Appeal against dismissal quash order
2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgement dated 02.01.2025 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati whereby the High Court dismissed the application filed by the appellants herein in Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”) and refused to quash C.C. No.1015 of 2021 on the file of the Court of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati for the offences punishable under Sections 290, 341 and 171F read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861, the appellants are before this Court.
3. The appellant Manchu Mohan Babu in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5247 of 2025 is the Chairman of Sri Vidyaniketan Educational Institutions and the appellant Manchu Vishnu Vardhan Babu in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8623 of 2025 is the son of Manchu Mohan Babu (hereinafter, “the appellants”).
5. The above acts are alleged to have caused obstruction to the free flow of traffic, inconvenience, annoyance and risk to passengers.
6. On receipt of the said information about the rally and dharna, the Mandal Parishad Development Officer and In-charge of the Model Code of Conduct Team-IV, Chandragiri Assembly Constituency arrived at the spot, videographed the rally and dharna and registered a written complaint with the police. Consequently, an FIR bearing No. 102 of 2019 came to be registered on 22.03.2019 against the aforesaid appellants and other participants in the rally and dharna at the Chandragiri Police Station, District – Tirupati Urban.
7. Statements of certain witnesses having been recorded, a chargesheet came to be filed on 03.06.2020 against the appellants in C.C. No. 1015/2021.
8. Being aggrieved by the said criminal proceedings, the appellants approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati by filing Criminal Petition No.7446 of 2022 seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021. Vide impugned order dated 02.01.2025, the High Court dismissed the said petition. The High Court noted that there are specific allegations leveled against the appellants in the commission of the alleged offences and observed that there were no tenable grounds to quash the proceedings. Hence the instant appeal.
Analysis
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent-State.
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is, whether, the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 1015 of 2021 against the appellants herein ought to be quashed.
13. In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”), this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers under Section 482 of CrPC may be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all those parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may be appropriate in the following circumstances:
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2).
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.”
14. Further, this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, while affirming Bhajan Lal has held that:
“22. It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. …” (Underlining by us)
15. This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, reasoned that the criminal process cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and held that while entertaining an application for quashing an FIR at the initial stage, the test to be applied is whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the offence. This Court also concluded that the court should quash those criminal cases where the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose is likely to be served by continuation of a criminal prosecution. The aforesaid observations squarely apply to this case.
18. On a combined reading of the FIR and the charge-sheet, we fail to understand as to how the allegations against the appellants herein could be brought within the scope and ambit of the aforesaid provisions. Taking the allegations in the FIR and the charge-sheet as they stand, the crucial ingredients of the offences under Sections 290, 341, 171F read with 34 IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 are entirely absent. A reading of the FIR and the charge-sheet neither discloses any act committed or illegal commission that caused common injury, danger, annoyance to the public or any section of the public or interference with their public rights, nor do they disclose any voluntary obstruction to a person that prevents them from proceeding in any direction that they have a right to proceed in. Further they do not disclose any material to suggest that there was any undue influence at elections, impersonation at elections or any act committed with the intention to interfere with the free exercise of electoral rights. Further they do not suggest that any act was committed on a road or in an open place within the limits of a town that caused inconvenience, annoyance or posed a risk of danger or inquiry or damage to the public, and do not disclose any of the eight specified actions under Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861. Therefore, even if the case of the respondent-State is accepted at its face value, it cannot be concluded that the appellants, while conducting the rally and dharna, engaged in any form of obstruction of the road in a manner that led to the offences alleged. The appellants were exercising their right to freedom of speech and expression and to assemble peacefully. Therefore, no purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution.
20. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned facts and judicial dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the appellants herein is made out, therefore, the judgments of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly sub-paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of paragraph 102, extracted above and Pepsico, squarely apply to the facts of these cases. It is neither expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to continue.
21. In the result, we allow these appeals and set-aside the impugned judgment. The application under Section 482 of CrPC on the file of the High Court shall accordingly stand allowed. The FIR No.102 of 2019 dated 22.03.2019 registered at Police Station Chandragiri, District Tirupati under Sections 290, 341, 171F read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 34 of the Police Act, 1861 and the proceedings in C.C. No.1015 of 2021 shall accordingly stand quashed.
Judgments cited or involved
State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal – 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate – (1998) 5 SCC 749.
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre – (1988) 1 SCC 692.
Acts and Sections
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
Section 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
Section 290
Section 341
Section 171F read with Section 34
Police Act, 1861
Section 30
Section 34
Party
Manchu Mohan Babu and Manchu Vishnu Vardhan Babu vs State of Andhra Pradesh & Another – Criminal Appeal No. 3298 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5247 of 2025) – 2025 INSC 916 – July 31, 2025 Hon’ble Mrs. Justice B. V. Nagarathna. J Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.V. Viswanathan, J.
