# Section 299 IPC: Culpable homicide explained

- Link: https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/
- Published: 2023-07-23T13:07:05+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

Contents

 * [Appeal](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#appeal)
 * [Conclusions of trial and high court](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#conclusions-of-trial-and-high-court)
 * [Analysis](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#analysis)
 * [Question of law](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#question-of-law)
 * [Intent and knowledge](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#intent-and-knowledge)
 * [Sections 299 and 300 IPC](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#sections-299-and-300-ipc)
 * [Jagrup singh’s case](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#jagrup-singh8217s-case)
 * [60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid  discussion may be summed up thus:](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#60-few-important-principles-of-law-discernible-from-the-aforesaid%c2%a0-discussion-may-be-summed-up-thus)
 * [Party](https://section1.in/culpable-homicide-explained/#party)

##### Appeal

2. This appeal is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed against the
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 04.04.2019
in Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 2019 by which the High Court dismissed the appeal 
filed by the appellant herein thereby affirming the judgment and order of conviction
and sentence passed by the 1 Additional Sessions Judge, Namakkal in Sessions Case
No. 41 of 2017.

3. It appears from the materials on record that the appellant herein and his father
were put on trial in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Namakkal in Sessions
Case No. 41 of 2017 for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’). The **[Trial Court](http://localhost:8080/section1/suo-moto-guidelines-common-practice-and-procedure-in-criminal-trials-all-over-india/)**
held the appellant herein guilty for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in
default of payment of the amount of fine, further rigorous imprisonment of one year.
The co-accused i.e. father of the appellant herein came to be acquitted by the Trial
Court.

4. The appellant herein being dissatisfied with the judgment and order of conviction
and sentence passed by the Trial Court went in appeal before the High Court. The
High Court dismissed the appeal affirming the conviction of the appellant herein
for the **[offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC](http://localhost:8080/section1/custody-death-or-station-death-if-the-death-takes-place-inside-the-police-station-the-accused-persons-should-be-punished-for-the-offence-under-section-302-ipc/)**.

5. At the outset, Mr. S. Nagamuthu, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant herein, submitted that he is not pressing this appeal on merits. He submitted
that his only endeavour is to persuade this Court to alter the conviction of the
appellant from the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the [IPC](http://localhost:8080/section1/life-sentence-reduced-no-separate-sentence-for-pocso-is-imposed-while-maintaining-conviction-under-section-376-ab-ipc/)
to Section 304 Part II of the IPC and reduce the sentence accordingly.

##### **Conclusions of trial and high court**

12. The Trial Court, upon [**appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on recor**d](http://localhost:8080/section1/dying-declaration-witness-who-recorded-the-dying-declaration-must-state-in-his-chief-examination-that-the-doctor-examined-the-deceased-before-giving-fitness-certificate/)
and more particularly having regard to the genesis of the occurrence; the manner
of assault and the nature of the weapon, took the view that the case was not one
of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC but could be said one of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC 
and accordingly sentenced the appellant herein.

13. The High Court also came to the conclusion that the Trial Court was right in
holding the appellant herein guilty of the offence punishable under Section 304 
Part I of the IPC. 14. In such circumstances referred to above, the **[appellant is here before this Court](http://localhost:8080/section1/reversal-of-acquittal-appellate-court-cannot-reverse-the-acquittal-on-fresh-appreciation-of-evidence-and-without-recording-any-illegality-error-of-law-or-of-fact-in-the-trial-court-judgment/)**
with the present appeal.

##### **Analysis**

##### **Question of law**

17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through
the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether
the conviction of the appellant herein for the **[offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC](http://localhost:8080/section1/section-306-ipc-informant-has-no-right-to-withdraw-complaint-of-a-non-compoundable-offence/)**
should be further altered to Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

19. As the only argument canvassed before us is that the case does not [travel beyond](http://localhost:8080/section1/even-in-bail-matters-high-courts-can-travel-beyond-the-scope-and-pass-appropriate-orders-under-articles-226-and-227/)
culpable homicide as the same falls within the third part of Section 299 of the 
IPC, the accused could only be said to have knowledge that he is likely by his act
to cause death and not the intention to kill the deceased, we must explain the fine
distinction between the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’.

##### **Intent and knowledge**

20. The word “intent” is derived from the word archery or aim. The “act” attempted
to must be with “intention” of killing a man.

