Murder case: The eyewitness testimony is trusted more than the doctor’s testimony because eye-witness survived cross-examination

Appeal

Appeal by both the accused (father and son) convicted by the trial court and conviction upheld by the High Court

1. The appellant-convicts before us are the father and son, namely Adalat Yadav and Anirudh Yadav. Criminal Appeal No. 1788 of 2019 has been filed by Adalat Yadav, and Criminal Appeal No. 1789 of 2019 has been filed by Anirudh Yadav. Both challenging the common judgment dated 4th February 2017 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB)) No. 110 of 2012 and 79 of 2012 respectively, whereby the Division Bench, has confirmed finding of conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai1 in terms of judgment dated 22.11.2011 passed in Sessions Trial No. 251 of 2019 sentencing them to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for life under Section 302 and 149 read with Section 120B of Indian Penal Code, 18602 and also a fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default of payment of fine they shall undergo Simple Imprisonment for six months. The above convicts were further sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years under Sections 307, 149 of the I.P.C. read with Section 120B of the I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment they shall undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months. Apart from this, they were also sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 7 years under Section 27 of the Arms Act with a further direction to run the sentences concurrently.

Facts

2. The facts giving rise to these appeals, as set out by the Courts below, are as follows.

Deceased shot dead in the head-complainant and a bypasser got hurt in the firing- FIR registered on the same day: (i) On 4th December, 2008 while Sunil Yadav @ Sunil Kumar Yadav (PW-5/complainant) was homebound from the Begusarai Court along with his brother Ram Sharan Yadav (deceased), certain persons including two appellants/convicts surrounded them upon reaching the grocery store run by one Suresh Mahto. A-1 hurled abuses at them and stated that despite repeated directions/clear warnings given to them by Girdhari Yadav (who was also an accused before the High Court), against giving depositions in the murder case on one Mahesh Paswan, the deceased had refused to heed. He then fired his pistol, hitting the deceased on his head, making him fall to his death, instantly. A-2 had fired upon the deceased and, thereafter, other members of the group also opened fired on the complainant as also one Ganesh and Baidyanath Yadav, who were walking alongside the deceased and the complainant. The bullet fired by one Shivji Yadav, hit the complainant on his leg. A written complaint was lodged about the incident on the same day, resulting in registration of FIR Number 222/08 at Police Station Balia.

Trial court convicted total 4 persons: (ii) Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheets were filed bearing No.38/09 dated 04th March 2009 and No. 310/09 dated 16th March 2009, respectively. The Trial Court convicted a total of 4 persons including the appellant-convicts while acquitting one Ram Balak Yadav. A perusal of the Trial Court judgment reveals that such a finding has been arrived at upon a cumulative assessment of the testimonies of all the witnesses. It has been observed that PW-1 to PW-4 consistently supported the prosecution’s case, especially to the effect that enmity inter se the parties is germane on the earlier occurrence of violence on 28th November 2003, wherein the appellant-convicts were involved in an act of indiscriminate firing at the house of the deceased and also deployment of a bomb there. This had resulted in the death of the daughter of the deceased. They had also stated that while the background of the dispute between the parties was as alluded to above, the primary reason therefor was that the deceased was a witness against Girdhari Yadav. The learned Trial Judge, after taking note of the alleged contradictions between the testimonies of the witnesses as pointed out by the learned counsel for the parties but overall, termed them to be minor in nature, not affecting the sanctity of the statements.

High court agreed with the overall conclusion of trial court but differed in reasons: (iii) The High Court, in the impugned judgment while agreeing with the overall conclusion returned by the Trial Court, differed in its reasoning. According to the learned Division Bench, PWs-1 to 4 could not be relied upon as eyewitnesses. The relevant discussion is as under: –

“…..”

High court confirmed the conviction: (iv) The High Court, proceeding further, confirmed the conviction of three persons, one Bihari Yadav and the other two appellant-convicts on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant as PW-5. In doing so reliance was placed on judgment of this Court in Sudip Kumar Sen v. State of W.B..

