REVISION
REVISION AGAINST INTERLOCUTORY / INTERMEDIATE / FINAL ORDERS:
INTERMEDIATE ORDER:
The concept of an intermediate order first found mention in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137 in which case the interpretation and impact of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. came up for consideration. This decision is important for two reasons. Firstly it gives the historical reason for the enactment of Section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C. and secondly considering that historical background, it gives a justification for a restrictive meaning to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Apex Court then continued to held that the concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind – an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue. The view expressed in Amar Nath and Madhu Limaye was followed in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 6 SCC 195 wherein a revision petition was filed challenging the taking of cognizance and issuance of a process[1].
INTERMEDIATE ORDER – DIFFERENT NAMES [quasi-final order]:
We may note that in different cases, different expressions are used for the same category of orders – sometimes it is called an intermediate order, sometimes a quasi-final order and sometimes it is called an order that is a matter of moment. Our preference is for the expression `intermediate order’ since that brings out the nature of the order more explicitly.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER:
The expression ‘interlocutory order’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. ordinarily and generally, the expression interlocutory order has been understood and taken to mean as a converse to the term ‘final order’. However, in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra[2], such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order was not accepted as this will render the revisional power conferred by section 397(1) Cr.P.C nugatory. After taking into consideration the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the object of conferring a power of revision on the court of sessions and the High Court, it was observed as follows:
“In such a situation, it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression ‘interlocutory order’ as invariably be converse of the words ‘final order’. There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami’s case [AIR 1949 PC 1], but yet it may not be an interlocutory order – pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate order”[3].
It is now well neigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for section 397(2) of the Cr.P.C, 1973, the sole test whether such order was passed during the interim stage[4]. The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objection would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in section 397(2) Cr.P.C[5].
The term ‘interlocutory order’ in S. 397 (2) of the Code has been used in a restricted sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against the order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S. 397 of the code. Thus for instance, orders summoning witness, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lay u/s. 397 (2) of the code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court[6]. An order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the code, is in the nature of peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under section 156(1)[7]. It is also to be noted that the order passed in the police custody application is not a final order and it has not been ended into finality and it is only an interlocutory order and hence, there is no need to file a revision and the Criminal Original Petition itself is maintainable[8].
Any order which substantially affects rights of accused or decides certain rights of parties is not an interlocutory order[9].
OBJECT OF REVISION
The object of the provisions of revision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law [Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460]. The main object is to setting aside the order already passed by the lower court.
WHEN CAN BE INVOKED?
The revisional jurisdiction of the Court u/s 397 CrPC can be exercised where there is
- palpable error (jurisdictional point of view),
-
non-compliance with the provisions of law,
-
the decision is completely erroneous or
-
where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily
[Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460]
Inbuilt hidden point: see section 465(2) Cr.P.C.
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION IS VERY LIMITED TO THE ABOVE 4 POINTS ONLY.
REVISION – APPEAL – DIFFERENCES:
The revisional court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. Revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction[10].
Viva Question: Main difference is if the accused did not take his defence as per Chapter IV IPC, he can very well take the same before the Appellate court, and the appellate court will not look into the objection raised because it is substantial law. But the scope of revision mainly concentrates on Procedural law hence the objection is necessary at the earliest point.
REVISION – STATEMENT MUST CONTAIN IN REVISION PETITION:
In order to ensure that no such application for revision was made to any court earlier, every applicant shall be asked to make a statement in his application for revision that he had not filed a similar revision application in any court previously in the matter[11].
REVISION – DISMISSAL CAN BE DONE AT THE THRESHOLD [which means revision is not a right as appeal]:
That apart, a 3 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, in Girish Kumar Suneja vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[12], has held that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is only an entitlement and not a right and that such a petition can be rejected even at the threshold.
REVISION – POWERS OF COURT:
Normally, a revisional jurisdiction should be exercised on a question of law. However, when factual appreciation is involved, then it must find place in the class of cases resulting in a perverse finding. Basically, the power is required to be exercised so that justice is done and there is no abuse of power by the Court. (see Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460))[13].
REVISION – NOTICE – ONLY IF THE JUDGE SATISFIES WITH THE PRIMA FACIE:
As the High Court hears the counsel appearing for the petitioners in Criminal Revision petitions, the Sessions Jude is also bound to hear the counsel and only if the Judge is prima facie satisfied of the existence of any merit in the petition need he issue notice on the revision petition. In other words, no person as of right can invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court and ask that court to issue notice on the revision petition[14].
