Factual matrix
8. A plain reading of the aforesaid indicates that it is the case of the complainant that the accused persons were found engaged in the ceremony of religious conversion of around 90 persons belonging to the Hindu community at the Evangelical Church of India located in the Fatehpur district by the alleged use of force, cheating, fraud and coercion. It is not the case of the complainant that he was also converted by use of such alleged deceitful and fraudulent means by the accused persons. His role was that of a whistleblower who provided the information of the alleged incident to the police authorities. We have thought fit to give the particulars of the complainant as the same would be vital in deciding the legality and validity of FIR No. 224/2022 in light of the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act, as we shall discuss shortly hereinafter.
9. While the investigation of the aforesaid FIR was in progress, FIR No. 47/2023 came to be lodged on 20.01.2023 at the PS Kotwali, District Fatehpur for the offence punishable under Section(s) 3 and 5(1) of the U.P. Conversion Act respectively against 10 named and around 40-50 unnamed accused at the instance of one Sarvendra Vikram Singh who alleged in the said FIR that during his visit to the district Fatehpur for some personal work, he was allured into embracing Christianity by the accused persons. He alleged that he was offered cash, a job with a university and marriage with a beautiful girl. One of the accused who extended such offer was the Vice-Chancellor of the university, who is also Petitioner No. 1 in W.P. No. 123 of 2023. The complainant further alleged that having been allured by the offer made by the accused persons, he converted himself and embraced Christianity on 25.12.2021 at the Presbyterian Church, Deviganj, Fatehpur. The complainant further stated in his complaint that with the passage of time, he realized his mistake and returned back to profess Hindu religion. The contents of FIR No. 47/2023 are reproduced hereinbelow:
“……………….”
10. Three days after FIR No. 47/2023 was lodged, and while the investigation in FIR No. 224/2022 was still underway, one another FIR being FIR No. 54/2023 came to be lodged at the PS Kotwali, District Fatehpur, at the instance of one Virendra Kumar against 47 named and 20 unknown persons on 23.01.2023. The allegation levelled in the FIR was that the first informant, much like the one in FIR No. 47/2023, along with around 90 more Hindu persons, was allured into embracing Christianity by the accused persons during an event organised at the Evangelical Church of India, Fatehpur on 14.04.2022. He further alleged that after the mass conversion took place, his Aadhar card was taken away by the accused persons and his name was changed to Virendra D’Souza. He also alleged that the accused persons threatened to kill him if he would dare to report about the conversion anywhere. The contents of FIR No. 54 of 2023, shorn of unnecessary details, are extracted hereinbelow:
“…………………”
11. Merely seven minutes after the aforesaid FIR was registered, one another FIR, i.e., FIR No. 55/2023 came to be lodged against 47 named and 20 unnamed persons at the very same police station referred to above, at the instance of one Sanjay Singh under the very same provisions of the IPC and the U.P. Conversion Act respectively. In the said FIR too, the first informant alleged conversion by means of allurement at the alleged event dated 14.04.2022 and the allegations in both the FIRs are virtual reproductions of each other, except for the change in the personal particulars of the first informant. The contents of FIR No. 55 of 2023, devoid of unnecessary details are extracted hereinbelow:
“………………………”
12. One another FIR, i.e., FIR No. 60/2023, came to be lodged for the very same offences and at the very same police station at the instance of one Satyapal against 47 named and 20 unnamed accused persons. The allegations in this FIR are also virtually a reproduction of the allegations made in FIR Nos. 54/2023 and 55/2023 respectively except for the change in the particulars of the first informant. We are not reproducing the contents of the same for the sake of brevity.
13. Besides the aforementioned FIRs, one another FIR being FIR No. 538/2023 is also the subject matter of consideration in the present batch, the validity of the same and the proceedings arising therefrom being a subject matter of challenge in the SLP (Crl.) No. 8615/2024. The said FIR was lodged at the PS Nawabganj, District Prayagraj on 11.12.2023 at the instance of one Sanjeev Kumar against the Petitioner in the SLP (Crl.) No. 8615/2024 and a few unknown persons. The allegations in the said FIR were that on 10.12.2023, when the complainant along with his friend, was on his way to a village for some work, he was stopped by the accused persons, who used abusive language against him and also fired a shot at him with the intention to kill him. He further alleged that the accused also demanded Rs 1 lakh from him failing which the accused threatened to kill him. The complainant also alleged that the accused person was engaged in performing illegal conversion of Hindus to Christianity by giving them the allurement of curing diseases like cancer, etc.
