Appeal
Appeal against Hon’ble High court order set aside the discharging order
2. The captioned Appeal is filed assailing the Impugned Judgment/Final Order dt. 01.04.2024 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl. MC No. 1227/2009 whereby the Order/Judgment dt. 04.10.2008 passed by Additional Sessions Judge Delhi (“Sessions Court”) in CR No. 87/2008 discharging the Appellant for the offence u/s 498A Indian Penal Code, 1860 in FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered with PS Malviya Nagar, was set aside.
Factual background of paragraph 3 summarized as follows
The marriage between the appellant (husband) and the complainant (wife) took place on 28.02.1998, with the complainant bearing most of the wedding expenses. Both were Sub-Inspectors in the Delhi Police. Soon after marriage, the complainant faced mental and physical cruelty from the appellant and his family, including demands for dowry such as Rs. 1.5 Lakhs, a car, and a separate house. The complainant was subjected to abuse, beatings, and threats, including an incident on 27.04.1999 where she was physically assaulted and injured. Despite her efforts, she was thrown out of the matrimonial home in September 1999 and lived separately thereafter. Multiple complaints were filed by her between 1999 and 2002, culminating in FIR No. 1098/2002 against the appellant and his family under sections 498A, 406, and 34 IPC for dowry-related cruelty and harassment.
One of the arguments was that the present case was time-barred for taking cognizance
4. It has been argued on behalf of the Appellants that the High Court had erred in setting aside the Order dt. 04.10.2008 passed by the Sessions Court, which was well-reasoned and passed after due consideration of the material on record. It was vehemently argued that the present case was time-barred and the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance in light of the bar under Section 468 CrPC. Also, the Magistrate after taking cognizance on 27.07.2004 could not have reviewed its own order, subsequently at the stage of framing of charges.
10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by the complainant are that in the year 1999, the Appellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her for bringing insufficient dowry. The Complainant refers to few instances of such atrocities, however the allegations are generic, and rather ambiguous. The allegations against the family members, who have been unfortunately roped in, is that they used to instigate the Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry; however, there is no specific incident of harassment or any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her, and upon failure beat her up, but there is not even a cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he being a friend of the Appellant instigated him against the Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete picture of what may have transpired. For this reason alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home & Ors., fits perfectly to the present scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”
Analysis
9. We have heard Learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the material on record.
Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific allegations levelled against him are also obscure in nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald allegations without any specifics of time, date or place, there is no incriminating material found by the prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The Complainant has admittedly failed to produce any medical records or injury reports, x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dt. 06.12.1999 six days later on 12.12.1999. There is also no evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry allegedly made by the Appellant or his family and the investigative agencies in their own prudence have not added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to the chargesheet.
13. It is rather unfortunate that the Complainant being an officer of the State has initiated criminal machinery in such a manner, where the aged parents-in-law, five sisters and one tailor have been arrayed as an accused. Notwithstanding the possibility of truth behind the allegations of cruelty, this growing tendency to misuse legal provisions has time and again been condemned by this Court. The observations in Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr., Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr. aptly captures this concern.
Cognizance and Limitation
14. In addition, we are also of the considered view that the Complaint dt. 03.07.2002 filed by the Complainant was not time barred and was filed within the ascribed period of three years from the date of the commission of the offence. In arguendo, even if the assertion of the Appellants is considered to be true that the allegations pertain to the year 1999, and there is no material change from the first Complaint dt. 08.09.1999 and the final Complaint dt. 03.07.2002, it cannot be construed that the same was not within the time frame of limitation simply because cognizance was taken by the Magistrate two years later vide Order dt. 27.07.2004.
Computation of limitation is from date of filing complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not from the date of taking cognizance
15. It is a settled position of law that for the computation of the limitation period under Section 468 CrPC the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The dicta laid down in the case of Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh makes it unequivocally clear that the Magistrate is well within his powers to take cognizance of a complaint filed within a period of three years from the date of the commission of offence as mandated under section 468 CrPC. The relevant portion is reproduced as under:
“50. The Code imposes an obligation on the aggrieved party to take recourse to appropriate forum within the period provided by law and once he takes such action, it would be wholly unreasonable and inequitable if he is told that his grievance would not be ventilated as the court had not taken an action within the period of limitation. Such interpretation of law, instead of promoting justice would lead to perpetuate injustice and defeat the primary object of procedural law.
