regarded
as having been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of official duty, the same logic would apply with much more vigour
in the case of offences under the PC Act. Section 197 of the Code does not carve
out any group of offences that will fall outside its purview. Therefore, the observations
contained in para 50 of the decision in Parkash Singh Badal cannot be taken as carving
out an exception judicially, to a statutory prescription. In fact, Parkash Singh
Badal cites with approval the other decisions (authored by the very same learned
Judge) where this Court made a distinction between an act, though in excess of the
duty, was reasonably connected with the discharge of official duty and an act which
was merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. Interestingly, the proposition
laid down in Rakesh Kumar Mishra (supra) was distinguished in paragraph 49 of the
decision in Parkash Singh Badal, before the Court made the observations in paragraph
50 extracted above.

51. No public servant is appointed with a mandate or authority to commit an offence.
Therefore, if the observations contained in paragraph 50 of the decision in Parkash
Singh Badal are applied, any act which constitutes an offence under any [statute](https://section1.in/officers-investigating-the-offence-are-duty-bound-to-be-vigilant-before-invoking-any-provision-of-a-very-stringent-statute-like-the-sc-st-act/)
will go out of the purview of an act in the discharge of official duty. The requirement
of a previous sanction will thus be rendered redundant by such an interpretation.

52. It must be remembered that in this particular case, the FIR actually implicated
only four persons, namely PW-16, A-3, A-4 an A-5. A-1 was not implicated in the 
FIR. It was only after a confession statement was made by PW-16 in the year 1998
that A-1 was roped in. The allegations against A-1 were that he got into a criminal
conspiracy with the others to commit these offences. But the Management of BHEL 
refused to grant sanction for prosecuting A-3 and A-4, twice, on the ground that
the decisions taken were in the realm of commercial wisdom of the Company. If according
to the Management of the Company, the very same act of the co-conspirators fell 
in the realm of commercial wisdom, it is inconceivable that the act of A-1, as part
of the criminal conspiracy, fell outside the discharge of his public duty, so as
to disentitle him for protection under Section 197(1) of the Code. 53. In view of
the above, we uphold the contention advanced on behalf of A-1 that the prosecution
ought to have taken previous sanction in terms of Section 197(1) of the Code, for
prosecuting A-1, for the offences under the IPC.

##### **Part-II (Revolving around grant of pardon)**

54. As we have indicated elsewhere, the FIR was filed on 31.01.1997 against 4 persons
namely K. Bhaskar Rao (the person who turned Approver later) and A-3 to A-5. K. 
Bhaskar Rao, who later turned approver, was arrested in August, 1998 and released
on bail by the respondents themselves. After his release, the said K. Bhaskar Rao
gave a confession statement under Section 164 of the Code before the XVIII Metropolitan
Magistrate, Chennai on 16.11.1998. On the basis of the statement so given by K. 
Bhaskar Rao, prosecution filed a petition in Criminal M.P No. 562 of 2000 before
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai under Section 306 of the Code for the grant
of pardon. On the said petition so filed on 22.06.2000, the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Madurai (to whom it was made over) summoned K. Bhaskar Rao to appear
before him on 17.07.2000. After broadly informing K. Bhaskar Rao of the consequences
of his action, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate adjourned the matter to 
18.07.2000. On 18.07.2000, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate read out the
contents of his confession statement and asked Bhaskar Rao whether it was voluntarily
given by him after knowing the consequences. Once K. Bhaskar Rao answered the questions
in the affirmative, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order on 
18.07.2000 granting pardon to K. Bhaskar Rao under Section 306 of the Code. Thereafter,
the respondents filed a [final report](https://section1.in/closure-report-and-further-investigation-entire-settled-propositions-explained/)
on 16.07.2002 directly before the Special Judge for CBI cases, Chennai, without 
the case being committed by the Magistrate. Since the aforesaid K. Bhaskar Rao had
[already been granted](https://section1.in/difference-between-cancellation-of-bail-and-appeal-against-the-bail-already-granted/)
pardon by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, the prosecution examined him
as PW-16 before the Special Court for CBI cases and marked (i) the statement of 
K. Bhaskar Rao under Section 164 of the Code as Exhibit P- 44; (ii) the copy of 
the [petition filed](https://section1.in/protest-petition-cannot-be-filed-against-the-order-of-the-magistrate-taking-cognizance/)
under Section 306 of the Code dated 22.06.2000 as Exhibit P-51; and (iii) the proceedings
dated 17.07.2000 and 18.07.2000 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai,
relating to the tender of pardon, as Exhibit P-52.

