Though there are variations in the two dying declarations the second dying declaration is found more believable and witnesses did not state many facts in their 161 statements

Appeals

Appeal against the confirmation of acquittal under section 302 IPC but conviction under section 498A IPC by High Court

1. Three Criminal Appeals have been filed against the order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 1248 of 2002, wherein the High Court was pleased to set aside the conviction of the accused persons namely Nagendra Singh (Husband), Narendra Singh (Father-in-Law) and Lila Singh (Mother-in-Law) u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) acquitting them of the charge u/S. 302 of IPC. However, the High Court upheld their conviction u/s 498A of IPC, reduced the sentence to the period they have already undergone and maintained the fine of Rs. 1000/- each as imposed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge.

Appeals by both accused and the de facto complainant

2. Criminal Appeal No. 302 / 2014 has been filed by Narendra Singh, the father-in-law of the deceased challenging his conviction u/s 498A IPC. Criminal Appeal No. 309 / 2014 has been filed by Pushp Raj Singh Baghel, the brother of the deceased (de facto complainant) against all three accused persons challenging their acquittal u/s 302 IPC and Criminal Appeal No. 307 / 2014 has been filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh against all three accused persons challenging their acquittal u/s 302 IPC. Hence, all these three criminal appeals are taken up together and disposed of by this common order.

Facts

Prosecution case: Accused had stuffed cloth in deceased’s mouth and pured kerosene and set her on fire

3. The case of the prosecution as laid in the charge-sheet is that the deceased woman had tied the matrimonial knot with Nagendra Singh on 12.07.2000. To fulfill the burgeoning demands of dowry, she was subjected to taunts and cruelty by her in-laws. Things took a steep turn for her on 15.04.2001 when she sustained burn injuries in the kitchen, i.e., within nine months of the marriage. As per the prosecution, the husband of the deceased had stuffed cloth in her mouth, poured kerosene oil all over her body and set her on fire and was immediately rushed to the Primary Health Center, Devlond, Madhya Pradesh for treatment. She was examined by PW-6 / Dr. Rajesh Mishra, who reported that 55% of her body was burnt, and it was fatal to her life. There was a smell of Kerosene oil emanating from her clothes.

Dying declaration was recorded by Executive Magistrate on 16.4.2001 and second dying declaration was recorded by  DSP on 17.4.2001

4. Legal proceedings were put into motion. The next day, i.e., on 16.04.2001, her dying declaration came to be recorded by the Executive Magistrate Shri Prabha Shankar Tripathi wherein the victim stated that her husband, her mother-in-law and her father-in-law used to demand car and on the day of the incident, they stuffed cloth into her mouth and poured kerosene and set her on fire. The same day, the police reached the residence of the respondents, seized a burnt iron bucket, two plastic boxes which smelt of kerosene and other oil, burnt jute bag, matchsticks and burnt pieces of paper. Thereafter they seized the place of occurrence, i.e. the kitchen. Since her condition continued to worsen, on 17.04.2001 she was shifted to Gandhi Medical Hospital, Rewa for treatment. A second dying declaration was recorded by Shri KL Suryavanshi who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police. In the second dying declaration, there was a contradiction and the victim this time stated that since her in-laws used to quarrel with her over insufficiency of dowry, she poured Kerosene on herself and set herself on fire.

FIR was registered on 18.4.2001 and charge sheet came to be filed against all the accused

5. On 18.04.2001, FIR No. 51 / 2001 was registered u/s 306 / 498A / 34 IPC and S. 3 / 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short DP Act). She died while being treated in hospital on 22.04.2001. The next day, post-mortem was conducted by PW17 / Dr. SK Pathak, who stated that death was caused due to cardio-respiratory failure as a result of ante mortem burn injuries on her person. After completion of investigation, chargesheet came to be filed against all the accused persons u/S. 302 / 304 / 498A IPC and S. 3 / 4 of DP Act.

6. Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Beohari (in short Sessions Court) framed charges u/s 498A/304B and in the alternative u/s 302 / 34 IPC against all the accused persons.

7. The prosecution examined 23 witnesses. The accused persons denied the prosecution case and they examined two defence witnesses who deposed that the victim had locked the door of the kitchen from inside and committed suicide or that this incident had taken place accidentally in the kitchen.