SECOND REVISION:
The language of section 397 (3) & section 399 (3) Cr.P.C altogether makes it abundantly clear that a second revision is not maintainable under section 397 (3) as well as section 399 (3) Cr.P.C. The position of law is settled in Asgar Khan v. State of U.P[15].
In view of the above cited ruling rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the second revision viz., this petition filed by the petitioner under section 482 Cr.P.C is not at all maintainable according to law. Hence, in view of the above circumstances, this petition is liable to be dismissed[16].
It is trite that, a second revision is not maintainable at the instance of the party who has already exhausted his remedy by invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. In extraordinary cases, where there is gross injustice is ensued, a petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C before this Court is maintainable[17].
DELAY IN FILING REVISION:
Supreme Court has held that the high court had condoned the delay on the ground that mere technicalities should not come in the way of rendering justice. While there can be no dispute with the above proposition, we do not see how the same could have had any application to the present case. It was the duty of the High Court to consider the reasons assigned for the delay and thereafter come to the conclusion whether, on the grounds shown, sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act has been made out[18].
REVISION BY THIRD PARTY:
In J.M.Arumugam and another vs. State[19] Madras High Court has held that a third party to a criminal proceeding, has not right of subrogation for stepping into the shoes of the defacto-complainant and continue the prosecution case. As per the criminal jurisprudence the state has prosecuted the case, based on the complaint by assuming the role of the victim, as a crime is a wrong against the entire society. However, if it is a private wrong, it can be construed only as a tort for which, the affected party alone can seek the remedy by claiming damages. In a criminal case, for the benefit of a convicted accused, one can maintain public interest litigation to meet the ends of justice, in order to safeguard human rights, however, the same would not be available to any third party to proceed against the accused, based on the complaint given by a defacto-complainant and if it is permitted that would amount to opening of the flood gate, whereby permitting private persons, seeking remedy for their private vengeance and there would be no end for the same. Madras High Court then concluded that third party to a criminal proceedings is not legally entitled to maintain criminal revision against discharge or acquittal recorded by the trial court, unless he is also an aggrieved person[20].
Victim rights:
1) Sivasubramanian vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its secretary to Government, Legal Department, Secretariat, Chennai – W.P (MD) NO. 21119 of 2019 – dt:01.10.2019 – Madras Division Bench.
2) Jagjeet Singh and Others vs. Ashish Mishra @ Monu and another – Crl.Apl.No: 632 of 2022 – dt:18.04.2022 – Hon’ble Apex Court 3 Judge Bench].
REVISION MUST BE IN WRITING (detailed orders):
The High Court, therefore, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction u/s 397 r/w s. 401 Cr.P.C was required to assign reasons in support of its conclusions as to how the reasons assigned by the Learned Trial Judge were unteanable and/or were otherwise insufficient[21].
REVISION – NO CRYPTIC ORDER:
We find that the High Court has, by a cryptic order, dismissed the revision petition. It has not noticed the various submissions made by the appellant, as noticed above. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh consideration in accordance with law[22].
REVISION – ADVERSE REMARKS/FINDINGS:
If a Judge writes in his judgment that the accused will marry another girl and live happily is a remarks or findings against that accused.
In my considered view, in such a situation, the remedy available for the Accused is in the form of Revision under Sections 397 & 401 of the Code, for Section 397 of the Code, states that any finding could also be challenged by the aggrieved. The Division Bench has not adverted to this aspect of Sections 397 & 401 of the Code. The Division Bench simply has held that like “any other order”, an acquittal cannot be challenged by an acquitted person. But, the grounds upon which he was acquitted; the adverse remarks made against him; and the adverse findings made against him; are all matters, which fall under the term “findings” as employed in Section 397 of the Code and therefore, they are all revisable[23].
INSTANCES
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER – NON-BAILABLE WARRANT:
In the opinion of this Court, issuance of Non-Bailable Warrant is not a final order, but, it is only an interlocutory order and it is always open to the petitioner to surrender before the trial Court and pray for its recall[24].
REVISION – REASONING ORDER IN INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS not necessary: We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrate and Session Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them[25].
