Total summary
Appeal and Impugned Order
The present criminal appeal is filed by the appellant-accused, Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra, assailing the common judgment and order dated October 9, 2012, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 491 of 1994 and Criminal Appeal No. 1190 of 1996. The impugned High Court judgment reversed the Trial Court’s earlier order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sentencing him to undergo life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for two years, respectively. [Para 1]
Factual Matrix
The prosecution alleged that on September 20, 1989, the appellant, who had been living separately from his wife Sushma and their two sons for about six years, took them on a trip from Kanpur to Khajuraho under a false pretext. It was contended that during this trip, the appellant murdered his wife and one son by strangulation and attempted to kill the other child, who managed to escape. On September 26, 1989, a truck driver found the surviving 4-5 year old male child wandering naked and injured near Bhero Ghat and handed him over to the police, following which the decomposed bodies of the woman and the other child were discovered the next evening. The prosecution’s case subsequently rested on circumstantial evidence, alleged subsequent recoveries of clothes and an acid bottle at the appellant’s behest six months later, and the eyewitness testimony of the surviving child. [Para 2, 3]
Trial and Appellate Courts Verdicts
The Additional Sessions Judge, Panna, acting as the Trial Court, originally acquitted the appellant, finding the prosecution’s evidence insufficient and ruling that the testimony of the child witness was unreliable, unnatural, and fraught with contradictions, lacking necessary corroboration. Conversely, upon appeals filed by the State, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed this acquittal, determining that the child witness’s testimony was trustworthy and without reason for tutoring. The High Court further held that this testimony was adequately corroborated by the appellant’s subsequent conduct of absconding and his purportedly false explanation under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, thereby concluding that the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt to warrant conviction. [Para 8, 9]
Core Legal Arguments and Ratio Decidendi
The appellant argued that the conviction erroneously relied on the uncorroborated and tutored testimony of the child witness, highlighting the absence of motive, medical or forensic evidence, and a failure to establish the “last seen” theory, while the State countered that the child’s testimony, coupled with the accused’s absconding behavior and subsequent recoveries, completed the chain of circumstances. The Supreme Court laid down the ratio decidendi that in cases relying on circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be unequivocally complete to point solely towards the guilt of the accused, and where a child witness is susceptible to tutoring, it is a rule of prudence to seek corroboration. Applying the double presumption of innocence and holding that suspicion cannot substitute proof, the Court ruled that an appellate court should not interfere with a reasoned acquittal if two reasonable conclusions are possible, thus setting aside the High Court’s conviction. [Para 12, 14, 20]
Important paragraphs
21. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, we are unable to sustain the view taken by the High Court for the reasons mentioned hereinbelow.
Principle and appreciating appeal against order reversing acquittal
22. At the very outset, it must be noted that this being an appeal against an order reversing an acquittal, the High Court, as per settled law, was bound to bear in mind the double presumption of innocence operating in favour of the appellant, and could interfere only upon a finding that the view taken by the Trial Court was not merely different from its own but was one no reasonable court could have taken on the material before it. This principle is well settled and expounded in Chandrappa v State of Karnataka1. The relevant paragraph is produced hereinbelow.
“44. ….. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
23. In our considered opinion, this threshold has not been met in the present case. The High Court’s finding of guilt principally rested on the statement of the child witness, PW-28, whom the court found to be a reliable and natural witness. The Trial Court had declined to give undue weight to this testimony for reasons that were duly supported by material.
Corroboration of child witness before a conviction is required
24. It is well settled that while there is no inflexible rule requiring the testimony of a child witness to be corroborated before a conviction can be sustained, this Court has held that such corroboration is a rule of prudence which is to be ordinarily followed. In Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., this Court held that the evidence of a child has to be evaluated carefully given he is an easy prey to tutoring. Paragraph 19, which deals with it is as follows:
“19. The law recognises the child as a competent witness but a child particularly at such a tender age of six years, who is unable to form a proper opinion about the nature of the incident because of immaturity of understanding, is not considered by the court to be a witness whose sole testimony can be relied upon without other corroborative evidence. The evidence of a child is required to be evaluated carefully because he is an easy prey to tutoring. Therefore, always the court looks for adequate corroboration from other evidence to his testimony. (See Panchhi v. State of U.P. [(1998) 7 SCC 177:1998 SCC (Cri) 1561])”
Tested against this standard, the Trial Court’s insistence on independent corroboration of the child witness’s account, given the specific and serious doubts as to tutoring as discussed below, cannot be said to be an unreasonable or impermissible approach.
Child witness was stated as tutored
25. The child (PW-28) was only four and a half years of age when the incident occurred and the testimony was recorded 4 years later. Moreover, it is an admitted fact that the child lived with a constable Ramkishore. The said child witness in paragraphs 30 and 61 of his statement had also categorically stated that he was tutored. He had said that the Station House Officer had made him read his statement before going to the Court and had told him that the same statement was to be given before the Magistrate. He had also stated that the appellant had tried to strangulate him with a rope and thrown acid on him. However, the said statement stands falsified by medical evidence.
PW 28 witnessed the killing of his mother and went back to sleep is unnatural and contrary to human conduct
26. The Trial Court also noted that the version of PW-28, that upon hearing his mother cry, he had woken up and witnessed the appellant killing his mother and then throwing her in the jungle, and then had gone back to sleep. It was further stated that he had again woken up and witnessed his brother being killed, which was unnatural and contrary to human conduct. In light of these circumstances, the testimony of PW-28 was not found to be reliable.
Since the bodies were in an advanced stage of decomposition, no definite opinion could be given
29. There is no medical or scientific evidence connecting the appellant to the crime. The post-mortem report of the deceased persons was of no assistance since as per the statements of the doctors, PW-1 and PW-20, the bodies were in an advanced stage of decomposition. Therefore, no definite opinion could be given regarding the cause of death. The chemical examination report of the bloodstained soil was also inconclusive as there was not enough blood for examination and it had decomposed.
Recovery of clothes becomes doubtful since the recoveries were made from the place of occurrence after 6 months
32. The recovery of the clothes, in such circumstances also becomes doubtful considering that such recoveries were made from the place of occurrence 6 months subsequent to the discovery of the bodies of the deceased persons. Further doubt is created when the statement of PW-10, a witness to the recovery memo of articles seized from the house of the deceased, is seen who stated that certain clothes were taken from the house by the police without any writing. PW-11, the subsequent Investigating Officer, has also admitted in cross-examination that the recovered articles did not show any water, mud, or earth residue which is highly doubtful considering the fact that as per the prosecution case these articles were seized from under a rock, 6 feet deep in the ground after being hidden for several months. In light of the above, the possibility of the articles being planted cannot be ruled out.
No witness stated about any enmity between the appellant and the deceased
35. On motive, none of the witnesses deposed regarding any enmity between the appellant and the deceased. In fact, PW-17 deposed that the relations between the deceased and the appellant were amicable. It was stated that they had resolved their issues and decided to live separately, and she was paying her rent herself. Thus, motive is found absent and in any case there is lack thereof for the appellant to have committed such act.
Conclusion
Appeal allowed
38. In light of the above stated reasons, in absence of cogent evidence leading to the sole conclusion of guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. The present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 09.10.2012 passed by the High Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges.
39. In light of the acquittal of the appellant, the bail bonds as submitted by the appellant stand discharged.
Resources
Cited Judgments
- Panchhi National Commission for Women vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
- Anil Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar
- Bodh Raj vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir
- Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
- State of U.P. vs. Satish
- Reddy Sampath Kumar vs. State of A.P.
- Ramreddy Rajeshkhanna Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
- Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer vs. State of Kerala
Acts and Sections
- Indian Penal Code (IPC): Section 302 and Section 201.
- Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC): Section 313.
Party
Ravi Kumar Singh Malhotra v. The State of Madhya Pradesh - Criminal Appeal No. 937 of 2014 - 2026 INSC 899 - August 20, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih.
