Sri Sujit Das and Ors. etc. vs Union of India – Criminal Appeal Nos. of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 12451-12453 of 2026) – 2026 INSC 1195 – November 5, 2026 – Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, Justice Atul S. Chandurkar
Summary: This appeal addresses the constitutional mandate to produce a detained individual before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of initial restraint. The highest court ruled the constitutional clock begins upon actual physical detention and curtailment of liberty, not when formal arrest is later recorded. Any artificial distinction between investigatory detention and formal arrest to delay judicial production is unconstitutional. Consequently, the extended detention was deemed illegal, leading to the immediate release of the detained individuals.
Appellant and impugned order challenged
The appellants challenged the common judgment and order passed by the High Court which had dismissed their regular bail applications in connection with a criminal case registered under various sections of a specialized narcotics statute. [paras 2, 3, 4]
Factual matrix
The accused individuals were intercepted during a search and seizure operation for alleged drug trafficking offences, where they were detained and taken into custody around the early afternoon of the first day. Despite being physically restrained and having their liberty curtailed from that moment, their formal arrest was only recorded late morning the following day, creating an artificial gap in the timeline. They were ultimately produced before the Magistrate late in the afternoon on the second day, significantly exceeding the constitutional twenty-four-hour limit from the time of their initial apprehension. [paras 10, 11]
Other courts verdicts
The Special Judge initially rejected the bail applications of the accused individuals at the first instance. Subsequently, the High Court also dismissed their bail applications by placing reliance on a previous decision and treating the initial hours of physical restraint as being outside the constitutional time limit. [paras 9.7, 9.8]
Core legal arguments of appellant vs respondent
The appellants argued that the constitutional time limit mandated by Article 22(2) commences at the exact moment a person is detained and their liberty is effectively curtailed, asserting that the delayed formal arrest was a deliberate tactic to circumvent this fundamental rule. Conversely, the prosecution contended that a distinction exists between investigative detention and formal arrest, suggesting that the initial period of restraint required to complete statutory formalities before the formal recording of the arrest should not be counted towards the deadline for production before a magistrate. [paras 6, 10, 12, 13]
Ratio Decidendi
The highest court established that the Constitution does not recognize any form of detention outside the ambit of arrest, meaning the production period strictly commences the moment a person is detained by an arresting authority on suspicion of an offence and their liberty is effectively curtailed. Authorities cannot artificially distinguish between detention for interrogation and formal arrest to bypass the judicial production mandate, as any such buffer zone is unconstitutional and invalidates the arrest. Furthermore, procedural compliances under special statutes do not override this fundamental constitutional protection, and failure to present the detained individual before a magistrate within the mandated timeframe renders their continued detention illegal, necessitating their release on bail. [paras 16, 26, 40, 43, 58, 61, 64, 69]
Directions issued
The authorities were directed to produce the appellants before the jurisdictional Special Court within seven days to be released on bail on appropriate terms and conditions. Furthermore, a copy of the judgment was ordered to be circulated to all Directors General of Police, Registrars General of the High Courts, and Directors of State Judicial Academies to ensure compliance.
Important paragraph
Case of the prosecution
5. Prosecution case, in brief, is that on the basis of a secret information, Sri Rahul Sharma, Inspector, Divisional Preventive Force (DPF), Customs Division, Agartala, constituted a team to carry out an ambush on 29.09.2025, at around 08:00 am at a place which is 6 kilometers away from Khowai Chowmuhani. The secret information was that three persons were travelling in a truck and proceeding towards Agartala carrying narcotic/psychotropic substances. At around 09:05 am, the suspected vehicle bearing registration No. TR-06-1767 arrived at the place where the ambush was set up. The Inspector found that there were three occupants in the said truck including the driver. Inspector Rahul Sharma followed the said truck along with his team and, at around 01:00 pm, another person came on a motorcycle and met the occupants of the truck at a place called Shanitala Noabadi. They handed over one white coloured plastic sack to the person who came on a motorcycle after taking it out from the truck. At that point of time, all the four of them were detained by the search team and a total 11.03 Kg. of methamphetamine (Yaba) tablets were recovered. After re-checking of the vehicle, two trolly bags were further recovered, which were hidden deep under the sacks containing ginger on the cargo bed of the truck. Upon opening of each of the trolly bags, the officer recovered brown packets. When those brown packets were opened, blue and black plastic sachets containing small pink tablets with a pungent smell, believed to be Yaba, were found. Inspector Rahul Sharma then completed all the seizure related procedural formalities and arrested the four persons i.e. the three occupants of the truck and the person who arrived at the scene on a motorcycle. These four persons include the three appellants and one Sri Raju Das. The accused persons were arrested on 30.09.2025 and since then they have been in custody.