Summarizing the aforesaid FIRs facts
14. The aforesaid factual discussion would indicate that three distinct incidents have been alleged which form the subject matter of the FIRs under challenge in the present batch of petitions:
a. The incident dated 14.04.2022, alleged to have taken place at the Evangelical Church of India, Fatehpur, wherein alleged mass religious conversion of around 90 Hindus to Christianity took place. The FIR Nos. 224/2022, 54/2023, 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively pertain to this incident. Out of these four FIRs – FIR Nos. 54, 55 and 60 respectively were lodged at the instance of the first informants who claim to be the victims of the alleged conversion, whereas FIR No. 224/2022 came to be lodged at the instance of a person who was not a victim of the said conversion, but was rather the leader of an organisation.
b. The incident dated 25.12.2021, which took place at the Presbyterian Church, Deviganj, Fatehpur, wherein the first informant in FIR No. 47/2023 was alleged to have been illegally converted from Hinduism to Christianity.
c. The incident dated 10.12.2023 which forms the subject matter of FIR No. 538/2023.
Quash petitions preferred and the Hon’ble High Court declined to entertain petitions
15. Aggrieved by the registration of FIR Nos. 54/2023, 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively, a number of writ petitions came to be filed before the High Court seeking quashing of the said FIRs. Further, an application under Section 482 of the CrPC was also filed before the High Court for quashing of FIR No. 538/2024 and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. However, the High Court declined to entertain the petitions and dismissed the same vide the impugned judgments, which we deem appropriate to briefly discuss before proceeding further.
16. It is noteworthy that as on date, the investigation is complete in all the aforesaid FIRs and chargesheets have been filed before the concerned jurisdictional courts. However, for the convenience of exposition, we shall advert to the details and contents of the chargesheet and case diary while dealing with the individual FIRs in the later parts of this judgment.
Impugned judgments (reasons for decline to quash)
17. The Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7380/2023, SLP (Crl.) No. 13679/2023 and SLP (Crl.) No. 7233/2023 respectively arise from the impugned common judgment and order dated 02.06.2023 passed by the High Court in a batch of five petitions. The appellants in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7380/2023 were the Petitioners in the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 1819 of 2023 before the High Court and had prayed for the quashing of FIR No. 55/2023. The appellant(s) in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 13679/2023 were the Petitioners in the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 2360 of 2023 before the High Court and were seeking quashing of FIR No. 60/2023. Lastly, the appellant in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7233/2023 was the Petitioner in the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 1991 of 2023, 1994 of 2023 and 1998 of 2023 respectively before the High Court and was seeking the quashing of FIR Nos. 55/2023, 60/2023 and 54/2023 respectively.
FIRs registered in belated stage: 18. The High Court, in its impugned judgment dated 02.06.2023 has noted that the quashing of the FIRs as prayed for in the batch of writ petitions was primarily on the ground that the FIRs were registered at a highly belated stage, the alleged incident having taken place more than a year prior to the registration of the FIR. The Petitioners before the High Court further contended that the said FIRs were not the first in point of time in relation to the alleged incident since FIR No. 224/2022 had already been registered pertaining to the very same alleged incident. Thus, the contention of the Petitioners before the High Court was that the FIRs being repetitive, they were liable to be quashed. The contentions raised on behalf of the Petitioners therein were met by the State by submitting that similar petitions challenging FIR No. 55/2023 had already been dismissed by a coordinate bench of the High Court after taking the view that the FIR disclosed commission of cognizable offences.
Would not hit as second Fir: 19. The High Court, referring to the order passed by a coordinate bench in the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 1814 of 2023, wherein the challenge to FIR No. 54/2023 was negatived, observed that FIR No. 224/2022, having been registered at the instance of a person not competent to lodge an FIR under the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act, would amount to an invalid FIR in the eyes of law and therefore the subsequent FIRs registered pertaining to the very same alleged incident, would not be hit by the dictum as laid in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181, as the same would not amount to a second FIR in relation to the same alleged incident. In light of such reasoning, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition of the appellants herein.
