# POCSO: Acquitted based on victim’s statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C

- Link: https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/
- Published: 2023-07-25T13:27:32+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

Contents

 * [Some facts](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#some-facts)
 * [Victim has resiled from her statement recorded under section.164 before court](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#victim-has-resiled-from-her-statement-recorded-under-section164-before-court)
 * [Analysis and conclusions](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#analysis-and-conclusions)
 * [Documents to determine the age of the juvenile](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#documents-to-determine-the-age-of-the-juvenile)
 * [Proving someone as juvenile](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#proving-someone-as-juvenile)
 * [Defence corroborated the statement recorded under section .164 Cr.P.C by calling the Magistrate as defence witness](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#defence-corroborated-the-statement-recorded-under-section-164-crpc-by-calling-the-magistrate-as-defence-witness)
 * [Party](https://section1.in/pocso-case-acquitted-based-on-victims-s-164-cr-p-c-statement/#party)

1. The sole appellant is aggrieved by the conviction affirmed and the sentence imposed
by the Madras High Court, rejecting his plea1 . He is acquitted of committing offense
under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code (hereafter “IPC”), but convicted under
Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereafter“
POCSO Act”).

##### **Some facts**

##### Victim has resiled from her statement recorded under section.164 before court

6. Ms. E.R. Sumathy, learned counsel submitted that the findings of the courts below
are unsustainable. Firstly, she relied on the circumstance that the victim M in 
her statement under Section 164 Cr. PC, clearly indicated that she left with the
appellant of her own accord and that her sister and aunt knew these facts. It was
pointed out that the same statement further acknowledged that M and the appellant
had known and loved each other for a year. In these circumstances, when she eloped
with the appellant, the fact that she did not support her previous statement to 
the Magistrate and resiled from it, should have been an important aspect that cast
serious doubts about the prosecution story.

9. The prosecution, however, did not provide any evidence to establish that the 
victim’s age was under 18. It was argued that, given the totality of these circumstances
and that the victim had changed her version and deposed contrary to what she stated
in her statement under Section 164 of Cr. PC, the appellant could not have been 
convicted for the offences he was charged with. It is lastly argued that the High
Court acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 366 IPC which gives a 
complete lie to the prosecution story about the kidnapping or forceful abduction
of the victim.

10. Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the 
State, supported the concurrent conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts below;
he submitted that even though the victim and the appellant knew each other, and 
even if it was accepted that they had feelings for each other, the fact remains 
that the victim was below the statutory age, and consent is irrelevant. He submitted
that the findings of the courts below with respect to the age of the victim were
supported or corroborated only by the testimony of DW-2, the Head Mistress of the
school where M had studied. She had deposed that according to the school records,
M’s date of birth is 11.07.1997.

##### **Analysis and conclusions**

11. Before discussing the merits of the contentions and evidence in this case, it
is necessary to extract Section 34 of the POCSO Act which reads as follows:

> “34. Procedure in case of commission of offence by child and determination of 
> age by Special Court. – (1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a
> child, such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice(
> Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016). (2) If any question arises
> in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or not,
> such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself
> about the age of such person and it shall record in writing its reasons for such
> determination. (3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid
> merely by any subsequent proof that the age of a person as determined by it under
> sub-section (2) was not the correct age of that person.”

12. In view of Section 34 (1) of the POCSO Act, Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 becomes
relevant, and applicable. That provision is extracted below:

> “94. Presumption and determination of age. – (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee
> or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any
> of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) 
> that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such 
> observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with 
> the inquiry under section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting
> for further confirmation of the age.
> (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding
> whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board,
> as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking
> evidence by obtaining –\
> (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent
> certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence
> thereof;
> (ii) (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority
> or a panchayat;
> (iii) (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined
> by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted
> on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test
> conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within
> fifteen days from the date of such order.
> (3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so 
> brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true
> age of that person.”

##### Documents to determine the age of the juvenile

13. It is evident from conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the
dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him 
being a victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps
indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the
Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the concerned court has to determine
the age by considering the following documents:

> “(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent
> certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence
> thereof;
> (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or 
> a panchayat;
> (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by
> an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted
> on the orders of the Committee or the Board”.

14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate
from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination
board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate 
issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter
in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification
test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders
of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case,
concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or
matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school
transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly,
the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the 
court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to
establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen
back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned
Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the 
year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer
to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it
was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold 
that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors., [2021 (12) SCR 502] this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases
where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile
Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act,
and held as follows:

> “20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in 
> determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be
> decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available.
> But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was 
> by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates,
> if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from
> the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;(
> iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or 
> a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical
> opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age
> of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being
> made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on
> lower side within the margin of one year.”

16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various
options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in [Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors [[2019] 9 SCR 735]](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/46214/46214_2018_11_1502_15300_Judgement_25-Jul-2019.pdf)
that:

> “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school
> and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination
> board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category(
> ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal
> authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination
> by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant
> change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules 
> of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) the matriculation or
> equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the
> certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school
> first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth 
> certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate
> are placed in the same category”.

##### **Proving someone as juvenile**

17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v State of West Bengal [[2012] 9 SCR 224],
this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone
is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further,
in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted
in order of preference.