58. We have carefully considered the above submissions.

59. Before we proceed with our analysis, it is necessary to bring on [record Sections](https://section1.in/reason-is-necessary-while-recording-direction-to-pay-the-interim-compensation-u-s143a1-n-i-act/)
306 and 307 of the Code and Section 5 of the PC Act.
 “……………………..”

61. A careful look at the anatomy of Section 306 of the Code shows that it provides
a plethora of steps either in the alternative or in addition. They are as follows:-

> (i) Section 306(1) divides a [criminal case](https://section1.in/burden-of-proof-public-prosecutor-while-explaining-the-principles-of-106-iea-in-criminal-cases-honble-supreme-court-has-addressed-the-government-to-appoint-skilled-lawyers-as-public-prosec/)
> into three stages, namely, (i) investigation; (ii) inquiry; and (iii) trial of
> the offence.
> (ii) A Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate is empowered to 
> grant pardon to any person, at any of the three stages, namely the stage of investigation,
> the stage of inquiry or the stage of trial. In contrast, the Magistrate of the
> first class can grant pardon only in two stages, namely the stage of inquiring
> into or the stage of trying the offence.
> (iii) Sub-section (2) of Section 306 makes the provisions of Section 306 applicable
> to any offence triable exclusively by a Court of Session or a Court of Special
> Judge appointed under the [Criminal Law](https://section1.in/basics-of-criminal-law-part-3-criminal-jurisprudence/)
> Amendment Act, 1952 and to any offence punishable with imprisonment which may 
> extend to seven years or more.
> (iv) Sub-section (3) of Section 306 obliges the Magistrate tendering pardon, not
> only to record reasons for doing so but also to state whether the tender was accepted
> by the person to whom it was made;
> (v) Sub-section (4) of [Section 306 makes it mandatory that every person](https://section1.in/when-every-insult-or-intimidation-for-humiliation-to-a-person-would-not-amount-to-an-offence-under-section-31x-of-the-sc-st-act-supreme-court-explains/)
> accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) shall be examined as a
> witness both in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance and in the subsequent
> trial. Sub-section (4) also imposes an additional condition that the person accepting
> a tender of pardon shall be detained in custody till the termination of the trial,
> except when he is already on bail.
> (vi) A careful look at clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) shows that the procedure
> prescribed therein is applicable only to cases covered by sub-section (1).
> (vii) Sub-section (5) prescribes that once a person has accepted a tender of pardon
> under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4) then the Magistrate
> taking cognizance should commit the case for [trial either to the Court](https://section1.in/reversal-of-acquittal-appellate-court-cannot-reverse-the-acquittal-on-fresh-appreciation-of-evidence-and-without-recording-any-illegality-error-of-law-or-of-fact-in-the-trial-court-judgment/)
> of Session or to the Court of Special Judge. In cases not covered by clause (a)
> of sub-section (5), the Magistrate taking cognizance should make over the case
> to the Chief Judicial Magistrate in terms of clause (b).

62. Section 307 of the Code empowers the Court to which the commitment is made, 
to tender pardon. The power can be exercised at any time after the commitment of
the case but before judgment is passed.

63. Coming to Section 5 of the PC Act, it is seen that sub-section (1) empowers 
the Special Judge to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed
to him for trial. It also says that while trying the accused persons, the Special
Judge is obliged to [follow the procedure](https://section1.in/court-cannot-convert-complaint-into-a-1563-cr-p-c-petition-without-following-procedures/)
prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases by the Magistrates. This is
why this court held in Bangaru Laxman (in para 40 of the report) that the [Special Judge under the PC Act](https://section1.in/p-c-act-special-judge-discharge-shall-be-u-s-227-cr-p-c-and-not-u-s-239-cr-p-c/),
while trying offences, has a dual power of the Sessions Judge as well as that of
the Magistrate and that such a Special Judge conducts the proceedings both prior
to the filing of the charge sheet and for holding trial. In fact what was in question
in Bangaru Laxman was whether the pardon tendered by the Special Judge, one day 
before the filing of the charge sheet, was correct or not. This court found the 
same to be in order.

