Section 306 IPC: Suicide: Break ups and expressing emotions through words do not constitute instigation to commit suicide but suicides depend on the victim’s mental state
**Appeal Against the Conviction for Offences Under Sections 417 and 306 IPC by the Hon’ble High Court** The appellant did not fulfill his promise to marry the deceased, as she ultimately took her own life. The deceased ingested poison and succumbed to her injuries in the hospital, following which she made statements (dying declarations) to witnesses. The mother of the deceased (P.W-1) filed a First Information Report (FIR) under section 306 in conjunction with 34 IPC. Subsequent to the trial, the Sessions Court acquitted the appellant, indicating that there were no charges substantiated in the dying declaration provided by the deceased. The court’s rationale for acquittal was that only the deceased harbored feelings for the appellant, while the appellant did not reciprocate those feelings. Nevertheless, the Hon’ble High Court subsequently convicted the appellant. This case involves two critical dying declarations: one recorded by the Police Sub-Inspector (PSI) and another by the Taluka Executive Magistrate. Both declarations were also validated by a medical practitioner. The content of these dying declarations lacks any allegations of a physical relationship and demonstrates that the deceased alone held affections for the appellant. Furthermore, there were no claims that the appellant had instigated the deceased to ingest poison or that there existed any physical relationship between them. In the context of the abetment of suicide, as articulated under Section 306 IPC, it is essential to note that abetment is a prerequisite for imposing penalties under this provision. In alignment with Section 107 IPC, it is necessary to establish instigation to take a specific action. Instigation is defined as exceeding mere emotional expression; the mere utterance of words does not constitute instigation and does not intentionally incite another individual to commit suicide. Judicial observations have highlighted that conflicts in domestic relationships are prevalent, and the occurrence of suicide is predominantly influenced by the mental state of the victim. A review of pertinent judgments reveals that the dissolution of a romantic relationship does not amount to instigation for suicide. There exists a lack of direct evidence demonstrating that the appellant instigated or provoked the deceased to commit suicide. Ultimately, the breach of a promise to marry is characterized as not a matter about a broken relationship.
Murder case acquittal: How to appreciate Circumstantial evidence is explained
The appeal revolves around the modification of a conviction from Section 302 of the IPC (murder) to Section 304, Part 1 (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). After an FIR was lodged regarding a dead body found in a shop’s verandah, an autopsy revealed death due to a head injury, leading to the arrest of the appellants based on suspicion. Witnesses testified that they had seen the deceased with the accused, and the trial commenced with charges under Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The trial court convicted the appellants under these charges, but the High Court later reduced the conviction to Section 304, Part 1. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court examined the circumstantial evidence and found that the prosecution’s claims, including motive and the “last seen” circumstance, were insufficient; the significant time gap between when the deceased was last seen with the accused allowed for the possibility of third-party involvement. The court also determined that the recovery of a stone—claimed to be the weapon—was inadmissible, as it was not linked to the injuries through medical testimony and was based on an improper disclosure. Consequently, the Supreme Court acquitted the appellants, concluding that the multiple injuries on the deceased indicated an intention to kill, rendering the modification erroneous.
Section 483 BNSS: Bail: Magic mushrooms are natural produce and cannot be termed a mixture and their classification as narcotic drugs depends on the psilocybin content
This is an order from the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court regarding a bail petition filed under section 483 BNSS 2023 by the petitioner who got– arrested under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985for possession of 60 grams of magic mushrooms. The petitioner argued that magic mushrooms are not explicitly listed as a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, and the FSL report did not specify the psilocybin content. The court noted that magic mushrooms themselves do not meet the definitions under the NDPS Act and cannot be assumed to contain 60 grams of psilocybin. The court also highlighted procedural violations in handling the contraband. Considering these points, the court granted bail to the petitioner with conditions. The order was delivered by His Lordship Mr. Justice N. Anand Venkatesh. J., on 27.11.2024.
Article: The Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937- Conundrum
Author of this article is Thiru. S. James Raja, LLM student ( corporate governance and Industrial Jurisprudence) , Central University of Tamilnadu, Thiruvarur, Tamilnadu.