Coordinate bench already declined to quash: 20. The Criminal Appeal arising out of the SLP (Crl.) 10187/2023 arises from the impugned judgment dated 05.07.2023 passed by the High Court in the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 5180/2023, wherein the challenge to FIR No. 60/2023 came to be rejected by the High Court on the ground that a coordinate bench had already declined to quash the FIR in question.
Quoting previous order: 21. The Criminal Appeal arising out of the SLP (Crl.) No. 13231/2023 arises from the impugned judgment dated 04.08.2023 passed in the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 12146 of 2023 by the High Court wherein FIR No. 54/2023 was challenged inter alia on the ground that the said FIR could not be said to be the first FIR in relation to the alleged offence and hence was liable to be quashed. However, the High Court declined to quash FIR adopting the same line of reasoning as was adopted in the judgment dated 02.06.2023 impugned in the SLP(Crl.) 7380/2023.
FIR disclosed cognizable offence: 22. The appellant(s) in the Criminal Appeal arising out of the SLP (Crl.) No. 15251/2023 were the Petitioners in a batch of writ petitions, i.e., the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 13610 of 2023, 13566 of 2023, 13597 of 2023 and 13577 of 2023 respectively before the High Court and were seeking to get FIR No. 60/2023 quashed. However, the High Court declined to quash the said FIR on the ground that the allegations levelled in the said FIR clearly disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence, and further the case put up by the Petitioners was in the form of their defence which could not have been gone into at the stage of seeking quashing of the FIR. The High Court also observed that the crime as alleged was serious in nature and that the petitions of few other co-accused had already been dismissed and therefore the petitions preferred by the appellant(s) herein also deserved to be dismissed.
Analysis
Issues for consideration
32. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following key issues fall for our consideration:
a. Whether FIR No. 224/2022, having been lodged by a person not falling within one of the categories specified in the unamended Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act, is liable to be quashed on that ground alone?
b. Whether FIR Nos. 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively could be said to be covered by the decision of this Court in T.T. Antony (supra) and thus are liable to be quashed?
c. Whether the High Court committed any error in declining to quash FIR No. 54/2023?
d. Whether this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 32, should quash FIR Nos. 224/2022 and 47/2023 respectively, more particularly when they are being questioned for the first time before this Court and have not been challenged before the High Court?
e. Whether the High Court committed any error in declining to quash the proceedings emanating out of FIR No. 538/2023?
High Court ought to have applied the principles of T.T.Antony case instead dismissed by quoting the coordinate bench order
35. At the outset, we deem it necessary to point out a peculiarity that pervades a few of the impugned judgments of the High Court. While we are yet to test the reasoning employed by the High Court as regards whether FIR No. 54/20223 could be said to be the first FIR pertaining to the alleged incident dated 14.04.2022 in light of FIR No. 224/2022, what is strikingly strange is that while acknowledging that the contents of FIR Nos. 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively bear striking similarities with the contents of FIR No. 54/2023 and also that the same pertain to the very same incident as alleged in FIR No. 54/2023, the High Court failed to apply the principles laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony (supra) to the said FIRs on the patently incorrect reasoning that a coordinate bench of the High Court had already upheld the validity of FIR No. 54/2023 as being the first FIR pertaining to the alleged incident. Even if it could be said that FIR No. 54/2023 was the first FIR as FIR No. 224/2022 was non-est, we fail to understand how FIR Nos. 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively would not amount to subsequent FIRs despite bearing such striking similarities with FIR No. 54/22.
36. Although we propose to independently apply our minds to ascertain whether FIR Nos. 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively would be covered by the decision in T.T. Antony (supra) yet we fail to understand as to how the maintainability of FIR No. 54/2023 could have been a valid ground for the High Court to hold FIR Nos. 55 and 60 of 2023 respectively as valid, despite acknowledging that the same were mere subsequent FIRs pertaining to the very same alleged incident.
AG’s submission on unlawful and illegal religious conversions also noted
38. We also wish to underscore that the learned AG has vehemently submitted as regards the gravity and seriousness of the act of unlawful and illegal religious conversions and their apparent conflict with the fundamental tenets of constitutional morality. However, as the present batch of matters relates to specific FIRs, it would be necessary to examine the same applying the settled and established legal principles governing the quashing of the FIRs and the findings arrived at as a result thereto may not have a bearing with the seriousness of the offences alleged, so long as it is not one of the principles governing the inherent powers of the court to quash the criminal proceedings.