SUSPENSION OF SENTENCE – REVISION – SURRENDER NOT NECESSARY:
In so far as the ‘relief of suspension of sentence’, it is to be mentioned that in respect of Revision against the conviction, an accused need not surrender and undergo confinement for seeking the relief of suspension of sentence pending disposal of the Criminal Revision. However, the Revisional Court may decline to exercise power under section 397(1) of Cr.P.C., to suspend the sentence imposed on the accused, considering the merits of each case in respect of the seriousness and gravity of offence and also the incarceration of an accused coupled with etc[26].
REVISION – AGAINST CONDONATION PETITION:
Whether the impugned order dismissing the petition u/s 142 (b) of N.I Act for condoning the delay is an interlocutory in nature?
An order which overrides important rights and liabilities cannot be termed as interlocutory. This dictum has been held in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana (AIR 1977 SC 2185=1978 L.W (Cri) 40]. Further, an interlocutory order is not revisable. The purpose of section 397 Cr.P.C, 1973, is to keep such an order outside the purview of the power of revision so that the enquiry or trial may proceed without delay. An interlocutory order is one made or given during the progress of an action. It does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. It will be difficult to provide a straight jacket formula. The real test would be that if the judgment or the order disposes of the rights of the parties, it would be a final order. If it does not dispose of the rights of the parties, it would be an interlocutory order. If the order is merely a step-in-aid to adjudicate the rights, in that event, it cannot be termed to be a final order. This principle is laid down in Lakhwinder v. C.B.I [1998 Cr.L.J 258 (P&H). Finally, quoting the above judgments Madras High Court finally concluded that, the order dismissing the delay condonation petition is not an interlocutory one but it is a final order[27].
REVISION – PHOTO COPIES IN REVISIONAL STAGE [introduction of evidence cannot be done]:
Supreme Court held that we see no error or perversity in the view taken by the High Court that in a revision petition photocopies of documents produced by the accused for the first time, could not be entertained and made a basis for setting aside an order passed by the trial court and dismissing a complaint which otherwise made out the commission of an offence. Supreme court further held that we do not think that we can possibility look into document without proper proof and without verification of its genuineness. There was and is no clear and unequivocal admission on the record, at least none was brought to our notice, regarding the genuineness of the document or its probative value[28].
WHETHER CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION AGAINST THE ORDER OF SUMMONING IS MAINTAINABLE?
In view of the above legal position, we hold, as it must be, that revisional jurisdiction under section 397 Criminal Procedure Code was available to the respondent NO.2 in challenging the order of the Magistrate directing issuance of summons. The first question is answered against the appellant accordingly[29].
The High Court of Karnataka has dismissed the petitions for quashing of the criminal proceedings filed by the appellants on the ground that this Court in Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh [(2013) 15 SCC 624] has laid down the law that an order summoning the accused is revisable under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and hence the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not be maintainable. We disagree with the view of the High Court. On a plain reading of the judgment of this Court in Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh (supra) no such proposition of law has been laid down. In fact, in paragraph 21.3 this Court has held to the contrary i.e. the power under Section 482 would always be available to challenge an order issuing process or summons[30].
REVISION – FRAMING OF CHARGE [example POCSO and rape 375 sixthly]:
It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charges the High Court should not exercise its powers of revision by way of quashing the charges by confining its attention only to the recitals in the FIR. An FIR can never represent the entire evidence of the case[31].
Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the First Information Report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged[32].
The scope of interference and exercise of jurisdiction under section 397 of Code of Criminal Procedure has been time and again explained by this court. Further, the scope of interference under section 397, Cr.P.C at a stage, when charge had been framed, is also well-settled. Further Supreme Court quoting Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another[33] set aside the order of the High Court quashing the charges in revision and allowed the appeal[34].
Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to re-appreciate the matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no mandatory time limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer, duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated. Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the High Courts or other courts relating to PC Act or all other civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six months from today unless extended by a speaking order on above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil and criminal appellate/revisional courts under the jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on expiry of above period, resume the proceedings without waiting for any other intimation unless express order extending stay is produced[35].
REVISION – DISCHARGE:
The High Court has committed jurisdictional error by not entertaining the revision petition on merits and overlooking the fact that ‘discharge’ is a valuable right provided to the accused[36].
REVISION – AGAINST APPEAL [BECAUSE THE CONCEPT OF SECOND APPEAL DOES NOT EXIST IN CR.P.C]:
A revision against an appellate judgment of a Criminal Court is maintainable before the High Court but the same has its own limitations[37].
