# Section 27 Evidence Act: There cannot be a ‘discovery’ of an already discovered fact and the discovery should be a distinct fact from the facts already discovered

- Link: https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/
- Published: 2023-05-09T13:43:26+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

Contents

 * [Gist of appeal](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#gist-of-appeal)
 * [Circumstantial facts in the present case](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#circumstantial-facts-in-the-present-case)
 * [Murder was for deceased’s tractor by kidnapping him is the ‘motive’ and the motive is not convincing](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#murder-was-for-deceased8217s-tractor-by-kidnapping-him-is-the-8216motive8217-and-the-motive-is-not-convincing)
 * [Discoveries made in the present case and its alanysis](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#discoveries-made-in-the-present-case-and-its-alanysis)
 * [Section 27 Evidence Act: There cannot be a ‘discovery’ of an already discovered fact and the discovery should be a distinct fact from the facts already discovered](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#section-27-evidence-act-there-cannot-be-a-8216discovery8217-of-an-already-discovered-fact-and-the-discovery-should-be-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered)
 * [Analysis of circumstantial evidence](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#analysis-of-circumstantial-evidence)
 * [Time of death in post-mortem does not tally with the prosecution’s alleging time of death. Also presence of rigot mortis not explained by the prosecution](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#time-of-death-in-postmortem-does-not-tally-with-the-prosecution8217s-alleging-time-of-death-also-presence-of-rigot-mortis-not-explained-by-the-prosecution)
 * [Section 165 Indian Evidence Act](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#section-165-indian-evidence-act)
 * [Presence of rigor mortis after 90 hours is unusal](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#presence-of-rigor-mortis-after-90-hours-is-unusal)
 * [Last seen facts in the present case are not reliable to convict](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#last-seen-facts-in-the-present-case-are-not-reliable-to-convict)
 * [What is burden of proof under section 106 IEA?](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#what-is-burden-of-proof-under-section-106-iea)
 * [Section 106 IEA shall comes to play only when prosecution discharge initial burden](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#section-106-iea-shall-comes-to-play-only-when-prosecution-discharge-initial-burden)
 * [Prosecution not discharged its initial burden](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#prosecution-not-discharged-its-initial-burden)
 * [Party](https://section1.in/there-cannot-be-a-discovery-of-an-already-discovered-fact-discovery-should-be-of-a-distinct-fact-from-the-facts-already-discovered/#party)

##### **Gist of appeal**

1. The appellant, and one Mange Ram, were convicted in Sessions Trial No. 47 of 
2000, for offences under Sections 302/364/392/394/201 read with Section 34 of Indian
Penal Code (‘IPC’), by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jagadhri, Haryana.
They were awarded life sentence under Section 302 IPC, and lesser sentence on the
remaining convictions, vide order dated 11.07.2003. The two then filed separate 
appeals before Punjab and Haryana High Court. During the pendency of his appeal 
the co-accused Mange Ram passed away on 24.10.2004, and his appeal stood abated 
vide order dated 11.05.2017. The appeal of the present appellant was dismissed and
the conviction and sentence of the trial court was upheld by the High Court, vide
its order dated 31.05.2017. His SLP before this Court was given leave on 28.03.2022.

2. The case of the prosecution is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. The‘
evidence’ of last seen and the “discoveries” made from the information given by 
the appellant.

XXX

##### **Circumstantial facts in the present case**

7. The evidence of last seen is of Karanjit Singh (PW10) who is the neighbour of
the complainant (PW11). PW10 had seen the deceased along with the two accused i.
e., Dinesh Kumar and Mange Ram at about 7:00 P.M. on 08.05.2000. According to the
witness the deceased was driving the tractor and the two i.e., the appellant and
Mange Ram were sitting on the mudguard of the tractor.

