# There is no bar to release the accused in default bail though his previous bail was cancelled under section 439(2) Cr.P.C

- Link: https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/
- Published: 2024-07-01T19:45:14+00:00
- Author: Reshma Azath

Contents

 * [Prayer to cancel the bail](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#prayer-to-cancel-the-bail)
 * [Crux of the case](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#crux-of-the-case)
 * [Petitioner side Contention](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#petitioner-side-contention)
 * [Respondent side contentions](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#respondent-side-contentions)
 * [Relied with Supreme Court Judgment](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#relied-with-supreme-court-judgment)
 * [Party](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#party)
 * [Author’s note (by Ramprakash Rajagopal with the permission of Reshma Azath)](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#authors-note-by-ramprakash-rajagopal-with-the-permission-of-reshma-azath)
 * [Further study](https://section1.in/there-is-no-bar-to-release-the-accused-in-default-bail-though-his-previous-bail-was-cancelled-under-section-4392-cr-p-c/#further-study)

##### **Prayer to cancel the bail**

The petition has been filed by the defacto complainant in Cr.No. 2 of 2023 registered
under Sections 406, 420, 294(b) and 506(i) of IPC by the first respondent seeking
to cancel the bail granted to the second respondent/accused by the Judicial Magistrate-
I, Ulundurpet in C.M.P.No. 3002 of 2023 dated 13.07.2023.

##### **Crux of the case**

3. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused were running a chit fund and
had cheated the petitioner to a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-. A sum of Rs.2,00,000/- had
been repaid through the **[bank account](http://localhost:8080/section1/freezing-of-accused-companys-bank-account-for-17-years-is-not-proper-company-is-permitted-to-withdraw-amount/)**
of the daughter of the petitioner/defacto complainant and another sum of Rs.10/-
lakhs had been repaid by cash. There was a balance of Rs.38,66,650/- to be repaid.
The petitioner had therefore lodged a complaint leading to registration of FIR in
Cr.No. 2 of 2023 under the aforementioned provisions.

4. By an order dated 30.01.2023, the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet had**
[granted bail](http://localhost:8080/section1/parameters-of-granting-bail-in-commercial-quantity-u-s-37-of-ndps-act/)**
by imposing the normal conditions of execution of bond and production of sureties
and appearance before the respondent daily for a period of 15 days and thereafter
as and when required. The second respondent was also directed to appear before the
said Court every Monday until further orders.

##### **Petitioner side Contention**

 5. Aggrieved by the grant of bail, the petitioner herein filed Crl.O.P.No. 2927
of 2023 before this Court under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C., to **[cancel the bail granted](http://localhost:8080/section1/difference-between-cancellation-of-bail-and-appeal-against-the-bail-already-granted/)**
by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet. By order dated 01.03.2023, a learned Single
Judge of this Court, on examination of all the facts particularly the allegation
that the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet, had granted bail without any
condition to deposit cash or title deed and had granted bail by a cryptic order 
and that there were further complaints against the second respondent/first accused,
had allowed the said original petition and cancelled the bail granted by the Judicial
Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet to the second respondent/first accused. The first respondent/
investigating Officer was directed to secure the second respondent in manner known
to law.

6. The second respondent was thereafter secured on 12.05.2023. She was remanded 
to custody and continued to be in custody till 30.06.2023. The second respondent
then filed C.M.P.No. 3002 of 2023 under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C to enlarge her on 
bail. That application was taken up for consideration on 13.06.2023 by the Judicial
Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet. In that order, it had been observed that the second respondent/
first accused was in **[custody](http://localhost:8080/section1/custody-death-or-station-death-if-the-death-takes-place-inside-the-police-station-the-accused-persons-should-be-punished-for-the-offence-under-section-302-ipc/)**
from 03.01.2023 till 31.01.2023 and again from 12.05.2023 to 13.06.2023 for alleged
offences under Section 406, 420, 294(b) and 506(i) IPC. It had been stated that 
by taking the two spells of custody into consideration, the second respondent/first
accused has been in custody for 62 days and **[final report had not been filed](http://localhost:8080/section1/in-cross-case-or-case-in-counter-the-i-o-has-to-file-both-the-final-reports-before-the-jurisdictional-magistrate/)**
within the stipulated period of 60 days and therefore, the second respondent /first
accused was entitled for statutory bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., and accordingly,
enlarged her on bail on execution of sureties, with directions not to indulge in
tampering of witness and to co-operate with the investigating agency. That order
is now sought to be cancelled by the defacto complainant.