21. Intention, which is a state of mind, can never be precisely proved by direct
evidence as a fact; it can only be deduced or inferred from other facts which are
proved. The intention may be proved by res gestae, by acts or events previous or
subsequent to the incident or occurrence, on admission. Intention of a person cannot
be proved by direct evidence but is to be deduced from the facts and circumstances
of a case. There are various relevant circumstances from which the intention can
be gathered. Some relevant considerations are the following:-

> 1. The nature of the weapon used.
> 2. The place where the injuries were inflicted.
> 3. The nature of the injuries caused.
> 4. The opportunity available which the accused gets.

22. In the case of Smt. Mathri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 986, at page 990,
Das Gupta J. has explained the concept of the word ‘intent’. The relevant observations
are made by referring to the observations made by Batty J. in the decision Bhagwant
v. Kedari, I.L.R. 25 Bombay 202. They are as under:-

> “The word “intent” by its etymology, seems to have metaphorical allusion to archery,
> and implies “aim” and thus connotes not a casual or merely possible result-foreseen
> perhaps as a not improbable incident, but not desired-but rather connotes the 
> one object for which the effort is made-and thus has reference to what has been
> called the dominant motive, without which, the action would not have been taken.”(
> Emphasis supplied).

23. In the case of Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488, at page 490, the following
observations have been made by Chadrasekhara Aiyar J.:-

> “6. … Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge.
> Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is 
> an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many **[cases intention and knowledge merge](http://localhost:8080/section1/if-two-separate-cases-merges-on-the-same-period-of-time-then-the-set-off-can-be-granted/)**
> into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed
> from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt
> thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even
> in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this had
> led to a certain amount of confusion.” (Emphasis supplied).

24. In para 9 of the judgment, at page 490, the observations made by Coleridge J.
in Reg. v. Monkhouse, (1849) 4 COX CC 55(C), have been referred to. They can be 
referred to, with advantage at this stage, as they are very illuminating:-

> “The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has
> been committed, because you cannot look into a man’s mind to see what was passing
> there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does
> or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision.
> It is a general rule in **[criminal law](http://localhost:8080/section1/basics-of-criminal-law-part-3-criminal-jurisprudence/),**
> and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is
> the natural consequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as
> to leave no doubt of the intention. A man could not put a pistol which he knew
> to be loaded to another’s head, and fire it off, without intending to kill him;
> but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered.
> For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could
> not be inferred from the act. So if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated,
> the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely; was
> he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?”(
> Emphasis supplied).

25. Bearing in mind the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and also bearing
in mind that our legislature has used two different terminologies ‘intent’ and ‘
knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent
to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with
a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, it would be proper to hold that ‘intent’ and‘
knowledge’ cannot be equated with each other. They connote different things. Sometimes,
if the consequence is so apparent, it may happen that from the knowledge, intent
may be presumed. But it will not mean that ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ are the same.‘
Knowledge’ will be only one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration 
while determining or inferring the requisite intent.

26. In the case In re Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141, also the distinction
between ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’ is aptly explained.

27. Thus, while defining the offence of culpable homicide and murder, the framers
of the IPC laid down that the requisite intention or [knowledge must be imputed to the accused](http://localhost:8080/section1/culpable-homicide-not-amounting-to-murder-the-nature-of-the-injury-itself-is-enough-to-find-out-the-intention-or-knowledge-of-the-accused/)
when he committed the act which caused the death in order to hold him guilty for
the offence of culpable homicide or murder as the case may be. The framers of the
IPC designedly used the two words ‘intention’ and ‘knowledge’, and it must be taken
that the framers intended to draw a distinction between these two expressions. The
knowledge of the consequences which may result in the doing of an act is not the
same thing as the intention that such consequences should ensue. Except in cases
where mens rea is not required in order to prove that a person had certain knowledge,
he “must have been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could
follow.” (Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, Volume 1 at page 40).

