7. During the same bail proceedings, on 04.07.2022, the High Court made adverse remarks against the Appellants herein. These remarks made by the High Court were widely reported in the media and caused injury to the reputation of the Appellants.
xxx
10. Through the present Appeals filed before this court, the Appellants seek for the remarks made by the High Court against them to be expunged.
12. In the aftermath of the aforesaid proceedings, this court is now tasked with answering two questions in the present Appeals.
I. Whether the adverse remarks made by the High Court against the appellants during the bail proceedings of the respondent No. 1 is liable to be expunged?
II. Whether the direction issued by the High Court to seek for reports against the Appellant No.2 during the bail proceedings of the respondent no.1 is liable to be set aside?
ISSUE – I – Whether the adverse remarks made by the High Court during the bail proceedings of the respondent No.1 is liable to be expunged?
14. It is to be noted that bail proceedings, unlike a full criminal trial, are burdened with the task of only forming a prima facie view on the merits of the case. In such a circumstance when the evidence is not fully analyzed, and a presumption of innocence is still operational in favour of the accused, the courts must then be extremely cautious in passing adverse remarks against the accused. This becomes especially important in cases where the party against whom the remarks are passed do not have a lis in the said proceedings, for such comments, especially if passed by constitutional courts, can cause great injury to the reputation of the parties at the receiving end of such remarks. This burden of caution on the courts has been held in a catena of judgments by this Court.
15. In the case of Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar [(1986) 2 SCC 569], this Court, while examining certain remarks made by a High Court stated that the courts, while passing adverse remarks, must be extremely careful and must resort to passing such remarks only if it is necessary to come to fair conclusion in order to meet the ends of justice.
16. In the case of State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566], wherein this court was examining certain disparaging remarks made by the High Court against the State officials held that judges, must refrain from passing adverse remarks, as the same can cause great mischief and might become an antithesis to the ends of achieving justice.
17. Further, In the case of Election Commission of India v. M.R. Vijaybhaskar [(2021) 9 SCC 770], while examining certain adverse remarks made by the High Court, held that judges must exercise extreme caution while passing remarks in court that may susceptible to misinterpretation.
20. In the bail proceedings of Respondent No.1, because the Appellant No.3 was not a party, he did not have the opportunity to place his submissions on record for the court to peruse the same. No specific allegations against Appellant No.3 were made before the High Court, since the bail proceedings, and the submissions of the counsels in furtherance of the said bail proceedings, were only limited to Respondent No.1. In this context, when no allegations were made against Appellant No.3, and the presumption of innocence is still functional in the favour of the Appellant No.3, we find it to be a gross abuse of the process of law to pass such adverse remarks against him, as such remarks do not just cause injury to his reputation, but also has the potential to cause great prejudice to his actual trial.
ISSUE – II – Whether the direction issued by the High Court to seek for reports against the Appellant No.2 during the bail proceedings of the respondent no.1 is liable to be set aside?
22. In the case of RBI v. Cooperative Bank Deposit A/C HR. Sha [(2010) 15 SCC 85], the Reserve Bank Of India challenged an order passed by the High Court during an application under section 439 of the CrPC, wherein directions were issued to the bank to distribute the money it recovered from the accused. This court, while examining these directions held that the High Court must have confined itself to the issues relevant for the purposes of deciding bail.
23. In the case of State Represented by Inspector of Police v. M. Murugesan & Anr [(2020) 15 SCC 251], this Court held that in cases where a separate mechanism exists, the court under its inherent powers, especially in context of bail proceedings, cannot issue directions that are outside the purview of deciding the grant or rejection of bail.
24. Further, in the case of State of Punjab vs Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Others [(2011) 14 SCC 770], where after deciding a criminal appeal, the High Court continued to pass orders with respect to other offenders in unconnected cases, this court held that such invocation of jurisdiction outside the purview of the main case at hand was unjust.
25. In light of the abovementioned facts, we are of the opinion that the actions of the High Court during the bail proceedings of a third party are manifestly arbitrary and unjust, and the High Court must have confined itself to the issues relevant to it for the purposes of deciding the bail of the Respondent No.1. A court of bail, especially in cases where the bail is sought for by a third party, is not a court that has all the relevant information to pass an order on the merits of an unconnected party, and such an order, if passed, has the potential to cause great harm to the said party without them being afforded an actual and meaningful opportunity to defend themselves. It is a well settled principle of law that any party, when being accused of an illegal act, must be given an opportunity be fairly heard. This opportunity to be meaningfully heard however has not been afforded to the Appellant No.2, and hence we hold issue 2 in favour of the Appellant No.2.
PARTY: SEEMANT KUMAR SINGH vs. MAHESH PS & ORS. – CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 872 OF 2023 21st MARCH, 2023.
