However, we differ, and why?
Section 144(1)(b) of the BNSS states: “(b) his legitimate or illegitimate child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself,” which is notably different fromthe earlierSection125ofthe CrPCthatspecifically mentioneda“minor child.” However, the BNSS still includes a proviso saying that, in the case of a female child mentioned in clause (b), maintenance shall continue “until she attains her majority.” This proviso makes it clear that the word “child” in clause (b) refers to a minor. If the legislature had intended to include major children, the term ‘majority’ in the proviso would be not only incongruous but legally unnecessary.
Section 144(1)(b) of BNSS reads: “(b) his legitimate or illegitimate child, whethermarriedornot,unable to maintainitself,”whereas Section125CrPC previously referred expressly to a “minor child.” Notably, BNSS retains a proviso stating that for a female child under clause (b), maintenance is to continue “until she attains her majority.” This explicit reference to the majority underscores that the child in clause (b) continues to address the minor child. If the legislature had intended to include major children, the term ‘majority’ in the proviso would be not only incongruous but legally unnecessary.
Furthermore, Section 144(1)(c) specifically provides for maintenance to a child who has attained majority “who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself”. This shows that the law creates a clear distinction between two categories: clause (b) refers to children in general, meaning minors; while clause (c) deals exclusively with adult children who are incapacitated. If clause (b) were interpreted to include major children as well, then clause (c) would become unnecessary. Such an interpretation, which makes one provision meaningless, goes against the well-established principles of legal interpretation.
Indian legislation consistently defines “child” as a person under eighteen, for example, the BNS, Juvenile Justice Act, POCSO, and the Indian Majority Act, 1875. The absence of an explicit redefinition in BNSS implies reliance on the same meaning. The removal of the word “minor” in Section 144(1)(b) is better understood as a drafting refinement rather than a substantive expansion. Except for marriage, all other substantive rights and liabilities revolving around the child deem him/her a minor.
A helpful analogy can be drawn from the amendment to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Prior to its amendment, the provision required the plaintiff to “aver and prove” that he had performed or was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. After the amendment, the word “aver” was deleted, and only the word “prove” was retained. This led to some initial confusion, but courts rightly clarified that the omission of the word “aver” did not remove the requirement of making necessary averments in the pleadings. The logic was that proof presupposes averment. The legislature deleted the word “aver” only because it was redundant, not because the requirement of pleading ceased to exist. Similarly, in the case of Section 144(1)(b) BNSS, the omission of the word “minor” does not indicate a change in the intended subject rather, it reflects that the concept of minority is inherently implied in the term “child,” making the word “minor” unnecessary.
Alternatively, in a special case, it could be argued that the omission of the word “minor” was aimed at avoiding conflict with statutes like the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, which defines “child” as a person up to fourteen years of age. Under such logic, a child over 14 who is working and capable of maintaining themselves may no longer require support under maintenance law. However, even if such legislative harmonisation were assumed, the claim that the term “child” now includes the one who has attained majority is highly speculative. If the intention was truly to expand the scope to adult offspring, the legislature might have used the words “sons and daughters” rather than retaining the term “child.” The choice of language is deliberate and precise, and cannotbe readinamanner that overturns its commonly accepted legal meaning.
Summation
In summation, the removal of the word “minor” from Section 144(1)(b) appears to be a stylistic choice aimed at avoiding verbosity, not an intent to widen eligibility. In the absence of reasons for the removal of the word minor in the Act, Clause (b) should continue to be understood as referring to minors. Only a judicial ruling interpreting Section 144 otherwise would warrant reassessment.
Authors: M.S.Parthiban and Praveen Kumar – views expressed are personal.
