PRESENT APPEAL
2. This appeal is at the instance of an accused charged with the offence punishable under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”) in connection with the First Information Report (FIR) No. 175 of 2022 dated 11.08.2022 registered with the Mirzapur Police Station, District Saharanpur, State of U.P. and is directed against the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated 17.10.2022 passed in the Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 13339 of 2022 filed by the appellant herein for quashing of the aforesaid FIR by which the High Court rejected the Writ Petition and thereby declined to quash the FIR referred to above.
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FACTS IN THE FIR
4. Thus it appears on a plain reading of the aforesaid FIR that the victim namely Husna (respondent No.3 herein) had earlier lodged an FIR No. 122 of 2022 for the offences punishable under Sections 376D, 323, 120B, 354A and 452 reply of the IPC and under Sections 7 and 8 reply of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 against Haji Iqbal @ Bala (father-in-law of the appellant herein), Mehmood, Javed, Alishan, Afjal and Dilshad. It is alleged that while the investigation of the FIR No. 122 of 2022 referred to above was going on, the accused persons namely Khurshid, Farukh, Maharaj and Suleman had telephonically as well as in person threatened the victim saying that they are the associates of Iqbal alias Bala and that if she would not withdraw the said FIR No. 122 of 2022, then she as well as her family members would be killed.
ANALYSIS
QUESTION INVOLVED IN THE CASE
9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the FIR should be quashed so far as the appellant herein is concerned?
10. We take notice of the following facts:-
1. The appellant herein has not been named in the FIR as one of the accused persons. There is no allegation worth the name in the entire FIR against the appellant herein.
2. It appears that further statement of the first informant was recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in the said statement, the name of the appellant herein surfaced.
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12. With the recording of the further statement referred to above, the investigating agency added Sections 147, 148, 149, 195A, 386 and 504 of the IPC.
VICTIM HAS ROPED THE APPELLANT ALSO IN HER FURTHER STATEMENT FOR THE REASON HE HAPPENS TO BE THE SON-IN-LAW OF A HARDENED CRIMINAL
14. It appears from the aforesaid that the first informant in her further statement made out altogether a different story than what she narrated in the FIR. We would not go to the extent of saying that since the name of the appellant herein does not figure in the FIR and it came to be disclosed only for the first time in the further statement of the victim that itself can be a ground to quash the FIR. However, there are many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case which indicates that the case on hand is one of false implication. Just because the appellant herein happens to be the son-in-law of a very hardened criminal as alleged by name Iqbal @ Bala, he has also been roped in by way of further statement. It is pertinent to note that the victim in her FIR has not even remotely referred to the presence of Salman s/o Latife at village Mirzapur Paul. We are highlighting all this only to demonstrate, how the entire case was fabricated step by step.
SECTION 195A IPC
15. There is a different angle to this matter. It appears that the investigating agency has invoked Section 195A of the IPC. Section 195A of the IPC reads thus:-
“Section 195A. Threatening any person to give false evidence.─Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause that person to give false evidence shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both;
and if innocent person is convicted and sentenced in consequence of such false evidence, with death or imprisonment for more than seven years, the person who threatens shall be punished with the same punishment and sentence in the same manner and to the same extent such innocent person is punished and sentenced.”
APPLICATION OF SECTION 195A IPC IN THE PRESENT CASE
16. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that if any individual is threatened with any injury to his person, reputation or property and such threats are administered with intent to cause that person to give false evidence, the same would constitute an offence under Section 195A of the IPC. In our opinion, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 195A of the IPC are disclosed, on plain reading of the FIR and the further statement of the first informant including the statement of the so-called eye witness. The allegation in the FIR is that the accused persons threatened and pressurised the first 12 informant to withdraw her first FIR bearing No. 122 of 2022 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376D, 323, 120B, 354A and 452 reply of the IPC. There is nothing to indicate that the accused persons threatened the first informant with intent that the first informant gives false evidence before the Court of law. The later part of Section 195A makes it very clear that false evidence means false evidence before the Court of law. On such false evidence if a person is convicted and sentenced, then the person found guilty of administering threats would be liable to be punished with the same punishment and sentence in the same manner and to the same extent as such innocent person is punished and sentenced. The word “false” in Section 195A should be read in the context with what has been explained in Section 191 of the IPC which falls in Chapter XI – of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice. Thus, even if we believe the allegations levelled in the FIR to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 195A are disclosed. To give threat to a person to withdraw a complaint or FIR or settle the dispute would not attract Section 195A of the IPC.