Sessions court convicted the accused persons u/ss. 498A, 302 r/w 34 IPC

8. The Sessions Court convicted the three accused persons u/S. 498A / 302 r/w 34 IPC. However, the accused persons were acquitted from the charge of S. 304B IPC. They were punished with rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- each in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months u/S. 498A IPC and imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default rigorous imprisonment for ten months u/s 302 r/w 34 IPC. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Appeal in High Court

9. Against the aforementioned judgment, the accused persons preferred a Criminal Appeal No. 1248/ 2002 before the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur challenging the order of conviction and sentence.

High Court set aside the conviction of s.302 IPC but upheld their conviction u/s 498A IPC

10. The High Court set aside the conviction of the accused persons under S. 302 of IPC but upheld their conviction u/s 498A of IPC and reduced the sentence to the period they have already undergone and maintained the fine of Rs. 1000/- each as imposed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge.

Analysis and Findings

15. What we have before us is an unfortunate tale of a young lady, who, standing at the summit of her youth and expecting a life of marital bliss and fortune, succumbed to flames within nine months of her marriage.

High Court set aside the conviction of murder based on the second dying declaration, holding insufficient evidence

16. Initially, the Trial Court held the husband and his parents guilty of S.302 IPC by placing reliance on the first dying declaration of the deceased which was recorded on 16.04.2001, and holding that as per the first dying declaration, the accused persons were guilty of murdering the deceased by setting her on fire. However, the same was set aside by the High Court by observing that firstly, there are two contradictory dying declarations, and secondly, there is insufficient evidence to hold the accused persons guilty of murder.

Witnesses did not properly explain why several facts, including dowry demands, were absent from their statements made to the police

17. The main witnesses of this case are the family members of the girl, i.e. PW-1 / Brijendra Singh (Father), PW-2 / Sita Singh (Mother), PW-3 / Devendra Singh (Uncle) and PW-5 / Pushpraj Singh (Brother) who have concurrently stated that the deceased woman was being tortured and harassed for dowry, particularly demanding a Maruti Car. However, their examination could not withstand the test of the cross-examination. Many contradictions have emerged. Firstly, the witnesses did not state the factum of demand of dowry, or the fact that the girl was being tortured at the hands of her in-laws before the police, and secondly they did not have a proper explanation as to why the said facts were missing from their statements made before the police. It appears that the testimonies rendered before the Court were an afterthought, as the same improvements appear across the statements of all the witnesses, with a jarring accuracy which was hitherto missing in the statements recorded before the Police. Another reason why the testimonies are doubtful is that apart from the family members, there is not a single witness who can corroborate the version of the prosecution. While in usual cases, the testimonies of the family are enough to convict an accused person, however, as a rule of caution, if there are improvements or contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution, then the Courts must look for corroboration through other evidence which unfortunately is missing in this case.

It is proved by doctor that the accused brought the deceased to the hospital is fatal for prosecution

19. PW-6 / Dr. Rajesh Mishra, working on the post of Assistant Surgeon at Primary Health Center, was available on duty on 15.04.2001 at 7 AM when deceased lady was brought in a burnt and unconscious state by the accused persons. If the accused persons wanted the girl to die, there is no reason for them to take the deceased lady to the hospital in the first place. 20. The prosecution has also examined the Neighbours, namely PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9, who have all turned hostile before the Court and not much could be deciphered from their testimonies except that the neighbours were of the opinion that the deceased victim had cordial relations with her in-laws.

Unless it is directly established that her in-laws have done something so cruel they cannot be held responsible

21. Whatever may be the cause of her unhappiness, the reason for her discontent, unless it is directly established that her in-laws have done something so cruel in nature that she felt, they cannot be held responsible or liable for abetting her causing cruelty in the nature of abetting suicide.