REVISION – AGAINST ACQUITTAL [but cannot turn the acquittal into conviction as per section 401(4) Cr.P.C]:
The revision court, would at most, interfere with the order of court below, only when there is a mis-reading of the evidence or overlooking of an important evidence, or any legal flaw[38].
What about sessions judge?
Sessions Judge has no such power as High Court has under section 401(4) Cr.P.C.
If we read section 397 Cr.P.C the power of High Court u/s 401(4) cr.p.c is absent here.
But u/s 399 Cr.P.C under session judge’s power of revision:
- u/s 399(1) cr.p.c – the sessions judge may exercise all or any of the powers of high court as per section 401(1).
-
But, 2,3,4, and 5 shall be construed as references to the sessions judge.
REVISION – SECTION 401(3) – 386(A) CR.P.C:
Section 386(a) thus authorises the appellate court to reverse an order of acquittal, find the accused guilty and pass sentence on the person found guilty. However, section 401(3) of the Code contemplates that the power of revision does not authorise a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. On the face of it, the High Court while exercising the powers of revision can exercise all those powers which have been conferred on the court of appeal u/s 386 of the Code but, in view of section 401(3) of the Code, while exercising such power, cannot convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. However, in a case where the finding of acquittal is recorded on account of misreading of evidence or non-consideration of evidence or perverse appreciation of evidence, nothing prevents the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal at the instance of the informant in revision and directing fresh disposal on merit by the trial court. In the event of such direction, the trial court shall be obliged to re-appraise the evidence in light of the observations of the revisional court on the merit of the case[39].
RETRIAL – EVIDENCE ALREADY RECORDED CANNOT BE ERASED:
So far as the position of law is concerned we are very clear that even if a retrial is directed in exercise of revisional powers by the High Court, the evidence already recorded at the initial trial cannot be erased or wiped out from the record of the case. The trial Judge has to decide the case on the basis of the evidence already on record and the additional evidence which would be recorded on retrial[40].
POWER OF MAGISTRATE TO TAKE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE AFTER REMAND OF CASE BY REVISIONAL COURT :
Where the revisional court u/s 398 CrPC had remanded the case to Magistrate to hold further enquiry, the direction does not necessarily oblige the Magistrate to record any further evidence. However, if prima facie case is made out, recording of further evidence by magistrate will not vitiate proceedings. See… 2011 CrLJ 87 (SC).
MATTER SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT WHEN SUFFICIENT MATERIAL FOR DECIDING THE CASE FINALLY IS ALREADY THERE BEFORE THE REVISIONAL/APPELLATE COURT :
In the case noted below, the Magistrate had convicted the revisionist for the offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and had sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for two months along with a fine of Rupees 5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month and also awarded a compensation of Rs. three lakhs payable to the respondent/complainant. While deciding the criminal revision u/s 401 CrPC, the High Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate for fresh 15 decision. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court by observing that when sufficient material was there before the High Court, it ought to have finally decided the matter itself and remanding it to the Magistrate for fresh decision was not proper for the High Court. See: Susanta Dey Vs. Babli Majumdar, AIR 2019 SC 1661.
REVISION – AGAINST REMAND:
The order of remand has no bearing on the proceedings of the trial itself nor it can have any effect on the ultimate decision of the case. If an order of remand is found to be illegal, it cannot result in acquittal of the accused or in termination of proceedings. A remand order cannot affect the progress of the trial or its decision in any manner. Therefore, applying the test laid down in Madhu Limaye case, it cannot be categorised even as an ‘intermediate order’. The order is, therefore, a pure and simple interlocutory order and in view of the bar created by 397 (2) Cr.P.C, a revision against the said order is not maintainable[41].
But to the contra Madras high court in K.S.Palanichamy vs. State[42] after discussed Jeyandra Saraswati Swamigal vs. State allowed a Criminal Revision case by setting aside a remand order to police custody u/s 167 (2) Cr.P.C. So also, Gujarat High Court in such a matter (i.e., revision against the remand order) after quoting the Joy Immaculate (supra) case held that if the remand is rejected and the remand of the accused is not given it would adversely affect the right of the prosecution to carry out further investigation and in a given situation the investigation may not be able to make any progress and therefore considering the aforesaid observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it cannot be said that the order passed by the Sessions Court is without jurisdiction[43].