64. Interestingly, sub-section (2) of Section 5 which empowers the Special Judge
to tender a pardon, does not speak about the stage at which a Special Judge may 
tender pardon. This point can be appreciated if we go back once again to Sections
306 and 307 of the Code which lays down the following rules:-

> (i) A Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate is empowered to tender
> pardon at any of the three stages;
> (ii) The Magistrate of first class is empowered to tender pardon at two stage;
> and
> (iii) The Court to which commitment is made (meaning thereby either a Court of
> Session or a Court of Special Judge named in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause(
> a) of sub-section (5) of Section 306) is empowered to tender pardon at only one
> stage namely the trial of the offence. Though the word trial, used in Section 
> 306(1) is not used in Section 307, the words appearing in Section 307, namely “
> at any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed” can only
> indicate the stage of trial, in view of the fact that under sub-section (5) of
> Section 306, [committal takes place after cognizance](https://section1.in/statement-cognizance-committal-evidence-on-handwriting-explained/)
> is taken.

65. In contrast, Section 5(2) of the PC Act does not speak about the stage at which
pardon may be tendered by a Special Judge. This is perhaps in view of the express
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 5 which empowers the Special Judge himself
to take cognizance without the accused being committed to him for trial. But the
second part of sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the PC Act creates a deeming fiction
that the pardon tendered by the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a pardon tendered
under Section 307 of the Code. However, as rightly contended by the learned Senior
Counsel for A-7, this deeming fiction is limited for the purposes of Sub-sections(
1) to (5) of Section 308 of the Code.

66. It appears that before the advent of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
Courts were taking a view that the Magistrates had the power to tender pardon even
after the commitment of the case for [trial to the Court of Session/Special Judge](https://section1.in/guidelines-if-surrender-of-proof-not-provided-then-the-registry-may-call-for-report-from-the-trial-judge/).
This was because of the way in which Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 was worded. A comparison of Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1973 with Section 338 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 will make the position
more clear.

67. The change brought about by the legislature to the procedure prescribed in Sections
306 and 307 of the Code of 1973 was noted by this Court in A. Devendran vs. State
of T.N [(1997) 11 SCC 720]. Incidentally, a question arose in A. Devendran (supra)
as to whether the non-examination of the Approver as a witness after grant of pardon
was a non-compliance of sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306 and whether it would vitiate
the proceedings. Paragraph 10 of the decision in A.Devendran is of importance and
hence it is extracted as follows:-

> “10. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether non-examination
> of the approver as a witness after grant of pardon and thereby non-compliance 
> of subsection 4(a) of Section 306 vitiates the entire proceeding. In the case 
> in hand there is no dispute that after the Chief Judicial Magistrate granted pardon
> to the accused he was not examined immediately after the grant of pardon and was
> only examined once by the learned Sessions Judge in course of trial. The question
> that arises for consideration is: When an accused is [granted pardon after the case is committed to the Court](https://section1.in/court-can-grant-pardon-even-for-other-offences-if-connected-with-the-present-one/)
> of Session would it be necessary to comply with sub-section (4)(a) of Section 
> 306 of the Code. The contention of Mr Mohan, the learned counsel appearing for
> the State, in this connection is that Section 307 [merely](https://section1.in/hit-run-cases-closing-of-final-reports-mere-non-filing-and-closing-of-final-reports-under-section-468-cr-p-c-is-an-acquittal-of-an-offender-by-the-police-themselves-without-reference-to-the-co/)
> mandates that pardon should be tendered on the same condition and such condition
> obviously refers to the condition indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 306,
> namely, on the accused making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances
> within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned,
> whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. According to the learned
> counsel, sub-section (4) of Section 306 is not a condition for tendering pardon
> but is merely a procedure which has to be followed when a person is tendered pardon
> by a [Magistrate](https://section1.in/powers-of-magistrate-u-s-1563-direction/)
> in exercise of power under Section 306. Since after a case committed to the Court
> of Session pardon is tendered by the court to whom the commitment is made, it 
> would not be necessary for such court to comply with sub-section (4)(a) of Section
> 306. Mr Murlidhar, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, on the other
> hand contended, that the object and purpose engrafted in clause (a) of sub-section(
> 4) of Section 306 is to provide a safeguard to the [accused who can cross-examine](https://section1.in/case-diary-section-1723-cr-p-c-the-accused-has-a-right-to-cross-examine-police-officer-as-per-section-145-evidence-act-whenever-the-police-officer-uses-it-to-refresh-his-memory/)
> even at the preliminary stage on knowing the evidence of the approver against 
> him and can impeach the said testimony when the approver is examined in court 
> during trial, if any contradictions or improvements are made by him. This right
> of the accused cannot be denied to him merely because pardon is tendered after
> the proceeding is committed to the Court of Session”.