Analysis
15. At the outset it would be appropriate to refer to the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions.
Interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India
16. Since the entire case revolves around interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, the said provision may be adverted to at the outset. Article 22 provides for protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. While clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India deal with preventive detention, clause (3) thereof clarifies that clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 shall not apply to any person who, for the time being is an enemy alien or to any person who is arrested or detained under any preventive detention law. Thus, clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 apply to cases of arrest other than preventive detention. Clause (1) of Article 22 deals with furnishing of grounds of arrest etc. to the arrestee, with which we are presently not concerned. We are concerned with clause (2) of Article 22, which reads as follows:
22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
Explaining 24 hours period of detention by the police or other legal authorities to detained a person
16.1. What is discernible from the above is that there is a positive mandate in clause (2) of Article 22. It says, every person (without any exception) who is arrested and detained in custody has to be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest without fail. However, the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate is required to be excluded while computing the period of 24 hours. This provision ends with a clear declaration that no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. Therefore, this provision makes it abundantly clear that the 24-hours deadline is sacrosanct. The only period which is permitted to be deducted from the 24 hours mandate is the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate. The Constitution does not permit any other time period to be excluded from the 24 hours period.
Section 57 Cr.P.C r/w Article 22(2)
17. Section 57 CrPC contains the constitutional mandate of Article 22(2). It says that no police officer shall detain in custody a person without warrant for a longer period than, under all the circumstances of the case, is reasonable and such period shall not, in absence of a special order of a magistrate under Section 167 CrPC, exceed 24 hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate.
Remand is never a mechanical exercise: 18. Section 57 CrPC is a little bit more elaborative. It not only speaks of the 24 hours mandate but says that detention in custody of a person without warrant shall not be for a longer period than what is reasonable considering all the circumstances of the case which in any case should not exceed 24 hours unless there is a special order of a magistrate. So, the statutory limitation is not only that of 24 hours; detention in custody should not be for a longer period than what is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. This aspect has to be borne in mind not only by the police or detaining authority but by the magistrate as well and has to be taken into account while considering remand. Therefore, remand is never a mechanical exercise.
Section 57 Cr.P.C/section 58 BNSS & Section 167 Cr.P.C
19. Since there is a reference in Section 57 CrPC to Section 167 CrPC, we may also advert to the same. Section 167 CrPC lays down the procedure where investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. In such a case, the investigating officer or the officer-in-charge of the police station is required to transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case and shall also forward the accused to such magistrate. The magistrate may authorize detention of the accused for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. As per the proviso, the magistrate may authorize detention of the accused person otherwise than in police custody beyond the period of 15 days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so. However, the total period of such detention shall not exceed 90 days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years and 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence.
20. The mandate of Section 57 CrPC is carried forward in Section 58 of BNSS.
Arrest and its procedure
Arrest Provision and procedure: 21. Section 41 to Section 60A are included in Chapter V CrPC, which deals with arrest of persons. Section 41 deals with a situation when police may arrest without warrant, whereas Section 41A provides for notice of appearance before a police officer. As per sub-section (1) of Section 41A, the police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under Section 41(1), issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received, or reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice. Sub-section (2) says that it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice. In the event there is compliance, the noticee shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested (sub-section (3)). However, in terms of sub-section (4), if such a person fails to comply with the terms of the notice, the police officer may arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.
How to arrest under regular and NDPS Act? 22. How arrest has to be made has been dealt with in Section 46 CrPC.
23. Section 35 of BNSS has combined erstwhile Sections 41 and 41A of the CrPC. On the other hand, Section 43 of BNSS contains the provisions of Section 46 CrPC.
24. Since this is a case arising out of the NDPS Act, it would be useful to also refer to the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act.
