Appeal against the conviction
2. The appellant was tried for the murder of one ‘S’. The relevant Sessions Court, for reasons assigned in the judgment dated 18th January, 2020 convicted the appellant for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part-II, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and by an order dated 21st January, 2020 sentenced him to 10 (ten) years rigorous imprisonment.
Hon’ble High Court maintained the conviction of appellant but reduced the sentence to 8 years
3. Such conviction and sentence were carried by the appellant in an appeal under Section 374 (2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench. By its judgment and order dated 8 th February, 2024, the High Court maintained the conviction of the appellant, however, reduced the sentence to 8 (eight) years rigorous imprisonment.
4. Despite being partially successful before the High Court, the appellant remained dissatisfied and has laid a challenge to the judgment and order dated 8 th February, 2024.
Notice limited to sentence only
5. A limited notice, confined to the sentence, was issued on 4 th March, 2025 by a coordinate Bench of this Court. Upon service of notice, respondent no. 1-State entered appearance through its counsel. Respondent no. 2 – the complainant, however, informed this Court of his inability to engage a counsel and sought legal aid.
Facts of the prosecution: Rape and Murder
7. The prosecution case in a nutshell is this. The first cousin of the appellant3 had allegedly been raped by S’s elder brother. C had given birth to a child too. While V was in custody and facing trial for the offence under Section 376, IPC, the family members of the appellant including the father of C insisted that marriage between C and V be solemnised. The parties tried to find out a solution a day prior to the incident of crime which, however, proved abortive.
8. On the following day, the family members of C including the appellant again stormed the residence of V. An altercation led to a scuffle. S, a completely innocent person, intervened to bring about peace. It was, at this stage, that the appellant rushed to a nearby house, picked up an axe and struck a blow on the neck of S. Unfortunately, S succumbed to the injury inflicted on him by the appellant.
9. Circumstances leading to the death of S were duly proved before the sessions court. The outcome of the trial as well as the appeal have been noted above and hence are not repeated.
Prayer of appellant
11. Referring to a coordinate Bench decision of this Court in Deo Nath Rai v. State of Bihar, Mr. Kaushik submits that for a similar offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II, IPC, 5 (five) years rigorous imprisonment was imposed by this Court. He urges that even if this Court were not inclined to let off the appellant with the period of sentence already undergone, suitable reduction may be ordered having regard to the facts and circumstances where the appellant lost control of his senses.
12. Mr. Kaushik, accordingly, prayed that the appeal be allowed by ordering suitable reduction in the term of sentence.
What is intention? Defined
15. On the question of intention, referring to the decision of another coordinate Bench of this Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P., Mr. Gaur invites our attention to paragraph 29 thereof reading as follows:
“29. Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters — plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.”
Analysis
21. We have heard the parties and considered the evidence on record with the care and attention the same deserves.
Since no provocation nor blow stuck by mistake or accident section 300 Exception -1 would not be attracted
22. No doubt, the appellant had a reason to bear a grudge against V because he had allegedly raped C which finally resulted in C delivering a baby. The appellant, being a close relative of C and faced with the situation in which C was placed, may not have been unjustified in nurturing a grievance and securing justice for her, with the father of C. Suffice to note, C was also very young and having given birth to a child, the appellant might have felt as a dutiful brother to take care of her interest. Having said that, we cannot keep aside the role of S in the entire incident. An open fight had followed the scuffle during which the two opposing factions were giving blows and hits to each other. S happened to be the younger brother of V. There is no allegation levelled by any witness that S was part of the altercation and the subsequence scuffle leading to fight; in fact, there is evidence on record that S had intervened in course of the fight and was attempting to bring about peace between the two factions. An innocent person was done to death by the appellant without there being any provocation. The sessions court did not convict the appellant for murder since, according to it, Exception 1 to Section 300, IPC was attracted. In our considered opinion, the appellant might have been deprived of the power of self-control by reason of the alleged act of rape committed by V on C. But there was no such sudden provocation at the place of occurrence which necessitated him to act in the manner he did and cause the death of S. Indeed, as observed above, neither S was instrumental in provoking the appellant nor was the blow struck on S’s neck by the appellant by mistake or accident. Once we have concluded that there was no provocation, Exception 1 was certainly not applicable. Be that as it may, neither the respondent no. 1-State nor the respondent no. 2 – the complainant appealed against the judgment of conviction recorded by the sessions court. We, therefore, do not see reason to dilate on this aspect any further but would bear this in mind while considering the prayer of Mr. Kaushik for reduction in the term sentence imposed by the High Court.