After considering the scheme of the U.P. Conversion Act 2021 (paras. 40 to 59) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:
The word ‘religion’ is not defined in Indian Constitution
60. As observed in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt reported in AIR 1954 SC 282, the word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution. The Court concluded that religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities.
Explaining Article 25 and Article 19(1)(a)
61. A nine-Judge Bench of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India reported in (2017) 10 SCC 1, recognised the right to privacy as a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. Touching upon the interplay between privacy and the right to freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, this Court underlined that Article 25 encapsulates within it the ability to choose a faith and the subsequent freedom to express or not to express such choice. In other words, Article 25 carries with it the facets of privacy rights, whereby the person has the intrinsic right to freedom of conscience and also the choice to express it to the world at large. This Court highlighted that although Part III of the Constitution does not have a separate Article declaring privacy as a fundamental right, yet the broader scheme of Part III portrays and contains in it the various aspects of privacy, Article 25 being one of them. The Court categorically noted that the freedom of conscience as ensured under Article 25 falls within the zone of purely private thought process. It was also emphasised that privacy is a condition precedent for the rights under Article 25 to come into being. This Court also read privacy rights in other rights pertaining to religious belief under Articles 26 and 28 respectively. Some of the relevant observations made in the said decision are as follows:
“298.[…]The constitutional right to the freedom of religion under Article 25 has implicit within it the ability to choose a faith and the freedom to express or not express those choices to the world. These are some illustrations of the manner in which privacy facilitates freedom and is intrinsic to the exercise of liberty. The Constitution does not contain a separate article telling us that privacy has been declared to be a fundamental right. Nor have we tagged the provisions of Part III with an alpha-suffixed right to privacy : this is not an act of judicial redrafting. Dignity cannot exist without privacy. Both reside within the inalienable values of life, liberty and freedom which the Constitution has recognised. Privacy is the ultimate expression of the sanctity of the individual. It is a constitutional value which straddles across the spectrum of fundamental rights and protects for the individual a zone of choice and self-determination.
xxx
372. […] Insofar as religious beliefs are concerned, a good deal of the misery our species suffer owes its existence to and centres around competing claims of the right to propagate religion. Constitution of India protects the liberty of all subjects guaranteeing [ …] the freedom of conscience and right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion. While the right to freely “profess, practise and propagate religion” may be a facet of free speech guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a), the freedom of the belief or faith in any religion is a matter of conscience falling within the zone of purely private thought process and is an aspect of liberty. There are areas other than religious beliefs which form part of the individual’s freedom of conscience such as political belief, etc. which form part of the liberty under Article 21.
xxx
413. Ex facie, privacy is essential to the exercise of freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion vide Article 25. The further right of every religious denomination to maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs and to own and administer property acquired for such purposes vide Article 26 also requires privacy, in the sense of non-interference from the State. Article 28(3) expressly recognises the right of a student attending an educational institution recognised by the State, to be left alone. Such a student cannot be compelled to take part in any religious instruction imparted in any such institution unless his guardian has consented to it.” (Emphasis supplied)
Legal questions framed
65. The journey to answering the issues framed above would necessarily have to pass through the following legal questions:
a. What are the contours of inherent powers of the High Courts insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings is concerned and what are the principles governing the exercise of such powers?
b. Whether an FIR can be quashed after the filing of a chargesheet? If yes, is there any change in the considerations governing quashing in the two cases?
c. Whether this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 32 can consider the prayer for quashing of criminal proceedings?
d. Whether multiple FIRs pertaining to the same alleged offence/incident is maintainable?
Principles governing the quashing of criminal proceedings
66. The power to quash criminal proceedings is guided by the principle of preventing the abuse of the process of law or miscarriage of justice, and of securing the ends of justice. It can be done by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or by exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (Section 528 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, “the B.N.S.S.”)) and even by the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, if the circumstances so require.
After quoting (1) State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568, placing reliance on Bhajan Lal (supra) [para. 29]; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749 [para.26]; Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar, reported in 1958 SCC OnLine SC 81 [para.5] has held as follows:
70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings, if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.
Guidelines to High Court to determine the veracity of a prayer in quash proceedings
72. This Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330, laid down steps that ought to be followed by the High Court to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing of proceedings. The steps were premised on the understanding that the courts are not barred from looking at the materials produced by the accused of sterling and impeccable quality. It was held that the material should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to reject, dismiss and condemn the allegations as false. The judicial conscience of the High Court would then be persuaded to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings with a view to prevent abuse of process of the court and secure the ends of justice. The relevant observations have been reproduced hereinbelow:-
“30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC:
30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2. Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false?