24.1. Section 41 of the NDPS Act deals with the power to issue warrant and authorization. Sub-section (1) says that a metropolitan magistrate or a magistrate of the first class or any magistrate of the second-class specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under the NDPS Act, or for the search, whether by day or by night, of any building, conveyance or place in which he has reason to believe any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under the NDPS Act has been committed. Sub-section (2) says that any such officer of gazetted rank of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, etc. of the Central Government including the paramilitary forces if he has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken in writing that any person has committed an offence punishable under the NDPS Act, may authorize any officer subordinate to him but superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or a constable to arrest such a person or search a building, conveyance or place or himself arrest such person or search a building, conveyance or place.
Entry, Search and Seizure and arrest without arrest warrant or authorization: 24.2. The power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorization is provided in Section 42 of the NDPS Act. As per sub-section (1), such a power is conferred upon an officer who is superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable, if he has reason to believe from his personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under the NDPS Act has been committed, may, between sunrise and sunset enter into and search any such building and conveyance or place etc. What is of relevance is clause(d) of sub-section (1) of Section 42. It provides that such an officer may detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under the NDPS Act.
How search of persons to be conducted in NDPS Act? 24.3. The conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted is dealt with in Section 50 of the NDPS Act. As per sub-section (1), when any officer duly authorized under Section 42 is about to search any person in terms of Sections 41, 42 or 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest gazetted officer of any of the departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest magistrate. Sub-section (2) says that if such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before the gazetted officer or the magistrate referred to in sub-section (1).
24.4. Section 51 of the NDPS Act clarifies that provisions of the CrPC shall apply to warrants, arrests, searches and seizures.
24.5. That brings us to Section 67 of the NDPS Act, which empowers an officer referred to in Section 42 of the NDPS Act to call for information etc. It says that any officer referred to in Section 42 and who is authorized in this behalf by the Central Government or by a State Government may, during the course of any enquiry in connection with the contravention of any provisions of the NDPS Act, call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself whether there has been any contravention of the provisions of the NDPS Act or any rule made thereunder; require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the enquiry; and examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case.
Mandatory requirement of Article 22(2)
26. In case after case the Supreme Court has declared that the 24 hours period provided in Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India is a constitutional mandate which has to be followed mandatorily. Any infringement or breach of clause (2) of Article 22 would render the arrest illegal and unconstitutional. It is a constitutional safeguard intended to act as a safety barrier to check executive excess.
Judgments references
27. In the case of Khatri vs State of Bihar, this Court declared that the requirement of producing an arrested person before a magistrate is a binding constitutional command. It must be strictly and scrupulously observed. This decision came in the backdrop of the horrific Bhagalpur blindings of prisoners. In that context this Court noted that in a few cases the accused persons do not appear to have been produced before the Judicial Magistrates within 24 hours of their arrest as required by Article 22 of the Constitution. The Bench strongly urged the State and its police authorities to ensure that the constitutional and legal requirement to produce an arrested person before a Judicial Magistrate within 24 hours of the arrest must be scrupulously observed. This Court observed that the provision inhibiting detention without remand is a very healthy provision which enables the magistrates to keep check over the police investigation. In the facts of that case, this Court opined that either the blinded prisoners were not physically produced before the Judicial Magistrates and the Judicial Magistrates mechanically signed the orders of remand or they did not bother to enquire even if they found that the prisoners before them had received injuries in the eyes.
28. This Court in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal, declared that the 24 hours rule mandated under clause (2) of Article 22 is intended to prevent unlawful detention and custodial abuse. This Court acknowledged the prevalence of custodial violence and abuse of police power in the country and observed that notwithstanding constitutional and statutory safeguards, growing incidents of torture and deaths in police custody was a disturbing factor. This Court recorded that experience shows that worst violations of human rights take place during the course of investigation when the police with a view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to third degree methods including torture and adopts techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. It has been held thus:
- Instances have come to our notice where the police has arrested a person without warrant in connection with the investigation of an offence, without recording the arrest, and the arrested person has been subjected to torture to extract information from him for the purpose of further investigation or for recovery of case property or for extracting confession etc.
* * * * * * *
28.1. This compelled the Court to issue a slew of guidelines, including permitting the presence of the counsel of the arrestee at some point of time during the interrogation to deter the police from using third degree methods during interrogation.
29. Again, in the case of Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Subhash Sharma, this Court has held that violation of clause (2) of Article 22 vitiates the arrest being in contravention of Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution of India. In such an event, it becomes the duty of the court dealing with the bail application to release the accused on bail.