68. As seen from what is extracted above, the Chief Judicial Magistrate granted 
pardon to the accused in that case but he was not examined immediately after the
grant of pardon and was only examined once before the Sessions Judge in the course
of trial. Therefore, the question that arose was whether it was necessary to comply
with sub-section (4)(a) of Section 306, when an accused is granted pardon after 
the case is committed to the Court of Session. As seen from the argument advanced
before this Court in A. Devendran was that the object of clause (a) of sub-section(
4) of Section 306 is to provide a safeguard to the accused so that he can cross 
examine even at the preliminary stage on knowing the evidence of the approver and
can impeach the said testimony when the approver is examined in Court during trial.

69. For finding an answer to the said question, the Court in A. Devendran, first
made a distinction between a case where tender of pardon was made before the commitment
of the same to the Court of Session and a case where pardon is tendered after commitment.
After making such a distinction, on the basis of whether pardon was tendered before
or after the committal, this Court held in Devendran (para 11) as follows:-

> “11. … A combined reading of sub-section (4) of Section 306 and Section 307 would
> make it clear that in a [case](https://section1.in/even-in-a-case-where-the-final-report-of-the-police-under-section-173-is-accepted-and-the-accused-persons-are-discharged-the-magistrate-has-the-power-to-take-cognizance-of-the-offence-on-a-complaint/)
> exclusively triable by the Sessions Court if an accused is tendered pardon and
> is taken as an approver before commitment then compliance of sub-section (4) of
> Section 306 becomes mandatory and non-compliance of such mandatory requirements
> would vitiate the proceedings but if an accused is tendered pardon after the commitment
> by the Court to which the proceeding is committed in exercise of powers under 
> Section 307 then in such a case the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 306
> are not attracted. …”
>  ….

71. It is interest to see that in Suresh Chandra Bahri [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80], this
court first held that the procedure prescribed in Section 306(4)(a) of the Code 
is mandatory and not directory and that its non-compliance will render the committal
order illegal. After so holding, this court raised a question in the last line of
para 30 extracted above, as to what is the effect of such non-compliance on the 
trial. While answering this question, this court found in Suresh Chandra Bahri, 
that the Court to which the case was committed, noticed this irregularity even at
the threshold and [hence remanded the matter back](https://section1.in/pmla-trial-court-ought-to-have-given-opportunity-to-the-accused-in-complaint-case-before-taking-cognizance-and-hence-cognizance-order-set-aside-case-remanded-back/)
to the Magistrate for recording the evidence of the approver. Thus the defect got
cured before trial and hence this court held in paragraph 31 of the decision that
eventually no prejudice or disadvantage was shown to have been caused to the accused.

72. Thus, there were two distinguishing features in Suresh Chandra Bahri. The first
was that the Chief Judicial Magistrate who tendered pardon in that case committed
the case to the Court of Session for trial (unlike the case on hand) without examining
the approver as a witness in the Court. The second distinguishing feature was that
the [Court to whom the case](https://section1.in/s-c-quashed-g-o-of-tamilnadu-for-anti-land-grabbing-cell-and-adviced-to-enact-appropriate-legislation-for-land-grabbing-cases/)
was committed for trial noticed the defect and hence remanded the case back to the
Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. Therefore, this court applied the prejudice 
test in that case.

73. But more importantly, what was held in Suresh Chandra Bahri to be vitiated, 
was the committal order. Therefore, it was concluded eventually in Suresh Chandra
Bahri that the moment the defect in the committal order is cured before trial, the
trial does not get vitiated.