30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?
30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied)
Discussing Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors case
73. While looking into the present matter, we came across many judgments and orders of various High Courts, more particularly, the High Court of Allahabad, wherein the decision of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401, has been interpreted as curtailing the scope of inherent powers of the High Courts to quash the criminal proceedings as compared to the scope laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra). We deem it important to discuss the decision in Neeharika (supra) so as to understand its true import and whether it has limited the scope of the decision in Bhajan Lal (supra) in any manner.
74. The decision in Neeharika (supra), inter alia, held as follows:-
a. First, the police have the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. to investigate into cognizable offence. As a matter of rule, the courts should not interfere at the stage of investigation of a cognizable offence, however, in cases where no cognizable offence is disclosed in the FIR, the court should not permit an investigation to continue. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection. The courts should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences except where noninterference would result in miscarriage of justice.
b. Secondly, the decision of Bhajan Lal (supra), in so many words, holds that the courts should not interfere at the stage of investigation except in cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice. The High Courts are well within their jurisdiction to quash an FIR/complaint with due regard to the restraints imposed by law, more particularly, the parameters laid down in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 and Bhajan Lal (supra).
c. Thirdly, where the initiation of criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law, or in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the High Court, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution, may quash the FIR, complaint, or criminal proceedings, and may even stay the proceedings.
75. In Neeharika (supra), the Court was dealing with the issue whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order either staying the investigation or an order stating that “no coercive steps” be taken during the investigation. The Court held that the law as regards the exercise of powers by the High Court to quash an FIR, or a complaint and the parameters applicable for exercise of such powers in quashing an FIR, or a complaint should be made applicable in the form of parameters to be applied while considering the grant of interim stay or protection. It is in this context, and only in this context that the Court reiterated the established principles governing the exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Neeharika’s case and Bhajan Lal’s are standing in harmony and of no contradiction
76. The Court referred to its various other decisions to discuss the scope and ambit of the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution. In this context, the Court referred to Bhajan Lal (supra), to state that while identifying the cases in which the FIR/complaint can be quashed, the High Court should not embark upon an inquiry into the merits and demerits of the allegations and quash the proceedings. A plain reading of the decisions in Neeharika (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra) indicates that both decisions stand in harmony and admit of no contradiction.
77. To resolve the issue in Neeharika (supra), the Court referred to and interpreted the time-tested principles laid down in the earlier pronouncements of this Court on the scope and ambit of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution, and applied them to the facts of the said case, without in any manner unsettling the settled principles of law.
Neeharika case did not lay down any dictum that an FIR/complaint cannot be quashed at investigation stage
78. The decision in Neeharika (supra) by no means should be understood to lay an absolute dictum that an FIR/complaint cannot be quashed at the stage of investigation. The decision proceeds on the premise that if an “information” given to the police discloses commission of an offence, then it requires investigation. However, it does not take away the inherent powers of the High Court, which are discretionary and are to be exercised judicially upon a careful application of mind to the facts and the relief sought.
Judgment of a court of law is not Euclid’s theorem nor provision in a statute
80. In the context of the decision in the Neeharika (supra), we would like to say that a judgment of a court of law should not be read as a Euclid’s theorem nor as a provision in a statute, vide Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani reported in (2008) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778 (vide paras 9 to 12), Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University reported in (2008) 9 SCC 284, etc.
Cr.P.C vests right to an aggrieved person to seek a remedy before courts
81. Undoubtedly, if an offence is alleged to have been committed, the police is duty bound to investigate into the offence. The Cr.P.C. vests this power in police to investigate all cases where it is suspected or reported that an offence has been committed. However, at the same time, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person also has a right to seek a remedy before the courts and in a given case, if the High Court is convinced that the investigation by the police is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, it can and must quash the FIR or the proceedings arising therefrom, or issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his powers.
Material High Court can take into consideration to quash an FIR/complaint
82. In the State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 522, this Court elaborated on the types of material the High Court can take into consideration to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that may be tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence and that only such material that manifestly runs contrary to the accusations in the FIR could be considered for the purpose of quashing. The relevant observations read thus:-
“5.[…] Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239] this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge.[…]” (Emphasis supplied)
Whether an FIR can be quashed after the filing of chargesheet?
