Appeal against the Hon’ble High court judgment confirming the acquittal
1. Assailed before us, at the insistence of the complainant, is a judgment and order dated 23rd November, 2023 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Principal Bench at Jabalpur), passed in Criminal Revision No.3125 of 2021, whereby the judgment/order dated 11th November, 2021 in Sessions Trial No.52/2019 of the learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Seoni, acquitting the accused- Respondents (Nos.2 to 9) of the charges under Sections 294, 323, 506, 353, 352 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code1 was confirmed.
Background facts and procedural history
Appellant was abused and beaten to unconsciousness when he was appointed as chairman of waqf board
2. The complainant-appellant was appointed as the Chairman of the District Waqf Board, Seoni, thereby being charged with the supervision of Masjid Committees. As a result of the dispute between the newly appointed committee of which he was the Chairman and the previous committee, the claimant was abused and beaten to the point of unconsciousness.
After discharge from the hospital fir came to be lodged under sections 294, 323, 506 read with 34 IPC
3. He was taken to the district hospital wherefrom he was referred to the Asian Hospital, Nagpur and upon discharge therefrom, FIR No.133 of 2018 dated 9th March, 2018 under Sections 294, 323, 506 read with 34 IPC came to be lodged.
Charge framed under Sections 294, 332/34 and 307/34 IPC
5. The Additional Sessions Judge, Seoni, framed charges under Sections 294, 332/34 and 307/34 IPC. Such framing of charge by order dated 17th September, 2019 was challenged before the High Court in Criminal Revision No.4805 2019, whereby vide order dated 21st January, 2020 the same was set aside on the ground that the documents made part of the record were not supplied to the accused. The matter was remanded for framing of charge afresh.
7. Aggrieved by the said order, the complainant-appellant preferred the instant criminal revision. The impugned order records that the medical officer of the District Hospital, Seoni, gave his opinion about the nature of the injury sustained by the complainant, also observing that the throttling could have resulted in respiratory arrest. There are observations with respect to bruises and abrasions, however, details as to their size and location were missing. Such assessment was termed as general and superficial.
8. As such, it was held that no case under Section 307 IPC was made out and the Criminal Revision was, thus, dismissed.
Consideration by Supreme Court
Section 307 IPC
10. Section 307 IPC is the charge that the Courts below have concurrently, refused to frame. It reads as under:-
“307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.Attempts by life convicts.— When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.”
Ingredients of section 307 IPC
11.1 In State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao [(2003) 10 SCC 434], the Court identified the essential ingredients for the applicability of the section. The relevant extract is as below:
“The essential ingredients required to be proved in the case of an offence under Section 307 are:
- that the death of a human being was attempted;
- that such death was attempted to be caused by, or in consequence of the act of the accused; and
- that such act was done with the intention of causing death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as : (a) the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or (b) was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause (a) death, or (b) such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the accused having no excuse for incurring the risk of causing such death or injury.”
11.2 This Court in Om Prakash v. State of Punjab [1961 SCC OnLine SC 72], as far back as 1961, observed the constituents of the Section, having referred to various judgments of the Privy Council, as under:
“a person commits an offence under Section 307 when he has an intention to commit murder and, in pursuance of that intention, does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not. It is to be clearly understood, however, that the intention to commit the offence of murder means that the person concerned has the intention to do certain act with the necessary intention or knowledge mentioned in Section 300. The intention to commit an offence is different from the intention or knowledge requisite for constituting the act as that offence. The expression “whoever attempts to commit an offence” in Section 511, can only mean “whoever : intends to do a certain act with the intent or knowledge necessary for the commission of that offence”. The same is meant by the expression “whoever does an act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he, by that act, caused death, he would be guilty of murder” in Section 307. This simply means that the act must be done with the intent or knowledge requisite for the commission of the offence of murder. The expression “by that act” does not mean that the immediate effect of the act committed must be death. Such a result must be the result of that act whether immediately or after a lapse of time.”
Court must see the intention and knowledge for the nature of extent of injury suffered
11.3 Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand [(2004) 12 SCC 220] holds that the nature or extent of injury suffered, are irrelevant factors for the conviction under this section, so long as the injury is inflicted with animus. It has been held:
“10. …To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. …What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
11. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. If the injury inflicted has been with the avowed object or intention to cause death, the ritual nature, extent or character of the injury or whether such injury is sufficient to actually causing death are really factors which are wholly irrelevant for adjudging the culpability under Section 307 IPC. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 IPC merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.”
Principle governing the application of section 34 IPC
11.4 The principle governing the application of Section 34 has been captured thus in Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P. [(2020) 4 SCC 126]:
“24. Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at the spot as held in Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar [Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar, (2003) 1 SCC 268 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 301] . There must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.”
Intention may be required to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case instead of hard evidence
13. It is well recognized that intention may not always be proved by hard evidence and instead may be required to be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. If the doctor who conducted the examination posits the possibility of throttling, then under what circumstances, without rigorous cross-examination, could it be concluded that the injuries sustained were simple? That apart, even if the injuries were taken as simple, the extent of the injuries, as observed supra in Hari Mohan Mondal, are not relevant, if the intent is present. We are not in agreement with the learned Courts below that intent was absent, as the Doctor’s report itself records throttling to be reasonably suspected.
Appeal allowed and direction to the trial court to conduct the trial for the charges framed
16. In view of the above discussion, given that the minor nature of injuries is not sufficient reason to not frame a charge under Section 307 IPC, as per the law laid down by this Court, the judgment impugned, passed in Criminal Revision No. 3125 of 2021 dated 23rd November, 2023, is set aside. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The concerned Trial Court is directed to have the Respondents stand trial for all the offences for which charges have been framed, as also Section 307. The trial shall proceed on its own merits, as per law, uninfluenced by the observations hereinabove which were for the limited purpose of testing the propriety of the impugned order. The same shall be expedited.
Party
Shoyeb Raja … Appellant(S) versus State of Madhya Pradesh & ors … Respondent(S) – Criminal Appeal No. 3327 of 2024 – 2024 INSC 731- September 25, 2024.
section 307 ipc, 307, attempt to commit murder, attempt murder, doctor opinion
Further study