Courts must be loath to grant bail after trial commences
Petition against the order granting bail pending trial-Petitioner lodged FIR against the respondent under sections 376D and 342 IPC-Co-accused was released on bail long time back-Statement under section 164 CrPC was recorded by the Magistrate-After trial started respondent-2 preferred bail application was dismissed by trial court and allowed by the Hon’ble High Court based on the discrepancies between FIR and statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C-Apex court heard the parties but respondent no-2 though notice served-Hon’ble Supreme Court on the practice of courts dealing with bail applications after the trial starts-Courts are loath to entertain bail applications after trial commences-Judicial notice on granting bail after charge framing-Courts granting bail based on discrepancies in the deposition after trial commences will have its own impact on the pending trial-Conclusion-Though the Apex court did not disturb the bail granted imposed certain further conditions-Hon’ble Supreme court did not disturbed the bail order.
PC Act: Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii): Presumption can also be drawn for smaller bribe amounts further accused has not proved that rs.2000 bribe amount was a legal fee or repayment of loan
This judgment outlines the State’s appeal against a High Court decision that acquitted the accused under the Prevention of Corruption (PC) Act. **Overview of Allegations** The case centers on the accused, a treasury assistant, who allegedly requested a bribe to facilitate the encashment of a leave salary bill. This demand was captured on tape, leading to the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) under Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act. Subsequently, a trap was organized based on this information, resulting in the recovery of the bribe from the accused after a thorough investigation was conducted. A final report was compiled, and charges were duly framed under the PC Act. **Trial Proceedings** During the trial, the prosecution presented a robust case by examining 12 witnesses and introducing 30 documents along with 10 material objects. Notably, the accused did not provide any defense evidence. The trial court ultimately found the accused guilty of offenses under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The accused subsequently appealed this conviction in the High Court, which led to an acquittal. As a result, the state has pursued this appeal. **Constructive Analysis** The analysis reviews the key components of Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act, alongside Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. It emphasizes that a presumption under Section 20 can only be warranted when the prosecution establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally accepted money knowing it to be a bribe. A Constitution Bench has clarified the process for drawing inferences regarding offenses under Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act in cases devoid of direct or primary evidence. Importantly, the examination revealed no procedural irregularities in granting sanction for prosecution. **Witness Contributions** The informant (P.W.1) played a significant role by recording the demand for illegal gratification on tape and supplying this evidence to the Lokayukta police. Following the tape recording, phenolphthalein-coated currency notes were presented to P.W.3, whose hands tested positive, validating the evidence. After receiving the bribe, the accused was arrested, and a seizure Mahazar was prepared along with the collection of pertinent materials. The corroborative testimonies from P.W.2 and P.W.3 reinforced P.W.1’s account. Additionally, P.W.4 confirmed that the accused had responsibilities related to receiving and verifying the surrender leave salary bill. P.W.5 provided insights into the sodium carbonate solution test conducted by the Investigating Officer (I.O.). Supportive testimony was also provided by the hotel owner, while P.W.7 confirmed that the informant prepared the surrender leave salary bill. Furthermore, P.W.12, the I.O., detailed the tape recording and the events of the trap proceedings. **Conclusion** The absence of oral or documentary evidence from the accused in the defense phase brought clarity to the prosecution’s case. The Apex Court upheld the findings regarding the demand and acceptance of the bribe. The accused was unable to substantiate, during cross-examination, that the alleged bribe constituted a legal fee or loan repayment. Notably, the accused did not indicate any loan dealings with the complainant in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement. The presumption under Section 20 parallels Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, shifting the responsibility to the accused to show evidence of innocence regarding the charged offenses. In applying the “two-view theory” to this case, the conclusion has been reached that the criminal appeal is justified in being allowed. This case exemplifies the ongoing efforts to combat corruption and reinforce accountability within public service.
Death penalty to acquittal: Supreme Court acquitted a death penalty accused by stating that it is shocked to see trial court imposed death penalty instead of acquitting him
The judgment addresses the conviction and sentencing of the appellant, Ashok, who was accused of raping and murdering a ten-year-old girl in 2009. The trial court had sentenced Ashok to capital punishment, which was later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court. The Supreme Court, upon reviewing the case, found significant procedural lapses, including the failure to provide timely and effective legal aid to the appellant and the improper recording of the appellant’s statement under Section 313 of the CrPC. Consequently, the Supreme Court acquitted Ashok of all charges and emphasized the importance of fair trial procedures and effective legal aid. The judgment also includes directives to ensure proper legal aid and fair trial practices in future cases.