74. But in cases where a Special Court itself is competent to take cognizance and
also empowered to grant pardon, the procedure under Section 306 of the Code gets
by-passed, as held by this Court in State through CBI vs. V. Arul Kumar [(2016) 
11 SCC 733]. An argument was advanced in Arul Kumar (supra) (as seen from paragraph
20 of the Report) that Section 306 of the Code has no application to cases relating
to offences under the PC Act. In support of the said argument, the decision in P.
C. Mishra vs. State (CBI) [(2014) 14 SCC 629] was also relied upon. While dealing
with the said contention, this Court held in Arul Kumar as follows:-

> “21. Sub-section (1) of Section 5, while empowering a Special Judge to take cognizance
> of offence without the accused being committed to him for trial, only has the 
> effect of waiving the otherwise mandatory requirement of Section 193 of the Code.
> Section 193 of the Code stipulates that the [Court of Session cannot take cognizance of any offence](https://section1.in/supreme-court-explains-procedure-to-compound-the-offence-u-s-324-ipc/)
> as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by
> a Magistrate under the Code. Thus, embargo of Section 193 of the Code has been
> lifted. It, however, nowhere provides that the cognizance cannot be taken by the
> Magistrate at all. There is, thus, an option given to the Special Judge to straightaway
> take cognizance of the offences and not to have the committal route through a 
> Magistrate. However, normal procedure prescribed under Section 190 of the Code
> empowering the Magistrate to take cognizance of such offences, though triable 
> by the Court of Session, is not given a go-by. Both the alternatives are available.
> In those [cases where charge-sheet is filed](https://section1.in/police-officials-cannot-file-case-under-section-188-ipc/)
> before the Magistrate, he will have to commit it to the Special Judge. In this
> situation, the provisions of [Section 306 of the Code would be applicable](https://section1.in/dismissal-of-complaint-and-section-311-cr-p-c-applications-by-magistrate-for-non-appearance-not-proper/)
> and the Magistrate would be empowered to exercise the power under the said provision.
> In contrast, in those cases where Special Judge takes cognizance of offence directly,
> as he is authorised to do so in view of Section 5(2) of the PC Act, 1988, Section
> 306 of the Code would get bypassed and as the Special Judge has taken cognizance,
> it is Section 307 of the Code which would become applicable. Sub-section (2) of
> Section 5 of the PC Act, 1988 makes this position clear by prescribing that it
> is the [Special Judge who would exercise his powers](https://section1.in/whether-power-of-attorney-can-delegate-his-powers-to-special-power-of-attorney-s-c-says-yes/)
> to tender of pardon as can clearly be spelled out by the language employed in 
> that provision. Section 5(2) is to be read in conjunction with Section 5(1) of
> the PC Act, 1988. The aforesaid legal position would also answer the argument 
> of the learned counsel for the respondent based on the judgment of this Court 
> in A. Devendran [A. Devendran v. State of T.N., (1997) 11 SCC 720=1998 SCC (Cri)
> 220] . In that case, this Court held that once the proceedings are committed to
> the Court of Session, it is that court only to which commitment is made which 
> can grant pardon to the approver. The view taken by us is, rather, in tune with
> the said judgment.”

75. In other words, this Court recognised in Arul Kumar two types of cases, namely(
i) those which come through the committal route; and (ii) those where cognizance
is taken directly by the Special Judge under Section 5(1) of the PC Act. In the 
second category of cases, the Court held that Section 306 of the Code would get 
by-passed.

76. Therefore, it is clear that when the Special Court chooses to take cognizance,
the question of the approver being examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate
as required by Section 306 (4)(a) does not arise. Shri Padmesh Mishra, learned counsel
for the respondent is therefore right in relying upon the decisions of this [Court in Sardar Iqbal Singh vs. State](https://section1.in/supreme-court-clarified-the-celebrated-uma-devi-judgment-state-of-karnataka-vs-umadevi-2006-4-scc-1-hereinafter-umadevi-judgment/)(
Delhi Administration) [(1977) 4 SCC 536] and Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of
Maharashtra [(2013) 13 SCC 1].

77. In Sardar Iqbal Singh (supra) the offence was triable by the Special Judge who
also took cognizance. Therefore, there were no committal proceedings. Though Sardar
Iqbal Singh arose under the 1898 Code, sub-section (2) of Section 337 of the 1898
Code was in pari materia with Section 306(4)(a) of the 1973 Code. Therefore, the
ratio laid down in Sardar Iqbal Singh was rightly applied in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon(
supra) for coming to the conclusion that where a Special Judge takes cognizance 
of the case, the occasion for examining the approver as a witness arises only once.

