Appeal
Appeal against writ petition against the order of rejecting the plea of premature release after 22 years
The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing letter dated 09.07.2025 of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) (for short “impugned letter”) which rejected the recommendation of the State of Uttarakhand and disallowed the plea of premature release of the petitioner who has been in jail for approximately twenty-two (22) years.
Appellant convicted for section 302 IPC and sentenced to life and fine
2. This case has a chequered history and its facts may briefly be adverted to. On the basis of a complaint dated 09.05.2003 of the elder sister of the deceased, Case No.162/2003 under Section 302of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”) was registered at Mahanagar Police Station, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) against the petitioner and other accused persons. The investigation was initially carried out by the U.P. State Police and thereafter by CB-CID. However, vide Notification dated 24.06.2003, the case was transferred to Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Pursuant to the investigation, the petitioner along with other co-accused, faced a trial before the Sessions Judge, Lucknow, U.P. However, this Court, by its order dated 08.02.2007, in Transfer Petition No.456/2005, transferred the trial to Dehradun, Uttarakhand, with a request to the then Chief Justice of Uttarakhand to create a Special Court for the trial of the case. The petitioner along with other co-accused was convicted for the murder of the deceased by the Special Judge, Dehradun vide judgment dated 24.10.2007 in Sessions Trial No.411/2005 under Sections 120B/302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine.
Criminal appeal dismissed by the High Court dated: 16.7.2012
2.1 Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred Criminal Appeal No.507/2007 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital but the same came to be rejected by judgment dated 16.07.2012 and the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court was affirmed. The petitioner then preferred SLP (Crl.)No.7507/2013 against the judgment dated 16.07.2012. However, the same was also dismissed by order dated 19.11.2013 by this Court.
Petitioner’s representation to the Principal secretary of the president for premature release was not answered and hence as per the High Court he was released on bail
2.2 On 06.09.2022, the petitioner made a representation to the Principal Secretary, Office of the President of India seeking premature release from prison. The said representation was forwarded to the Chief Secretary, Government of Uttarakhand for proper action. Since no action was taken on the said representation, the petitioner approached the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2146/2022 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttarakhand to consider premature release of the petitioner. The High Court by its order dated 13.01.2023 directed the respondents to consider the premature release of the applicant within a week failing which the applicant would be released on bail. The State of Uttarakhand having failed to take a decision within a week, the petitioner approached the Trial Court for bail and was granted bail vide order dated 30.01.2023 by the Special Judge, Anti-corruption, Dehradun.
Petitioner received a letter receiving a government order that his premature release application had been rejected
2.3 Subsequently, the petitioner received a letter dated 07.06.2023 wherein it was mentioned that the appropriate Government vide G.O. dated 07.05.2023 had rejected his premature release application and consequently, the petitioner was directed to surrender immediately. The petitioner, accordingly, surrendered on 17.06.2023 at District Jail, Haridwar, Uttarakhand.
Premature release was rejected based on clause 5 of the Uttarakhand State permanent Police, 2022
2.4 Sometime later, the petitioner preferred Writ Petition (Crl.) No.896/2023 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttarakhand to furnish grounds in support of the rejection of premature release of the applicant, which according to him were never furnished to him. However, the said writ petition came to be dismissed as withdrawn by order dated 06.07.2023 with liberty to challenge the said decision, as the grounds were furnished by the State of Uttarakhand in the Court. Briefly put, the premature release was rejected on the ground that the petitioner fell within clause 5 of the Uttarakhand State (for Remission/Premature Release of Convicted Prisoners Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Courts) Permanent Policy, 2022 which is a prohibited category for grant of premature release being a case investigated by the CBI under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
Analysis
3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel for the State of Uttarakhand, and learned ASG on behalf of the Union of India and have also perused the material on record.