28. This awareness is termed as knowledge. But the knowledge that specified consequences
would result or could result by doing an act is not the same thing as the intention
that such consequences should ensue. If an act is done by a man with the knowledge
that certain consequences may follow or will follow, it does not necessarily mean
that he intended such consequences and acted with such intention. Intention requires
something more than a mere foresight of the consequences. It requires a purposeful
doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. This we may make it clear by referring
to two passages from leading text-books on the subject. Kenny in his Outlines of
Criminal Law, Seventeenth Edition at page 31 has observed:-

> “To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective; the
> noun ‘intention’ in the present connexion is used to denote the state of mind 
> of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible consequences of his
> conduct…….. It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also
> foresight, since a man must decide to his own satisfaction, and accordingly must
> foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed……… Again, a man cannot 
> intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it.” (Emphasis supplied).

29. Russell on Crime, Twelfth Edition, 1st Volume at page 41 has observed:-

> “In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word “intention” is
> used to denote the mental attitude of a man who has resolved to bring about a 
> certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to
> achieve a particular end at which he aims………… Differing from intention, yet closely
> resembling it, there are two other attitudes of mind, either of which is sufficient
> to attract legal sanctions for harm resulting from action taken in obedience to
> its stimulus, but both of which can be denoted by the word “recklessness”. In 
> each of these the man adopts a line of conduct with the intention of thereby attaining
> an end which he does desire, but at the same time realises that this conduct may
> also produce another result which he does not desire. In this case he acts with
> full knowledge that he is taking the chance that this **[secondary](http://localhost:8080/section1/secondary-evidence-document-that-are-not-properly-stamped-cannot-be-secondary-evidence/)**
> result will follow. Here, again, if this secondary result is one forbidden by 
> law, then he will be criminally responsible for it if it occurs. His precise mental
> attitude will be one of two kinds-(a) he would prefer that the harmful result 
> should not occur, or (b) he is indifferent as to whether it does or does not occur.”(
> Emphasis supplied).

30. The phraseology of Sections 299 and 300 respectively of the IPC leaves no manner
of doubt that under these Sections when it is said that a particular act in order
to be punishable be done with such intention, the requisite intention must be proved
by the prosecution. It must be [proved that the accused](http://localhost:8080/section1/juvenile-justice-act-2015-though-offences-pocso-and-murder-have-been-proved-accused-acquitted-based-on-procedural-illegalities/)
aimed or desired that his act should lead to such and such consequences. For example,
when under Section 299 it is said “whoever causes death by doing an act with the
intention of causing death” it must be proved that the accused by doing the act,
intended to bring about the particular consequence, that is, causing of death. Similarly,
when it is said that “whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death” it must be proved that the
accused had the aim of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.

31. Thus, in order that the requirements of law with regard to intention may be 
satisfied for holding an offence of culpable homicide proved, it is necessary that
any of the two specific intentions must be proved. But, even when such intention
is not proved, the offence will be culpable homicide if the doer of the act causes
the death with the knowledge that he is likely by his such act to cause death, that
is, with the knowledge that the result of his doing his act may be such as may result
in death.

32. The important question which has engaged our careful attention in this case 
is, whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case we should maintain
the **[conviction](http://localhost:8080/section1/fact-discovered-and-recovery-mahazar-witnesses/)**
of the appellant herein for the offence under Section 304 Part I or we should further
alter it to Section 304 Part II of the IPC?

##### **Sections 299 and 300 IPC**

33. Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC deal with the definition of ‘culpable homicide’
and ‘murder’, respectively. In terms of Section 299, ‘culpable homicide’ is described
as an act of causing death (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with 
the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii)
with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a
reading of this provision, the former part of it emphasises on the expression ‘intention’
while the latter upon ‘knowledge’. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however,
of different degrees. The mental element in ‘culpable homicide’, that is, the mental
attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. 
Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted-above, it would
be ‘culpable homicide’. Section 300 of the IPC, however, deals with ‘murder’, although
there is no clear definition of ‘murder’ in Section 300 of the IPC. As has been 
repeatedly held by this Court, ‘culpable homicide’ is the genus and ‘murder’ is 
its species and all ‘murders’ are ‘culpable homicides’ but all ‘culpable homicides’
are not ‘murders’. (see Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289).
 34. In
the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, this
Court, while clarifying the distinction between these two terms and their consequences,
held as under:-

> “12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, ‘culpable homicide’ is genus and ‘murder’
> is species. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice-versa. Speaking generally,‘
> culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment,
> proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
> three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is what may be called ‘culpable 
> homicide of the first degree’. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide,
> which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable
> homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section
> 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest
> type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest
> among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this
> degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.” (Emphasis supplied).