##### **Murder was for deceased’s tractor by kidnapping him is the ‘motive’ and the motive is not convincing**

8. As we can see the case of the prosecution rests on two circumstantial evidences:(
A) The disclosure given in the police custody and the discovery on its basis and(
B) The evidence of last seen in the form of PW10. In a case of circumstantial evidence,
motive too is of significance. As far as motive is concerned, the prosecution case
is that the two accused killed the deceased only to steal his tractor. The deceased
in this case was a 42 year old well built man of 6 feet 2 inches in height (Post
Mortem report dated 12.05.2000). The prosecution case is that the deceased was kidnapped
and murdered by the two accused, for his tractor which they had robbed from the 
deceased, after putting him to death. Now this tractor the accused had in any case
abandoned, and did nothing to recover it till one of them was caught on 12.05.2000.
In short, the ‘motive’ is not very convincing.

##### **Discoveries made in the present case and its alanysis**

The disclosure made by the appellant while in police custody, which led to certain
discoveries, such as the place where the stolen tractor was abandoned, the place
where the alleged crime was committed, and the place where the body was thrown in
the canal, and also the discovery of ‘Parna’, burnt hair, wrist watch, and currency
notes of Rs.250/.

##### **Section 27 Evidence Act: There cannot be a ‘discovery’ of an already discovered fact and the discovery should be a distinct fact from the facts already discovered**

Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

> “How much of information received from accused may be proved—Provided that, when
> any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from
> a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of
> such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly
> to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”

The above provision shows that discovery should be of a distinct fact, the fact 
which has been discovered by disclosure of the one in police custody. All the same,
these facts were already in the knowledge of the police in the earlier discovery
made by the co-accused Mange Ram. The co-accused Mange Ram was arrested on 12.05.2000
and had led to these discoveries on 12th, 13th & 14th May.

The present appellant was arrested on May 14, 2000, and the alleged discoveries 
made by him were later in time. The discoveries which were made on the pointing 
out of co-accused Mange Ram cannot be read against the present appellant. If the
disclosure has been made by the accused to the police while he was in their custody
and such a disclosure leads to discovery of a fact then that discovery is liable
to be read as evidence against the accused in terms of Section 27 of the Act. All
the same, the distinguishing feature of such a discovery must be that such a disclosure
must lead to the discovery of a “distinct fact”. The recovery of the stolen tractor,
the place where the murder was committed and the place where body was thrown in 
the canal were facts which were already in the knowledge of the police, since it
is the case of the prosecution that the co-accused Mange Ram, who was arrested by
the police 2 days preceding the arrest of the present appellant, had earlier led
to the same discoveries on 12th, 13th & 14th of May, 2000. So, this disclosure and
discovery made thereafter cannot be read against the present appellant. There cannot
be a “discovery” of an already discovered fact! What remains is the discovery of
currency notes, wrist watch, ‘Parna’ and hair. The forensic report of hair only 
says that it belongs to ‘human’. The currency notes cannot be really identified 
with the deceased. What remains is the watch and the ‘Parna’, which has been identified
with the deceased.

##### **Analysis of circumstantial evidence**

The second is the evidence of “last seen”. This is in the form of PW10 Kartar Singh
who is the neighbour of the complainant and who had seen the appellant along with
co-accused Mange Ram with the deceased on 08.05.2000 at about 7.30 PM in the evening.

##### **Time of death in post-mortem does not tally with the prosecution’s alleging time of death. Also presence of rigot mortis not explained by the prosecution**

9. The admitted position is that the body of deceased was discovered from the canal
four days later i.e. on 12.05.2000 in the afternoon and the post-mortem was conducted
at about 4.15 PM on the same day i.e. 12.05.2000. According to Post-mortem report
the death had taken place more than 48 hours prior to the post-mortem, which would
mean that death took place approximately before 4.00 PM on 10.05.2000. Although 
the autopsy reports normally do not give precise time of death, but only indicate
an approximate time or duration, yet under normal circumstances in the present case,
death should have been on May 10, 2000 or May 9, 2000. All the same, the case of
the prosecution is that the deceased was killed on May 8, 2000 itself. If this be
so then it was the duty of the prosecution to explain as to how rigor mortis remained
present in the body, even after four days of the death. The possibility of the rigor
mortis remaining in the body for 90 hours cannot be ruled out completely, but this
was never explained by the prosecution. It was the duty of the prosecution to explain
the unusual circumstances under which rigor mortis remained present in the body,
even for 90 hours, in the month of May.

