# Limitation For Initiation Of Domestic Violence Proceedings: Revisiting The Ratio In Kamatchi

- Link: https://section1.in/limitation-for-initiation-of-domestic-violence-proceedings-revisiting-the-ratio-in-kamatchi/
- Published: 2026-08-27T09:48:59+00:00
- Author: section1

Contents

 * [Introduction](https://section1.in/limitation-for-initiation-of-domestic-violence-proceedings-revisiting-the-ratio-in-kamatchi/#introduction)
    - [The Reference and the Observations](https://section1.in/limitation-for-initiation-of-domestic-violence-proceedings-revisiting-the-ratio-in-kamatchi/#the-reference-and-the-observations)
    - [The Mis-reliance on Inderjit Singh Grewal](https://section1.in/limitation-for-initiation-of-domestic-violence-proceedings-revisiting-the-ratio-in-kamatchi/#the-misreliance-on-inderjit-singh-grewal)
    - [Constitutional Aspect and Scope of Reference Jurisdiction](https://section1.in/limitation-for-initiation-of-domestic-violence-proceedings-revisiting-the-ratio-in-kamatchi/#constitutional-aspect-and-scope-of-reference-jurisdiction)
 * [Conclusion](https://section1.in/limitation-for-initiation-of-domestic-violence-proceedings-revisiting-the-ratio-in-kamatchi/#conclusion)

#### **Introduction**

The question of limitation for initiating proceedings under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005[^1] (hereinafter referred to as “the DV Act”) is
no longer _res integra_, having been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **_Kamatchi
v. Lakshmi Narayanan_**[^2]. The Apex Court held that the period of limitation prescribed
under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[^3] (Cr.P.C.) does not
apply to an application filed under Section 12 of the DV Act. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court further clarified that an application under Section 12 cannot be equated to
a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. or a police report.

However, the question of limitation has re-emerged following a recent Reference 
Order passed by a Division Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Madras
in **_D. Balu & Ors. v. P. Jothilakshmi_**[^4].

##### **The Reference and the Observations**

The specific Question of Law referred to the Division Bench was:

_“Whether a divorced woman can maintain a complaint under the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?”_

While the Division Bench answered the referred question in the affirmative, it went
further to observe the issue of limitation—a point that was neither referred to 
it nor directly in question before the Bench.

The Hon’ble Division Bench observed:

_“The divorced woman can maintain the complaint under the provisions of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 for the domestic violence that took place
during the domestic relationship._

    ```wp-block-verse
    Provided the application must be filed within the limitation period, as stipulated under Section 468 of Cr.P.C.”
    ```

With due deference to the Hon’ble High Court, while there is no dispute regarding
the proposition that a divorced woman can maintain an application under Section 
12 of the DV Act, the observation applying Section 468 Cr.P.C. raises significant
concern.

It is humbly submitted that this observation appears to have been made _obiter_ 
and, with due respect, runs counter to the binding ratio laid down by the Apex Court
in **_Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan_**[^2].

##### **The Mis-reliance on _Inderjit Singh Grewal_**

Regrettably, it appears that the binding ratio in **_Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan_**[
^2] was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Bench. Instead, the Division Bench
arrived at its conclusion on limitation by relying upon the earlier decision in **
_Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab_**[^5].

With the utmost respect, this reliance is misplaced. In **_Kamatchi_**[^2], the 
Apex Court specifically examined and distinguished **_Inderjit Singh Grewal_**[^
5], clarifying its scope as follows:

> _“Inderjit Singh Grewal was decided before the decision of this Court in Sarah
> Mathew. Rather than the issue of limitation, what really weighed with this Court
> in Inderjit Singh Grewal was the fact that the domestic violence was alleged after
> the decree for divorce, when any relationship between the parties had ceased to
> exist. It is true that the plea based on Section 468 of the Code was noted in 
> paragraph 32 of said decision but the effect and interplay of Sections 12 and 
> 31 of the DV Act was not noticed. In Krishna Bhattacharjee, as is evident from
> paragraph 33 of the said decision, the plea of limitation was rejected as the 
> offence was found to be a continuing one and as such there was no terminal point
> from which date the limitation could be reckoned.”_