Letter disallowed premature release of the petitioner ought to be quashed on account of cryptic order
5. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival submissions and on perusal of the material on record, we are of the view that the impugned letter of the MHA which disallowed the premature release of the petitioner ought to be quashed on account of it being a non-speaking and cryptic order. The letter, in relevant paragraph, noted:
“3. The relevant documents having regards to all facts and material placed on record produced by the Government of Uttarakhand vide aforesaid letter, the judgements of the court of Special Judge/ Session Judge, Dehradun, Hon’ble High Court, Uttarakhand and Hon’ble Supreme Court of India were considered by the Competent Authority. After considering the above facts, documents and material on record, Competent Authority is not concurred with the proposal of the Uttarakhand Government for premature release of life convict, Rohit Chaturvedi s/o Suresh Chandra Chaturvedi.”
Quite clearly, the letter is ex facie non-speaking, as it does not disclose any reason whatsoever for the conclusion arrived at by the Competent Authority. While it makes a bare reference to the consideration of certain documents, including the letter of the Government of Uttarakhand and the judgments of the Special Judge, Dehradun, the High Court of Uttarakhand, and this Court, it conspicuously fails to indicate what weighed with the Competent Authority in rejecting the proposal for premature release.
Recording of reasons is not an empty formality it ensures transparency, fairness, and accountability in decision making
5.1 It is a settled principle of law that any order affecting rights of a person and particularly his liberty must be with reasons and14must reflect due application of mind. Recording of reasons is not an empty formality, it is a safeguard against arbitrariness and ensures transparency, fairness, and accountability in decision-making. The absence of reasons renders it bald and makes it impossible to ascertain whether relevant factors were duly considered or not.
5.2 In the present case, the order merely states that the Competent Authority “does not concur” with the proposal, without disclosing any basis for such disagreement. There is no discussion of the petitioner’s conduct, applicable remission policy, or any specific adverse material, if at all, against the petitioner. The letter, therefore, fails to meet the minimum requirement of a reasoned order and reflects complete non-application of mind. Such a cryptic rejection not only violates the principles of natural justice but also frustrates the petitioner’s right to seek effective judicial review as the absence of reasons deprives a constitutional Court of the opportunity to examine the propriety of the decision.
Executive discretion, though broad in matters of remission, is not uncanalised and must necessarily be exercised on relevant,15rational, and non-discriminatory considerations and not being rejected owing to irrelevant and extraneous reasons.
The review committee constituted by the State Government, though the jail authorities were in favour of releasing the petitioner has rejected the petition was for irrelevant reasons
5.3 In this regard, we may usefully refer to the case of Laxman Naskar vs. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626, in which the jail authorities were in favour of releasing the petitioner, but the review committee constituted by the State Government recommended the rejection of the claim for premature release on three grounds.
They were (i) the two witnesses who had deposed during the trial as also the people of the locality were apprehensive that the release of the petitioner will disrupt the peace in the locality; (ii) that the petitioner being 43 years old had the potential of committing another crime; (iii) the incident is not an individual act of crime but a sequel of a political feud. This Court while placing reliance on Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595 stipulated certain factors that govern the grant of remission. These are namely:
(i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large?
(ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime?
(iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime?
(iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict anymore?
(v) Socio-economic condition of the convict’s family.
Based on the above factors, this Court held in the said case that the decision to reject the claim of remission was based on irrelevant reasons. Consequently, the Court quashed the order of the government and directed it to consider the matter afresh, asunder:
“8. If we look at the reasons given by the Government, we are afraid that the same are palpably irrelevant or devoid of substance. Firstly, the views of the witnesses who had been examined in the case or the persons in the locality cannot determine whether the petitioner would be a danger if prematurely released because the persons in the locality and the witnesses may still live in the past and their memories are being relied upon without reference to the present and the report of the jail authorities to the effect that the petitioner has reformed himself to a large extent. Secondly, by reason of one’s age one cannot saywhether the convict has still potentiality of committing the crime or not, but it depends on his attitude to matters, which is not being taken note of by the Government. Lastly, the suggestion that the incident is not an individual act of crime but a sequel of the political feud affecting society at large, whether his political views have been changed or still carries the same so as to commit crime has not been examined by the Government.”
