Madras High Court Quashed: Section 69 and 351(2) BNS: Distinction between a promise to marry and a mere breach of promise due to later circumstances explained.

PRAYER: Petition filed under Section 528 BNSS to call for the records pertaining to PRC.No.75 of 2025 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.III, Dindigul and quash the same.

This Criminal Original Petition filed by the petitioner/accused as against the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate Court, for seeking quashment of the criminal proceedings.

The prosecution case arose out of a personal relationship between the petitioner and the defacto complainant. It was alleged that the petitioner, on the promise of marriage, had sexual intercourse with the defacto complainant from the year 2020 onwards and later refused to marry her, and also allegedly threatened her. Based on these allegations, a case was registered for offences under Sections 69 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The petitioner approached the Court contending that the relationship was consensual, that there was no deceit or false promise at the inception, and that criminal law was being invoked only after the relationship broke down.

The Court examined the materials on record and the rival submissions. The central issue before the Court was whether the continuation of a long-standing consensual relationship, which later ended without marriage, could by itself attract the offence under Section 69 of the BNS, which requires sexual intercourse by deceitful means or by a promise to marry made without any intention of fulfilling it. The Court emphasised that the crucial requirement is the existence of a dishonest or mala fide intention at the very beginning of the relationship, and not a mere subsequent failure to marry.

Relying on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Court noted that a clear distinction has been consistently drawn between a false promise made from the inception and a mere breach of promise due to later circumstances. The Court also took note of the prolonged duration of the relationship, which spanned several years, and the fact that the defacto complainant was an educated adult and a practising Advocate, fully conscious of the nature and consequences of the relationship.

The Court found no material to indicate that the petitioner lacked intention to marry from the outset or that the consent was obtained by deception. With regard to the allegation of criminal intimidation under Section 351(2) of the BNS, the Court held that where the relationship between the parties was admittedly consensual and disputes arose only after the relationship ended, the ingredients of criminal intimidation were not made out. The alleged threats were viewed in the backdrop of a failed personal relationship rather than as conduct attracting criminal liability.

The Court further observed that consensual relationships between adults, even if accompanied by expectations of marriage, cannot be retrospectively converted into criminal cases merely because the relationship ends in discord. The criminal process, the Court held, cannot be used to moralise private conduct or to convert personal disappointment into prosecution, and the law intervenes only when consent is vitiated by coercion, deception, or incapacity.

While allowing the petition, the Court held that the continuation of the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and accordingly quashed the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate Court.

Analysis of the Court

12. Applying the above principles, this Court finds that the materials on record disclose that the relationship between the petitioner and the defacto complainant spanned several years from 2020 to 2025. The defacto complainant is a law graduate and a practising Advocate, well aware of the consequences. There is no material to suggest that the petitioner had a fraudulent or mala fide intent at the inception of the relationship. The allegations indicate, at best, a breakdown of a consensual relationship, which by itself cannot attract the penal provisions of Section 69 of the BNS.

14. This Court is conscious of the prevailing social realities. It is a matter of fact that, in present times, instances of premarital intimacy between consenting adults are not uncommon. This Court makes this observation not to endorse or moralise such conduct, but to acknowledge the changing contours of personal relationships in contemporary society. The line between emotional attachment and physical relationship is often indistinct, and when such relationships end in discord, competing narratives frequently emerge about what transpired in private. What is transpiring between them is within the realm of personal choice. Whether the relationship was founded on affection, expectation of marriage, or mere mutual pleasure is known only to them. It is neither possible nor appropriate for a Court to conclusively determine such matters. The criminal process cannot be used to moralise private conduct or convert personal disappointment into litigation, as Courts deal with legality, not morality. The law intervenes only where consent is vitiated by coercion, deception, or incapacity.

15. In the present case, both the petitioner and the defacto complainant are educated adults who consciously entered into a relationship of intimacy. What transpired between them was a matter of their personal choice. Having exercised that choice, it is not open to either to later portray private discord as criminal misconduct. The law is not an instrument for resolving emotional fallouts or for attributing moral blame arising from consensual acts between adults.

16. Of late, this Court has witnessed an increase in complaints of this nature, where relationships voluntarily entered into are subsequently projected as instances of deception or breach of promise. Such matters, rooted in personal association and mutual choice, do not ordinarily warrant criminal prosecution. The growing tendency to invoke the criminal process in private relationship disputes must be checked, for the criminal law cannot be permitted to become a means for settling personal or emotional disputes.

17. Considering the above discussion, the prolonged consensual nature of the relationship between the parties and the ratios referred to supra, this Court is of the view that continuation of the prosecution against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is allowed. The proceedings in PRC.No.75 of 2025 pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. III, Dindigul, are hereby quashed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

Party: C.Saravanan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Rep. by The Inspector of Police, Dindigul AWPS Rural, Dindigul District & another [Crl.OP(MD) No.12300 of 2025 and Crl.MP(MD) Nos.9539, 9542 of 2025] - Date of Judgment : 12.11.2025
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