30. This provision was also examined in great detail by this Bench, of course in a slightly different context, in the case of Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol Vs. State of Punjab. The issue before this Court in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol was whether an accused, who has suffered breach of both clauses (1) and (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, be re-arrested for the same offence? If so, under what circumstances, in what manner and the procedure that is required to be followed in such a case?
30.1. While answering the above, the Bench issued detailed guidelines and observed that the constitutional mandate of Article 22(2), beautifully explained in the celebrated case of Khatri, continues to remain firm and unshaken, as if engraved in stone.
31. In Niranjan Singh, this Court, speaking through Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, examined the question as to when is a person in custody within the meaning of Section 439 CrPC? Answering this question, this Court held that a person would be in custody when he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered himself to the court’s jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical presence. In that context, this Court declared that no lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of Section 439 CrPC. This Court held that the word ‘custody’ is of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. Proceeding further, this Court held that explanations and submissions to the effect that police have taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into formal custody would amount to unfair evasions of the straightforwardness of the law. The declaration is so profound that it merits its extraction which we hereunder do:
7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of Section 439 CrPC? When he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered himself to the court’s jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical presence. No lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. The equivocatory quibblings and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in court that the police have taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on this shady facet here because we are satisfied that the accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose.
32. In Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @ Siddique, a Single Bench of the Bombay High Court was considering the bail prayer of the accused persons who were charged with committing offences under the NDPS Act read with Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962. In the facts of that case, it was noticed that the accused persons were actually detained from the midnight of 19.07.1989. The statements of all the accused persons were recorded by the same officers between the midnight of 19.07.1989 and the midnight of 20.07.1989. During this period of 24 hours they were not allowed to leave the place of their detention. They were also not produced before the magistrate. They were produced before the magistrate only on 21.07.1989 at 05:20 pm. Their arrest was recorded in such a manner that their production before the magistrate fell within 24 hours stipulated by Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 57 of the CrPC. It was the stand of the prosecution that after their arrest, the accused were not detained beyond 24 hours.
32.3. The High Court explained further that an investigating officer may lawfully detain a suspect for an offence. Detention in custody for interrogation is not authorized by law. The investigating officer may detain for an offence only. Any restraint on a person’s liberty except for an offence is illegal. There is no authority in the investigating officer to detain a person for the purpose of interrogation or helping them in the enquiry.
32.4. The High Court referred to several such instances of illegal detention and remarked that the tendency to detain suspects for questioning and manipulating the record to show a later time of arrest is a reprehensible practice of recent origin followed by the officers of the Customs Department and the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). What the investigating officers do, in such cases, is to procure statements by assault, illegal detention and fear of continued detention. Then, they present these documents as ‘statements’. That is not what the law permits them to do. This manipulation and abuse of the legislative sanction for the use of statements of the accused requires to be censured in the strongest terms.
33.1. After referring to Sections 57 and 167(1) of CrPC, the High Court examined the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @ Siddique and other similar judgments observed that Section 57 CrPC refers to the expression ‘detention’; it does not use the expression ‘from the time of arrest’. Therefore, the period of detention starts the moment an accused is apprehended by the police, as from that moment itself, there is a restraint so far as personal liberty of the concerned person is concerned as he remains under the confines of police personnel. Thus, it would amount to a detention of a person right from the time he is apprehended by the police personnel. Therefore, the arrest of a person commences from the time restraint is placed on his liberty and not from the time of the arrest officially recorded by the arresting officer.
33.2. The High Court declared that the period of apprehension is also to be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the 24 hours period as envisaged under Section 57 CrPC. This is further clarified by the High Court by declaring that 24 hours is not to be calculated from the time of the official arrest being shown by the police personnel in the arrest memo but from the time he was initially apprehended or taken into custody.
39. The next case is that of the Madras High Court. In Kannan, the accused was also arrested under the NDPS Act. The order of remand of the accused was challenged before the Madras High Court on various grounds including on the ground that he was produced before the magistrate after 24 hours. The primary contention made on behalf of the accused was that he was detained by the police on 09.10.2024 at 05:00 pm from which time the 24 hours period should be reckoned but he was produced before the magistrate only at 05:30 pm on 10.10.2024, showing his arrest at 06:30 pm on 09.10.2024.