Proceed to analyse the case on merits instead of returning back to the authority
5.4 In the instant case, even the bare attempt to give any reason, good or bad, notwithstanding, is also not made out. On that basis alone, this Court can quash the impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 on the ground that it is a non-speaking order and remand the matter to the respondent–Union of India for fresh consideration. However, in our view, such a course would serve no useful purpose in the peculiar facts of the present case. The respondent–Union of India has defended its decision before this Court by contending that the petitioner is not entitled to remission having regard to the role attributed to him in the offence. The stand of the respondent on merits thus stands fully stated and conclusively articulated before this Court. In such circumstances, remanding the matter to the very authority which has already taken a firm view against the petitioner would amount to an empty formality. The controversy before this Court, therefore, appears not to be one of absence of consideration, but the legality and sustainability of the conclusion already reached. In that light, remand may not be directed mechanically where it would not serve any substantive purpose. Considering that the petitioner has already undergone more than twenty-two (22) years of incarceration and all relevant material is already before this Court, relegating the petitioner to another round of administrative consideration would only prolong the proceedings unnecessarily. Sending the matter to the very same authority for reconsideration would be futile and not serve the interests of justice, particularly when the basis of that rejection is already fully articulated before this Court on merits. We, therefore, proceed to examine the case on merits.
Principles governing the grant of remission under various Acts and rules, including the Constitution of India discussed
6. The principles governing the grant of remission, as distinct from commutation, pardon, and reprieve, may be understood with reference to the judgment of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 (“Prem Raj”). Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India deal with the clemency powers of the President of India and the Governor of a State, respectively. These provisions confer the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment, as well as the power to suspend, remit, or commute sentences in specified cases. Under Article 72, the President’s power extends, inter alia, to (i) all cases where the punishment or sentence is for an offence against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends; and(ii) all cases where the sentence is one of death. Similarly, Article 161 empowers the Governor of a State to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment, or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any person convicted of an offence against a law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the State extends. In Prem Raj, it was observed that the powers under Articles 72 and 161 are absolute in nature and cannot be fettered by statutory provisions such as Sections 432, 433, or 433-A of the CrPC akin to Sections 473, 474 and 475 of BNSS, or by prison rules.
Various forms of clemency (mercy) discussed
6.1 The judgment in Prem Raj further clarified the distinctions between the various forms of clemency:
a) A pardon is an act of grace from the authority entrusted with the execution of laws, which exempts the individual from the punishment imposed for the offence committed. A pardon affects not only the punishment prescribed for the offence but also the guilt of the offender itself.
b) A pardon must, however, be distinguished from amnesty, which is a general pardon of political prisoners and an act of oblivion. Amnesty may result in the release of the convict, but it does not erase any disqualification incurred by reason of conviction.
c) A reprieve means a stay or postponement of the execution of a sentence, particularly a capital sentence.
d) A respite refers to the awarding of a lesser sentence instead of the prescribed penalty, having regard to mitigating circumstances, such as the absence of prior convictions, etc. It is akin to release on probation for good conduct under Section 360 of the CrPC akin to Section 401 of the BNSS.
e) Remission, in contrast, merely reduces the period of sentence without altering its character. In the case of remission, neither the conviction nor the guilt of the offender is affected. The sentence imposed by the court also remains intact, except to the extent that the convict is relieved from undergoing incarceration for the entire term awarded. Thus, remission only shortens the duration of actual imprisonment.21f) Finally, commutation involves the substitution of one form of sentence with a lighter sentence of a different nature. In this context, Section 432 of the CrPC akin to Section 473 of BNSS empowers the appropriate Government to suspend or remit sentences.
6.3 The same principles were reiterated in State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606, wherein this Court observed that the right of a convict to be considered for remission under the governing remission policy must surely be regarded as a legal right. Such a right emanates not only from the Prisons Act,1894, but also from the Rules framed thereunder. Although no convict can claim remission as an absolute constitutional right, except under Articles 72 and 161, the existence of a remission policy nevertheless confers a legal entitlement to be considered for remission in terms of that policy. The Court further held that where a policy decision has been formulated, whether by statutory rule or otherwise, all persons falling within its ambit are entitled to equal treatment.
