# Murder case: Appreciation of evidence – Circumstantial evidence & recovery under section 27 Indian Evidence Act

- Link: https://section1.in/appreciation-of-evidence-circumstantial-evidence-recovery-u-s-27-iea/
- Published: 2023-01-23T10:01:06+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

**APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE – CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE – MUST BE AND NOT MAY BE:**

10. It can thus clearly be seen that it is necessary for the prosecution that the
circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully
established. The court holds that it is a primary principle that the accused ‘must
be’ and not merely ‘may be’ guilty before a court can convict the accused. It has
been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘
may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’. It has been held that the facts
so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is 
to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty. It has further been held that the circumstances should be such that they
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. It has been held 
that there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must 
show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused.

**LAST SEEN THEORY – TIME GAP IMPORTANCE – EXPLAINED:**

16. Insofar as last seen theory is concerned, it will be relevant to refer to the
following observations of this Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Satish ((2005)
3 SCC 114):

“22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of
time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased
is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused 
being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some 
cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when
there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In
the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the 
deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion 
of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased
and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the 
evidence of PW 2.”

17. It could thus clearly be seen that the last seen theory comes into play where
the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last
seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any
person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. 
If the gap between the time of last seen and the deceased found dead is long, then
the possibility of other person coming in between cannot be ruled out.

**RECOVERY – WHAT IS & HOW TO APPRECIATION OF? – EXPLAINED:**

20. As early as 1946, the Privy Council had considered the provisions of Section
27 of the Evidence Act in the case of **Pulukuri Kotayya and Others v. King Emperor(
1946 SCC OnLine PC 47)**. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations
of the Privy Council in the said case:

“The second question, which involves the construction of s. 27 of the Indian Evidence
Act, will now be considered. That section and the two preceding sections, with which
it must be read, are in these terms. [His Lordship read ss. 25, 26 and 27 of the
Evidence Act and continued:] Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides
an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain
statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary
to bring the section into operation is that the discovery of a fact in consequence
of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a
police officer must be deposed to, and there upon so much of the information as 
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems
to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of 
information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true,
and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent
of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered
to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is brought
into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment
some object, such as a dead body, a weapon or ornaments, said to be connected with
the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw for the Crown, has argued
that in such a case the“fact discovered” is the physical object produced, and that
any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. On this view
information given by a person that the body produced is that of a person murdered
by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder,
or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity, would all be admissible.
If this be the effect of s. 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed
by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in
police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the legislature 
that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise
of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion 
in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it
seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove 
equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal
principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to s. 26, added
by s. 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships’
view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent
to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object
is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given
must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history,
of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it
is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce 
a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife;
knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the 
knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered
is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with which I stabbed
A.”, these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the
knife in the house of the informant.”

[Emphasis supplied].

21. It could thus be seen that Section 27 of the Evidence Act requires that the 
fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge
of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to the
said

fact. The information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced
is not related to its discovery. The said view has been consistently followed by
this Court in a catena of cases.

22. This Court, in the case of Chandran v. The State of Tamil Nadu ((1978) 4 SCC
90), had an occasion to consider the evidence of recovery of incriminating articles
in the absence of record of the statement of accused No. 1. In the said case also,
no statement of accused No. 1 was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act 
leading to the recovery of jewels. The Court found that the Sessions Judge as well
as the High Court had erred in holding that the jewels were recovered at the instance
of accused No. 1 therein in pursuance to the confessional statement (Ex. P27) recorded
before PW34 therein. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations 
of this Court in the said case:

“36. ……Thus the fact remains that no confessional statement of A1 causing the recovery
of these jewels was proved under Section 27, Evidence Act…”

23. It is thus clear that this Court refused to rely on the recovery of jewels since
no confessional statement of the accused was proved under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act.

24. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court
in the case of State of Karnataka v. David Rozario and Another ((2002) 7 SCC 728):

“5. ……This information which is otherwise admissible becomes inadmissible under 
Section 27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a police
officer or did come from a person not in the custody of a police officer. The statement
which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which is the information leading
to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being the information, the same has to be
proved and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words, the
exact information given by the accused while in custody which led to recovery of
the articles has to be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both
the accused and the prosecution that information given should be recorded and proved
and if not so recorded, the exact information must be adduced through evidence. 
The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation
by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact 
is discovered as a search made on the strength of any information obtained from 
a prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the information supplied by the
prisoner is true. The information might be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature
but if it results in discovery of a fact, it becomes a reliable information. It 
is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact envisaged
in the section. Decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor [AIR
1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA 65] is the most quoted authority for supporting
the interpretation that the “fact discovered” envisaged in the section embraces 
the place from which the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as to
it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect. (See State 
of Maharashtra v. Damu [(2000) 6 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1088 : 2000 Cri LJ 2301]…”

[Emphasis supplied].

25. A three Judges Bench of this Court recently in the case of Subramanya v. State
of Karnataka **(2022 SCC Online SC 1400)**, has observed thus:

“82. Keeping in mind the aforesaid evidence, we proceed to consider whether the 
prosecution has been able to prove and establish the discoveries in accordance with
law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads thus:

“27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.—

Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information
received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer,
so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

83. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution
witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been
made by the appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

84. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the accused appellant while 
in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that he would lead
to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence, the site of burial of the
dead body, clothes etc., then the first thing that the investigating officer should
have done was to call for two independent witnesses at the police station itself.
Once the two independent witnesses would arrive at the police station thereafter
in their presence the accused should be asked to make an appropriate statement as
he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he is said to have hidden
the weapon of offence etc. When the accused while in custody makes such statement
before the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or rather
the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the first part 
of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with law.
This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act
is always drawn at the police station in the presence of the independent witnesses
so as to lend credence that a particular statement was made by the accused expressing
his willingness on his own free will and volition to point out the place where the
weapon of offence or any other article used in the commission of the offence had
been hidden. Once the first part of the panch nama is completed thereafter the police
party along with the accused and the two independent witnesses (panch witnesses)
would proceed to the particular place as may be led by the accused. If from that
particular place anything like the weapon of offence or blood-stained clothes or
any other article is discovered then that part of the entire process would form 
the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects the investigating 
officer to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the 
Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence of the investigating officer then
it is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects of 
the matter.”

26. This Court has elaborately considered as to how the law expects the IO to draw
the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In
the present case, leave aside the recovery panchnama being in accordance with the
aforesaid requirement, there is no statement of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein)
recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. We are, therefore, of the considered
view that the prosecution has failed to prove the circumstance that the dead body
of the deceased was recovered at the instance of Boby (accused No. 3/appellant herein).

**Party:** Boby vs State of Kerala – Crl. Apl No: 1439 Of 2009 – January 12, 2023.

Source: [Download](https://demonew.section1.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/10895_2009_8_102_40920_Judgement_12-Jan-2023.pdf)

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