Merely witnesses are relatives of deceased is not a ground to discard the testimony
The appellant is appealing against a life sentence conviction confirmed by the High Court for the murder of the deceased. The incident occurred after the appellant, angered by the removal of bricks, assaulted the deceased with a knife following a verbal altercation. The investigation concluded that the death was homicidal, as supported by the post-mortem report. The trial court found the appellant guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), a decision later upheld by the High Court. The prosecution successfully established the appellant’s responsibility for the death, and the claim that the testimony from witnesses (who were relatives of the deceased) should be discarded was rejected. Although the evidence indicates a lack of premeditation and that only a single injury was inflicted, both the trial court and High Court correctly convicted the appellant. The question at hand is whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC should be maintained was answered that in the case on hand not necessary.
If unnecessary adjournment seeks for cross-examination then the courts are empowered to appoint amicus for cross-examination
We, therefore, find it appropriate that in an event the witnesses are present and the defence counsel unnecessarily seeks an adjournment, learned Trial Judge should appoint an Amicus and direct the cross examination to proceed.
Section 12 (2) POCSO Act: Head Master is the guardian of the school and dutybound to inform the POCSO offence failing which action may be taken
A former headmaster was charged under the POCSO Act for failing to report child sexual abuse. Despite not being directly involved in the abuse, he was implicated due to his negligence in not informing authorities about the incident. The court dismissed his petition to quash the charges, emphasizing the headmaster’s responsibility to protect children and report such crimes immediately.
Quash: Appellant’s possession of buttondar knife was for any of the prohibited categories as indicated in the DAD Notification and hence quashed
The appellant, Irfan Khan, was charged under Sections 25, 54, and 59 of the Arms Act, 1959, for possessing a buttondar knife with dimensions exceeding the legal limits. Irfan Khan filed a petition in the High Court of Delhi to quash the FIR and charge-sheet, which was rejected. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the knife’s dimensions did not violate the Arms Act or the DAD notification, as there was no evidence that the knife was meant for manufacture, sale, or test. The Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the FIR, charge-sheet, and all proceedings against Irfan Khan, stating that the prosecution’s case lacked fundamental allegations and evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted.
Murder case: Acquittal: No utterance of a single word by the witnesses about the illicit affair further recovery of skeletal remains not proved as per law
The appeal arises from a judgment by the High Court of Telangana, which upheld the conviction of the appellant (A1) and acquitted two co-accused (A2 and A3) in a criminal case involving charges under Sections 384, 364, 302, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The trial court convicted A1, A2, and A3 for various offences, including life imprisonment for murder (Section 302 IPC). The High Court upheld the conviction of A1 but acquitted A2 and A3. The prosecution alleged that A1’s wife had an extra-marital affair with the deceased, K. Nagesh. Hence, A1, along with A2 and A3, abducted and murdered K. Nagesh, and concealed the skeletal remains of the deceased’s body. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence including the recovery of skeletal remains and DNA profiling with the mother of the deceased. However, the court found inconsistencies and gaps in the prosecution’s evidence, particularly regarding the recovery, collection and identification of DNA samples. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of circumstantial evidence and the motive. The court quashed the convictions and acquitted A1, ordering his immediate release.
When doctrine of lis pendens commences?
The Supreme Court of India reviewed a previous judgment in the case of M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. vs. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors., where the petitioner sought specific performance of a contract. The Trial Court had dismissed the suit, while the High Court partly allowed it, directing specific performance proportionate to the consideration paid. The Supreme Court analyzed whether the suit was barred by limitation and whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance. The Court concluded that the limitation period began from the date the petitioner received notice of refusal of performance. It also examined the petitioner’s readiness and willingness to perform the contract and the respondents’ failure to provide necessary documents. The Court addressed the doctrine of lis pendens, which bars the transfer of property during litigation, and concluded that it applied in this case. Ultimately, the Supreme Court recalled its previous judgment and restored the High Court’s decision, directing specific performance proportionate to the consideration paid by the petitioner. The review petitions were allowed, and the judgment of the High Court was restored.