7. It has been contended by the learned counsel that though the averments in the
First Information Report revealed that the second respondent/first accused had cheated
the defacto complainant to a sum of more than Rs.50/- lakhs and after repayment 
of a part of that amount was still due and payable more than Rs.30/- lakhs, the 
Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet, had granted bail without imposing any condition.
8. It was also contended that the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet, had
wrongly appreciated the provisions under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., relating to grant
of statutory bail if final report was not filed within a period of 60 days from 
the date of initial remand and had applied that particular provision to the second
respondent, whose earlier bail had been cancelled by a learned Single Judge of this
Court. 9. According to the learned counsel, when the second respondent/first accused
was again taken into custody, it would not mean continuation of the earlier period
of remand. It is stated that the Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet, had therefore
wrongly applied the provision under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C and granted bail.

##### **Respondent side contentions**

10. The learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) appearing for the first respondent
contended that when the second respondent/ first accused had been granted bail in
the first instance, she had produced sureties and thereafter, the right of the Magistrate
to further remand the accused under Section 167 Cr.P.C., had come to an end. It 
is further contended that having availed the right to be granted bail, the second
respondent cannot claim a further right under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. It had been
contended by the learned Government Advocate (Crl.Side) that Section 167(2) Cr.P.
C., would not be applicable in the second instance and there cannot be clubbing 
of two separate broken periods of custody. It had also been contended that the order
passed granting bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., has to be interfered with by 
this Court.

11. The learned counsel for the second respondent / first accused however supported
the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet, and pointed out that
the second respondent / first accused had been in custody from 03.01.2023 till 30.01.2023
when bail was granted but was actually in custody till 02.02.2023 the day when she
furnished securities and stated that the first spell of custody was for a period
of 31 days. It was again contended that she had been again taken into custody on
12.05.2023. She was granted bail on 14.06.2023 when sureties had been furnished 
and this spell of custody was for a period of 34 days. The learned counsel therefore
clubbed both the two period of custody and stated that the second respondent had
been in custody for a total period of 65 days which is beyond the statutory period
of 60 days given to the **[investigating agency to file the final report](http://localhost:8080/section1/closure-report-and-further-investigation-entire-settled-propositions-explained/)**
and therefore stated that the Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet had correctly applied
the provision under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C., and had granted bail to the second respondent.

##### **Relied with Supreme Court Judgment**

12. In this connection, the learned counsel placed reliance on the Judgement of 
the Hon’ble **[Supreme Court](http://localhost:8080/section1/burden-of-proof-public-prosecutor-while-explaining-the-principles-of-106-iea-in-criminal-cases-honble-supreme-court-has-addressed-the-government-to-appoint-skilled-lawyers-as-public-prosec/)**
reported in (2022) 13 SCC 542 [ Gautam Navlakha Vs. National Investigation Agency],
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court had examined whether broken periods of custody
can be counted for the purpose of default period. The learned counsel placed reliance
on paragraph Nos. 66 & 67 of the said Judgment. They are as follows:-

> “83. Let us take another example. After ordering remand, initially for a period
> of 15 days of which 10 days is by way of **[police custody](http://localhost:8080/section1/police-custody-does-not-mean-first-15-days-only/)**
> and 5 days by way of judicial custody, the Magistrate enlarges an accused on bail.
> The High Court interferes with the order granting bail on the basis that the bail
> ought not to have been granted. Resultantly, the person who on the basis of the
> order of bail, has come out of jail custody, is put back into the judicial custody
> or jail custody. The order is one passed by the High Court. The order granting
> custody by the High Court cannot be treated as one which is not anchored in Section
> 167CrPC. Therefore, we would think that though the power is vested with the Magistrate
> to order remand by way of appropriate jurisdiction exercised by the superior courts,(
> it would, in fact, include the Court of Session acting under Section 439) the 
> power under Section 167 could also be exercised by courts which are superior to
> the Magistrate.
> 84. Therefore, while ordinarily, the Magistrate is the original court which would
> exercise power to remand under Section 167, the exercise of power by the superior
> courts which would result in custody being ordered ordinarily (police or judicial
> custody) by the superior courts which includes the High Court, would indeed be
> the custody for the purpose of calculating the period within which the charge-
> sheet must be filed, failing which the accused acquires the statutory right to
> default bail”.”