41. In Arun K. Thomas, a learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court was examining bail applications of persons accused of committing offences under the NDPS Act as well as other provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Primary contention of the accused persons was that there was infraction of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 58 of the BNSS (Section 57 of CrPC) in as much as they were subjected to detention well before the formal recording of their arrest; consequently they were produced before the magistrate beyond 24 hours from the time of such detention though within 24 hours of the recorded time of arrest. Reliance was placed on Biswajit Mandal which was also a decision of a coordinate Bench of the High Court i.e. Single Bench decision.
42. First and foremost, Biswajit Mandal was decided by a co-ordinate Bench i.e. by a Single Judge of the same High Court. It is evident that learned Single Judge in Arun K. Thomas has taken a contra-position to the views expressed in Biswajit Mandal. Being a co-ordinate Bench, learned Single Judge should have avoided such a course of action. Instead, the matter should have been referred to the Chief Justice for placing the matter before a Bench having a higher strength.
43. That apart, as we have indicated in the cases of Aryaman Pattnayak and Kannan, here also the focus and thrust of the learned Judge in trying to distinguish between detention and arrest is not only misplaced but unwarranted as well. As already noted supra, compliance with the procedural formalities of the NDPS Act and the Rules of 2022 does not in any manner prevent the arresting authority from producing the detainee before the magistrate within the constitutionally prescribed time limit of 24 hours. The only exception the Constitution itself provides is the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate. Article 22(2) does not sanction exclusion of the time taken for enquiry and investigation before the arresting authority could effect arrest of the detainee. This is beyond the mandate of Article 22(2) of the Constitution. Article 22(2) does not sanction creation of any buffer zone where the liberty of an individual is curtailed for investigating purposes but not formally shown as arrested. Creation or contemplation of such buffer zone is unconstitutional. There cannot be any suspension or keeping in abeyance of the constitutional safeguards provided under clause (2) of Article 22 save and except what is provided thereunder. Therefore, the declaration that the period of 24 hours for the purposes of Article 22(2) commences from the completion of such search and seizure and only from the time of arrest recorded by the arresting authority is not only unsustainable in law but is entirely unconstitutional. At the cost of repetition, we assert that whether it is Section 67 of the NDPS Act or Rule 3 of the Rules of 2022, there is no statutory injunction preventing the detaining authority from producing the detainee before the magistrate within 24 hours of such detention. Therefore, the view taken by the learned Judge that the 24 hours period commences upon only formal arrest and not during antecedent detention necessitated by statutory procedure of seizure and inventory is contrary to the constitutional mandate of clause (2) of Article 22 read with Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC) and does not lay down the correct law on this point.
45. This Court in Deepak Mahajan was considering the question as to whether a magistrate before whom a person arrested under sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 is produced under sub-section (2) of Section 35 of the aforesaid Act, has jurisdiction to authorize detention of that person under Section 167 (2) CrPC?
What is the meaning of arrest in the context of criminal offence? Explained 45.2. Thus, arrest would mean the restraint or the deprivation of one’s personal liberty. The question whether a person is under arrest or not would depend on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. In the context of a criminal offence, an arrest consists in the taking into custody of another person under authority empowered by law for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing the commission of a criminal offence.
46. Therefore, this Court in Deepak Mahajan has held that a person would be deemed to be arrested if he is taken into custody and detained to answer a criminal charge or to prevent him from committing a criminal offence. In other words, a person would be deemed to be under arrest if he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. This decision thus supports the proposition which is being advanced on behalf of the appellants.
Fundamental rights are the core of Constitutional Jurisprudence: 49. We have our reservation on the aforesaid observations made by the Bench. First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These are fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under the special statutes. Such observations run counter to numerous judgments of this Court which reiterate the proposition that when there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the rigor of Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar such provisions under the special statutes would have to give way. [Please see Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb^16, Satender Kumar Antil Vs. CBI^17, Mohd. Muslim Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)^18, Ankur Chadha Vs. State of Madya Pradesh^19, Vijay Singh Vs. Union of India^20 wherein this Court clearly held that Article 21 of the Constitution of India over-rides Section 37 of the NDPS Act, Syed Iftikhar Andrabi Vs. National Investigation Agency^21 and Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol Vs. State of Punjab^22]. In fact, it could be urged that such an observation by the two-Judge Bench in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gola may be hit by the principle of per incuriam as K.A. Najeeb is a judgment by a three-Judge Bench. However, we would not comment beyond this point since Sukhwinder Singh @Gora is also by a coordinate Bench. That apart, from the facts of that case, it appears that the accused was in custody from 10.01.2024 and bail was granted to him by the High Court on 18.02.2026. At that stage, 2 out of the 24 prosecution witnesses were examined. It is a debatable issue as to whether a view could have been taken by the High Court that right to speedy trial of the accused was being jeopardized. Moreover, clause (2) of Article 22 was not an issue before the Bench in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora. Therefore, this decision also cannot come to the aid of the respondent.