85. The learned AG placed considerable emphasis on the fact that since chargesheets in all the impugned FIRs have already been filed, the plea of the appellant(s)/petitioners for the quashing of the FIRs is misconceived. The question as to whether an FIR can be quashed after the filing of a chargesheet is no longer res integra. The High Court, while dealing with a petition seeking quashing of an FIR, even after the chargesheet had been filed, is well within its powers to do so if, upon a collective reading of the FIR and the chargesheet, it is satisfied that they do not disclose commission of any offence or that the continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Thus, the filing of a chargesheet would not preclude the High Court from quashing of the criminal proceedings. This Court in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2019) 11 SCC 706, held thus:-
“…………..”
86. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2621; A.M. Mohan v. State, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339; Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2023) 16 SCC 666 and Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 59 respectively.
Petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of police report
87. It was held by this very Bench in Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., reported in (2024) 10 SCC 527, that a petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of a police report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. However, the courts are expected to apply their mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report before deciding on whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed or not. The relevant observations read thus:-
“19. No doubt, a petition to quash the FIR does not become infructuous on submission of a police report under Section 173(2)CrPC, but when a police report has been submitted, particularly when there is no stay on the investigation, the court must apply its mind to the materials submitted in support of the police report before taking a call whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed or not. More so, when the FIR alleges an act which is reflective of a dishonest conduct of the accused.
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21. In our view, the High Court ought to have considered the materials collected during investigation before taking a call on the prayer for quashing the FIR, the cognizance order and the proceedings in pursuance thereof.” (Emphasis supplied)
Accused can approach the High Court for quash the police report before taking cognizance
88. We find it apt to mention that an accused person may approach the High Court for quashing of the FIR and chargesheet under Article 226 of the Constitution till the time cognizance on the chargesheet has not been taken by the jurisdictional Trial Court. Once cognizance is taken, thereafter the accused person may approach the High Court under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. (earlier Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) at any stage of the proceedings for quashing of the FIR and the consequential proceedings on the ground of abuse of the process of law. (See: Order dated 15.10.2024 in SLP (Crl.) 13578/2024, Neeta Singh and Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others).
Whether criminal proceedings can be quashed by this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 32? YES
89. We shall now proceed to address the question as to whether a writ petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution would be maintainable for seeking quashing of an FIR and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
90. This Court, as the highest constitutional court, has been conferred with the powers as enshrined under Part III of the Constitution to provide remedies against the violation of fundamental rights. The very fact that the right to constitutional remedies has itself been enshrined as a fundamental right is a clear affirmation that this Court is the ultimate guarantor of their enforcement. Once the Constitution has cast such a responsibility upon it, this Court need not direct a petitioner to pursue an alternative remedy, when the grievance stems from the alleged violation of a fundamental right.
94. In the recent past, a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Vinod Dua v. Union of India, reported in (2023) 14 SCC 286, had quashed an FIR lodged against the petitioner therein in exercise of its powers under the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner therein had prayed for quashing of the FIR on the grounds that the criminal proceedings so initiated were an abuse of the process of the court and violative of his fundamental rights. This Court noted that the practice to direct the petitioners to approach the respective High Courts before approaching this Court is a practice of self-discipline, considering the pressure of mounting cases, however, in glaring circumstances showing blatant violation of fundamental rights, this Court would not hesitate to consider a writ petition filed for quashing of the criminal proceedings. In other words, there is no bar for this Court if it intends and finds fit to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution for the purpose of quashing of criminal proceedings. It also applied the principles of Bhajan Lal (supra), in order to test if the criminal proceedings deserved to be quashed. It further relied upon a three Judge Bench decision in Priya Prakash Varrier v. State of Telangana, reported in (2019) 12 SCC 432, in which this Court had quashed the criminal proceedings against the petitioner in exercise of its powers under Article 32 jurisdiction, on reaching the conclusion that the elements of Section 295A of the IPC were entirely absent. The relevant paragraphs have been produced below:
“paras. 29 to 31”
Whether multiple FIRs pertaining to the same alleged offence are maintainable? NO
Earliest information being the first in point of time is FIR
95. The earliest information, being the first in point of time, relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and recorded by the officer in charge of a police station, is what sets the investigative machinery in motion and marks the commencement of investigation. This information is commonly referred to as “the FIR”, and it is the only FIR. It is, no doubt, possible that more than one piece of information may be furnished to the police concerning the same incident involving one or multiple cognizable offences.
