Brief Facts
Respondent took out a country made pistol and fired it
2. The Appellant alleges that, on 31.08.2011, while the Appellant, his father, mother and his brother/Rajesh Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rajesh’) had gone to their fields, his chacha (paternal uncle)/Lillu Singh and his son Devi Singh/Respondent No.2 forcibly entered his house at around 10 am. When restrained by his wife who was alone at the house, the Appellant alleges that the two persons – father and son i.e., Lillu Singh and Respondent No.2 – manhandled her. When the said incident was narrated to the Appellant and his brother by the Appellant’s parents who had reached the house during the incident, Rajesh went to the accused/father-son duo, to enquire about the same. In this interaction, it is alleged that his chacha and Respondent No.2 forcibly took Rajesh inside their house, where the chacha caught/held him, and Respondent No.2 took out a country-made pistol and fired it on Rajesh with the intention to kill him. It is stated that pursuant to this, Rajesh suffered injuries and died en route to Kairana hospital.
FIR registered under section 452 and 302
3. Thereafter, the Appellant lodged a First Information Report being Crime Case No.385/2011 at Kairana Police Station, Muzaffarnagar against Lillu Singh and Respondent No.2 under Sections 452 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).
4. This complaint proceeded to be converted into Sessions Trial No.123/2012 before the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kairana, Muzaffarnagar. With a plea that his date of birth was 18.04.1995, and as on the date of the incident, he was aged 16 years, 4 months and 13 days, Respondent No.2 filed a miscellaneous application numbered as Miscellaneous Case No.04/11/2015 before the Trial Court seeking to establish his juvenility, which was connected with Sessions Trial No.123/2012. The Trial Court, on appreciating the evidence and material placed on record, vide Order dated 19.05.2015, confirmed that as on the date of the incident, the Respondent No.2 was 16 years, 4 months and 13 days old and thereby established his juvenility.
5. Aggrieved by the Order of the Trial Court, the Appellant preferred a criminal revision petition before the High Court, which was dismissed vide the Impugned Order. Consequently, the juvenility of the Respondent No. 2 stood confirmed by the High Court.
Analysis reasoning and conclusion
13. Having bestowed anxious thoughts to the issue, we find that the approach adopted by the Trial Court as well as the High Court was not proper. Though the issue of juvenility, indubitably and primarily has to be determined as per the relevant provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as applicable at the relevant time, yet under appropriate circumstances and with justifiable reasons, the Court examining the issue has the discretion to take other relevant materials and factors into account, for ultimately the cause of justice has to prevail.
14. In the present case, the serious allegation against Respondent No.2 is that on the exhortation of his father, he along with his father forcibly took the deceased Rajesh inside their house, whereafter Respondent No.2 took out a country-made pistol and shot the deceased Rajesh, resulting in his death.
15. With regard to the modalities of the enquiry governing determination of juvenility, Rule 12(3) of the Rules provides:
“12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age ………. “
19. The relevancy of an entry in a ‘public record’ is guided by Section 35 of the Evidence Act:
‘35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record, made in performance of duty.–– An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record or an electronic record, is kept, is itself a relevant fact.’
20. Section 74 of the Evidence Act deals with ‘public documents’:
‘74. Public documents– The following documents are public documents: ––
(1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts ––
(i) of the sovereign authority,
(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country;
(2) public records kept in any State of private documents.’
The records maintained by the said School would not be public documents and the head master/principal is not a public servant for the purpose of Evidence Act
21. There is no dispute on the factum that Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon – the first attended school – is not a Government School and thus, the records maintained by the said School would not be ‘public documents’. Moreover, the Headmaster/Principal of such School cannot be said to be a ‘public servant’ for the purposes of the Evidence Act. The Headmaster when examined has himself taken the stand that Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon was only a State Government-recognized school.
