Guidelines to the Courts to take control over investigation including sanctioning order

Appeal

2. The Appellant is aggrieved by the High Court of Judicature at Patna’s refusal in exercising its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in terms of judgment and order dated 9th May 2025 passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 62048 of 2023, wherein the prayer was to quash and order taking cognizance dated 1st June 2022 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sahasra in connection with Sahasra Sadar P.S Case No. 112 of 2005 dated 24th April 2005.

Factual aspects

3. As can be seen, the genesis of this case is over twenty years old. It is necessary to recapitulate past events in order to appreciate the context in which the impugned judgement is under challenge before us.

I. The Appellant is an officer of the Indian Administrative Services, Bihar Cadre. He was posted as District Magistrate-cum-Licensing Authority, Sahasra, Bihar, on 24 December 2002 and remained in the possession till his transfer to Banka on 11th April 2005.

II. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India passed an order vide letter No. 11026/76/2004, directed further streamlining of the procedure of issuance of arms licences. The said letter is extracted hereinunder:

“……..”

III. For compliance of the directions issued in the above quoted extract, one Bal Krishna Jha, ASI was deputed to collect information and during such gathering of information, it was found that 7 persons to whom arms licences had been issued were unverified. The details of these persons as given in the FIR, lodged upon the statement of the Station House Officer, PS Saharsa, are as under:

“………….”

The statement in the FIR was that some of these licences had been issued to persons who were not physically capable; the same had been issued in violation of Section 13(2), Arms Act, 1959, with intent to give undue benefit to the applicants, by the appellant, who, at the relevant point in time was District Magistrate-cum-licensing Authority, Sahasra, Bihar. As such, ‘the then licensing authority’ was also named as an accused therein. It was stated that the same had been done in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy and abetment at a large scale.

IV. After investigation, chargesheet dated 9 th July 2005 was entered wherein one of the accused persons, namely Omprakash Tiwari was sent up for trial whereas investigation against other persons was continued. A supplementary chargesheet dated 13th April 2006 was then filed, wherein, qua the appellant it was observed that no offence was made out under the Arms Act against him, and the allegations levelled were termed ‘false’. The complainant recorded his ‘no objection’ to such closure report. The relevant extract of the charge sheet is as under :-

“…………..”

V. The Sub-Divisional Officer of Police, Sadar, Saharsa by letter dated 26th November 2007 addressed to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa submitted as follows:

“…………………”

On the aforesaid aspects, a request for the re-investigation was resubmitted by letter dated 5th October 2008.

VI. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa in an order dated 19th June 2009 observed that an order for reinvestigation could not be granted but further investigation was permitted in law, and as such, permitted further investigation under Section 173(8), CrPC.

VII. The General Administration Department, Government of Bihar3 by letter dated 10th December 2015 asked the Appellant to show cause regarding the issuance of arms licences to a total of 16 accused persons. The Response is as under:

“………….”

VIII. The explanation was accepted and the Department discharged the Appellant on 25th February 2016 putting an end to the disciplinary proceedings. Hence, the chargesheet No.834/2020, after completion of further investigation, was submitted on 31st August 2020.

IX. The State granted sanction under Section 197 CrPC on 27th April 2022. Cognizance of the chargesheet was taken on 1st June 2022. It is against this order that the appellant had approached the High Court, and which resulted in the impugned judgment.

The impugned judgment

Hon’ble High Court rejected the application under section 482 Cr.P.C

4. The High Court rejected the application under Section 482, CrPC observing that various illegalities and irregularities pervaded the issuance of licenses by the appellant, in as much as certain persons who were physically unfit, were issued licenses; in some of the applications approved, the bodyguard of the appellant was listed in the “column of care”; in yet others licenses were issued a mere 2 days after calling for the police report, in which time the said report was obviously not furnished. Regarding the departmental proceedings, it was observed that while discharging the appellant, the department had asked him to remain careful in the future which, cannot be equated to exoneration in departmental proceedings. Further, on the aspect of power vested in the authority as per section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, it was held that the power cannot be used and arbitrary and unjust manner. The Court did observe that the Trial Court, keeping in view the many years that had passed since the inception of the case, ought to conclude the trial expeditiously by conducting the same on day-to-day basis.

Analysis

Scope of section 13(2A) of Arms Act

7. The first argument for us to consider is the scope of Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act. It reads as under:

“…………..”

Police verification is mandatory

It flows from the above that calling for a police verification report is mandatory and the same is to be sent to the licensing authority within a prescribed time. What is meant by prescribed has been clarified by Section 2 (g) which defines prescribed to be that which has been described in the rules made under the Arms Act. The rules in vogue at the relevant point in time i.e., 2002-2004 were the Arms Rules 1962. A perusal thereof reveals that the rules did not prescribe a timeline within which the police was to submit a report or the licensing authority is to either grant or deny a license.