##### **Section 165 Indian Evidence Act**

11. We are afraid that by pointing out the weakness in the cross examination of 
the defense the presiding judge indirectly admits to the weakness in the trial itself.
We say this for the reasons that under Section 165 of the Act, a trial judge has
tremendous powers to “ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of 
any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant”. It is in 
fact the duty of the Trial Judge to do so if it is felt that some important and 
crucial question was left from being asked from a witness. The purpose of the trial
is after all to reach to the truth of the matter.

The powers of a presiding judge in a criminal trial and his duty to get to the truth
of the matter have been laid down in a seminal judgement of this Court authored 
by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, which is Ram Chander v. State of Haryana [1981 AIR
1036]. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy in the said judgment refers to his earlier Judgment[
Sessions Judge, Nellore v. Intha Ramana Reddy, ILR 1972 AP 683; 1972 Cri LJ 1485]
given by him as a Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

The duty of the presiding judge of a criminal trial is not to watch the proceedings
as a spectator or a recording machine but he has to participate in the trial “by
evincing intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses in order 
to ascertain the truth.” While referring to a decision of Lord Denning in Jones 
v. National Coal Board [(1957) 2 All ER 155: (1957) 2 WLR 760] the learned Judge
had said that it is the duty of the judge to ask questions to the witnesses when
it becomes necessary to clear up any point that has been overlooked or left obscure,
then he goes on to say as under:
 “We may go further than Lord Denning and say that
it is the duty of a judge to discover the truth and for that purpose he may “ask
any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties, about
any fact, relevant or irrelevant” (Section 165, Evidence Act). But this he must 
do, without unduly trespassing upon the functions of the public prosecutor and the
defence counsel, without any hint of partisanship and without appearing to frighten
or bully witnesses. He must take the prosecution and the defence with him. The Court,
the prosecution and the defence must work as a team whose goal is justice, a team
whose captain is the judge. The judge, ‘like the conductor of a choir, must, by 
force of personality, induce his team to work in harmony; subdue the raucous, encourage
the timid, conspire with the young, flatter and (sic the) old’.”

##### **Presence of rigor mortis after 90 hours is unusal**

In our considered opinion the prosecution has failed to establish important links
in this case, which is so vital in a case of circumstantial evidence. Rigor mortis
present in the body after 90 hours is unusual, though possible under certain circumstances.
It was the duty of the prosecution to explain it. The defense too failed to question
it and the Court remained silent. Let us now revert to the evidence of last seen.

12. The evidence of last seen becomes an extremely important piece of evidence in
a case of circumstantial evidence, particularly when there is a close proximity 
of time between when the accused was last seen with the deceased and the discovery
of the body of the deceased, or in this case the time of the death of the deceased.
This does not mean that in cases where there is a long gap between the time of last
seen and the death of the deceased the last seen evidence loses its value. It would
not, but then a very heavy burden is placed upon the prosecution to prove that during
this period of last seen and discovery of the body of the deceased or the time of
the death of the deceased, no other person but the accused could have had an access
to the deceased. The circumstances of last seen together in the present case by 
itself cannot form the basis of guilt (See: Anjan Kumar Sarma & Others v. State 
of Assam – (2017) 14 SCC 359 -para 19).

##### **Last seen facts in the present case are not reliable to convict**

As per the postmortem which was conducted on 12.05.2000 at 4:15 P.M, the death was
48 hours prior to the post mortem, which means it was before 4:00 P.M. on 10.05.2000.
Even assuming that the death has taken place, a day earlier i.e. 09.05.2000, still
there is a long gap between the last seen which is at 7:00 pm on 08.05.2000 and 
the morning of 09.05.2000. In the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran – (2007)
3 SCC 755, where in the evidence of last seen, the recovery of dead body was only
a few hours before “last seen”, it was not considered reliable.

