Appeal
Appeal against the dismissal order of quash petition
2. The instant appeal questions the correctness of judgment in order dated 8th January, 2021, passed in Application u/s 482 No. 18712 of 2020 by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, whereby the appellant request to quash the chargesheet and proceedings arising out of Case Crime No. 1074 of 2019 u/s 354, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 was turned down.
Facts
Facts in brief
3. The appellant and respondent no. 22 are Directors in a joint concern by the name of ‘M/s LAJ-IDS Exports Pvt. Ltd.’ with the shareholding divided 3:1. Record reveals certain allegations and counter allegations in regard to mishandling of the company’s finances, however, the same are not within the scope of the present adjudication.
3.1 In July 2019, the appellant vide a communication Annexed as P-2 sought to end this partnership. However, this fact also stands disputed.
Complaint filed before S.S.P against appellant for threat of murder
3.2 On 20th July, 2019, respondent no. 2 filed a complaint before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Janpad – Gautambuddh Nagar, making allegations against RK Aneja (brother of the appellant and A-1 in the chargesheet) of inappropriate behaviour in the workplace as also alleged threat of murder.
“complaint”
Application filed under section 156(3) Cr.P.C
3.3 A preliminary enquiry report was submitted to the competent authority on 6th August, 2019. However, on 14th August, 2019, the complainant filed an application bearing no. 457/2019 u/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gautambuddh Nagar alleging non-lodging of complaint as also no investigation having taken place on the representation given to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Gautambuddh Nagar.
“relevant paragraph extracted”
Based on direction FIR came to be registered u/s 354 & 506 IPC
3.4 The CJM, on 20th August, 2019, in pursuance of this application, directed registration of complaint and investigation thereof. On 4th September, 2019, First Information Report No. 1074 of 2019 came to be registered u/s 354 & 506 of IPC where under the present appellant is A-2. Certain portions are extracted below: –
“relevant paragraph extracted”
Quash petition was dismissed
3.6 The appellant as also A-1 filed a Writ Petition in the High Court seeking protection from arrest as also the quashing of the subject FIR. Such a prayer to quash was refused but protection from arrest was granted till submission of the final report.
Charge sheet filed
3.7 Chargesheet No. 8264 of 2020 was filed on 10th January, 2020, under the sections above named stating that the statement of the complainant, statements of the appellant and witnesses and the statement of appellant u/s 164 CrPC, the offences were found to be made out. Relevant extract thereof is as follows: –
“relevant paragraph extracted”
Proceedings before the high court
4. The appellant filed a petition u/s 482 CrPC seeking a quashing of the chargesheet dated 10th January, 2020; cognizance order dated 24th June, 2020 as also stay on further proceedings against the appellant arising out of Case Crime No. 1074 of 2019 i.e. Trial Case No. 8264 of 2020 pending before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, FTC-2, Gautambuddh Nagar.
5. By the impugned order, the Learned Single Judge refused the prayer, observing that only malicious or malafide institution of proceedings warrants interference by way of the inherent powers of the High Court. It was further observed that there were disputed questions of facts and that the High Court could not enter into, nor could it undertake a “microscopic examination of facts and evidence to thwart the prosecution case”. Before it, a prayer for accepting the plea of bail was made seeking directions to the concerned court in that regard.
6. The Trial Court was directed to consider the prayer for bail on its own merits, and the appellant was directed to appear before the concerned Court within 45 days, and for such a time period, he was protected from any coercive steps.
Consideration by this court
Whether order refusing to quash is correct?
8. In the above conspectus, the sole question to be considered by this court is whether the charges levied against the appellant are ex-facie made out from the record, thereby justifying the High Court’s refusal to quash proceedings by invoking its inherent powers u/s 482 CrPC.
9. For the purposes of immediate recall, it may be stated here that the chargesheet finds the offences u/s 354 & 506 IPC to be established, warranting trial against the appellant as well as A-1.
Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while considering application u/s 482 Cr.P.C
10. It is well settled that when considering an application u/s 482 CrPC, the court cannot conduct a mini-trial but instead is to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged are made out. To put it differently, it is to be seen, without undertaking a minute examination of the record, that there is some substance in the allegations made which could meet the threshold of statutory language.
Consideration of sections 354, 503 & 506 IPC
11. Let us now consider the sections under which the offences have been alleged.
“354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.—Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threats, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.—Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both; if threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.—and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
Section 354 IPC: offence must be committed against a woman and criminal force was applied against her
12. A bear perusal of Section 354, IPC reveals that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty. [See: Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra [(2004) 4 SCC 371].
Section 350 IPC: Though criminal force is defined but what exactly does modest means not defined
12.1 Criminal force is defined in Section 350 IPC, however, what exactly does modesty means, which is an essential aspect for this Section to apply, has not been defined so as to constitute an offence u/s 354 IPC. Any discussion on this Section is incomplete without reference to Rupan Deol Bajaj (supra) [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S Gil – (1995) 6 SCC 194] wherein the Learned Judges observed:
“14. Since the word ‘modesty’ has not been defined in the Penal Code, 1860 we may profitably look into its dictionary meaning. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn.) modesty is the quality of being modest and in relation to woman means “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct”. The word ‘modest’ in relation to woman is defined in the above dictionary as “decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or lewd; shamefast”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines modesty as “freedom from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for propriety in dress, speech or conduct”. In the Oxford English Dictionary (1933 Edn.) the meaning of the word ‘modesty’ is given as “womanly propriety of behaviour; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and conduct (in man or woman); reserve or sense of shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or coarse suggestions”.
15. … From the above dictionary meaning of ‘modesty’ and the interpretation given to that word by this Court in Major Singh case [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1 : 1966 Supp SCR 286] it appears to us that the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman …”
12.2 While we hold the above observations as also the discussion made in Major Singh (supra) in the highest esteem and regard, it must not escape us that the observations were made in the societal context and milieu of that time and its import today should be interpreted in our present context. Reference in this regard may be made to observations by Bhat, J in Attorney General v. Satish [(2022) 5 SCC 545],
“66. … These require an element of application of physical force, to women. The expression “modesty” was another limitation as older decisions show that such a state was associated with decorousness [Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194:1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] of women. This added a dimension of patriarchy and class. [ Section 354 (or any other provision of IPC) does not offer a statutory definition of the term “modesty”, and over time, was interpreted broadly, contemporaneously with the developing and acknowledged role of women in society, to overcome its inherently colonial and patriarchal origins. … One cannot be unmindful of the circumstances in which these provisions were enacted by a colonial power, at a time, when women’s agency itself was unacknowledged, or had limited recognition. Further, women in India were traditionally—during the time of enactment of IPC, in the midNineteenth Century—subordinated to the care of their fathers, or their husbands, or other male relatives. They had no share in immovable property; notions of gender equality were unheard of, or not permitted. Women had no right to vote. Quite naturally, the dignity of women— or indeed their autonomy, was not provided for.
67. The advent of the Constitution of India revolutionised—at least in law, all that. Regardless of gender, race, caste, religion or region, or all of the acknowledged sectarian and discrimination enabling barriers, everyone enjoyed equality of law, and equal protection of law (Article 14). Further, the provision in Article 15(1) proscribed discrimination by the State (in all its forms) on various grounds, including gender. Article 15(3) enabled the State to enact special provisions for women and children.”
Contents of the FIR and the statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C do not meet the prima facie ingredients for the offences
12.3 Turning to the facts of the instant case, keeping in view the contents of the FIR, the statement in the final report of the investigating officer, and the statement u/s 164 CrPC of the complainant, we are of the view that even prima facie the ingredients as referred to supra, are not met. The record is silent with respect to the use of any force, apart from bald assertions of mental and physical discomfort caused to the complainant by the appellant.