Police officer is not obliged to record every subsequent piece of information in the station diary as FIR
96. A plain reading of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. makes it clear that a police officer is not obliged to record every subsequent piece of information in the station diary as the first information. The expression “second FIR” is a misnomer, for the law does not recognize the registration of more than one First Information Report in respect of the same offence. Any action taken by the police on information received after the first report forms part of the investigation into the same offence. The investigating agency, in the discharge of its bounden duty, must inquire not only into the cognizable offence disclosed in the first report but also into all connected offences arising from the same transaction or occurrence.
Accused shall not be taken through repeated investigation for same offence and hence second FIR is barred
97. The existence of another FIR stamps an abuse of investigative powers, undermines the fairness of the investigative process, and exposes the accused to unwarranted harassment through repeated investigations into the same offence. Such a practice militates against the procedure that all connected offences arising from the same incident or transaction must be investigated together in a single proceeding. It is for this reason that the law disregards the practice of registering a “second FIR”, save in situations where the test of sameness is inapplicable or a counter-case is being investigated into. In such cases, the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, may quash the subsequent FIR to prevent abuse of the process of law.
Subsequent information after the FIR is hit under section 162 Cr.P.C
98. This Court in T.T. Antony (supra), categorically held that any information furnished to the officer in charge of a police station after the commencement of investigation would constitute a statement covered by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. No such information, subsequent to the first information, can be treated as an FIR under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C., for that would amount to a “second FIR,” which is impermissible in law. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. only recognizes the first information about a cognizable offence as satisfying the requirements of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. It was held therein that there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of subsequent information qua the same cognizable offence/same occurrence/incident. The Court, without a scintilla of doubt, was correct in holding that a case arising out of second FIR is a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
“paras.18,20,27”
Test of sameness
99. In Babubhai (supra), this Court laid down the “test of sameness” to determine whether a second FIR pertains to the very same incident or constitutes different parts of the same transaction. It held that if the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR ought to be quashed. However, where the subsequent information discloses a distinct offence or version or sets up a counterclaim, the investigating agency is not precluded from proceeding thereon. The relevant observations read thus:-
“paras.20, 21”
There cannot be more than one FIR
100. This Court again reiterated that there cannot be more than one FIR for the same offence in Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., reported in (2013) 6 SCC 384. It permitted registration of an FIR when the incident is found to be separate; offences are similar or different, or where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the scope of the FIR recorded first. The Court held that the right to investigate flows from the Cr.P.C., and the power of reinvestigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of the investigating agency. The “test of sameness” introduced in Babubhai (supra) was affirmed to ascertain whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident and same occurrence. The relevant observation reads thus:-
“paras.14, 25”
101. This Court in Arnab Ranjan Goswami (supra), again, had the occasion to hold that any information relating to the same cognizable offence, the same occurrence, or the incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, cannot be treated as a fresh first information report and is barred. Except in cases where the test of sameness is inapplicable or where a counter-case arises, registration of a subsequent FIR would amount to an abuse of the investigative process and would warrant the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relevant observations read thus:-
“paras.31”
Police cannot refuse to register information regarding commission of cognizable offence
115. The Court also addressed the contention that as Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. mandates a police officer to register an FIR wherever any information about the commission of a cognizable offence is received, it would not be open to the police officer to refuse to register an FIR, and such a reading of Section 32 of the said Act would run contrary to the decision of this Court in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1. The Court rejected such contention and observed as follows:
“80. In the said case, a Constitution Bench of this Court has held that registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. It was further held that a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not, if the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the need for such an inquiry. The Court has also indicated certain cases where a preliminary inquiry may be conducted, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. They include matrimonial disputes, commercial offences and cases where there is abnormal delay/laches. This Court also held that the aforesaid were not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant a preliminary inquiry.
81. We would think that this Court was not, in the said case, considering a case under the Act or cases similar to those under the Act, and we would think that having regard to the discussion which we have made and on a conspectus of the provisions of CrPC and Section 32 of the Act, the principle laid down in Lalita Kumari [Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524] is not attracted when an information is made before a police officer making out the commission of an offence under Chapter IV of the Act mandating a registration of an FIR under Section 154 CrPC. W.P. (Crl.) No. 123 of 2023 Page 116 of 157
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85. It is to be noted that the duty to register FIR, when information is received about a cognizable offence falling under Chapter IV of the Act, it is clear from the very inception that a police officer has no jurisdiction to investigate the offence. It is not a case of absence of territorial jurisdiction. No doubt, if it is a case of another police officer being empowered to investigate the offence in terms of powers under CrPC, the law is, as laid down, that there is the obligation to register an FIR and then make it over to the police station which has jurisdiction. In fact, a conflict, when in the context of Sections 178 to 185 CrPC, which constitute exceptions to the general principle laid down in Section 177 CrPC, the High Court is to decide the dispute, as is provided in Section 186 CrPC. If an information is relatable only to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, we would think that the police officer would be out of bounds and he has no role to play in the investigation as neither he nor any other police officer has any role to play in the investigation. His duty lies in referring the complainant to the Drugs Inspector concerned. If he is in receipt of information about an offence under Chapter IV of the Act, he must promptly notify the Drugs Inspector concerned.” (Emphasis supplied)”
Unless there is irregularity in funding from international sources either U.P Act or IPC do not prohibit gatherings or doing charity work in the name of religion
132. The forensic report provided by the respondent no. 1 provides details about the materials seized by the investigating authorities from the possession of a few of the accused persons, including mobile phones, hard disks, etc. Most of the videos and images are description of the activities and drives conducted by an organization by the name World Vision. Pertinently, no material is directly linked to the incident alleged in FIR No. 224/2022. Moreover, we do not find from a reading of the U.P. Conversion Act that organization of religious gatherings or doing charity work in the name of religion has also been made a criminal offence. No provision in the IPC prohibits such activities too. No irregularity in the funding of the organization from international sources has been pointed out. More so, in case of any such irregularity, a number of provisions of the relevant legislations could have been invoked to deal with an erring organization. However, none of such provisions have been invoked in the present case. Receiving foreign aid and carrying out charitable work, even in the name of religion, ipso facto is not a punishable offence under any of the legislations.
Conclusion
161. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached the following conclusion:
a. FIR No. 224/2022 suffers from an incurable legal defect, having been lodged by a person otherwise not competent in law to do so as per the then prevailing statutory scheme. In such circumstances, the only course that would meet the ends of justice is to quash the said FIR as well as all consequential legal proceedings emanating therefrom, albeit in exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 32. Thus, FIR No. 224/2022 dated 15.04.2022 registered with the PS Kotwali, District – Fatehpur and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.
b. FIR Nos. 55/2023 and 60/2023 respectively registered with the PS Kotwali, District Fatehpur are squarely covered by the decision of this Court in T.T. Antony (supra) and for this reason are hereby quashed. Any consequential proceedings emanating from the said two FIRs shall also stand terminated.
c. A writ petition under Article 32 seeking quashing of the FIR is maintainable as held in a catena of decisions of this Court. In the extraordinary facts and circumstances of the present case, the writ petitions seeking the quashing of FIR Nos. 224/2022 and 47/2023 respectively are not only maintainable but also entertainable and are hereby allowed. All consequential proceedings emanating from FIR No. 224/2022 and 47/2023 respectively are also hereby quashed.
d. The institution of the complaint and the quality of the material gathered by the investigating authorities during the course of investigation into FIR No. 54/2023 fail to inspire any confidence as regards the bona fide of the investigation, thereby making it a fit case for us to quash the FIR and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. FIR No. 54/2023 and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom are hereby quashed.
e. The High Court committed an error in declining to quash FIR No. 538/2023 to the extent that no offence under the U.P. Conversion Act could be said to have been made out in view of the embargo contained in Section 4 of the U.P. Conversion Act. However, we clarify that insofar as FIR for the alleged offences under Sections 307, 386 and 504 of the I.P.C. respectively is concerned, the matter requires further consideration once all the relevant documents are brought on record and is thus ordered to be de-tagged from the present batch. The interim protection granted to the Petitioner earlier by this Court shall continue till the matter is finally heard and decided.
Party
Rajendra Bihari Lal and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others - W.P. (Crl.) No. 123 of 2023 - 2025 INSC 1249 - October 17, 2025 Hon’ble Mr. Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra.