(v) It is as such that the appellant – convicts are before us.

Analysis

Prosecution examined 10 witnesses, defence did not examine any witness and denied the prosecution story

4. The prosecution, to establish the guilt of these persons, examined a total of 10 witnesses. PWs-1 to 5 were allegedly eyewitnesses, PW-6 and PW-9 were investigating officers, PW-7 and PW-8 were expert witnesses, PW-10 has been generally categorized as formal witness. The defense led no evidence and, in their statements, recorded under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 issued blanket denial for the prosecution’s case and pleaded false implication.

Scope of Article 136 explained

5. It is a well settled position in law that this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, does not interfere in matters having concurrent findings of the Courts below [See: Goverdhan vs State of Chattisgarh, and Ravasaheb v. State of Karnataka] as such we need not delve into each and every individual’s testimonies and instead only examine whether the path adopted by the Courts below is compromised by any manifest error. Should that be established, only then individual reappreciation of all the testimonies would be justified.

Analysis of arguments advanced by both side (appellants vs state) respectively

Mr. Ashwani Kumar Singh’s Arguments (Appellants): These are explicitly listed in Paragraph 6 of the judgment:

• FIR Delay: He argued the incident happened between 5:00 and 6:00 P.M., but the FIR was registered at 10:30 P.M., suggesting suppression of the original version.
• Place of Occurrence: He argued the location was not proved because the FIR mentioned a grocery shop, but the Investigating Officer admitted the location (Bhagatpur Pitch Road) had no grocery shop.
• Medical vs. Ocular Evidence: To be absolutely precise with one minor detail from my previous summary: The defense specifically pointed out that PW-9 (an investigating officer) deposed the deceased was shot in the forehead, which conflicted with the postmortem doctor (PW-7) who said the bullet entered the base of the skull and exited near the nose.
• Missing Witnesses: He argued the defense was prejudiced because material police witnesses (like the officer-in-charge who received the written report) were not examined.
• Doubted Eyewitnesses: He highlighted that the High Court had doubted the presence of four of the eyewitnesses (PWs 1 to 4).

Mr. Azmat H. Amanullah’s Arguments (State): His counter-arguments are listed immediately following the appellants’ points:

• Prosecution Proven: He submitted that the prosecution’s case was entirely proved and the High Court was justified in relying on the complainant (PW-5) because an injured witness has greater evidentiary value.
• Place of Occurrence: He argued the location was clearly identified, and the different descriptions from witnesses were simply different reference points that all converged on the same area.
• Gunshot Injury: He argued the core fact that the deceased was shot in the head was indisputable and corroborated by the medical report, making any minor descriptive differences immaterial.

Analysing First argument: singular eyewitness testimony based on quantity

7. In light of the submissions, we now proceed to examine the matter. Out of the manifold contentions advanced by the appellant – convicts, the fact that four PWs have been discounted by the High Court is a major factor. This cannot be faulted since convictions on the basis of the testimony of a singular eyewitness is also permissible. After all, evidence on record is to be measured for quality, not on the basis of quantity. If the testimony is of ‘sterling quality’, resting a conviction thereon would be entirely permissible. Although this position is well settled, we may for ready reference reiterate the same as follows:

Evidence to be weighed not counted

(i) In Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand, this Court observed:

“10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000] .)”

(ii) A bench of three judges in Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi)8 , held:

“16. …As a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of single eyewitness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on corroboration. It is not the number, the quantity but quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise [see Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1055] ].”

Examining the concept of sterling quality

8. As per the High Court, the testimony of PW-5 is sufficient enough to make the needle of guilt rest on the appellant – convicts. In other words, his testimony is unimpeachable or that it is of sterling quality. What may qualify as sterling quality is discussed in the following judgments:

Sterling witness

(i) In Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court observed:

“para.22” [See also: Ganesan v. State]

(ii) In Naresh v. State of Haryana, it was observed:

“16. As noticed hereinabove, the evidence of the eyewitness should be of very sterling quality and calibre and it should not only instil confidence in the court to accept the same but it should also be a version of such nature that can be accepted at its face value.”