What is reasonable time? Explained

8. It is a generally understood position in law that when a legislation or a rule does not provide for limitation/time limit for a particular aspect, the same is to be governed by the standard of reasonable time. [See: Collector v. D. Narsing Rao] We may also refer to an earlier decision given by this Court in Collector v. P. Mangamma, as follows:

“paras. 5 & 6”

9. Given that at the relevant point in time, no time limit stood prescribed, an alternate interpretation to ‘prescribed time’ can be the time specified by the authority seeking the police report in such letter itself. This too, is absent from the record before us. The State and the learned Single Judge have chosen to focus on only one instance. Be whatsoever the contours of the application of doctrine of reasonable time, it only stands to reason that when no time stands clarified it is expected that the Authority may act appropriately within a logically sound period of time. In question are the appellant’s actions in so far as 16 licenses are concerned. However, the record only speaks, to perhaps one instance, where a mere two days after the request for the report of police was made, that the license was issued, and the papers in that regard and do not specify the time granted by the appellant/the appellant’s office to furnish the report. It cannot be doubted that the particular instance of application by Kanhaiya Kumar Singh and Chandan Kumar Singh would not be justified as a proper exercise of discretion when licenses have been granted after only two days, but given that the State has remained silent as to the timeline in other cases, we close consideration of this issue having recorded as above.

Regarding sanction

10. Next, let us turn our attention to the sanction issued against the appellant. As already recorded, it is his case that the sanction is vitiated because it is a non-speaking order. The sanction is reproduced below:

“…………..”

11. Section 197 which mandates the grant of sanction before commencement of prosecution for public servants, reads:

“………….”

Scope and ambit of sanction

The ambit of this Section has been discussed in various judgments of this Court. It will be necessary to refer to them as under:

11.1 In Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta through B.V. Nagarathna, J., this Court observed:

“25. As already noted, the object and purpose of the said provision is to protect officers and officials of the State from unjustified criminal prosecution while they discharge their duties within the scope and ambit of their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section 197CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a court to take cognizance of such offences which are mentioned in the said provision except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government when the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public servant.

26. There is no doubt that in the instant case the appellant herein was a public servant but the question is, whether, while discharging her duty as a public servant on the relevant date, there was any excess in the discharge of the said duty which did not require the first respondent herein to take a prior sanction for prosecuting the appellant herein…”

11.2 The factors to be borne in mind when dealing with a case involving sanction under this section has been, after consideration of number of previous pronouncements crystallised as follows in Devinder Singh v. State of Punjab:

“paras. 39 to 39.9”

11.3 A Bench of three Learned Judges in P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim held thus:

“5. The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government, touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance. Different tests have been laid down in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code: “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point for determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty.”

Object of inserting sanction section is to ensure there is no threat over the heads of official while discharging their public duty

12. The avowed object of sanctions being granted before cognizance is to ensure that the threat of criminal prosecution does not hang over the heads of the officials in discharge of their public duty. At the same time, it is not intended to protect officers who have transgressed the boundaries of their duty for some act/benefit which otherwise would not be termed acceptable. An aspect connected with this object, is that the authority granting sanction does not do so mechanically. This is a layer of protection envisioned by this Section. In other words, when allegations are made, it is not for the authorities to grant sanction simply on the basis of the allegations but it is also that they should examine the materials placed by the investigating agency and come to a prima facie satisfaction thereon, about the officer having some or the other involvement in the alleged offence/crime. In Mansukhlal Vitthaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, this Court held that the order of granting or refusing sanction must show application of mind. The relevant paragraphs thereof are extracted hereunder:

“17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to government servants against frivolous prosecutions. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 172 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 926 : AIR 1979 SC 677] ) Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty.

18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it…”

Sanction order did not reflects the application of mind of sanctioning authority

19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction” was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution.”

Not much more needs to be said. The sanction awarded against the appellant which we have extracted in toto (supra) can in our considered view, in no way be said to be reflecting application of mind by the authorities. If sanction is based on what can at best be described as vague statements such as “on perusal of the documents and evidences mentioned in Case Diary available”, this protection would be obliterated. The remainder of the sanction order touches upon the essence of Section 197 CrPC and the fact that the appellant is a public servant who would be covered thereby. The substance of why a sanction is required was however entirely missed by the sanctioning authority. The same is bad in law and must be, set aside. All consequential actions including the order taking cognizance, therefore would be quashed.