Though there are variations in the two dying declarations the second dying declaration is found more believable by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

23. The settled law is that a dying declaration is regarded with utmost evidentiary value, because it is believed that a person will not meet the maker with lies in his mouth. However, as a matter of prudence, if there are some suspicious circumstances related to a dying declaration, then in that case, the same can be rejected. Now turning our attention to the facts on hand we notice that there are two dying declarations on record, one recorded 16th April, 2001 by PW-18/ Prabha Shankar Tripathi, the Nayab Tehsilar and Executive Magistrate and the other one recorded 17th April, 2001 by PW-22/KL Survanshi which came to be marked as Ex.P-22 & Ex.P-30 respectively. In the first dying declaration Ex.P-22, the victim says that her in-laws set her ablaze due to insufficient dowry. The said declaration was recorded by PW-18/ Prabha Shankar Tripathi, the Tehsildar. In the cross-examination, the Tehsildar has deposed that there were about 4-5 persons who were there with the deceased in the hospital, and one of them had told the deceased to depose in a certain way at the time her Dying Declaration being recorded. This casts a shadow of doubt on the veracity of the dying declaration. In the second dying declaration, which was recorded by PW-22/KL Suryavanshi, the deceased changes her stance and stays that she poured the Kerosene herself and set herself on fire and thereby committing suicide. The variation in the two dying declarations in the manner she died casts doubt on their veracity, but we find the second declaration more believable than the first one because it appears that the first one was recorded after the deceased was tutored to give statement in a particular manner.

24. The law relating to dying declaration has been succinctly summarised in the case of Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, by this court:

“para.16”

If there are two inferences the one favour of the accused must be accepted

26. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, it was observed by this Court in para 9 that:

“9. This Court has, time out of number, observed that while appreciating circumstantial evidence the Court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record a conviction only if all the links in the chain are complete pointing to the guilt of the accused and every hypothesis of innocence is capable of being negatived on evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. The circumstance relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But this is not to say that the prosecution must meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused however far-fetched and fanciful it might be. Nor does it mean that prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because the law permits rejection if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied)

27. Thus, in a criminal trial, in case there are two inferences possible, then the one favouring the accused must be followed. Herein, no direct evidence was produced by the prosecution on record to implicate the father-in-law for mental cruelty, or to show that he was somehow directly involved in torturing the deceased or raising the demand for dowry. It seems that the father-in-law was roped in the present matter by an extension of roping the husband of the deceased, as is the case in certain S. 498A matters. This Court has time and again issued directions in order to ensure that there is no misuse of this law, which was purported by the legislature as a tool to ensure the safety of women in their marital homes and not to take grudges against all the members of the family even in the absence of any role attributable to them.

Conclusion

Accused/appellant appeal is allowed and informant’s appeal is dismissed

29. In the light of the above analysis, the evidence is brought on record would not be sufficient to establish the charge of guilt under Section 498A of IPC against the Appellant – Narendra Singh. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No. 302 / 2014 filed by Narendra Singh is allowed and his conviction u/s 498A IPC is set aside. Further, Criminal Appeal Nos. 309 / 2014 and 307 / 2014 are hereby dismissed.

Reference

Judgments cited or involved

• Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: Cited regarding the “five golden principles” (Panchsheel) of circumstantial evidence and the high standard of proof required to prevent the “moral conviction” of an accused.
• Laxman v. State of Maharashtra: Cited concerning the validity of a dying declaration, specifically that the absence of a doctor’s certification of “fitness of mind” does not automatically render a declaration invalid if the person recording it is satisfied the declarant was conscious and sensible.
• Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi: Referenced to outline the factors that determine the reliability of a dying declaration when it is the sole basis for conviction.
• Paparambaka Rosamma and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh: Discussed in the context of the medical fitness of a declarant during the recording of a statement.
• Kusa v. State of Orissa: Cited regarding the reliability of a dying declaration when the victim survived for several days and had multiple opportunities to speak.

Acts and Sections

Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860

• Section 302: Punishment for murder; the appellants were originally convicted by the trial court under this section for the death of the deceased (Mithlesh).
• Section 307: Attempt to murder; the High Court modified the conviction from Section 302 to Section 307, which was the primary subject of this appeal.
• Section 34: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention; used to establish the joint liability of the accused parties.
• Section 498A: Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty; the appellants were also charged and convicted under this section related to dowry harassment.

Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973

• Section 313: Power to examine the accused; the court noted that the appellants’ defense (that the deceased caught fire accidentally while cooking) was recorded during their statements under this section.
• Section 374: Appeals from convictions; the statutory provision under which the appeals were preferred before the High Court and subsequently the Supreme Court.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

• Section 32(1): Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead is relevant; this pertains to the dying declarations made by the deceased, which served as the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case.
• Section 113A: Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.
• Section 113B: Presumption as to dowry death.

Party

Narendra Singh v. State of MP - Criminal Appeal No. 302 of 2014 - April 30, 2026 - Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale.