Appeal
Appeals against the order of Hon’ble High Court dismissing quash petition
2. These appeals are directed against an order dated 18.06.2024 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Criminal Petition No.3829 of 2017, titled ‘Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd and others v. M/s. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Private Limited, arising out of complaint in PCR No.13146/2014 and CC No.18491 of 2016 pending on the file of the Court of II Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru. By the said order, the High Court dismissed the criminal petition filed by the appellants herein challenging the initiation of the criminal proceedings against them for the offences under sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, however, quashed the complaint as far as M/s. Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd.4 (Accused No.1) is concerned.
Facts
Respondent filed defamation complaint against appellants for printing news articles under sections 499 and 500 IPC
3. The genesis of the present cases lies in a private complaint dated 22.08.2014 filed by the complainant / respondent herein against the company and its directors, editors and journalists, numbering 14 accused persons, under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Sections 499 and 500 IPC. The gravamen of the complaint pertains to certain news articles published in various newspapers viz., Bangalore Mirror, Mumbai Mirror, The Times of India (Bangalore, Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi, and Pune Editions), and The Economic Times (New Delhi and Mumbai editions) on 27.06.2014, 28.06.2014, 29.06.2014, 06.07.2014, 07.07.2014, and 20.07.2014 which contained alleged defamatory contents regarding the authenticity of certain paintings to be auctioned by the respondent herein.
Summons issued to the appellants
4. Upon receipt of the complaint, the sworn statement of the complainant / respondent was recorded on 14.11.2014. Thereafter, the trial Court took cognizance of the complaint and directed to register the same for the offences under sections 499 and 500 IPC and issue summons to the accused, vide order dated 29.07.2016. The complaint was received as PCR No.13146/2014 and later, registered as CC No.18491 of 2016 which is now, pending on the file of the trial Court.
Hon’ble High Court dismissed quash petition in general and quashed for A1
5. Challenging the issuance of summons, the appellants filed Criminal Petition No.3829 of 2017 before the High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them. After due contest, the High Court dismissed the petition as against the appellants herein, however, quashed the complaint as far as the company (A1) is concerned. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants are before us with the present appeals.
Analysis
11. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on both sides and also perused the materials available on record.
Interim stay extended
12. Vide order dated 12.08.202410 in SLP (Criminal) No.10212 of 2024, this Court granted an order of interim stay of all further proceedings in connection with Complaint Case No.18491/2016 until further orders. Similar order was passed by this Court in SLP (Criminal) No.13443 of 2024 as well, on 14.10.2024. Consequently, such benefit was also extended to the appellant in SLP (Criminal) No.15653 of 2024 and the appellants in SLP (Criminal) No.16153 of 2024, vide orders dated 11.11.2024 and 14.11.2024 respectively.
Analysis of Legal provisions
13. At the outset, we refer to the relevant legal provisions applicable to the present case, as outlined below:
(a) The Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 – Sections 1, 5 & 7: Explained
13.1. It is vivid from the above provisions that every newspaper must clearly mention the names of its owner and editor, ensuring transparency in publication. Furthermore, a statutory presumption is cast upon the editor, who is responsible for the selection of content that is subsequently published, making him accountable for the same unless proven otherwise.
(b) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 499 & 500: Explained
13.2. From the above provisions, it is clear that defamation under section 499 IPC necessitates both an intention to harm or knowledge that the imputation is likely to cause harm, and that the imputation must be capable of lowering the reputation of the person in the estimation of others. In other words, the essence of defamation lies not merely in the making of an imputation but in its effect on the perception of the public, thereby impacting the standing of the person in society.
(c) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 202 Cr.P.C: Explained with previous judgment
13.3. The above provision clearly stipulates that upon receiving a private complaint under section 200 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate must mandatorily conduct an inquiry or investigation before proceeding to issue process against the accused, if such accused resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, the Magistrate must examine witnesses before issuing summons in cases where the accused resides outside the Magistrate’s jurisdiction. This mandatory requirement of inquiry or investigation was introduced through section 19 of the 18 Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) which came into effect from 23.06.2006 by introducing the words ‘and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction’.
13.4. The above requirement has been eruditely elucidated by this Court in Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are extracted below:
“23. Admitted position in law is that in those cases where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction, it is mandatory on the part of the Magistrate to conduct an enquiry or investigation before issuing the process. Section 202 CrPC was amended in the year 2005 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005, with effect from 22-6-2006 by adding the words “and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction”. There is a vital purpose or objective behind this amendment, namely, to ward off false complaints against such persons residing at a far-off places in order to save them from unnecessary harassment. Thus, the amended provision casts an obligation on the Magistrate to conduct enquiry or direct investigation before issuing the process, so that false complaints are filtered and rejected. The aforesaid purpose is specifically mentioned in the note appended to the Bill proposing the said amendment.
24. The essence and purpose of this amendment has been captured by this Court in Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj [Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479] in the following words: (SCC p. 644, paras 11- 12)
“11. Section 202 of the Code, inter alia, contemplates postponement of the issue of the process ‘in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction’ and thereafter to either inquire into the case by himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. In the face of it, what needs our determination is as to whether in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction, inquiry is mandatory or not.
12. The words ‘and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction’ were inserted by Section 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) w.e.f. 23- 6-2006. The aforesaid amendment, in the opinion of the legislature, was essential as false complaints are filed against persons residing at far-off places in order to harass them. The note for the amendment reads as follows:
False complaints are filed against persons residing at far-off places simply to harass them. In order to see that innocent persons are not harassed by unscrupulous persons, this clause seeks to amend sub-section (1) of Section 202 to make it obligatory upon the Magistrate that before summoning the accused residing beyond his jurisdiction he shall enquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for finding out whether or not there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.’ The use of the expression “shall” prima facie makes the inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, by the Magistrate mandatory. The word “shall” is ordinarily mandatory but sometimes, taking into account the context or the intention, it can be held to be directory. The use of the word “shall” in all circumstances is not decisive. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, when we look to the intention of the legislature, we find that it is aimed to prevent innocent persons from harassment by unscrupulous persons from false complaints. Hence, in our opinion, the use of the expression “shall” and the background and the purpose for which the amendment has been brought, we have no doubt in our mind that inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, is mandatory before summons are issued against the accused living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.”
26. The requirement of conducting enquiry or directing investigation before issuing process is, therefore, not an empty formality. What kind of “enquiry” is needed under this provision has also been explained in Vijay Dhanuka case [Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479], which is reproduced hereunder: (SCC p. 645, para 14)
“14. In view of our answer to the aforesaid question, the next question which falls for our determination is whether the learned Magistrate before issuing summons has held the inquiry as mandated under Section 202 of the Code. The word “inquiry” has been defined under Section 2(g) of the Code, the same reads as follows:
‘2. (g) “inquiry” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court;
It is evident from the aforesaid provision, every inquiry other than a trial conducted by the Magistrate or the court is an inquiry. No specific mode or manner of inquiry is provided under Section 202 of the Code. In the inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are examined whereas under Section 200 of the Code, examination of the complainant only is necessary with the option of examining the witnesses present, if any. This exercise by the Magistrate, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code.”
27. When we peruse the summoning order, we find that it does not reflect any such inquiry. No doubt, the order mentioned that the learned Magistrate had passed the same after reading the complaint, verification statement of the complainant and after perusing the copies of documents filed on record i.e. FIR translation of the complaint, affidavit of advocate who had translated the FIR into English, etc…
28. Insofar as these two accused persons are concerned, there is no enquiry of the nature enumerated in Section 202 CrPC.
