# Whether first complaint is maintainable if second complaint for dishonour of cheques based on compromise deed filed?

- Link: https://section1.in/whether-first-complaint-is-maintainable-if-second-complaint-for-dishonour-of-cheques-based-on-compromise-deed-filed/
- Published: 2023-03-12T09:58:28+00:00
- Author: Ramprakash Rajagopal

Contents

 * [Multiplicity of proceedings](https://section1.in/whether-first-complaint-is-maintainable-if-second-complaint-for-dishonour-of-cheques-based-on-compromise-deed-filed/#multiplicity-of-proceedings)
 * [Conclusion](https://section1.in/whether-first-complaint-is-maintainable-if-second-complaint-for-dishonour-of-cheques-based-on-compromise-deed-filed/#conclusion)
 * [Party](https://section1.in/whether-first-complaint-is-maintainable-if-second-complaint-for-dishonour-of-cheques-based-on-compromise-deed-filed/#party)

23 The question before this Court is whether parallel prosecutions arising from 
a single transaction under Section 138 of the NI Act can be sustained. In this case,
a set of cheques were dishonoured, leading to filing of the first complaint under
Section 138 of the NI Act. The parties thereafter entered into a deed of compromise
to settle the matter. While the first complaint was pending, the cheques issued 
pursuant to the compromise deed were dishonoured leading to the second complaint
under Section 138 of the NI Act. Both proceedings are pending simultaneously and
it is for this Court to decide whether the complainant can be allowed to pursue 
both the cases or whether one of them must be quashed and the consequences resulting
from such quashing.

25 The ingredients of the offence under Section 138 are:

> (i) The drawing of a cheque by person on an account maintained by him with the
> banker for the payment of any amount of money to another from that account;
> (ii) The cheque being drawn for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt 
> or other liability;
> (iii) Presentation of the cheque to the bank;
> (iv) The return of the cheque by the drawee bank as unpaid either because the 
> amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour
> the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account;
> (v) A notice by the payee or the holder in due course making a demand for the 
> payment of the amount to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt
> of information from the bank in regard to the return of the cheque; and
> (vi) The drawer of the cheque failing to make payment of the amount of money to
> the payee or the holder in due course within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

26 The ingredients of the offence were summarized in fairly similar terms in a judgment
of a two judge Bench of this Court in K Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan [(1999)
7 SCC 510] Justice K T Thomas observed:

> “14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation
> of a number of acts. The following are the acts which are components of the said
> offence: (1) drawing of the cheque, (2) presentation of the cheque to the bank,(
> 3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) giving notice in writing
> to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure
> of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.”

27** The nature of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is quasi-criminal
in that, while it arises out of a civil wrong, the law, however, imposes a criminal
penalty in the form of imprisonment or fine. The purpose of the enactment is to 
provide security to creditors and instil confidence in the banking system of the
country. The nature of the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act was considered
by a three judge Bench decision of this Court in P Mohanraj and Others v. Shah Brothers
Ispat Private Limited [(2021) 6 SCC 258], where Justice RF Nariman, after adverting
to the precedents of this Court, observed that:**

> “53. A perusal of the judgment in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas [S.A.L. Narayan Row v. 
> Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, (1966) 1 SCR 190 : AIR 1965 SC 1818] would show that a civil
> proceeding is not necessarily a proceeding which begins with the filing of a suit
> and culminates in execution of a decree. It would include a revenue proceeding
> as well as a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the
> reliefs therein are to enforce rights of a civil nature. Interestingly, criminal
> proceedings are stated to be proceedings in which the larger interest of the State
> is concerned. Given these tests, it is clear that a Section 138 proceeding can
> be said to be a “civil sheep” in a “criminal wolf’s” clothing, as it is the interest
> of the victim that is sought to be protected, the larger interest of the State
> being subsumed in the victim alone moving a court in cheque bouncing cases, as
> has been seen by us in the analysis made hereinabove of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable
> Instruments Act.”

28 Given that the primary purpose of Section 138 of the NI Act is to ensure compensation
to the complainant, the NI Act also allows for parties to enter into a compromise,
both during the pendency of the complaint and even after the conviction of the accused.
The decision of this Court in Meters and Instruments (P) Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta [(
2018) 1 SCC 560] summarises the objective of allowing compounding of an offence 
under Section 138 of the NI Act:

> “18.2. The object of the provision being primarily compensatory, punitive element
> being mainly with the object of enforcing the compensatory element, compounding
> at the initial stage has to be encouraged but is not debarred at later stage subject
> to appropriate compensation as may be found acceptable to the parties or the court.”

31 Thus, under the shadow of Section 138 of the NI Act, parties are encouraged to
settle the dispute resulting in ultimate closure of the case rather than continuing
with a protracted litigation before the court. This is beneficial for the complainant
as it results in early recovery of money; alteration of the terms of the contract
for higher compensation and avoidance of litigation. Equally, the accused is benefitted
as it leads to avoidance of a conviction and sentence or payment of a fine. It also
leads to unburdening of the judicial system, which has a huge pendency of complaints
filed under Section 138 of the NI Act. In Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) this Court had
emphasised that the compensatory aspect of the remedy under Section 138 of the NI
Act must be preferred and has encouraged litigants to resolve disputes amicably.