35. Section 300 of the IPC proceeds with reference to Section 299 of the IPC. ‘Culpable
homicide’ may or may not amount to ‘murder’, in terms of Section 300 of the IPC.
When a ‘culpable homicide is murder’, the punitive consequences shall follow in 
terms of Section 302 of the IPC, while in other cases, that is, where an offence
is ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishment would be dealt with under
Section 304 of the IPC. Various judgments of this Court have dealt with the cases
which fall in various classes of firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, respectively,
stated under Section 300 of the IPC. It would not be necessary for us to deal with
that aspect of the case in any further detail.

36. The principles stated in the case of Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958
SC 465, are the broad guidelines for the courts to exercise their judicial discretion
while considering the cases to determine as to which particular clause of Section
300 of the IPC they fall in. This Court has time and again deliberated upon the 
crucial question of distinction between Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, i.e. ‘culpable
homicide’ and ‘murder’ respectively. In Phulia Tudu v. State of Bihar, (2007) 14
SCC 588, this Court noticed that confusion may arise if the courts would lose sight
of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections.
This Court observed that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and 23
application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in
the various clauses of these sections.

37. This Court in Phulia Tudu (supra) has observed that the academic distinction
between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has always vexed
the courts. The confusion is caused if courts losing sight of the true scope and
meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves
to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation
and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used
in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC.

38. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of
Section 300 of the IPC. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under
clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim
being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused
to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not 
in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal
health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention to cause death’ is not
an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily
injury coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing
the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the
ambit of this clause. This clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended 
to Section 300 of the IPC.

39. Clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC does not postulate any such knowledge on
the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section
300 of the IPC can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally
given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen
or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person
as a result; of the rupture 26 of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart,
as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or 
special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury 
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not
be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In
clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC, instead of the words “likely to cause death”
occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC, the words “
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” have been used. Obviously, the distinction
lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real
and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between 
clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC and clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC is
one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury.
To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines
whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The 
word ‘likely’ in clause (b) of Section 299 of the IPC conveys the sense of probable
as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury…..sufficient 
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most
probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.

40. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended
to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or
injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. The decision
in the case of Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874, is an apt illustration
of this point.

41. The scope of clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC has been the subject matter
of various decisions of this Court. The decision in Virsa Singh (supra) has throughout
been followed in a number of cases by this Court. In all these cases the approach
has been to find out whether the ingredient namely the intention to cause the particular
injury was present or not? If such an intention to cause that particular injury 
is made out and if the injury is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, then clause thirdly of [Section 300 of 28 the IPC is attracted](http://localhost:8080/section1/breach-of-contract-is-not-the-only-remedy-for-contract-allegations-section-420-ipc-also-attracted/).
Analysing clause thirdly and as to what the prosecution must prove, it was held 
in Virsa Singh (supra).

42. Thus, it is clear that the ingredient of clause thirdly is not the intention
to cause death but on the other hand the ingredient to be proved is the intention
to cause the particular injury that was present. It is fallacious to contend that
wherever there is a single injury only a **[case of culpable homicide is made](http://localhost:8080/section1/whether-i-o-has-to-file-final-report-even-after-comes-to-the-opinion-that-there-is-no-case-made-out/)**
out irrespective of other circumstances. In Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan, AIR
1916 Bom 191, it was observed as under:-

> “Where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be
> absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended.” (Emphasis
> supplied).

45. This question was again considered in Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana, (1981)
3 SCC 616, by a Bench of this Court consisting of Justice D.A. Desai and Justice
A.P. Sen and following the ratio laid down in Virsa Singh (supra) it was held as
under:-

> “6. There is no justification for the assertion that the giving of a solitary 
> blow on a vital part of the body resulting the death must always necessarily reduce
> the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section
> 304 Part II of the Code. If a man deliberately strikes another on the head with
> a heavy log of wood or an iron rod or even a lathi so as to cause a fracture of
> the skull, he must, in the absence of any circumstances negativing the presumption,
> be deemed to have intended to cause the death of the victim or such bodily injury
> as is sufficient to cause death. The whole thing depends upon the intention to
> cause death, and the case may be covered by either clause Istly or clause 3rdly.
> The nature of intention must be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part
> of the body hit, the amount of force employed and the circumstances attendant 
> upon the death.”