29. The learned Magistrate did not look into the matter keeping in view the provisions of Section 7 of the Press Act and applying his mind whether there is any declaration qua these two persons under the said Act and, if not, on what basis they are to be proceeded with along with the Editors. Application of mind on this aspect was necessary. It is made clear that this Court is not suggesting that these two accused persons cannot be proceeded with at all only because of absence of their names in the declaration under the Press Act. What is emphasised is that there is no presumption against these persons under Section 7 of the Press Act and they being outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned, the Magistrate was required to apply his mind on these aspects while passing summoning orders qua A-1 and A-2.
Discussions and findings
Single complaint preferred against appellants for the alleged defame content published in different states
14. It appears to us that the complainant / respondent herein preferred a single complaint against accused for different news articles written on different dates and published in different editions in different States of the Country, viz., Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Bangalore and Pune. Upon receipt of the complaint, the respondent was examined and his sworn statement was recorded. Thereafter, the Magistrate took cognizance of the complaint and directed to register the same and issue summons to the accused. Consequently, the company (A1) and the appellants herein preferred criminal petition before the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against them. Vide order dated 18.06.2024, the High Court quashed the complaint only in respect of the Accused No.1 – Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd., and dismissed the criminal petition insofar as the appellants are concerned. Therefore, these criminal appeals are filed by the appellants.
Role of accused 2 is merely administrative in nature only
19. Let us first deal with the case of the appellant (A2) Jaideep Bose, who stands on a different footing from the other accused. He is serving as the Editorial Director of the company, which is the owner of all the newspapers in question. According to him, he is neither the author nor the editor of the news articles in question and his role is merely administrative in nature, with no direct involvement in the publication process. He further states that there was procedural irregularity in the process of issuance of summons as he resides in Mumbai, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court, and hence, the Magistrate was required to conduct an inquiry by examining witnesses as mandated under Section 202 Cr.P.C.
Press and Registration of Books Act 1867 imposes higher responsibility and liability on editor
19.1. As already reiterated, it is the editor who plays a key role in the publication process bearing responsibility for ensuring that the content published adheres to legal standards, including laws surrounding defamation. It is well settled that the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 (“the Act”) imposes a higher degree of responsibility and liability on an editor. Section 5 of the Act mandates that every newspaper or periodical publication must specify the name of the editor and owner. Section 7 creates a rebuttable presumption that the editor whose name is printed in the newspaper shall be held to be the editor in any civil or criminal proceedings in respect of that publication. Since an “editor” has been defined as the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper, the presumption goes to the extent of holding that he was the person, who controlled the selection of the matter that was published in the newspaper. However, merely because the Act does not mention persons holding other roles in a publication of the company, such as an Editorial Director, or mandate the publication of their names, the same does not imply that such persons cannot be made liable for any defamatory content. The key distinction is that unlike an editor, against whom a statutory presumption is imposed, there is no such presumption against the editorial director at the outset [See: K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham].
No averments in the complaint to establish as to how appellant-2 was responsible for controlling the contents of the newspaper publication
19.2. Turning to the complaint, which is also necessary in it, are specific allegations regarding the role of the accused in the publication process. This Court in Gambhirsinh R. Dekare v. Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel observed that while the Act does not recognise any other legal entity viz. Chief Editor, Managing Editor, etc. for raising a presumption, such individuals can still be proceeded against, but only when specific allegations are made against them. In the present case, the complaint merely alleges that the appellant (A2) oversaw the publications. No other averments were made to establish as to how the appellant (A2) was responsible for controlling the selection of contents of the newspaper publications. Furthermore, as already stated above, he is the editorial director of the company and not of the individual newspapers. Thus, in our view, such a broad, general or blanket statement without specific or substantive details cannot justify the issuance of summons.