6.4 In Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 (“Satish”), this Court held that neither the length of the sentence nor the gravity of the original offence can, by themselves, constitute the sole basis for refusing premature release. Any assessment regarding the likelihood of reoffending upon release must instead be founded on the antecedents of the prisoner and his conduct while in custody, rather than merely on age or apprehensions expressed by victims or witnesses. The Court further observed that although remission cannot be claimed as a matter of right, once the appropriate legislature has enacted a law governing remission, the executive cannot indirectly defeat or subvert its mandate. It was also held that where executive authorities fail to discharge their statutory obligations despite judicial directions, a Constitutional Court exercising powers of judicial review may itself intervene and secure compliance through the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners in Satish had undergone nearly two decades of incarceration and had suffered the consequences of their actions, the Court sought to strike a balance between individual reformation and societal welfare by directing their conditional premature release, subject to continued good conduct. Consequently, the State Government was directed to release the prisoners on probation under Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938 within two weeks.
Present case scenario: rejection of premature release was not only on heinous crime but also on no reasoning order
7. Reverting to the present case, the faint ground invoked by the respondent-Union of India in support of rejection of the petitioner’s plea for premature release is that the crime committed by the petitioner was a heinous one. We wish to make it clear that in a constitutional polity governed by the rule of law, the denial of remission cannot rest solely on the ground of heinousness of the crime. As we have already stated above, remission is not an extension of the sentencing process, but a distinct executive function concerned with the present and future, namely, the prisoner’s conduct, evidence of reformation, and prospects of reintegration into society. To predicate its denial only on the heinous nature of the offence is to collapse this distinction and to reconvert remission into a retrospective reaffirmation of guilt, which the criminal justice system has already adjudicated upon. The gravity and heinousness of the offence stand exhausted at the stage of sentencing and the judicial determination of punishment necessarily incorporates these considerations. A criminal justice system that refuses to look beyond the gravity of the offence to the offender’s transformation will betray its reformative ideal particularly at the remission stage. Justice does not permit permanent incarceration of an individual in the shadow of their worst act.
Offence cannot therefore be the sole ground for denying remission
7.1 The nature of the offence cannot, therefore, be the sole ground for denying remission. Emotive retribution is a course, incompatible with constitutional values. The decision on remission must emerge from a holistic assessment of the prisoner and after balancing societal interests with the prisoner’s right to be considered for release on fair and reasonable criteria.
7.2 As Plato, the Greek Scholar and Philosopher, said any means, of word or deed, privilege or deprivation, that can be used to make the unjust man or the criminal, hate injustice and avoid recidivism are to be employed: the inculcation of an all but instinctive aversion to injustice “is quite the noblest work of law” (Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Basic Book Publishers, 1980). Thus, Plato reminds us to treat punishment as an instrument with a definitive end, namely, to produce in the offender an instinctive aversion to injustice sufficient to prevent recidivism. Reading this into the law of remission will yield a clear conclusion: a remission authority is not revisiting the gravity of the crime; it is assessing whether the purpose of punishment continues to subsist. In that sense, Plato supplies a legal test for remission decisions: If the offender’s conduct and record in custody indicate that this “instinctive aversion to injustice” has taken root, then continued incarceration becomes unnecessary and arguably contrary to its own objective. The deprivation of liberty no longer serves correction but becomes retribution. In a liberal constitutional order, punishment and all its incidents, including remission, must necessarily be justified through reason and not outrage.