The aforesaid decision of this Court in Jagrup Singh (supra) has been strongly relied
upon by the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant.

##### **Jagrup singh’s case**

46. **However, the learned senior counsel did not seek to rely on the observations
made in para 6 referred to above in the case of Jagrup Singh (supra). The learned
senior counsel relied on the observations which we shall refer to hereinafter, but
after giving some factual background in the case of Jagrup Singh (supra)****.** 
On the fateful evening, the marriage of one Tej Kaur was performed. Shortly thereafter,
the appellant Jagrup Singh armed with a gandhala, his brothers Billaur Singh armed
with a gandasa and Jarmail Singh and Waryam Singh armed with lathies emerged suddenly
and made a joint assault on the deceased Chanan Singh and the three eyewitnesses,
Gurdev Singh, PW 10, Sukhdev Singh, PW 11 and Makhan Singh, PW 12. The deceased 
along with the three eyewitnesses was rushed to the Rural Dispensary, Rori where
they were examined at 6 pm by Dr. Bishnoi, PW 3, who found that the deceased had
a lacerated wound 9 cm × 11/2 cm bone deep on the right parietal region, 9 cm away
from the tip of right pinna; margins of wound were red, irregular and were bleeding
on touch; direction of wound was anterior-posterior. The deceased succumbed to the
injuries. The Doctor who performed an autopsy on the dead body of the deceased deposed
before the Trial Court that the death of the deceased was due to cerebral compression
as a result of the head injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. In the background of this case, this Court held:-

> “14. … In our judgment, the High Court having held that it was more probable that
> the appellant Jagrup Singh had also attended the marriage as the collateral, but
> something happened on the spur of the moment which resulted in the infliction 
> of the injury by Jagrup Singh on the person of the deceased Chanan Singh which
> resulted in his death, manifestly erred in applying Clause Thirdly of Section 
> 300 of the Code. On the finding that the appellant when he struck the deceased
> with the blunt side of the gandhala in the heat of the moment, without pre-meditation
> and in a sudden fight, the case was covered by Exception 4 to Section 300. It 
> is not suggested that the appellant had taken undue advantage of the situation
> or had acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Thus, all the requirements of Exception
> 4 are clearly met. That being so, the conviction of the appellant Jagrup Singh,
> under Section 302 of the Code cannot be sustained.
> 15. The result, therefore, is that the conviction of the appellant under Section
> 302 is altered to one under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. For
> the altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment
> for a period of seven years.” (Emphasis supplied)

**We have noticed something in the aforesaid observations made by this Court which,
in our opinion, creates some confusion.** We have come across such observations 
in many other decisions of this Court over and above the case of Jagrup Singh (supra).
What we are trying to highlight is that in Jagrup Singh (supra), although this Court
altered the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II, it took shelter 
of **[Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC](http://localhost:8080/section1/what-is-cruel-under-exception-4-of-section-300-ipc/)**.
The question is, was there any need for the Court to take recourse to Exception 
4 to Section 300 of the IPC for the purpose of altering the conviction from Section
302 to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. We say so because there is fine difference
between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC. Under the first part, the crime
of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one 
of the **[exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC](http://localhost:8080/section1/sudden-provocation-overt-act-of-killing-the-deceased-happened-during-a-fit-of-anger-in-the-heat-of-a-passionate-verbal-quarrel-and-would-fall-under-exception-4-to-section-300-ipc/)**,
while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore,
for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the
second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within
one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

47. In Jawahar Lal v. State of Punjab, (1983) 4 SCC 159, also the accused hit the
deceased with a knife blow in front of left side of his chest and as per the autopsy
report the injuries were found sufficient in an ordinary course of nature to cause
35 death. This Court took a view that the accused could be attributed the knowledge
that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death.

48. In Camilo Vaz v. State of Goa [(2000) 9 SCC 1 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1128] the accused
had hit the deceased with a danda during a premeditated gang-fight, resulting in
the death of the victim. Both the trial court and the Bombay High Court convicted
the appellant under Section 302 IPC. This Court, however, converted the conviction
to one under Section 304 Part II IPC and observed:- (SCC p. 9, para 14)

> “14. … When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with
> such a force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be 37 imputed
> to the accused. In that situation case will **[fall in Part II of Section 304 IPC](http://localhost:8080/section1/sudden-provocation-overt-act-of-killing-the-deceased-happened-during-a-fit-of-anger-in-the-heat-of-a-passionate-verbal-quarrel-and-would-fall-under-exception-4-to-section-300-ipc/)**
> as in the present case.” (Emphasis supplied).