1. REVISION – AGAINST THE ORDER OF INVESTIGATION BY MAGISTRATE U/S. 156(3) OR 202 OF THE CODE – PURELY INTERLOCUTORY – NO RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ARE AFFECTED: BUT IF COGNIZANCE IS TAKEN ON THAT PETITION THEN REVISION LIES:
The accused does not have any right to be heard before he is summoned by the court under the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he has got no right to raise any objection till the stage of summoning and resultantly he cannot be conferred with a right to challenge the order passed prior to his summoning[44]. At the stage of 156(3) of the code, the prospective accused cannot step in before the Magistrate and interfere with the investigation by challenging a direction for registration of the F.I.R, when he cannot even participate in the investigation, which is conducted ex parte at this stage. It was observed by the Supreme Court even if a statutory bar for taking cognizance is raised on the ground that the cognizance is raised on the ground that the complaint was barred by limitation u/s. 468 of the code, the appropriate stage for the accused to raise this objection was at the stage of framing of charges[45]. In the other hand even where a jurisdictional bar to proceed with a case, in the absence of certain preconditions as required u/s. 195 Cr.P.C is claimed, no embargo can be placed on the power of the police to investigate. The bar, if at all, could only be considered at the stage when the court decides to take cognizance of the case[46]. We thus see that the orders for investigation are only an ancillary step in aid of the investigation or trial, and are clearly interlocutory in nature, similar to orders granting bail, or calling for records, or issuing search warrants, or summoning witnesses and other like matters which infringe no valuable rights of the prospective accused, and are not amenable to challenge in a criminal revision, in view of the bar contained in Section 397(2) of the code[47]. And also the Apex in its judgment[48] promulgate that the direction for investigation passed by the Magistrate under Section 156 (3) is purely interlocutory in nature, and involves no substantial rights of the parties, we are of the view that the bar u/s. 397(2) Cr.P.C to the entertainment of a Criminal Revision can also not be circumvented by moving an application u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. conducting an investigation is the plenary power of the police in an cognizable offence. The police authorities are exercising their statutory powers u/Ss. 154 & 156 of the code, and even the High Court in its inherent powers u/s. 482 Cr.P.C cannot interfere with the exercise of this statutory power, and also held that an application u/s. 482 Cr.P.C would also not lie against an order for investigation u/s. 156(3) Cr.P.C which is an adjunct to the police power to investigate in Chapter XII of the code[49]. In view of the above it is clear and evident that the revision against that the order u/s. 156(3) of the Code Directing the police to investigate is clearly an interlocutory order and a Criminal Revision so also an order u/s. 482 Cr.P.C against the same is barred in view of Section. 397 (2) of the code.
REVISION – AGAINST 91 & 311 CR.P.C – NO:
Supreme Court has once had occasion to speak about revision against the order of 91 & 311, and held that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defense that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable[50].
REVISION – AGAINST 319 CR.P.C – YES:
When there is specific remedy provided by way of appeal or revision, inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C cannot and should not be resorted to. Complaint was not justified in approaching High Court u/s 482 against an order passed u/s 319 Cr.P.C refusing to issue summons to appellants when remedy of revision u/ss 397/401 Cr.P.C there against was available to him[51].
REVISION – AGAINST PROCLAIMED OFFENDER:
Therefore, in such circumstances, i have every reason to believe that the respondent is absconding and to declare him as a proclaimed offender. Hence, i set aside the order of the learned Magistrate and direct him to pass an order under section 82 Cr.P.C and give other directions, as contemplated under the other provisions of the Cr.P.C. Accordingly, this revision is allowed. The Magistrate is directed to comply with the orders within 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order[52].
FINDINGS OF FACTS RECORDED BY LOWER COURT NOT TO BE ALTERED BY REVISIONAL COURT MERELY BECAUSE ANOTHER VIEW ON THE SAME EVIDENCE IS POSSIBLE :
Where in a case of maintenance filed by wife u/s 125 CrPC, the High Court had altered the findings of facts recorded by the Magistrate in its revisional powers u/s 401 CrPC even when the said findings of facts recorded by the Magistrate were neither perverse nor erroneous but based on proper appreciation of evidence on record, setting aside the order of the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has ruled that the High Court in its revisional powers could not have interfered with the findings of facts recorded by the lower court only because the High Court could have arrived at a different or another conclusion.