50. We are dealing with one of the most important provisions of our Constitution viz. clause (2) of Article 22. Before we endeavour to interpret clause (2) of Article 22, it would be advisable to advert to various decision of this Court telling us how to go about interpreting a constitutional provision, more particularly a provision which is included in Part III of our Constitution as a fundamental right?
Any statute cannot interpret the Constitution but other way around: 55. We have only extracted a few of the numerous judgments of this Court highlighting the importance or necessity of interpreting a constitutional provision, more particularly a fundamental right enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, in a manner which aligns with the constitutional objective and which does not whittle down the constitutional safeguards. A statute, special or otherwise, cannot be a guide to interpret the Constitution; rather, it should be the other way around. To reiterate, a fundamental right must be interpreted in such a manner that it upholds and furthers the objective of such a fundamental right.
57. Applying the above interpretative standards, we have no hesitation in our mind that the exercise undertaken by the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattnayak while taking the view that detention of a person leading to temporary disruption of his liberty in the course of a search and seizure process cannot be treated as a detention alike arrest runs contrary to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. There is no such thing called temporary disruption of liberty. The further view of the Orissa High Court that a detention is not arrest if it is for brief questioning but if it goes beyond a short investigatory hold, then it becomes an arrest is constitutionally unsustainable, delving into a realm of uncertainty. We are afraid, a constitutional provision, that too, a fundamental right, cannot be interpreted in such a manner. Similar is the position in respect to the interpretation of the Madras High Court in Kannan and of the Kerala High Court in Arun K. Thomas.
58. Having sieved through the judgments of the High Courts in Aryaman Pattnayak, Kannan and Arun K. Thomas, which we have disapproved, let us once again revert back to Article 22. As noticed supra, the heading of this fundamental right is protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. We are concerned with clause (2) thereof which we have already extracted above and analyzed extensively. Clause (2) says that every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall not be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of the magistrate. The key expression appearing in clause (2) of Article 22 is ‘arrested and detained in custody’. What is the meaning of this expression? Does it mean that the two crucial words appearing in this expression, ‘arrest’ and ‘detain’, should be assigned separate meanings or they mean one and the same thing. It is important to note that the expression is conjunctive and not disjunctive. Had it been disjunctive, two separate meanings could have been assigned to the two words. But the expression being joint and conjunctive, the two words appearing therein would mean one and the same thing. This is because the Constitution does not recognize any detention dehors arrest. Thus, the prescription of 24 hours time period would commence the moment a person is detained by the arresting authority suspecting him to have committed an offence, when his liberty is effectively curtailed. To that extent, the words appearing in clause (2) of Article 22 i.e. ‘arrested’ and ‘detained’ are synonymous. Any attempt to draw an artificial distinction between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’ would dilute or negate the fundamental protection guaranteed by the Constitution under clause (2) of Article 22. Such an endeavour should be avoided. We must adopt that interpretation which enhances and furthers the constitutional objective.
Reason for insistence of 24 hours is to eliminate custodial violence which is an unfortunate reality: 61. There is a reason for insistence on the 24 hours mandate under clause (2) of Article 22, which is mandatory and as we have interpreted, would commence from the time of detention when the person detained is deprived of his liberty. The endeavour of this Court has always been to eliminate custodial violence which unfortunately takes place during the time when a person is under detention and not shown as formally arrested, in the process delaying production before the magistrate. Custodial violence is an unfortunate reality of our country and is judicially acknowledged. In Khatri, this Court was confronted with the horrific Bhagalpur blindings of prisoners where this Court observed that the provisions inhibiting detention without remand is a very healthy provision enabling the magistrate to keep a check over police investigation. Likewise, in D.K. Basu, this Court acknowledged the prevalence of custodial violence and abuse of police power in the country and observed with concern that notwithstanding the constitutional and statutory safeguards, growing instances of torture and death in police custody was a disturbing factor. Significantly, this Court recorded that worst violation of human rights take place during the course of investigation when the police with a view to extract information or confession resorts to third degree methods by adopting techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. The above aspect has also been elaborated in detail by the Bombay High Court in Ashak Hussain Allah Detha @ Siddique.