19. It is clear from the above narrative that none of the documents produced during
the trial answered the description of “the date of birth certificate from the school”
or “the matriculation or equivalent certificate” from the concerned examination 
board or certificate by a corporation, municipal authority or a Panchayat. In these
circumstances, it was incumbent for the prosecution to prove through acceptable 
medical tests/examination that the victim’s age was below 18 years as per Section
94(2)(iii) of the JJ Act. PW-9, Dr. Thenmozhi, Chief Civil Doctor and Radiologist
at the General Hospital at Vellore, produced the X-ray reports and deposed that 
in terms of the examination of M, a certificate was issued stating “that the age
of the said girl would be more than 18 years and less than 20 years”. In the cross-
examination, she admitted that M’s age could be taken as 19 years. However, the 
High Court rejected this evidence, saying that “when the precise date of birth is
available from out of the school records, the approximate age estimated by the medical
expert cannot be the determining factor”. This finding is, in this court’s considered
view, incorrect and erroneous. As held earlier, the documents produced, i.e., a 
transfer certificate and extracts of the admission register, are not what Section
94 (2) (i) mandates; nor are they in accord with Section 94 (2) (ii) because DW-
1 clearly deposed that there were no records relating to the birth of the victim,
M. In these circumstances, the only piece of evidence, accorded with Section 94 
of the JJ Act was the medical ossification test, based on several X-Rays of the 
victim, and on the basis of which PW-9 made her statement. She explained the details
regarding examination of the victim’s bones, stage of their development and opined
that she was between 18-20 years; in cross-examination she said that the age might
be 19 years. Given all these circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the
result of the ossification or bone test was the most authentic evidence, corroborated
by the examining doctor, PW-9.

21. In her statement under Section 164 of the Cr. PC, the victim M had deposed that
she was in love with the appellant, had consumed poison, and had even been hospitalized
because she was adamant to live with the appellant. No doubt, she resiled from her
statement. Yet, the medical evidence (deposition of PW-11, Dr. Kavitha) indicated
that the victim had a ruptured hymen; there was no external injury at her private
parts, and that according to her “48 hours before medical examination there was 
no evidence to show that she had sexual assault is the opinion given by me.” This
witness also produced her Notes of examination (Ex. P-11). In view of these facts,
this court is of the opinion that the prosecution was not able to establish that
there was any penetrative sexual assault as a result of coercion or compulsion on
the part of the appellant. Even the High Court recognized this, albeit while reducing
the sentence (since, in its opinion, M was a minor at the time), observing that “
P.W.3 had gone to the extent of taking poison to commit suicide out of love failure,
under enormous pressure, he had accompanied P.W.3, married her and had sexual intercourse
with her, both before the marriage as well was after the marriage.” From these facts,
and the definitions under POCSO Act, especially the definitions of “sexual assault”,
Sections 5 and 6, read with Sections 350 and 351 IPC, it can be seen that it is 
only when there is penetrative sexual assault, which implies sexual contact with
or without consent of the minor victim, that the offences under the POCSO Act are
committed.

##### **Defence corroborated the statement recorded under section .164 Cr.P.C by calling the Magistrate as defence witness**

22. All the facts proved in this case clearly indicate M’s willingness to accompany
the appellant and even celebrate their marriage. However, she did not support the
statement under Section 164 Cr. PC. To entirely discard that statement, the trial
court observed that:

> “In this case, on the orders of the Inspector of P.W.-16 had produced the girl
> Madheena before the Judicial Magistrate Court, Erode and she has given a statement
> voluntarily u/s.164 Cr.PC. To prove that the aforesaid statement was not given
> on any compulsion, no evidences have been put forth before this court.”

The above surmise by the trial court is untenable. The prosecution did not concededly
produce the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement; however, that officer
was available and was stationed at Erode. She deposed during the trial, as DW-1,
and importantly affirmed the veracity of the victim’s statement (Ex. P-4) by stating
as follows:

> “It is a true statement given by the said girl wilfully. The said statement was
> not given on compulsion. It is correct if it is stated that, (M), in her statement,
> had told me that, I and my neighbour who was in the nearby house, by name Yuvaprakash
> are in love for the past 1 1/2 years, we used to talk to each other frequently
> over phone, my grand-mother on seeing me speaking over the phone had told my father
> about it, I took pesticide for ants and attempted to commit suicide….”

The prosecution did not even cross examine this witness. Having regard to these 
overall factors, the court is of the opinion that M’s statement under Section 164
of the Cr. PC contained a truthful narration of the events. This, in other words,
meant that there was no penetrative sexual assault on her. Therefore, the provisions
of the POCSO Act will not be applicable in this case. The impugned judgment set 
aside the charge under Section 366 IPC against the appellant. The charges against
him, under Section 6 of the POCSO Act as well as Section 10 of the Prohibition of
Child Marriage Act, cannot be sustained; the findings of the courts below, i.e.,
conviction and sentences imposed are, therefore, set aside.

##### **Party**

P. YUVAPRAKASH vs. STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE – CRIMINAL APPEAL NO (S). 1898
OF 2023 – JULY 18, 2023.

**[https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/47421/47421_2018_8_1501_45230_Judgement_18-Jul-2023.pdf](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/47421/47421_2018_8_1501_45230_Judgement_18-Jul-2023.pdf)**

**[P.Yuvaprakash-vs.-State-pocso-acquittal](http://localhost:8080/section1/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/P.Yuvaprakash-vs.-State-pocso-acquittal-1.pdf)**

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