##### **Multiplicity of proceedings**

33 The pendency of court proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act and the multiplicity
of complaints in which a cause of action arising from one transaction is litigated
has dampened the ease of doing business in India, impacted business sentiments and
hindered investments from investors. Recognising these issues, the Ministry of Finance
by a notice [https://financialservices.gov.in/sites/default/files/Decriminalization%
20-%20Public%20Comments.pdf] dated 8 June 2020, has sought comments regarding decriminalisation
of minor offences, including Section 138 of the NI Act, to improve the business 
sentiment in the country.

34 It is in this backdrop that we must now analyse the issue regarding pendency 
of parallel proceedings for complaints under Section 138 of the NI Act. The question
that arises for our consideration is whether once the settlement has been entered
into, the complainant can be allowed to pursue the original complaint under Section
138 of the NI Act.

37 Allowing prosecution under both sets of complaints would be contrary to the purpose
of the enactment. As noted above, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy that
should be given priority as opposed to the punitive aspect. The complainant in such
cases is primarily concerned with the recovery of money, the conviction of the accused
serves little purpose. In fact, the threat of jail acts as a stick to ensure payment
of money. This Court in R. Vijayan v. Baby [(2012) 1 SCC 260] has emphasised how
punishment of the offender is of a secondary concern for the complainant in the 
following terms:

> “17. **The apparent intention is to ensure that not only the offender is punished,
> but also ensure that the complainant invariably receives the amount of the cheque
> by way of compensation Under Section 357(1)(b) of the Code. Though a complaint
> Under Section 138 of the Act is in regard to criminal liability for the offence
> of dishonouring the cheque and not for the recovery of the cheque amount (which
> strictly speaking, has to be enforced by a civil suit), in practice once the criminal
> complaint is lodged Under Section 138 of the Act, a civil suit is seldom filed
> to recover the amount of the cheque. This is because of the provision enabling
> the court to levy a fine linked to the cheque amount and the usual direction in
> such cases is for payment as compensation, the cheque amount, as loss incurred
> by the complainant on account of dishonour of cheque. Under Section 357(1)(b) 
> of the Code and the provision for compounding the offences Under Section 138 of
> the Act most of the cases (except those where liability is denied) get compounded
> at one stage or the other by payment of the cheque amount with or without interest.
> Even where the offence is not compounded, the courts tend to direct payment of
> compensation equal to the cheque amount (or even something more towards interest)
> by levying a fine commensurate with the cheque amount. A stage has reached when
> most of the complainants, in particular the financing institutions (particularly
> private financiers) view the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, as a proceeding
> for the recovery of the cheque amount, the punishment of the drawer of the cheque
> for the offence of dishonour, becoming secondary.”**

38. When a complainant party enters into a compromise agreement with the accused,
it may be for a multitude of reasons – higher compensation, faster recovery of money,
uncertainty of trial and strength of the complaint, among others. A complainant 
enters into a settlement with open eyes and undertakes the risk of the accused failing
to honour the cheques issued pursuant to the settlement, based on certain benefits
that the settlement agreement postulates. Once parties have voluntarily entered 
into such an agreement and agree to abide by the consequences of non-compliance 
of the settlement agreement, they cannot be allowed to reverse the effects of the
agreement by pursuing both the original complaint and the subsequent complaint arising
from such non-compliance. The settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint.
Non-compliance of the terms of the settlement agreement or dishonour of cheques 
issued subsequent to it, would then give rise to a fresh cause of action attracting
liability under Section 138 of the NI Act and other remedies under civil law and
criminal law.

40. Thus, in our view, a complainant cannot pursue two parallel prosecutions for
the same underlying transaction. Once a settlement agreement has been entered into
by the parties, the proceedings in the original complaint cannot be sustained and
a fresh cause of action accrues to the complainant under the terms of the settlement
deed. It has been urged by Mr V Giri, learned Senior Counsel, and Ms Liz Mathew,
learned counsel, that parallel prosecutions would not lead to a multiplicity of 
proceedings, as in the present case, both complaints are being tried by the same
court. This may be true for the case before us, however, this Court in Damodar S.
Prabhu (supra) and Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases (supra) has recognized multiplicity
of complaints as one of the major reasons for delay in trial of cases under Section
138 of the NI Act and the consequent choking of the criminal justice system by a
disproportionate number of Section 138 cases. While it is true that the trial in
this case is before one court, that is not necessarily the ground reality in all
cases.

##### **Conclusion**

45. Based on the discussion above, in our opinion, once the compromise deed dated
12 March 2013 was agreed, the original complaint must be quashed and parties must
proceed with the remedies available in law under the settlement agreement.

##### **Party**

**M/S GIMPEX PRIVATE LIMITED vs. MANOJ GOEL – Criminal Appeal No. 1068 of 2021 –
OCTOBER 08, 2021 – [2021] 11 S.C.R. 432.**

**[Gimpex-private-limited vs Manoj goes](http://localhost:8080/section1/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/gimpex-private-limited-vs-Manoj-goes.pdf)**

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