Right to speedy trial is a fundamental right

14. Various judgments of this Court have emphasised the right to speedy trial as being an important facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. Timely completion of investigation is inherent thereto.

14.3 Just recently, a bench of three Judges of this Court in Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P. (including one of us, Sanjay Karol J.) after considering number of pronouncements, culled out the features of fair trial. The third point mentioned therein is important here. It reads, “Process of investigation and trial must be completed with promptitude.”

Judicial control over the investigation

Read together, these provisions reveal a conception of policing that was investigative, preventive, and executive in nature, with the judiciary occupying a passive and peripheral role. The Magistrate’s function under the Codes of 1861 and 1872 was confined largely to receiving police reports or taking cognizance of completed investigations, rather than directing or monitoring their course. It was only with the advent of later reforms – first, through the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and subsequently under the Code of 1973 – that the architecture of criminal procedure began to incorporate judicial control and procedural accountability, through provisions such as Sections 61, 167 and 173(1) of the 1898 Code and 156(3), 167, and 173(1), 173(2) of the 1973 Code, which introduced oversight mechanisms (in Section 156(3) and 167) and prescribed reasonable limits (in Section 173(1), 173(2)) for the duration of investigations. In its latest avatar, the legislation codifying criminal procedure i.e. BNSS 2023, also provides similar timelines under Sections 187, 193, 230, 250, 251,262, 263 etc.

Investigations are to be completed in reasonable time

17. The inescapable conclusion arrived at from the above discussion in the Indian context, is that there has been an evolution in legislative wisdom over the years and the criminal procedure have moved from a period of no timelines and minimal judicial interventions/oversight to progressively more oversight and recognition of the need to conclude investigations 25 [2009] ZACC 27 in time. It may be true that no strict timelines are provided in the CrPC, but it is equally so that investigations are to be completed in reasonable time.

Conclusion and directions

20. On this count, prosecution against the appellant is liable to be quashed. The conclusion is that even though, in the one case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the administrative authorities have already discharged him, that issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also consequent action, we have decided in favour of the appellant.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Directions to the courts taking control over investigation including sanction

21. Before parting with this matter, we deem it fit to issue the following directions:

Further Investigation & Court’s Control: (i) In view of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali27, it can be seen that the ‘leave of the court’ to file a supplementary chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being the position, in our considered view, the Court is not rendered functus officio having granted such permission. Since the further investigation is being made with the leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof, is a function which the court must perform.

I.A is bound to explain to the court if there is long gap in filing charge sheet (only): (ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first information report and the culminating chargesheet, it is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the explanation so furnished.

If investigation is continue for a unduly long period accused may approach High Court for quash: (iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that the process of investigation has many moving parts and is therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of this judgement, clearly establishes that investigations cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty about the charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing plead his defence. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered.

Sanctioning order must reflect application of mind: (iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must be easily visible including consideration of the evidence placed before it in arriving at the conclusion.

Judgments involved, cited, or quoted

1. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (Citation: 1992 Supp. (1) 335)
2. Collector v. D. Narsing Rao (Citation: (2015) 3 SCC 695)
3. Collector v. P. Mangamma (Citation: (2003) 4 SCC 488)
4. State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (Citation: (1969) 2 SCC 187 : AIR 1969 SC 1297)
5. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar (Citation: (1987) 4 SCC 497 : AIR 1987 SC 2316)
6. Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (Citation: (1989) 1 SCC 532 : AIR 1989 SC 973)
7. Labouchere v. Dawson (Citation: (1872) LR 13 Eq Ca 322, 325 : 41 LJ Ch 472 : 25 LT 894)
8. Telangana Housing Board v. Azamunnisa Begum (Citation: (2018) 7 SCC 346)
9. P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim
10. Mansukhlal Vitthaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (Citation: (1997) 7 SCC 622)
11. Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (Citation: (1979) 4 SCC 172 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 926 : AIR 1979 SC 677)
12. Klopfer v United States (Citation: 386 U.S. 213 (1967))
13. R. v. Askov – [1990] 2 SCR 1199
14. R v. Morin (Refining the holding in R. v. Askov)

Acts and corresponding Sections involved

1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)
   1. Section 197 (Requirement for sanction for prosecution)
   1. Section 482 (Inherent power of High Court to quash proceedings/secure ends of justice)
2. Arms Act, 1959
   1. Section 13(2A) (Relates to the grant of arms licenses)
3. Constitution of India
   1. Article 21 (Protection of life and personal liberty, including the right to a speedy trial)

Party

Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ RL Chongthu vs. State of Bihar - Criminal Appeal No. 4970 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 10130 of 2025) - 2025 INSC 1339 - November 20, 2025 Lordship Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Lordship Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.