See : (i) State of T.N. Vs. Mariya Anton Vijay, (2015) 9 SCC 294 (paras 65 & 66) (ii) Shamima Farooqui Vs. Shahid Khan, (2015) 5 SCC 705.
QUANTUM OF MAINTENANCE NOT TO BE QUESTIONED IN REVISION :
Finding of fact on quantum of maintenance cannot be ordinarily disturbed in revision (by High Court). See : Mst. Jagir Kaur Vs. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521.
STAY
Wherever stay is granted, a speaking order must be passed showing that the case was of exceptional nature and delay on account of stay will not prejudice the interest of speedy trial in a corruption case. Once stay is granted, proceedings should not be adjourned and concluded within two-three months. Further Supreme Court has held that In view of above, situation of proceedings remaining pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied. Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not taken up. In an attempt to remedy this, situation, we consider it appropriate to direct that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order. The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalized. The trial Court where order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced[53].
[1] Girish Kumar Suneja vs C.B.I – (2017) 7 Scale 661=(2017) 14 SCC 809=(2018) 1 SCC(Cri) 202=2017 AIR SCW 3620=AIR 2017 SC 3620.
[2] AIR 1978 SC 47=1978 Cr.L.J 165 (para 13)
[3] State vs. N.M.T.Joy Immoculate – AIR 2004 SC 2282 [bench of 3 judges]
[4] AIR 1977 SC 2185-1977 CR.L.J 1891 – AMARNATH VS. STATE OF HARYANA; AIR 1978 SC 47 = 1978 CR.L.J 165 – MADHU LIMAYE VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA; AIR 1980 SC 962=1980CR.L.J 690 – V.C.SHUKLA VS. STATE; 1999 AIR SCW 660=AIR1999 SC 1028=A999 CR.L.J 1620 – RAJENDRA KUMAR PANDE VS. UTTAM.
[5] AIR 2000 SC 3346=2000 AIR SCW 3564 – K.K. Patel vs. State of Gujarat.
[6] Amarnath vs. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1977 SC 2185
[7] Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy vs. Narayan Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672
[8] 2011(2) LW (Cri) 603 – State vs. Thalapathi following V.C.Shukla vs. CBI – AIR 1980 SC 962=1980 Cri LJ 690=1980 SCC Cri 695=1980 Mad LJ (Cri) 664=1980 2 SCR 380=1980 2 SCJ 211
[9] Mohit @ Sonu and another vs. State of U.P – AIR 2013 SC 2248=2013(7) SCALE 620=(2013)7 SCC 789
[10] Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan Versus Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke & Others – 2015 (1) MLJ(Crl) 308 (SC).
[11] Law Commission Report – 73rd
[12] (2017) 14 SCC 809 followed in ANBARASU vs. MUKANCHAND BOTHRA – CRL RC.870/2017 – 24/07/2019.
[13] Chandra Babu @ Moses Versus State Through Inspector of Police & Others – 2015 CrLJ 4538 (SC).
[14] Venu vs. State of Kerala – (1986) MLJ (Crl) 3 (Ker)
[15]AIR 1981 SC 1169 followed in Sumit Rajan Chakraborty v. Tapas Kumar Nandi – 2012 (1) MWN (Cri) (DCC) 171 (Cal)
[16] D.Prabhu Srinivasan vs. Dr.G.Ramaprabha – 2014-2-L.W (Cri) 133
[17] S.Nallaperumal vs. Suguna – Crl.O.P No: 2264 of 2012; Dt: 24.4.2015
[18]SC – Kumar etc. vs. Karnataka Industrial Co.Op Bank Ltd & Anr – Crl.App No. 2049-2066 of 2012 (SLP (Cri) Nos. 5206-5223 of 2011).
[19]2009(2) MWN (CRI) 95 (MAD)
[20] P.Ravindran vs. State – 2010(1) TNLR 334 (Mad)
[21] CBI vs. Tuncay Alankus – (2013)9 SCC 611=(2014)1 SCC (Cri) 182
[22] Shivanth Prasad vs. The State of Bihar – 2008(2) MWN (Cri) 496 (SC)
[23] E.Kalivarathan vs. The State – 2015(1) CTC 87
[24] J.Mugundan vs. The State – CRL.O.P.No.18012 of 2020 – 20.11.2020.