22. Therefore, neither the Headmaster/Principal of the first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively.
23. Even otherwise, in the case at hand, except for the Headmaster’s sole testimony, there is no material to establish that the date 18.04.1995 as Respondent No.2’s date of birth, as recorded in the certificate issued by Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon, was correct. As a matter of fact, the Principal in his cross-examination stated that when the Respondent No.2 was leaving the school on that day after making cutting he had written the correct date of birth. Moreover, the Principal has also stated that the birth-date entry was made on the basis of an oral representation alone by Respondent No.2’s father and when he was asked for the horoscope or any other document in support of the date of birth of the Respondent No.2, nothing was submitted. This, in our view, discredits the certificate issued by the Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon. As noted hereinbefore, the other school certificates were issued following this and therefore, meet the same fate inasmuch as they cannot be treated as correct, in the face of conflicting public records and public documents as also the Medical Report which state to the contrary. The observations by a Bench of 2 learned Judges in Om Prakash v State of Rajasthan (supra) are clearly attracted, and the relevant excerpts therefrom read as under:
“ …………. “
Medical opinion will be sought from a constituted medical board about the age only in the absence of certificate given by corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat
24. Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules lays down the sequential list of certificates to be examined and the order thereof. As no ‘matriculation or equivalent certificates’ were available under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) of the Rules, thus under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the Rules, ‘date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended’ was attracted and certificate issued by Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon was taken as conclusive proof of date of birth. However, the deposition of the School’s Headmaster, especially to the effect that the birth-date was noted as per an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father, makes the said certificate unreliable. Moving on, Rule 12(3)(a)(iii) and Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules, respectively, provide for ‘birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat’ and ‘only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.’
Juvenile not proved
25. From an overall circumspection of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the Rules, the picture which emerges is that on the one hand, there is the certificate backed by the testimony of the Headmaster of the first school (which as indicated supra notes that the recordal was made on the oral say-so of Respondent No.2’s father) relating to the date of birth and the three consequentially-made/issued certificates, whereas on the other hand, there exists a statutory document, being a public record and a public document, in Form (A) under Rule 2 of the Rules framed under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 disclosing the year of birth of Respondent No.2 as 1991 as also the entry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly of the year 2012 and the Medical Report apropos the age of Respondent No.2 given by the Chief Medical Officer, Muzaffarnagar, who opined that Respondent No.2 was aged about 22 years on 01.12.2012. As such, the certificate issued by Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon could not have been taken as conclusive proof of date of birth of Respondent No.2, discarding Form (A) under Rule 2 of the Rules under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947; the entry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly of the year 2012, and; the Medical Report. On the basis of the latter three documents, it is clear that Respondent No.2 cannot be said to have been a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the unfortunate incident.
26. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, the declaration of Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ being plainly improper, the Impugned Order as well as the Order dated 19.05.2015 of the Trial Court holding the Respondent No.2 to be a ‘juvenile’ are hereby set aside. Respondent No.2 is held to have been a major as on the date of commission of the alleged offence and liable to be tried as a major for Crime No. 385/2011, Police Station – Kairana.
29. The trial shall proceed on its own merits in accordance with law without being prejudiced on merits by the instant Judgment. If the trial results in conviction, benefit of set-off in relation to 3 years shall be afforded to Respondent No.2.
30. The Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Judgments involved or cited
Birad Mal Singhvi v Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC 604
Om Prakash v State of Rajasthan, (2012) 5 SCC 201
Acts and Sections
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (referred to as the ‘Juvenile Justice Act’)
* Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (referred to as the ‘Rules’)
* Rule 12(3) of the Rules
* Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules
* Rule 12(3)(a)(i) of the Rules
* Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the Rules
* Rule 12(3)(a)(iii) of the Rules
* Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (referred to as the ‘IPC’)
* Section 452 (House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint)
* Section 302 (Punishment for murder)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’)
* Section 35 (Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record, made in performance of duty)
* Section 74 (Public documents)
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947
* Rule 2 of the Rules framed under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947
Party
Suresh vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Devi Singh – Criminal Appeal No. 347 of 2018 – 2025 INSC 918 – August 01, 2025 Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pankaj Mithal, J and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