Analysing First argument: Delay in Filing FIR

9. The next argument is that there is a delay in filing the FIR which leads to the doubt of suppression of the original version.

Delay in lodging FIR

(i) A three judge bench of this Court in State of H.P. v. Gian Chand, held:

“12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the court on its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case…”

(ii) In Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, it was observed:

“14. When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident.”

(iii) In Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra,

“para.24”

(iv) Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar15 ,

“para.16”

Delay in FIR not weaken the prosecution case

10. Keeping in view the above judgments, no fault can be found in the impugned judgment on the count of reliance on a single witness. The alleged delay in FIR as contended by the appellant-convicts, too, would not weaken the prosecution case.

Conflict between eyewitness testimony and medical evidence

11. In so far as the alleged conflict between eyewitness testimony and medical evidence is concerned, we may only observe that the same is difficult to comprehend. The relevant portion of the statement of PW-5 and PW-7 (Dr. Ashok Kumar Jha) is as follows:

PW-5: “…Adalat Yadav instigated all accused that kill all these and dictating it, he shot in Ram Sharan Yadav’s head with the pistol carrying in his hand; in consequence, he fell down and died. Annirudh Yadav also fired one bullet at Ram Sharan Yadav. After it, Bihari Yadav, Vijay Yadav, Shivji Yadav fired on us with the intention of causing death to me, Ganesh and Baijnath Yadav. The bullet fired by Shivji Yadav hit below my right knee…”

PW-7: “…Entry of the wound of deceased was on the back of the skull and exit of the wound in just as upper base of the nose.”

Though there had been some contradictions since eye-witness withstood the test of cross-examination would be at a higher pedestal than the medical witness testimony

In our view, both these testimonies are consistent for both, albeit in different terms, say that the deceased was shot on his head. That apart, if it was the case that there had been some contradictions between the testimonies, the generally applicable rule that eyewitness testimony would be superior to the medical opinion which is in the nature of expert testimony, would be applicable. Since PW-5 has withstood the test of cross-examination is an undisputed eyewitness to the incident and is also an injured witness, his testimony would be at a higher pedestal. As such, this factor too would count towards the guilt of the appellant – convicts.

Conclusion

It is the matter of luck PW-5 is survived the gun shot

13. In so far as the second appellant – convict is concerned, the sterling testimony of PW-5 clearly establishes that he had also fired the weapon. He was part of the group that had surrounded PW-5 and the deceased and clearly possessed the intention to kill. It was only a matter of luck that the said bullet did not hit the intended target. He has been correctly therefore, sentenced under Section 307IPC.

14. Viewed on the whole, as above, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed.

Resources

Hierarchy of the court judgments

1. Trial Court

• Court: Additional Sessions Fast Track Court-IV Begusarai.
• Case Number: Sessions Trial No. 251 of 2019. (Note: The source text records the trial number as 2019, despite the earlier judgment date).
• Date of Judgment: November 22, 2011.
• Outcome: Convicted four persons, including the appellants, and sentenced them to life imprisonment and other concurrent sentences.

2. High Court

• Court: High Court (Division Bench).
• Case Number: Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 110 of 2012 and 79 of 2012.
• Date of Judgment: February 4, 2017.
• Outcome: Confirmed the convictions and sentences awarded by the Trial Court.

3. Supreme Court (Current Proceeding)

• Court: Supreme Court of India.
• Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 1788-1789 of 2019.
• Date of Judgment: April 22, 2026.
• Outcome: Appeals dismissed, upholding the lower courts’ convictions.

