Acquittal: Gunshot: Witnesses might have already planned to frame the accused since they know the accused owned licensed weapon

The Supreme Court reversed the concurrent convictions for murder under constructive liability and the Arms Act, extending the benefit of doubt to the appellants due to pervasive contradictions in the testimonies of related eyewitnesses and glaring investigative deficiencies. The prosecution's narrative was discredited by medical evidence demonstrating that the fatal firearm wound was not instantaneously fatal as claimed, the highly unnatural conduct of taking the victim to the police station instead of a hospital, and the total lack of site maps, weapon seizures, or forensic corroboration. Consequently, because the evidence failed to eliminate a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the appeal was allowed and the appellants were acquitted.

Ashok Upadhyay and Anr. v. The State of Bihar – Criminal Appeal No. 1223 of 2022 – 2026 INSC 971 – September 08, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

Identification of Appeal and Impugned Judgment

The criminal appeal is filed by the convicted appellants, Ashok Upadhyay and Anr., challenging the final judgment of the High Court. The impugned judgment affirmed the order of the trial court, which had convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, while upholding the corresponding sentence handed down to them. [Paragraphs 1, 2]

Factual Matrix and Lower Courts’ Verdicts

The prosecution’s case originated from a neighborhood dispute over drainage blockage that caused waterlogging in front of the deceased’s residence. This escalated into a violent altercation between two families, wherein A2 allegedly fired a fatal shot at the deceased’s chest, while A1 fired at and assaulted other family members, prompting the relatives to transport the deceased’s body directly to the police station to lodge the First Information Statement. During the trial of five accused persons, the Sessions Court acquitted three individuals but convicted A1 and A2 under Sections 302/34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. On appeal, the High Court concurred with the trial court’s findings and dismissed the appellants’ challenge, affirming both the conviction and the sentence. [Paragraphs 2, 3, 4]

The appellant-accused argued that the prosecution’s narrative rested entirely on interested, related witnesses whose testimonies harbored material contradictions compared to their initial statements under Section 161 CrPC, and emphasized the complete lack of crime scene investigation, weapon recovery, or site mapping. The defense further contended that medical evidence—showing the victim could have survived for 3 to 6 hours—contradicted the ocular claims of instantaneous death, while defense witness testimony (DW1) pointed to local extremist activity as a plausible alternative hypothesis. In response, the prosecution relied heavily on the direct eyewitness accounts of the deceased’s sons, daughter, and daughter-in-law, arguing that their consistent identification of the appellants, coupled with the postmortem findings of a fatal gunshot wound and recovered pellets, sufficiently established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16]

Ratio Decidendi

The core ratio decidendi established by the Supreme Court is that even when a prosecution case relies on direct ocular evidence, a conviction cannot be sustained if the testimonies of related witnesses contain a ring of falsity and material contradictions that are further exacerbated by grave investigative lapses, such as the failure to recover the alleged weapon or prepare a site map. Applying the principles from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, the Court held that when the totality of circumstances—including contradictory medical evidence regarding the time of death and highly unnatural conduct by the informants—gives rise to a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the accused are legally entitled to the benefit of the doubt and subsequent acquittal. [Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21]

Important paragraphs

Injuries described by the witnesses in their statements were not actually found on the eyewitnesses during medical examination

12. PW7, the Doctor who examined PW5, PW6 and PW10 spoke of only simple injuries having been caused of abrasions, but in the case of PW5, an incised injury and in the case of PW6, a firearm injury. However, PW7 also clarified that he was not sure whether the incised wound could be caused with the butt of a gun or the injury sustained by PW6 was a firearm injury. The injuries as spoken of in the testimony was not found on the eyewitnesses. PW5 and PW6 were not stated to have been treated as in-patients and PW6’s child was not shown to have sustained any injuries, as the witnesses deposed.

Since contradictions marked from 161 statements does not inspire confidence

13. The injuries sustained do not inspire a finding as to the persons having been involved in an altercation where assault was made by lathis and multiple shots fired from a firearm. It also has to be noticed that the eyewitnesses were PW2, PW3 and PW10; who were the sons of the deceased, as also PW5; his daughter and PW6; his daughter-in-law. We already found that the evidence of PW5 & PW6, especially after the contradictions marked from the Section 161 statements does not inspire confidence to find their presence at the scene of occurrence. The testimonies of PW2, PW3 and PW10 also must be tested with the other attendant circumstances. The eyewitnesses have not stated in one voice as to where the dead body was taken. PW10 categorically stated that the dead body was taken to the police station and not the hospital while some others, including PW2 spoke of the body having been taken to the hospital. The inquest report and the testimony of I.O clearly indicate that the body was taken to the police station. PW6 in her testimony states that her father-in-law had not died immediately, and she could feel his pulse when he was taken from the scene of occurrence.

Body was taken to the police station instead of hospital

14. It is surprising that the body was taken to the police station while in the normal circumstances it would have been taken to the hospital. Here we again notice the testimony of the Doctor who conducted the postmortem, that the injury which led to the death of the deceased could not result in an instantaneous death and the person who sustained it, could survive for 3 to 6 hours.

IO not even an attempt was made to recover or seize the weapons which are gun and the pistol

17. We narrated the testimony of this witness only to again emphasize the suspicious conduct, of the dead body having been taken to the police station and the expert opinion of the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem that the person who suffered the wound, which turned fatal, could have survived for 3-6 hours. Coupled with this, is the fact that there is nothing recovered from the scene of occurrence, though explained as due to the heavy rains. Not even the map of scene of occurrence was prepared by the I.O. The weapons of assault, the gun and the pistol remained elusive. No attempt was made to recover or seize it, nor was even the license produced to show one of the accused having a licensed firearm. The nature of the licensed firearm would have been evident from the license, and it could have led to forensic examination of the cover of the cartridge, which was recovered from the dead body, whether it matches the type of gun for which the license was issued.

Court blamed the witnesses that they might have already planned to frame the accused since they know the accused owned licensed weapon

18. More pertinently, the eyewitnesses speak of A1 carrying a ‘licensed’ weapon and A2 carrying a pistol. On the mere sight of a weapon, it cannot be identified as one licensed. We pertinently observe that, this smacks of premeditation to frame the accused, who is known to have a licensed weapon. But unfortunately, the I.O did nothing to produce the license and prove at least that the accused had access to such a weapon. The circumstances, as we see, do not lead solely to the hypothesis of guilt and a lingering doubt, quite reasonable in the facts and circumstances brought out by the prosecution itself, that there could be a hypothesis of innocence. Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, speaks of such hypothesis of innocence, if available, restraining the court from entering a conviction.

Conclusion

Benefit of doubt

20. Due to the discrepancies and the inconsistencies, we are unable to place faith on the oral testimony of eyewitnesses. In that circumstance, the reasonable doubt regarding a hypothesis of innocence assumes relevance. We must emphasize that despite specific overt acts alleged on the other accused, the Trial Court acquitted them, affirmed by the High Court.

21. In the totality of the circumstances, we are persuaded to give the appellants herein the benefit of doubt and, hence, we acquit them.

Resources

Judgments Cited / Involved / Quoted

  • Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116: Cited for the legal principle that where the evidence reasonably gives rise to a hypothesis of innocence alongside a hypothesis of guilt, the court is restrained from entering a conviction; this doctrine was applied to evaluate the doubtful, contradictory, and uncorroborated ocular evidence presented by the prosecution.

Acts and Sections:

  • Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Section 34 and Section 302
  • Arms Act, 1959: Section 27
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Section 161
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