16. The learned counsel placed reliance on this dissenting opinion for the contention
that when there were two separate spells of detention, they must both clubbed together
and not viewed independently.

19. The facts in the present case are straight forward. The second respondent sought
bail in Cr.No. 2 of 2023 registered under Sections 406, 420, 294(b) and 506(i) of
IPC and filed C.M.P.No. 365 of 2023 before the Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet.
That application was taken up for consideration on 30.01.2023 and bail was granted
with the normal conditions of producing sureties and appearing before the respondent
and to co-operate during the course of investigation.

21. Thereafter, the petitioner/defacto complainant filed Crl.O.P.No. 2927 of 2023
seeking to cancel the order granting bail primarily on the ground that the Judicial
Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet had not imposed any conditions for grant of bail though
the offence was one of cheating to an amount of more than Rs.30/- lakhs which amount
was outstanding.

22. This Application in Crl.O.P.No. 2927 of 2023 came up for consideration before
a learned Single Judge of this Court on 01.03.2023 and the learned Single Judge 
cancelled the order granting bail holding that conditions had not been imposed and
a cryptic order had been passed. A direction had also been issued to take the second
respondent/first accused into custody.

24. In the first instance, when the second respondent/first accused was remanded
by the Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet on 03.01.2023, it was a remand under Section
167(2)Cr.P.C.

26. This provision gives the authority to the Magistrate to remand an accused for
a period of 15 days initially and thereafter for a maximum period of 90 days if 
the offence attracts a punishment of not less than 10 years or life imprisonment
or punishable with death and for a maximum period of 60 days for any other offence
if final report had not been filed. This would conversely mean that the investigating
officer should file the final report on completion of investigation within a period
of 90 days depending on the nature of the offence and within the period of 60 days
again depending on the nature of the offence.

27. In the instant case, the investigating officer was under obligation to file 
a final report within a period of 60 days from the date of first remand, namely,
30.01.2023. However, even before the expiry of the period of 60 days, the second
respondent/first accused had applied for bail and had been granted bail by the learned
Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet. That bail was not granted under Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C., but under Section 437(2) Cr.P.C.

29. This grant of bail is on the reasons stated by the Court. The Court then exercises
its discretion to grant bail.

30. In the instant case, the bail granted to the second respondent/first accused
had been cancelled under Section 439(2) Cr.P.C., by an order dated 01.03.2023 in
Crl.O.P.No. 2927 of 2023 by the High Court. Consequently the second respondent/first
accused had been again taken into custody. The Judicial Magistrate-I, Ulundurpet
had again remanded the accused.

31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gautam Navlakha referred supra had given an illustration
of two broken periods and had also stated that statutory bail can be granted when
the High Court had cancelled the bail. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had stated as follows:-

> “The order granting custody by the High Court cannot be treated as one which is
> not anchored in Section 167 of the Cr.P.C.”

32. In the instant case, the Hon’ble High Court had cancelled the bail under Section
439(2) Cr.P.C. It had been further explained that the power under Section 167 could
also be exercised by Courts which are superior to the Magistrate, which would indicate
that the High Court can also enlarge the accused under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court had further stated as follows:-

> “In such circumstances broken periods of custody can be counted whether custody
> is suffered by the order of the Magistrate or superior courts, if investigation
> remains incomplete after the custody, whether continuous or broken periods pieced
> together reaches the requisite period; default bail becomes the right of the detained
> person”.

33. In view of the above ratio, I hold that the order granting bail under Section
167(2) Cr.P.C., by the learned Judicial Magistrate has to be upheld in C.M.P.No.
3002 of 2023 dated 13.07.2023. 34. The other aspect is whether the Magistrate could
impose conditions while granting bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.