51. The matter can be looked at from different angle also. Once it is accepted (and there is no dispute about it) that it is not within the domain of the complainant or prosecuting agency to take cognizance of an offence or to issue process and the only thing the former can do is to file a complaint or initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if that action of initiation of proceedings has been taken within the period of limitation, the complainant is not responsible for any delay on the part of the court or Magistrate in issuing process or taking cognizance of an offence. Now, if he is sought to be penalized because of the omission, default or inaction on the part of the court or Magistrate, the provision of law may have to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. It can possibly be urged that such a provision is totally arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable. It is settled law that a court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than making it vulnerable and unconstitutional by adopting rule of litera legis. Connecting the provision of limitation in Section 468 of the Code with issuing of process or taking of cognizance by the court may make it unsustainable and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution.
53. In the instant case, the complaint was filed within a period of three days from the date of alleged offence. The complaint, therefore, must be held to be filed within the period of limitation even though cognizance was taken by the learned Magistrate after a period of one year. Since the criminal proceedings have been quashed by the High Court, the order deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside by directing the Magistrate to proceed with the case and pass an appropriate order in accordance with law, as expeditiously as possible.”
16. The following observation in Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan also re-iterates the said position, and further holds that simply because the cognizance is taken at a later stage, but the Complaint was filed within the specified period from the commission of the offence, the Complainant cannot be put to prejudice and her Complaint cannot be discarded as time-barred.
“It is, thus, clear that though Section 468 of the Code mandates that ‘cognizance’ ought to be taken within the specified period from the commission of offence, by invoking the principles of purposive construction, this Court ruled that a complainant should not be put to prejudice, if for reasons beyond the control of the prosecuting agency or the complainant, the cognizance was taken after the period of limitation. It was observed by the Constitution Bench that if the filing of the complaint or initiation of proceedings was within the prescribed period from the date of commission of an offence, the Court would be entitled to take cognizance even after the prescribed period was over.”
How to compute limitation in complaint cases? Explained
17. The observations made by the High Court in respect of computation of the limitation period is the correct appreciation of facts, and it is right in holding that “considering the date of commission of offence as 08.09.1999 and the date of filing of complaint as 03.07.2002, this Court finds that the Complaint was lodged by the Petitioner within a period of two years and ten months from the date of commission of alleged offence, which is within. the period of limitation of three years as per Section 468 of CrPC.”
Magistrate has taken cognizance correctly
18. Therefore, this is certainly not a case where the Complaint or the issuance of process is ex-facie barred by limitation, that the question of condonation of delay would arise. It is therefore clarified that the Magistrate had rightly taken cognizance of the offence under section 498A and the question of applicability or exercise of powers under section 473 CrPC as erroneously observed by the Sessions Court, does not even arise and need not be delved into at this stage.
Conclusion
Quash the FIR
19. In the interest of justice, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we deem it fit and appropriate to quash and set aside the FIR No. 1098/2002 dt. 19.12.2002 registered with PS Malviya Nagar and the Chargesheet dt. 27.07.2004.
Judgments involved/cited
K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana Represented by Its Secretary, Department of Home & Ors., (2018) 14 SCC 452
Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, 2024 INSC 9604
Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 671
Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Ors. v. State of Telangana & Anr., 2024 INSC 953
Preeti Gupta & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., [2010] 7 SCC 667
Sarah Mathew Vs Institute Cardio Vascular Diseases by Its Director DR K. M. Cherian & Ors., [2014] 2 SCC 62
Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, [2003] 8 SCC 559
Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan, [2022] 15 SCC 50
Acts and Sections involved
– Indian Penal Code, 1860: Sections 498A, 406, 34
– Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 468, 473, 482
– Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Sections 3 & 4 (not added to chargesheet)
Party
Ghanshyam Soni vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) & Another – Criminal Appeal No. 2894 of 2025 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9709 of 2024 – 2025 INSC 803- June 4, 2025 Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma.