A closer examination reveals that in **_Inderjit Singh Grewal_**[^5], after obtaining
a decree of divorce by mutual consent along with permanent alimony, the ex-wife 
initiated DV proceedings alleging that the divorce decree was obtained by fraud.
The actual basis for quashing the proceedings in that case was that initiating DV
complaints post-divorce under such circumstances constituted a clear abuse of the
process of law.

##### **Constitutional Aspect and Scope of Reference Jurisdiction**

Even assuming _arguendo_ that a distinction was intended between divorced women 
and other aggrieved persons under the DV Act, no specific reasoning for such a differentiation
was articulated. In my humble submission, creating an unreasoned classification 
that imposes a strict bar of limitation solely on divorced women may run counter
to the principles of equality enshrined under Article 14[^6] and Article 15[^7] 
of the Constitution of India.

Furthermore, well-established principles of judicial discipline dictate that a Bench
answering a Reference must strictly confine itself to the specific question referred
to it.

In **_Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal & Co. & Ors._**[^8], the
Hon’ble Supreme Court elucidated the scope of reference jurisdiction:

> _“8. It is fairly well settled that when reference is made on a specific issue
> either by a learned Single Judge or Division Bench to a larger Bench i.e. Division
> Bench or Full Bench or Constitution Bench, as the case may be, the larger Bench
> cannot adjudicate upon an issue which is not the question referred to.”_

This principle has been consistently affirmed by the Apex Court in **_T.A. Hameed
v. M. Viswanathan_**[^9], **_State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok_**[^10], and **_Aneesh
Kumar V.S. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors._**[^11].

#### **Conclusion**

Under Section 468 Cr.P.C., the period of limitation is intrinsically linked to the
quantum of punishment prescribed for an “offence.” Under the scheme of the DV Act,
an application under Section 12 does not allege an “offence” _per se_; penal consequences
arise under Section 31[^12] only upon the **breach of a protection order**. Where
there is no protection order, there is no penal offence, and consequently, no terminal
point from which limitation under Section 468 Cr.P.C. can be computed.

Therefore, the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in **_Kamatchi v. Lakshmi
Narayanan_**[^2] remains the correct and binding position. Beneficial social welfare
legislation like the DV Act cannot be given a narrow, restrictive interpretation
that curtails the remedies available to aggrieved women.

With due respect, I am humbly of the view that:

    ```wp-block-verse
    “The observations regarding Section 468 Cr.P.C. in D. Balu, being both per incuriam and beyond the scope of the Reference, warrant clarification or reconsideration by a Larger Bench to preserve certainty and consistency in the law.”
    ```

_Views are Personal._

…………………………………………………………………………………………………..

**FOOTNOTES:-**

[1]: Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Act No. 43 of 2005).

[2]: _Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan_, (2022) 15 SCC 50 : 2022 INSC 414.

[3]: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974), § 468.

[4]: _D. Balu & Ors. v. P. Jothilakshmi_, 2026 (4) CTC 507 (Mad).

[5]: _Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab_, (2011) 12 SCC 588 : 2011 INSC 601.

[6]: The Constitution of India, Art. 14.

[7]: The Constitution of India, Art. 15.

[8]: _Kerala State Science & Technology Museum v. Rambal & Co. & Ors._, (2006) 6
SCC 258.

[9]: _T.A. Hameed v. M. Viswanathan_, (2008) 3 SCC 243.

[10]: _State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok_, (2013) 5 SCC 1.

[11]: _Aneesh Kumar V.S. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors._, (2020) 9 SCC 511.

[12]: Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, Sec. 31.

### Further Study

 No Related Posts Found.