##### **What is burden of proof under section 106 IEA?**

The trial court as well as the High Court have lost sight of the vital aspect of
the matter. Both the Courts have relied on Section 106 of the Act and have held 
that since the accused was last seen with the deceased and he has not been able 
to give any reasonable explanation of his presence with the deceased in his statement
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., it has to be read against the accused and therefore
it has to be counted as an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.
In present case in the findings of the trial court and High Court this appears to
be the most important aspect which weighed with the trial court as well as the High
Court in establishing the guilt of the accused. We are, however, afraid this is 
a complete misreading of Section 106 of the Act.

xxx

Section 106 of the Act is an exception to the rule which is Section 101 of the Act,
and it comes into play only in a limited sense where the evidence is of a nature
which is especially within the knowledge of that person and then the burden of proving
that fact shifts upon him that person.

##### **Section 106 IEA shall comes to play only when prosecution discharge initial burden**

The burden of proof is always with the prosecution. It is the prosecution which 
has to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 106 of the Act does not
alter that position. It only places burden for disclosure of a fact on the establishment
of certain circumstances. We have no reason to doubt the testimony of PW10 (Karanjit
Singh), the sole witness of last seen. In his statement under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, when the appellant was questioned about being in the
company of the deceased on 08.05.2000 along with co-accused Mange Ram, no explanation
was given by the appellant about his whereabouts. It is for this reason that it 
has been held that the accused has not been able to discharge his burden under Section
106 of the Act and therefore this has to be read as an additional link in the chain
of evidence against the appellant. To our mind, however, Section 106 of the Act 
would not even come to play here under the facts and circumstances of the present
case.

13. What has to be kept in mind is that Section 106 of the Act, only comes into 
play when the other facts have been established by the prosecution. In this case
when the evidence of last seen itself is on a weak footing, considering the long
gap of time between last seen by PW10 and the time of death of the deceased, Section
106 of the Act would not be applicable under the peculiar facts and the circumstances
of the case.

##### **Prosecution not discharged its initial burden**

14. As far as the recovery is concerned, the recovery is again weak. The so called
alleged place of crime and the recovery of tractor or the place where the tractor
was abandoned had already been disclosed by the co-accused by the time the present
appellant was arrested. Therefore, making a disclosure about the place of occurrence
or the place where the tractor was abandoned is of no consequence. As far as the
recovery of watch, currency notes of Rs. 250/, hair and ‘Parna’ from the residence
of the appellant are concerned, the currency notes and hair have not been identified
with the deceased. In a criminal trial, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt. This heavy burden has to be discharged by the prosecution. It 
becomes even more difficult in a case of circumstantial evidence. In the present
case, the nature of circumstantial evidence is weak. In order to establish a charge
of guilt on the accused, the chain of evidence must be completed and the chain must
point out to one and only one conclusion, which is that it is only the accused who
have committed the crime and none else. We are afraid the prosecution has not been
able to discharge this burden.

xxx

15. In our considered view, in the present case the prosecution has not been able
to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence of last seen, only leads
upto a point and no further. It fails to link it further to make a complete chain.
All we have here is the evidence of last seen, which as we have seen looses much
of its weight under the circumstances of the case, due to the long duration of time
between last seen and the possible time of death. What we can call as discovery 
here under Section 27 of the Act, is the discovery of ‘Parna’ and watch of the deceased.
This evidence in itself is not sufficient to fix guilt on the appellant.

In a case where there is no direct eye witness to the crime, the prosecution has
to build its case on the circumstantial evidence. It is a very heavy burden cast
on the prosecution. The chain of circumstances collected by the prosecution must
complete the chain, which should point to only one conclusion which is that it is
the accused who had committed the crime, and none else. Each evidence which completes
the chain of evidences must stand on firm grounds. In our considered opinion, the
evidence placed by the prosecution in this case does not pass muster the standard
required in a case of circumstantial evidence.

Accused **[Acquitted](http://localhost:8080/section1/category/acquittal/)**

##### **Party**

Dinesh Kumar vs. The State of Haryana – CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.530 OF 2022 – May 04,
2023.

**[https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/31881/31881_2018_11_1501_44221_Judgement_04-May-2023.pdf](https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/31881/31881_2018_11_1501_44221_Judgement_04-May-2023.pdf)**

**[Dinesh-Kumar-vs.-The-state-of-Haryana-may-9](http://localhost:8080/section1/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Dinesh-Kumar-vs.-The-state-of-Haryana-may-9-1.pdf)**

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