35. In Rakesh Kumar Paul [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 :(
2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 401], where the investigation is not completed within 60 days 
or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet is filed by 60th or 90th day,
the accused gets an “indefeasible right” to default bail, and the accused becomes
entitled to default bail once the accused applies for default bail and furnish bail.
Therefore, the only requirement for getting the default bail/statutory bail under
Section 167(2) CrPC is that the accused is in jail for more than 60 or 90 days, 
as the case may be, and within 60 or 90 days, as the case may be, the investigation
is not completed and no charge-sheet is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused
applies for default bail and is prepared to furnish bail. No other condition of 
deposit of the alleged amount involved can be imposed. Imposing such condition while
releasing the accused on default bail/statutory bail would frustrate the very object
and purpose of default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. As observed by this Court
in Rakesh Kumar Paul [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 : (2018)
1 SCC (Cri) 401] and in other decisions, the accused is entitled to default bail/
statutory bail, subject to the eventuality occurring in Section 167 CrPC, investigation
is not completed within 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no chargesheet
is filed by 60th or 90th day and the accused applies for default bail and is prepared
to furnish bail.

36. In view of the reasons stated, the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate 
No.I, Ulundurpet in C.M.P.No. 3002 of 2023 dated 13.07.2023 is upheld. This Petition
stands dismissed.

##### **Party**

J**aya Selvi … Petitioner/Defacto Complainant vs. 1. State By: The Station House
Officer Elavanasoorkottai Police Station Kallakurichi District. … Respondent/Respondent
2. Amalameri … Respondent/Accused-1, Crl.O.P.No.18509 Of 2023 ,Dated On – 30, November
2023** – **coram:- In The High Court Of Judicature At The Hon’ble Mr. Justice C.
V.Karthikeyan**

**[https://mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/index.php/casestatus/viewpdf/1086995](https://mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/index.php/casestatus/viewpdf/1086995)**

**[Jaya-Selvi-vs.-The-SHO-Elavanasoorkottai-Police-Station-TNPID](http://localhost:8080/section1/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Jaya-Selvi-vs.-The-SHO-Elavanasoorkottai-Police-Station-TNPID.pdf)**

##### **Author’s note (by Ramprakash Rajagopal with the permission of Reshma Azath)**

It is the case of the prosecution that the accused were running a chit fund and 
had cheated the petitioner to a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-.

Here, if a chit fund establishment is involved in cheating by not returning the 
deposit money is a serious offence as per section 5 of Tamil Nadu Protection of 
Interests of Depositors (In Financial Establishments) Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu Act 
44 of 1997) [**in short TNPID Act**] which is read as follows:

> “**section 5:** Default in repayment of deposits and interest honouring the commitment.–
> Notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter II, where any Financial Establishment
> defaults the return of the deposit or defaults the payment of interest on the 
> deposit, or fails to return in any kind, or fails to render service for which 
> the deposit has been made, every person responsible for the management of the 
> affairs of the Financial Establishment shall be punished with imprisonment for
> a term which may extend to ten years and with fine which may extend to one lakh
> of rupees and such Financial Establishment is also liable for a fine which may
> extend to one lakh of rupees.”

Right, now the core question is Whether the Chit fund establishment (though not 
registered as company) would come within the purview of section 2(2) & (3) of TNPID
Act? and, The answer is ‘Yes’ as declared by the Hon’ble Madras High Court in **
[S.Nandhini vs.State of Inspectof or Police, Economic Offence Wing-II](https://mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/index.php/casestatus/viewpdf/436877)–(
Coram: Lordship Mr. Justice N. Anand Venkatesh, J) – Criminal Original Petition 
No. 7112 of 2017; Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 5146 of 2017, 5147of 2017,
16479 of 2018 – 22-01-2019 reported in** **(2019) 1 LW(Cri) 197 **the relevant paragraph
is reproduced as follows:

> “23. The nature of transaction in this case involves deposits made by the general
> public. Deposits by its very nature creates an obligation to the person who receives
> it to return it to the person who made the deposit. The definition of the term
> deposit under Section 2(2) of the Act, will also take within its fold the amount
> received by any person or entity in the name of subscription for a chit transaction.
> If this subscription amount is not repaid and a default is committed, naturally
> it becomes an offence under Section 5 of the Act. The definition of the term deposit
> under Section 2(2) r/w Section 5 of the Act, clearly takes within its fold the
> subscription/deposits received in the name of a chit transaction and giving it
> a restricted meaning, will defeat the very object of the Act”.