78. In any case, all decisions cited so far, uniformly say that the object of examining
an approver twice, is to ensure that the accused is made aware of the evidence against
him even at the preliminary stage, so as to enable him to effectively cross examine
the approver during trial, bring out contradictions and show him to be untrustworthy.
The said object stands fulfilled in this case, since the confession statement of
the approver before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate was enclosed to the Charge
Sheet. The approver was examined as PW-16 during trial and he was cross examined
on the contents of the confession statement. The Magistrate who [recorded the confession](https://section1.in/confession-recorded-in-the-language-unknown-to-the-accused-not-improper-if-properly-took-down/)
was examined as PW 17 and the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate who granted pardon
was examined as PW-18. The proceedings before the XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate,
the petition under section 306 of the Code and the proceedings on tender of pardon
were marked respectively as EXX. P-50, 51 and 52. All the accused were given opportunity
to cross examine these witnesses both on the procedure and on the contents.

##### 79. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that there was no violation of the procedure prescribed by Section 306(4)(a) of the Code. Thus, we answer the second issue against the appellants.

##### **Part-III (Revolving around the merits of the case qua culpability of each of the appellants)**

##### **As regards A-1**

80. Though we have found in Part-I of this judgment that the failure of the prosecution
to take previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code has vitiated the proceedings
against A-1, we would nevertheless deal with his case on merits to see if the offences
under the IPC or under the PC Act stood proved beyond reasonable doubt.

83. As rightly contended by Shri Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel, this Court
has laid down two tests in Sarwan Singh vs. State of Punjab [1957 SCR 953], to be
satisfied before accepting the evidence of an approver. The first is that the approver
is a reliable witness and the second is that his [statement should be corroborated with sufficient evidence](https://section1.in/section-27-iea-mere-exhibiting-the-disclosure-statement-to-the-io-is-not-sufficient-but-the-io-must-give-description-about-the-conversation-while-recording-disclosure-statements-in-evidence/).
Again, in Ravinder Singh vs. State of Haryana [(1975) 3 SCC 742] this Court pointed
out that, “an approver is a most unworthy friend” and that he having bargained for
his immunity, [must prove](https://section1.in/alibi-accused-must-prove-the-alibi-after-getting-answer-from-the-witness-that-the-accused-was-not-in-police-station/)
his worthiness for credibility in court. The test to be fulfilled was pithily put
in paragraph 12 of the Report by this Court as follows:-

> “12. … This test is fulfilled, firstly, if the story he relates involves him in
> the crime and appears intrinsically to be a natural and probable catalogue of 
> events that had taken place. The story if given of minute details according with
> reality is likely to save it from being rejected brevi manu. Secondly, once that
> hurdle is crossed, the story given by an approver so far as the accused on trial
> is concerned, must implicate him in such a manner as to give rise to a conclusion
> of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a rare case taking into consideration all
> the factors, circumstances and situations governing a particular case, conviction
> based on the uncorroborated evidence of an approver confidently held to be true
> and reliable by the Court may be permissible. Ordinarily, however, an approver’s
> statement has to be corroborated in material particulars bridging closely the 
> distance between the crime and the criminal. Certain clinching features of involvement
> disclosed by an approver appertaining directly to an accused, if reliable, by 
> the touchstone of other independent credible evidence, would give the needed assurance
> for acceptance of his testimony on which a conviction may be based.”

84. [Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act](https://section1.in/in-npds-cases-confession-is-hit-under-section-25-indian-evidence-act/),
1872 declares an accomplice to be a competent witness and that a conviction is not
illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.
However, while considering the import of Section 133. This Court held in M.O. Shamsudhin
vs. State of Kerala [(1995) 3 SCC 351] that the court is bound to take note of a
precautionary provision contained in Illustration (b) to [Section 114 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/fact-discovered-and-recovery-mahazar-witnesses/),
which provides that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated
in material particulars.

85. Keeping the above principles in mind, if we turn our attention to the evidence
of PW-16, it will be seen that he was trying to shift the burden on A-1, to save
his own skin. The following admissions made by him during the cross-examination 
showed that he was unworthy of credit:-