Magistrate did not conduct enquiry under section 202 (1) Cr.P.C since the appellants are falls outside his jurisdiction
19.3. The Magistrate, without a proper examination and inquiry, proceeded to issue summons to the appellant (A2). It is also pertinent to note here that the appellant (A2) resides in Mumbai, which falls outside the jurisdiction of the concerned Magistrate. In such a scenario, as discussed earlier, the Magistrate was required to proceed with the complaint in accordance with section 202(1) Cr.P.C. However, no such inquiry was conducted in the present case. Therefore, considering all these aspects, we are of the opinion that the complaint is not maintainable against the appellant (A2)
Complainant failed to produce any witness to establish prima facie hence quashed
20. Regarding the appellants in the other appeals, it is evident from the orders of the trial Court as well as the High Court that not all news articles individually authored by the various accused were considered. While passing the impugned order, the High Court referred only to one article authored by Ms. Neelam Raj (A4) and neither took into account nor discussed the other news articles authored by the remaining accused. Furthermore, the mandatory procedure under section 202 Cr.P.C., was clearly not followed. The Appellants viz., A8, A9, A10, A12 and A13 reside in Mumbai / Kolkata, whereas the complaint was filed in Bangalore. The complainant failed to produce any witness to prima facie establish that the alleged imputations had lowered their reputation in the estimation of others and the Magistrate, after merely reviewing the complainant’s statement, proceeded to issue summons. Thus, the Magistrate’s order clearly suffers from procedural irregularity. Ordinarily, such irregularities would warrant a remand. However, in the present case, the auction was conducted on 27.06.2014 and the complaint was filed on 22.08.2014. No material has also been placed before us to suggest that the auction was unsuccessful or that any damage or loss was actually caused, due to the alleged news articles published in the newspapers. Irrespective of the same, at this stage, remanding the matter for fresh examination of witnesses before issuance of summons would serve no useful purpose, given the remote likelihood of securing witnesses. It would only prolong the litigation yielding little to no benefit especially, since the auction has already concluded and more than a decade has passed. We also take note of the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants that there is no intent to defame or harm the complainant’s reputation. Notably, this Court vide common order dated 20.07.2022 titled ‘M/s.DAG Pvt. Ltd. V. M/s.Bid & Hammer Auctioneers (P) Ltd.’ allowed similar criminal appeals bearing Nos. 1008/2022 etc. cases, arising from the complaint filed by the same complainant. In view of the above stated reasons, to meet the ends of justice, we are inclined to quash the order passed by the High Court as well as the issuance of summons by the Magistrate. Consequently, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants are also liable to be quashed.
Importance of freedom of speech and expression explained
21. Before parting, we find it necessary to emphasise that right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India is paramount. At the same time, it is reiterated that those working in the media, particularly, individuals in key positions, authors, etc., must exercise utmost caution and responsibility before publishing any statements, news, or opinions. The power of the media in shaping public opinion is significant and the press possesses the ability to influence public sentiments and alter perceptions, with remarkable speed. As aptly stated by Bulwer Lytton, “The Pen is mightier than the sword”. Given its vast reach, a single article or report can resonate with millions, shaping their beliefs and judgments, and it has the capability to cause severe damage to the reputation of those concerned, with consequences that may be far-reaching and enduring. This highlights the critical need for accuracy and fairness in media reporting, especially when dealing with matters having the potential to impact the integrity of individuals or institutions. Keeping these aspects in mind, publication of the news articles must be done in public interest and with good faith.
List of judgments cited or relied upon
1. Aroon Purie v. State of NCT of Delhi – 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1491
2. Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya – (2024) 2 SCC 86
3. Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private Limited & Ors. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited – (2022) 14 SCC 1
4. M/s. DAG Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Bid & Hammer Auctioneers (P) Ltd – Criminal Appeal No. 1008 of 2022 arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 6732/2019
5. K.M. Mathew v. K.A. Abraham – 2002 (6) SCC 670
6. Gambhirsinh R. Dekare v. Falgunbhai Chimanbhai Patel – 2013 (3) SCC 697
7. Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj – (2014) 14 SCC 638: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 479
8. Abhijit Pawar v. Hemant Madhukar Nimbalkar – (2017) 3 SCC 528
Party
Jaideep Bose vs. M/s. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Pvt Ltd – Criminal Appeal No. 814 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10 212 of 2024) – 2025 INSC 241 – February 18, 2025.