Compulsory installation of CCTV systems in Police Stations and preservation of the footage data: 63. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Paramvir Singh Saini Vs. Baljeet Singh^28 following Shafhi Mohammad, considered the question of audio video recording of statements made under Section 161 CrPC as well as the larger question as to the installation of the CCTV cameras in police stations generally. The larger Bench directed that the State and the Union Territory Governments should ensure that CCTV cameras are installed in each and every police station. In order to ensure that no part of a police station is left uncovered, CCTV cameras should be installed at all entry and exit points; main gate of the police station; all lockups; all corridors; the lobby and the reception area; all verandahs and outhouses; Inspector’s room; Sub-Inspector’s room; areas outside the lockup room, station hall, in front of the police station compound; outside (not inside) washrooms and toilets; duty officers room; back part of the police station etc. Such CCTV systems must be equipped with night vision and must necessarily consist of audio as well as video footage. The data should be preserved for a period of 18 months; and more in the event of a complaint being made of custodial violence. Additionally, the Bench directed the Union of India to install CCTV cameras and recording equipments in the offices of: (i) Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) (ii) National Investigation Agency (NIA) (iii) Enforcement Directorate (ED) (iv) NCB etc.
63.1. The Bench clarified that as most of the above agencies carry out interrogation in their offices, CCTVs shall be compulsorily installed in all offices where such interrogation and holding of accused takes place in the same manner as it would in a police station.
Conclusion
69. In the circumstances, we would like to summarize our conclusions as under:
(i) the 24 hours timeline as mandated under clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India would commence from the date and time of detention of the person detained when his liberty stands curtailed and not from the time of his formal arrest;
(ii) in the event, such detention continues beyond 24 hours before the person is produced before a magistrate, he shall be forthwith released from custody;
(iii) while computing the 24 hours deadline, no other time period is permitted to be excluded therefrom except the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate;
(iv) the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Aryaman Pattnayak, Madras High Court in Kannan and Kerala High Court in Arun K. Thomas do not lay down the correct law qua interpretation of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India;
(v) the detaining authority should keep in mind not only the 24 hours deadline mandated by clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution but also ensure that such detention should not extend beyond a reasonable period within the 24 hours period considering the circumstances of the case in terms of Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC);
(vi) at the time of production, the magistrate is duty bound to record the actual date and time of detention of the person produced before him when his liberty stood curtailed and examine whether the 24 hours deadline has been complied with or not from the time of such detention. If there is breach of the 24 hours deadline, the concerned person shall be released forthwith from detention;
(vii) the magistrate shall also examine at the time of production whether the detention of the person produced, though is within the time frame of 24 hours, has exceeded the period which can be construed to be reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he is satisfied that detention in custody has been for a longer period than what is reasonable, he may decline remand;
(viii) in so far the present case is concerned, for the reasons cited in paragraphs 65, 66 and 67 above, the detention of the appellants was not only in breach of clause (2) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India but was for a period beyond what can be construed to be a reasonable period considering all the circumstances of the case which was in contravention of Section 58 BNSS (Section 57 CrPC);
(ix) consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 29.04.2026 and direct that the appellants shall be produced before the jurisdictional Special Court within a maximum period of 7 days from today whereafter they shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as may be deemed appropriate.
70. A copy of this judgment and order may be circulated to all Director Generals of Police of the States and Union Territories as well as to the Registrar Generals of the High Courts and Directors of State Judicial Academies.
Resources
- Judgments Referenced
- State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh alias Gora – Relied upon by the High Court regarding the rigour of bail conditions under the special narcotics statute.
- Aryaman Pattnayak v. Union of India – Mentioned by the respondent to argue that temporary disruption of liberty during search and seizure does not equate to formal arrest.
- Acts and Sections Involved
- Constitution of India
- Article 21 – Protection of life and personal liberty.
- Article 22(2) – Requirement to produce an arrested person before a magistrate within twenty-four hours.
- Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
- Section 37 – Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable, imposing strict conditions for bail.
- Section 50 – Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted.
- Sections 21(C), 22(C), 23(C), 25, 25A, 28, and 29 – Penalties for offences involving commercial quantities of psychotropic substances.
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
- Section 58 – Providing that detention without warrant must not be longer than reasonable in the circumstances.
- Constitution of India