[25] Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of W.B – AIR 2000 SC 522=2000(1) Crimes 96(SC)=2000 Cr.L.J 746(SC)
[26] Markandan vs. Inspector of Police – 2007(1) MLJ (Crl) 210 (Mad) followed in M. Senthilkumar Versus P. Ramalingam – Crl.R.C.(MD)No. 588 of 2015 & M.P.(MD).No. 1 of 2015 – dt. 18-01-2016.
[27] S.K.A.P.Bala Krishnan v. Jimmy – 2010-2-L.W (Cri) 1200 (Mad)
[28] Helios & Matheson Infom .Tech v. Rajeev Saw – 2012-1-L.W (Cri) 353 (SC)
[29] Om Kr. Dhankar vs. State of Haryana – 2012(2) CTC 871 (SC)=2012(3) MLJ (Cri) 563 (SC)=2012(11) SCC 2522012(3) SCALE 363.
[30] Aroon Purie vs. Jayakumar Hiremath – (2017) 7 SCC 767.
[31] Tej Bir v. State of Haryana – 2012 (3) SCJ 493= AIR 2012 SC 943=2012 Cr.L.J 488 (SC)=(2012)1 MLJ 510 (SC)=2011(5) SCALE 250=(2011)11 SCC 556.
[32] Munna Devi vs. State of Rajasthan and another – AIR 2002 SC 107=2002(1) Crimes 145 (SC)=2001(8) SCALE 88=(2001)9 SCC 631=2002 Cr.L.J 225 (SC)
[33] 2012 (9) SCC 460;
[34] State of Rajasthan vs. Fatehkaran Mehdu – 2017(2) MWN (Cri) 6 (SC).
[35] ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. Vs CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION – (2018) 2 RCR(Criminal) 415=AIR 2018 SC 2039 cited in
[36] SANJAY KUMAR RAI vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR – CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.472 OF 2021 [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 10157 OF 2019] – Decided on : 07-05-2021.
[37]Gosu Jairami Reddy vs. State of A.P – 2011 (8) SCALE 58 following Gurbaksh Singh – AIR 1955 SC 320; AIR 1958 SC 1012; Ramaniklal Gokaldas & ors vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 1752; Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd vs. M.ajgannathan 2001 AIR SCW 4786; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & ors Vs. State of U.P – AIR 2006 SC 951
[38] Chinna Kannu Ammal vs. K.K.Periasamy – I(1998)DMC 136
[39] Ganesha vs. Shranappa & another – 2014(1) AICLR 765 (SC)=2013(4) MLJ (Cri) 757 (SC)=2013(14) SCALE 59=(2014)1 SCC 87
[40] Satyajit Banerjee v. State of West Bengal 2005 (1) SCC 115 followed in Nasib Singh Versus The State Of Punjab & Another – Criminal Appeal Nos. 1051-1054, 1055-1059 of 2021; dated: 08-10-2021 [3 judge bench].
[41] State vs. N.M.T.Joy Immoculate – AIR 2004 SC 2282 [bench of 3 judges]
[42] 2012 Cr.L.J 2464 (Cri)
[43] Vishalbhai Vallabhhai Madan vs. State of Gujarat – 2012(3) Crimes 570 (Guj)
[44]Abdul Aziaz vs. State of U.P – 2009 Cr.L.J 1683
[45]Arun Vyas & others vs. Anita Vyas – AIR 1999 SC 2071
[46]State of Punjab vs. Raj singh & others, AIR 1998 SC 768; 1998 Cr.L.J 104
[47] Father Thomas vs. State of U.P & another – 2011 Cr.L.J 2278 [F.B] Allahabad High Court
[48] State vs. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641
[49] Divine Retreat Centre vs. State of Kerala & others – AIR 2008 SC 1614; Nirmaljit Singh Hoon vs. State of West Bengal & another – AIR 1972 SC 2639.
[50] Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam – (2009) 3 SCALE 840=(2009) 2 CTC 660 (SC)=(2009) 5 SCC 153=(2009) 3 MLJ (Cri) 503 (SC)
[51] Mohit @ Sonu and another vs. State of U.P – AIR 2013 SC 2248=2013(7) SCALE 620=(2013)7 SCC 789
[52] Geetha Ramachandran vs. S.Ravichandran – 2003(2) CTC 171
[53] ASIAN RESURFACING OF ROAD AGENCY PVT. LTD. Vs CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION – (2018) 2 RCR(Criminal) 415.
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