Therefore, as we have learned from the aforesaid judgment that cheating by Chit 
fund financial establishment is a serious offence and not a Magisterial offence 
which shall be triable only by the TNPID Special Court.

Now another question arises whether the Special Judge of TNPID Special Court is 
a ‘Session Judge’ or not is no longer res-integra inasmuch as the legal position
was very much settled by the Hon’ble Madras of Madras High Court Division Bench 
in **[G. Sheik Mohaideen vs. S. Deivendran](https://mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/index.php/casestatus/viewpdf/157368)–(
Before : M. Sathyanarayanan and P.N. Prakash, JJ)  – Criminal Revision Case No. 
841 of 2011 – 07-06-2018 reported in (2018) 1 LW (Cri) 841 : (2018) 2 MWN(Cri) 229:(
2018) 3 MLJ (Criminal) 1 (Mad-DB) **and the relevant paragraph is reproduced as 
follows:

 

> “25. In fine, we hold that:
> A Special Court constituted under the TNPID Act is not a Court of Magistrate. 
> The Presiding Officer of the Special Court can only be a person of the cadre of
> a District and Sessions Judge. As a sequitur, we hold that appeals from judgments
> of convictions or acquittals passed by a Special Court under the TNPID Act would
> lie to the High Courtunder Chapter XXIX Cr.P.C., irrespective of the quantum of
> sentence.
> An appeal under Section 11 of the TNPID Act is confined to the orders passed by
> the Special Court under Sections 7 to 10 of the TNPID Act and under the Code of
> Civil Procedure, 1908 and will not include judgments of convictions or acquittals.
> The law laid down in Antony **[Antony and 3 others Vs. the State represented by
> Inspector of Police, Economic Offences Wing-II, Nagercoil, Kanyakumari District,(
> 2011) 2 LW(Crl) 298]** to the extent that it is inconsistent with the law laid
> downherein, will stand overruled”.

Now, despite to the aforesaid pronunciations of the Madras High Court judgments 
The Station House Officer Elavanasoorkottai Police Station Kallakurichi District
has sent the First Information Report to the Learned Judicial Magistrate court, 
Ulundurpet. The Station House Officer ought to have forward the concerned FIR to
the TNPID Special court inasmuch as the Special court holds the original jurisdiction
to grant, reject or cancel bail application.  

In the present case, the advocates who argued the petition did not bring the aforesaid
judgments and Act to the notice of the Hon’ble Madras High Court single bench.

Finally, the question of law emerges now is, Whether the bail granted by the Learned
Magistrate under section 167 (2) Cr.P.C is “**legal**” inasmuch as the TNPID Special
Court holds the original jurisdiction? I leave it to the readers.

Yours,

Ramprakash Rajagopal,

Advocate, Tamilnadu.

##### **Further study**

 * [**N.I Act appeal: Deposit of 20% is not an absolute rule may be reduced or even exempted**](http://localhost:8080/section1/n-i-act-appeal-deposit-of-20-is-not-an-absolute-rule-may-be-reduced-or-even-exempted/)
 * **[Section 167 crpc: Accused cannot claim default bail on the ground that the further investigation against other accused is pending](http://localhost:8080/section1/section-167-crpc-accused-cannot-claim-default-bail-on-the-ground-that-the-further-investigation-against-other-accused-is-pending/)**
 * **[SECTION 167 Cr.P.C & CONDITION](http://localhost:8080/section1/section-167-cr-p-c-condition/)**
 * **[BAIL – BAIL CAN BE GRANTED DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED IF HE IS IN POLICE CUSTODY](http://localhost:8080/section1/bail-can-be-granted-despite-the-presence-of-the-accused-if-he-is-in-police-custody/)**
 * **[Bail condition: Concerned court may consider for misappropriated money should be allowed to be deposited before the order of Anticipatory bail or bail](http://localhost:8080/section1/concerned-court-may-consider-misappropriated-money-should-be-allowed-to-be-deposited-before-the-order-of-anticipatory-bail-or-bail/)**

### Further Study

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