Importance of intention
To prove mens rea something better than vague statements must be produced before the court
12.4 It is well settled that for mens rea to be established, something better than vague statements must be produced before the court. As evidenced by the annexures referred to above, i.e. the FIR, the preliminary investigation report as also the concluding portion of the chargesheet, no direct allegation nor any evidence in support thereof can be found attributing intent to the appellant. It cannot be said, then, that a case u/s 354 IPC is made out against the appellant.
13. Let us now examine the next charge for which the appellant stands accused. For an offence u/s 503 to be established, it must be shown that:- (1) Threatening a person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested. (2) Such threat must be intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. Punishment for this offence is prescribed u/s 506 IPC, which is two years or with a fine or both, as applicable to this case.
13.1 Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka [(2015) 7 SCC 423] as affirmed by a bench of three judges in Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab [(2020) 8 SCC 811], records the principle of application of Section 506, IPC in the following terms: –
“11.…A reading of the definition of “criminal intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to do.
13. …It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “criminal intimidation”. The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant….”
13.2 A recent judgment of this court, Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P [2024 SCC OnLine SC 726] held as under: –
“38. An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The intention of the accused to cause alarm must be established by bringing evidence on record. The word ‘intimidate’ means to make timid or fearful, especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word ‘threat’ refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Injury involves doing an illegal act.”
This judgment also, with reference to Manik Taneja (supra), underscored the importance of material and evidence being placed on record to demonstrate intention. A mere statement without intention would not attract the offence.
13.3 What flows from the judgments referred is that for an offence of criminal intimidation to be prima facie established, the intention should be clearly visible, and the same is to be established by evidence on record. Granted that at this stage, evidence on record is not the standard to be applied since the trial is underway, but at least the results of the investigation and the material gathered thereunder, which is on record, should disclose somewhat of an offence. The FIR, interim investigation report and the chargesheet, reproduced above, do not disclose any offence having been committed by the appellant herein.
14. During oral submissions, it was urged that the statements u/s 161 and 164 CrPC, when read collectively, do indeed disclose an offence having been committed by the appellant. This was in response to the submission on behalf of the appellant that, on the face of it no offence is made out against him. We find it difficult to accept the submission on behalf of the complainant. The position of law in regard to the admissibility of these statements is settled. We may refer to State of Maharashtra v. Maroti s/o Kashinath Pimpalkar [(2023) 4 SCC 298] [https://api.sci.gov.in//pdfdate/index1.php?filename=supremecourt/2022/858/858_2022_7_1501_39287_Judgement_02-Nov-2022.pdf&dno=8582022&dt=2022-11-02] (authored by one of us, Hon. C.T Ravikumar J.) wherein the Court held-
“23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings in that case was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.
24. There can be no dispute with respect to the position that statements recorded under Section 161CrPC are inadmissible in evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act, 1872. As a matter of fact, statement recorded under Section 164CrPC can also be used only for such purposes.”
16. This Court has on numerous occasions considered the power of the High Courts to quash criminal proceedings u/s 482 CrPC. The scope thereof, therefore, does not require us to devote substantive portions of this judgment thereto. Only for the purposes of immediate reference, we take notice of a few pronouncements in this regard, other than State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Suppl (1) SCC 335], which is recognised as the locus classicus on the issue.
17. Having regard to the judgments above, we are of the view that the sum total of the circumstances, submissions and documents on record, considered supra, do not point to appellant (Naresh Aneja) having committed any offence against the complainant. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgement of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad passed in Application u/s 482 No. 18712 of 2020 is set aside. Ex consequenti, criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 1074 of 2019 are quashed qua the present appellant.
18. The appeal is allowed. It is clarified that the observations here are restricted only to the present Appellant, and no view whatsoever has been expressed in respect of R.K Aneja, regarding whom the law will continue on its course.
Party
Naresh Aneja @ Naresh Kumar Aneja … Appellant(S) versus State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. … Respondent(S) – 2025 INSC 19 – Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2025 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 1093 Of 2021) – January 2, 2025.