8. All relevant considerations necessary for adjudicating the petitioner’s entitlement to remission already being before this Court, we will now proceed to examine the same on merits
8.1 Firstly, the State Government of Uttarakhand had recommended the petitioner’s premature release after considering the relevant factors pertaining to his incarceration and conduct. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State has also taken the stand before this Court that appropriate orders may be passed in the present case. Thus, the only impediment to the grant of remission is the refusal by the respondent–Union of India. The recommendation of the State assumes significance, as the State authorities are best placed to assess the petitioner’s behaviour during custody, his reformation, institutional discipline, and the28likelihood of his reintegration into society. The fact that the State Government, after evaluating the petitioner’s case in its entirety, found him fit for premature release shows that the petitioner satisfies the parameters ordinarily relevant for consideration of remission. This assumes importance particularly because the State Government, being directly concerned with prison administration and the implementation of remission policies, has not found any reason to deny the petitioner the benefit of premature release. In fact, the petitioner’s custody certificate dated 16.05.2025specifically records that his conduct during incarceration has been good.
8.2 Secondly, the petitioner has already undergone more than twenty-two years of incarceration. The petitioner having spent more than two decades in continuous custody, the sentence undergone by him is itself a relevant consideration while examining his entitlement to premature release/remission. The prolonged incarceration undergone by the petitioner demonstrates that he has already suffered the consequences of the conviction for an extensive duration and has remained subject to the rigours of imprisonment for a considerable part of his life.
Conclusion
Appellant/petitioner is released/remitted
10. Since we have held that the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of premature release/remission and since he is already on interim bail, his surrender shall not be required, and the respondents shall treat him as having been prematurely released/remitted in terms of the present order.
11. This Writ Petition is allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Resources
Cited Judgments
- Sarat Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334
- Facts/Principle: Clarified the distinction between judicial sentencing and executive remission.
- Holding: Remission is an executive act that curtails the duration of imprisonment but does not “wipe out” or alter the judicial order of conviction.
- State of Haryana vs. Mahender Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606
- Facts/Principle: Examined the right of a convict to be considered for remission.
- Holding: While there is no absolute constitutional right to remission, a convict has a legal right to be considered for it under existing government policies, ensuring equal treatment for all eligible persons.
- Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580
- Facts/Principle: Addressed the criteria for refusing premature release.
- Holding: The gravity of the original offence or length of sentence cannot be the sole basis for denial. Authorities must prioritize the prisoner’s conduct in custody and their potential for reformation.
- Prem Raj vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 7 SCC 121
- Context: Cited regarding the procedural exercise of discretionary powers under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Involved Legal Concepts
- Amnesty: A general pardon for groups (usually political), which does not erase legal disqualifications.
- Reprieve: A temporary stay or postponement of a sentence, typically a capital sentence.
- Respite: Awarding a lesser sentence due to mitigating factors like pregnancy or lack of prior convictions.
- Remission: Shortens the term of incarceration without changing the nature of the punishment or the conviction.
- Commutation: Substituting one form of punishment for a lighter category (e.g., death sentence to life imprisonment).
Acts and sections:
1. Constitution of India
- Article 72: Power of the President to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence.
- Article 161: Power of the Governor to grant pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit, or commute sentences in certain cases.
- Article 32: The petitioner filed this Writ Petition under this Article seeking a writ of certiorari and mandamus.
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
- Section 432: Power to suspend or remit sentences by the appropriate Government.
- Section 433: Power to commute sentences.
- Section 433A: Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases (specifically relating to life imprisonment where a minimum of 14 years must be served).
- Section 435: Necessity of the State Government to consult with the Central Government in cases investigated by the CBI.
- Section 360: Order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition.
3. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)
(Cited in the judgment as the modern equivalent to CrPC sections)
- Section 473: Corresponds to Section 432 of the CrPC regarding suspension or remission of sentences.
- Section 401: Corresponds to Section 360 of the CrPC regarding release on probation.
4. Other Statutes
- Prisons Act, 1894: Cited as a source from which the legal right to be considered for remission emanates.
- U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938: Specifically mentioned in the context of the Satish vs. State of U.P. precedent regarding conditional premature release.
5. Relevant Policies
- Remission Policy of the State of Uttarakhand: The executive guidelines governing the eligibility and procedure for the premature release of convicts in the state.
Party
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.446 OF 2023ROHIT CHATURVEDI ...PETITIONER VERSUS STATE OF UTTARAKHAND & OTHERS ...RESPONDENTS - 2026 INSC 490 - MAY 15, 2026.