51. In the case of Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148, the two relevant
Sections 299 and 300 respectively are brilliantly analysed and the relevant observations
are made at page 151 in para 7. Before we refer to those observations, we would 
refer to certain observations made earlier. They are as under:-

> “The offence of culpable homicide involves the doing of an act (which term includes
> illegal omissions) (a) with the intention of causing death, or (b) with the intention
> of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (c) with the knowledge
> that the act is likely to cause death. If the death is caused in any of these 
> three circumstances, the offence of culpable homicide is said to be committed…….**
> [Intention and knowledge in the ingredients of the section](http://localhost:8080/section1/common-intention-section-34-ipc-appreciation-of-eye-witness-explained/)**
> postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude and this mental condition
> is the special mens rea necessary for the offence. The guilty intention in the
> first two conditions contemplates the intended death of the person harmed or the
> intentional causing of an injury likely to cause his death. The knowledge in the
> third condition contemplates knowledge of the death of the person. Sec. 300 tells
> us when the offence is murder and when it is culpable homicide not amounting to
> murder. Sec. 300 begins by setting out the circumstances when culpable homicide
> turns out into murder which is punishable under sec. 302 and the exceptions in
> the same section tell us when offence is not murder but culpable homicide not 
> amounting to murder punishable under sec. 304. Murder is an aggravated form of
> culpable homicide. The existence of one of four conditions turns culpable homicide
> into murder while the special exceptions reduce the offence of murder again to
> culpable homicide not amounting to murder.” (Emphasis supplied).

52. We will now refer to the relevant observations made in para 10 at page 151. 
They are as under:-

> “The third clause views the matter from a general stand-point. It speaks of an
> intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of
> nature to cause death. The emphasis here is on the sufficiency of the injury in
> the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The sufficiency is the high probability
> of death in the ordinary way of nature and when this exists and death ensues and
> the causing of such injury is intended the offence is murder. Sometimes the nature
> of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused,
> and sometimes both are relevant. The determinant factor is the intentional injury
> which must be sufficient to cause death, that is to say, the probability of death
> is not so high, the offence does not fall within murder but within culpable homicide
> not amounting to murder or something less. The illustration appended to the clause
> 3rdly reads:
> ‘(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the
> death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A
> is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death.’ The
> sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary way of nature
> is the gist of the clause irrespective of an intention to cause death. Here again,
> the exceptions may bring down the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to
> murder.” (Emphasis supplied).

53. This Court in Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P., (2007) 14 SCC 660, noticed
that the academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting
to murder’ had vividly been brought out by this Court in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu
Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382, where it was observed as under:-

> “…that the safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of Sections
> 299 and 300 of the Code is to keep in focus the key words used in various clauses
> of the said sections. Minutely comparing each of the clauses of sections 299 and
> 300 of the Code and the drawing support from the decisions of the court in Virsa
> Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465=1958 Cri LJ 818) and Rajwant Singh 
> v. State of Kerala, (AIR 1966 SC 1874=1966 Cri LJ 1509) speaking for the court,
> Justice RS Sarkaria, neatly brought out the points of distinction between the 
> two offences, which have been time and again reiterated. Having done so, the court
> said that wherever the Court is confronted with the question **[whether the offence is murder](http://localhost:8080/section1/murder-case-whether-s-302-or-s-304-ipc-explained/)**
> or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, on the facts of a case, it would
> be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to 
> be considered at the first stage would be that the accused has done an act by 
> doing which he has caused the death of another. Two, if such causal connection
> between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering
> whether that act of the accused amounts to culpable homicide as defined in section
> 299. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the offence would be culpable
> homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the First or Second part of
> Section 304, depending respectively, on whether this second or the third clause
> of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive but the
> cases come within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence
> would still be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the
> first part of Section 304 of the Code. It was, however, clarified that these were
> only broad guidelines to facilitate the task of the court and not cast-iron imperative.”(
> Emphasis supplied).