##### “………”

##### **Offence of conspiracy not sustained**

103. In fact, the only person found by both the Courts to be guilty of the offence
under [Section 120B](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-conspiracy-by-only-one-accused/)
was A-1. Therefore, an argument was advanced that a single person cannot be held
guilty of criminal conspiracy. But this contention was repelled by the Courts on
the ground that PW-16 was the second person with whom A-1 had entered into a conspiracy.
In other words, the reasoning adopted by the [Trial Court](https://section1.in/trial-court-shall-not-insist-the-defence-counsel-to-put-particular-question-in-particular-manner/)
and the High Court was that only A-1 and PW-16 were part of the conspiracy. Such
a reasoning was a huge climbdown from the original charge that A- 1 to A-7 entered
into a criminal conspiracy, to cause wrongful loss to BHEL and to confer a wrongful
gain to A-5 to A-7. Once an offence of Section 120B is not made out against A-5 
to A-7, the very foundation for the prosecution becomes shaky. Therefore, we are
of the view that the conviction of A-1 for the offences under Section 120B read 
with Sections 420, 468, Section 471 read with Section 468 and Section 193 IPC and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act cannot be sustained.

##### **Conviction for false evidence not correct**

104. We are surprised that A-1 was found guilty of an offence under Section 193.
Section 193 applies only to false evidence given in any stage of a judicial proceeding
or the fabrication of false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage 
of a judicial proceeding. The allegation against A-1 was not even remotely linked
to any of the Explanations under Section 193 of the IPC. Therefore, the judgment
of the Trial Court and that of the High Court convicting A-1 for the aforesaid offences
and [sentencing him to imprisonment of varying terms and fines](https://section1.in/sentencing-fine-forcing-the-accused-to-pay-duplicate-fines-for-the-same-sentence-would-be-amount-to-double-punishment/)
of different amounts are liable to be reversed.

##### **Section 73 Evidence Act**

130. The High Court fortunately realised the pitfall in the reasoning of the Trial
Court. But in an over-anxiety to somehow convict A-7, the High Court adopted a very
peculiar route, namely that of undertaking the task of comparing the admitted signatures/
handwritings with the disputed ones under [Section 73 of the Evidence Act](https://section1.in/fact-discovered-and-recovery-mahazar-witnesses/).

131. For invoking Section 73, there must first have been some signature or writing
admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court, to have been written or made
by that person. The Section empowers the [Court also to direct](https://section1.in/suo-moto-guidelines-common-practice-and-procedure-in-criminal-trials-all-over-india/)
any person present in Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling
the Court to compare the words or figures.
 132. There was no signature or writing
available before the High Court, which had been admitted or proved to the satisfaction
of the Court to have been written or made. The High [Court did not also direct](https://section1.in/madras-high-court-directed-vigilance-to-inquire-about-a-senior-counsel-receiving-rs-50-lakh-as-fees-to-give-judge-to-get-order/)
A-7 to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling a comparison. Without
following the procedure so prescribed in Section 73, the High Court invented a novel
procedure, to uphold the conviction handed over by the [Trial Court](https://section1.in/framing-of-charge-discharging-s-302-ipc-and-framed-charge-u-s-304-ii-ipc-invalid/)
through a wrong reasoning.

135. Even in the questioning under Section 313 of the Code, no specific question
was put to A-7 whether Exhibits P-66, P-76, P-90, P-92 and P- 75 were in his handwritings
and whether they contained his signatures. Therefore, what was contained in Exhibit
P-75 was not even admitted signatures.

136. In the absence of either admission or [proof](https://section1.in/prosecution-not-proved-the-murder-case-beyond-reasonable-doubt/)
of the admitted signatures, the High Court could not have resorted to Section 73
of the Evidence Act.

##### **Conclusion**

139. In the light of the above discussion, all the appeals are allowed and the judgment
of the [Special Court](https://section1.in/pmla-cognizance-under-pmla-special-court-can-take-cognizance-only-by-way-of-complaint-filed-by-the-authority-authorized-on-this-behalf/)
for CBI cases convicting the appellants for various offences and the judgment of
the High Court confirming the same are set aside. The appellants are acquitted of
all the charges. The bail bonds, if any, furnished by them shall stand discharged.

[Accused Acquitted](https://section1.in/juvenile-justice-act-2015-though-offences-pocso-and-murder-have-been-proved-accused-acquitted-based-on-procedural-illegalities/).

**[https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2010/31937/31937_2010_7_1502_44711_Order_15-Jun-2023.pdf](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2010/31937/31937_2010_7_1502_44711_Order_15-Jun-2023.pdf)**

**[A.Srinivasulu-vs.-The-State-approver](http://localhost:8080/section1/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/A.Srinivasulu-vs.-The-State-approver-1.pdf)**

### Further Study

 No Related Posts Found.