SECTION 195A Cr.P.C
17. In the aforesaid context, we must look into Section 195A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Section 195A of the CrPC reads thus:-
“Section 195A. Procedure for witnesses in case of threatening, etc.—A witness or any other person may file a complaint in relation to an offence under section 195A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
18. The plain reading of the aforesaid provision indicates that if a witness or any other person receives threats and such threats are administered with an intent to cause that person to give false evidence before the Court, then such witness or person can file a complaint in relation to the offence under Section 195A of the IPC. It goes without saying that such complaint has to be lodged before the Court recording the evidence. Section 195A of the CrPC provides a remedy of filing a complaint. “Complaint” means as defined under Section 2(d) of the CrPC which reads thus:-
19. We are conscious of the fact that Section 195A of the IPC is a cognizable offence. In a cognizable offence, police has power to investigate. We are not going into the question whether the bar of Section 195 of the CrPC would apply to Section 195A of the IPC as we have taken the view that none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under Section 195A of the IPC are disclosed in the facts of the present case.
SECTION 386 IPC
20. We take notice of the fact that Section 386 of the IPC has also been invoked. Section 386 of the IPC relates to extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. Section 386 of the IPC runs as follows:—
“Section 386. Extortion by putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt. —Whoever commits extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
FORCIBLY TAKING ANY PROPERTY WILL NOT COME UNDER SECTION 383 IPC
22. So from the aforesaid, it is clear that one of the necessary ingredients of the offence of extortion is that the victim must be induced to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, etc. That is to say, the delivery of the property must be with consent which has been obtained by putting the person in fear of any injury. In contrast to theft, in extortion there is an element of consent, of course, obtained by putting the victim in fear of injury. In extortion, the will of the victim has to be overpowered by putting him or her in fear of injury. Forcibly taking any property will not come under this definition. It has to be shown that the person was induced to part with the property by putting him in fear of injury. The illustrations to the Section given in the IPC make this perfectly clear.
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INFORMANT DID NOT MENTIONED SHE PAID AMOUNT OUT OF FEAR
24. Thus, it is relevant to note that nowhere the first informant has stated that out of fear, she paid Rs. 10 Lakh to the accused persons. To put it in other words, there is nothing to indicate that there was actual delivery of possession of property (money) by the person put in fear. In the absence of anything to even remotely suggest that the first informant parted with a particular amount after being put to fear of any injury, no offence under Section 386 of the IPC can be said to have been made out.
HOW TO APPROACH THE FIR FILED WITH ULTERIOR MOTIVE IN QUASH PROCEEDINGS?
26. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
27. In the overall view of the matter, we have reached the conclusion that the FIR No. 175 of 2022 dated 11.08.2022 deserves to be quashed in so far as the appellant herein is concerned. It is so apparent that as the State believes that the father-in-law of the appellant namely Iqbal @ Bala is a 21 very hardened criminal, his son-in-law i.e. the present appellant who has been implicated in the further statement of the first informant is also a criminal.
28. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 175 of 2022 dated 11.08.2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed.
CASE QUASHED
PARTY: SALIB @ SHALU @ SALIM …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S) – CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2344 OF 2023 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 3152 of 2023) – 2023 INSC 687 – AUGUST 08, 2023.
https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2023/7263/7263_2023_14_1507_46052_Judgement_08-Aug-2023.pdf