54. In the case of Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1984 SC 759, the accused stood
in front of the house of the deceased and used filthy language against some persons
who were unconnected with the deceased. The deceased came out of his house and told
the accused that he should not use vulgar and filthy language in front of ladies
and asked him to go away. The accused questioned the authority of the deceased to
ask him to leave the place. In the ensuing altercation, the accused gave one blow
with a knife which landed on the (right) chest of the deceased which proved to be
fatal. This Court came to the conclusion that the accused could not be convicted
under Section 302, but was guilty under Section 304 Part II. The circumstances which
weighed with this Court were : (i) there was no connection between the accused and
the deceased and the presence of the deceased at the time of the incident, was wholly
accidental; (ii) altercation with the deceased was on the spur of the moment and
the accused gave a single blow being enraged by the deceased asking him to leave
the place; (iii) the requisite intention could not be attributed to the accused 
as there was nothing to indicate that the accused intended the blow to land on the
right side of the chest which proved to be fatal.

55. In Chamru, Son of Budhwa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 652, in somewhat
similar circumstances, where there was exchange of abuses between the two parties
both of whom were armed with lathis, they came to blows and in the course of the
fight that ensued, the accused struck a lathi blow on the head of the deceased which
caused a fracture of the skull resulting in the death. In view of the fact that 
the accused had given only one blow in the heat of the moment, it was held that 
all that can be said was that he had given the blow with the knowledge that it was
likely to cause death and, therefore, the offence fell under Section 304, Part II
of the IPC. In Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 
SC 116, there was, as here, a sudden quarrel leading to an exchange of abuses and
in the heat of the moment a solitary blow with a hockey-stick had been given on 
the head. The Court held that the offence amounted to culpable homicide not amounting
to murder punishable under Section 304, Part II.

56. In Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab, (1981) 4 SCC 245, the accused, without any
prior enmity or premeditation, on a short quarrel gave a single blow with a dagger
which later proved to be fatal. This Court observed that since there was no premeditation,
Part 3 of Section 300 of the IPC could not be attracted because it cannot be said
that the accused intended to inflict that particular injury which was ultimately
found to have been inflicted. In the facts and circumstances of that case, the conviction
of the accused was altered from Section 302 to that under Section 304 Part II IPC
and the accused was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years.

57. In Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342, the accused on the spur
of the moment inflicted a knife-blow on the chest of the deceased. The injury proved
to be fatal. The doctor opined that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. This Court observed that: (SCC p. 344, para 8):-

> “8. … The quarrel was of a trivial nature and even in such a trivial quarrel the
> appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these
> circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could
> be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely
> to cause death. …” (Emphasis supplied)…

This Court altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 IPC to Section
304 Part II IPC and sentenced the accused to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five
years.

58. In Hem Raj v. State (Delhi Admn.), 1990 Supp SCC 291, the accused inflicted 
single stab injury landing on the chest of the deceased. The occurrence admittedly
had taken place on the spur of the moment and in heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
According to the doctor the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death. This Court observed as under: (SCC p. 295, para 14)”-

> “14. The question is whether the appellant could be said to have caused that particular
> injury with the intention of causing death of the deceased. As the totality of
> the established facts and circumstances do show that the occurrence had happened
> most unexpectedly in a sudden quarrel and without premeditation during the course
> of which the appellant caused a solitary injury, he could not be imputed with 
> the intention to cause death of the deceased or with the intention to cause that
> particular fatal injury; but he could be imputed with the knowledge that he was
> likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Because in the absence
> of any positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with
> the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted that particular injury
> which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death, neither 
> clause I nor clause III of Section 300 IPC will be attracted.” (Emphasis supplied)…

This Court while setting aside the conviction under Section 302 convicted the accused
under Section 304 Part II and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
seven years.

59. We may lastly refer to the decision of this Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju v. 
State of A.P., (2006) 11 SCC 444=(2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 500 (SCC pp. 457-58, para 29),
wherein this Court enumerated some of the circumstances relevant to finding out 
whether there was any intention to cause death on the part of the accused.