Judgments that are cited

1. Interference with Concurrent Findings

• Goverdhan vs State of Chattisgarh (2025) and Ravasaheb v. State of Karnataka (2023): Cited to establish the legal principle that under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not interfere in matters where there are concurrent findings of guilt by the lower courts, unless there is a manifest error justifying a reappreciation of testimonies.

2. Reliance on a Single “Sterling” Witness

• Sudip Kumar Sen v. State of W.B. (2016): Relied upon by the High Court to justify confirming the convictions based solely on the testimony of a single injured eyewitness.
• Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand (2003): Cited to explain that the law of evidence does not demand a specific number of witnesses. It notes that a single witness’s testimony must be classified as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or neither, with the latter category requiring corroboration. (This judgment also references Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (1957) for the same concept).
• Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020): Cited to affirm the time-honored principle that “evidence has to be weighed and not counted.” It establishes that there is no legal impediment to convicting an accused on the sole testimony of a reliable eyewitness. (This excerpt also references Sunil Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2003)).
• Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012) and Ganesan v. State (2020): Cited to define the concept of a “sterling witness.” A sterling witness is someone of such high quality, caliber, and consistency that their unassailable version of events can be accepted by the court at face value without requiring any corroboration.
• Naresh v. State of Haryana (2023): Cited to further reinforce that the evidence of an eyewitness must be of sterling quality and instill confidence in the court to be accepted at face value.

3. Delay in Lodging an FIR

• State of H.P. v. Gian Chand (2001): Cited to rule that a delay in lodging an FIR is not a “ritualistic formula” for discarding a prosecution case. If the delay is satisfactorily explained, it is not fatal to the case.
• Ravinder Kumar v. State of Punjab (2001): Cited to provide examples of genuine causes for delayed FIRs, such as victims’ relatives needing time to regain mental composure, rural ignorance of police procedures, or a lack of adequate transport.
• Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra (2007): Cited to emphasize that mere delay is not fatal but must be considered within the totality of the circumstances. Valid explanations for delay include time consumed seeking medical aid or avoiding the police out of fear and threats. (This judgment also references Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad (1955) to note that each case’s facts must be evaluated individually).
• Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar (2008): Cited to reiterate that if an adverse inference is avoided by properly and satisfactorily explaining the delay in lodging the FIR, the prosecution’s case cannot be thrown out.

4. Evidentiary Value of an Injured Eyewitness

• Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024) and Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra (2023): Cited to support the principle that the testimony of an undisputed, injured eyewitness who has successfully withstood cross-examination is placed on a higher pedestal and generally overrides conflicting expert medical opinion.

5. Lack of Independent Witnesses

• Manjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2019), Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2020), and Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024): Cited to establish that the prosecution’s case is not compromised merely by the lack of independent witnesses (such as local villagers). The court acknowledged the societal reality that common people often hesitate to involve themselves in matters concerning violent or ill-reputed individuals out of fear.

Acts and Sections

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

• Section 120B: Pertaining to criminal conspiracy.
• Section 149: Pertaining to offenses committed by any member of an unlawful assembly.
• Section 302: Pertaining to the punishment for murder, under which the appellants were sentenced to rigorous life imprisonment.
• Section 307: Pertaining to the punishment for attempted murder, under which the appellants were sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

The Arms Act

• Section 27: Under this section, the appellants were sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)

• Section 313: This section governs the power to examine the accused; the defense recorded their statements issuing a blanket denial of the prosecution’s case under this provision.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

• Section 134: This section establishes that no particular number of witnesses is required for the proof of any fact. It was cited to uphold the principle that evidence must be weighed by its quality rather than counted by quantity, allowing conviction on the sole testimony of a reliable eyewitness.

Constitution of India (Included as a primary legal framework cited in the document)

• Article 136: Refers to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction; the Court cited this article to note its settled position of not interfering in matters with concurrent findings of guilt by lower courts unless there is a manifest error.

Party

Adalat Yadav etc. versus The State of Bihar - Criminal Appeal Nos. 1788-1789 of 2019 - 2026 INSC 403 - April 22, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.