##### 60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid  discussion may be summed up thus:

> (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could
> be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge
> of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is 
> described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder
> even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand 
> and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘
> A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty 
> in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only
> single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within
> Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into
> the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim
> at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’
> and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be 
> sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty
> in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be 
> caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course
> of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of
> Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although
> only single injury was caused.
> (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses(
> 1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise
> be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused’s case attracts
> any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the
> case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide
> not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the
> case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300
> of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such
> as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or
> knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 
> of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the 
> IPC. In that situation also, the [offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder](http://localhost:8080/section1/juvenile-justice-act-2015-though-offences-pocso-and-murder-have-been-proved-accused-acquitted-based-on-procedural-illegalities/)
> under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section,
> if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence 
> under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of
> the IPC.
> (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the
> first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of
> the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it 
> falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section
> 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there
> is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such
> intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
> (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended,
> and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
> cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled
> and the offence would be murder.
> (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases: (i) when
> the case falls under one or the other of 51 the clauses of Section 300, but it
> is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused
> is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘
> sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower 
> degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause
> death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (
> iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
> without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it
> more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC
> is that under the first part, the crime of** [murder is first established and the accused](http://localhost:8080/section1/juvenile-justice-act-2015-though-offences-pocso-and-murder-have-been-proved-accused-acquitted-based-on-procedural-illegalities/)**
> is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, 
> while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. 
> Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable
> under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his
> case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
> (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’.
> When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say
> that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has
> to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused
> had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
> (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder(
> Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing
> with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides,
> both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting
> to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought
> within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of
> the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence
> on record, the prosecution must still be required under the **[law to bring the case](http://localhost:8080/section1/december2023-weekly-case-law-report-1-07/)**
> under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge 
> of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any
> one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the
> charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide
> not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
> (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly
> of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury
> inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence.
> Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances
> of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon
> used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in 
> causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant
> on the attack.
> (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide
> a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary
> cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death
> has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to 
> be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
> (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim,
> no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have
> the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the
> death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not,
> is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
> (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause 
> death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is
> sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts
> a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely
> falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions
> applies.
> (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty
> knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury
> is sufficient 55 in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that
> the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
> circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that
> he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge,
> and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

61. We once again recapitulate the facts of this case. On the fateful day of the
incident, the father and son were working in their agricultural field early in the
morning. They wanted to transport the crop, they had harvested and for that purpose
they had called for a lorry. The lorry arrived, however, the deceased did not allow
the driver of the lorry to use the disputed pathway. This led to a verbal altercation
between the appellant and the deceased. After quite some time of the verbal altercation,
the appellant hit a blow on the head of the deceased with the weapon of offence (
weed axe) resulting in his death in the hospital.

62. Looking at the overall evidence on record, we find it difficult to come to the
conclusion that when the appellant struck the deceased with the weapon of offence,
he intended to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. The weapon of offence in the **[present case](http://localhost:8080/section1/how-sanctioning-authority-shall-examine-the-case-presented/)**
is a common agriculture tool. If a man is hit with a weed axe on the head with sufficient
force, it is bound to cause, as here, death. It is true that the injuries shown 
in the post mortem report are fracture of the parietal bone as well as the temporal
bone. The deceased died on account of the cerebral compression i.e. internal head
injuries. However, the moot question is – whether that by itself is sufficient to
draw an inference that the appellant intended to cause such bodily injury as was
sufficient to cause death. We are of the view that the appellant could only be attributed
with the knowledge that it was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause
the death. It is in such circumstances that we are inclined to take the view that
the case on hand does not fall within clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC.

63. In the aforesaid view of the matter and more particularly bearing the **[principles of law](http://localhost:8080/section1/judgments-full-of-citations-on-all-the-principles-of-criminal-law/)**
explained aforesaid, the present appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the
appellant under Section 304 Part I of the IPC is altered to one under Section 304
Part II of the IPC. For the altered conviction, the appellant is sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years.

##### **Party**

ANBAZHAGAN vs. THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE – CRIMINAL APPEAL
NO. 2043 OF 2023 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 9289 of 2019) – JULY 20, 
2023.

**[https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/32956/32956_2019_4_1501_45202_Judgement_20-Jul-2023.pdf](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/32956/32956_2019_4_1501_45202_Judgement_20-Jul-2023.pdf)**

**[Anbazhagan vs. The State](http://localhost:8080/section1/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Anbazhagan-vs.-The-State-1.pdf)**

### Further Study

 No Related Posts Found.