Duty of the judge while imposing sentence explained
24. In Raj Bala (supra), this Court upon a survey of precedents on the point of sentence, had the occasion to observe as follows:
“16. A court, while imposing sentence, has a duty to respond to the collective cry of the society. The legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion on the court but the duty of the court in such a situation becomes more difficult and complex. It has to exercise the discretion on reasonable and rational parameters. The discretion cannot be allowed to yield to fancy or notion. A Judge has to keep in mind the paramount concept of rule of law and the conscience of the collective and balance it with the principle of proportionality but when the discretion is exercised in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to relinquishment of duty and reckless abandonment of responsibility. One cannot remain a total alien to the demand of the socio-cultural milieu regard being had to the command of law and also brush aside the agony of the victim or the survivors of the victim. Society waits with patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the part of the society and when the criminal culpability is established and the discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said hope is shattered and the patience is wrecked. It is the duty of the court not to exercise the discretion in such a manner as a consequence of which the expectation inherent in patience, which is the ‘finest part of fortitude’ is destroyed. A Judge should never feel that the individuals who constitute the society as a whole is imperceptible to the exercise of discretion. He should always bear in mind that erroneous and fallacious exercise of discretion is perceived by a visible collective.”
25. One of the precedents, as reaffirmed in Raj Bala (supra), is Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat8 , where Arijit Pasayat, J., speaking for a two-judge Bench, articulated the parameters governing the determination of an appropriate sentence in the following words:
“7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and property of the people is an essential function of the State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross-cultural conflict where living law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing Society stated that: “State of criminal law continues to be—as it should be—a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society.” Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation, sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law, and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed, etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N. [(1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724]
9. Criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just deserts as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread.
10. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now unknown in civilised societies, but such a radical departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction, drastic sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable practical consequences.” (emphasis ours)
Conclusion
Sentence: appeal dismissed but direction to the government regarding remission policy
27. We have taken into account that the appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of the incident and that there may have been some exasperation in his mind. Nevertheless, the courts are obligated to adopt a balanced and principled approach in matters of sentencing. Undue leniency can cause public confidence in the justice system to plummet, while excessive severity may lead to injustice.
28. Guided by the aforesaid decisions and after having considered the factual matrix, we are of the considered opinion that the sentence imposed by the High Court does not call for any interference and that the appellant is not entitled to any relief.
29. The appeal is liable to be and is, accordingly, dismissed. 30. Needless to observe, the appellant shall be entitled to seek premature release in terms of the remission policy of the State of Karnataka, provided he acquires eligibility thereunder.
Judgments that are quoted or cited
- Deo Nath Rai v. State of Bihar: Cited by the appellant’s counsel, Mr. Rahul Kaushik, in support of his argument for a reduced sentence, where five years of rigorous imprisonment was imposed for a similar offence under Section 304 Part-II, IPC. The citation for this case is (2018) 13 SCC 87.
- Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P.: Cited by Mr. Gaur, the amicus curiae, on the question of intention in distinguishing between Section 302 and Section 304, Parts I and II of the IPC. The citation for this case is (2006) 11 SCC 444.
- Raj Bala v. State of Haryana: Cited by Mr. Gaur to emphasize that a court should not reduce a sentence based on fancy or notion, and that proportionality must be maintained in the interest of the victim. The judgment was also relied upon by the Supreme Court. The citation for this case is (2016) 1 SCC 463.
- Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat: Cited in the judgment as a precedent reaffirmed in Raj Bala (supra), articulating the parameters governing the determination of an appropriate sentence. The citation for this case is (2006) 2 SCC 359.
- Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N.: Referenced within the quote from Shailesh Jasvantbhai v. State of Gujarat to support the duty of every court to award a proper sentence. The citation is (1991) 3 SCC 471 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 724.
Acts and Sections referred
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):
- Section 304 Part-II: Culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the offence for which the appellant was convicted.
- Section 376: Offence of rape, for which ‘V’ (the deceased ‘S”s elder brother) was facing trial.
- Section 302: Punishment for murder, which the amicus curiae argued the appellant ought to have been convicted under.
- Section 300: Defines murder; specifically, Exception 1 to this Section was mentioned as the reason the Sessions Court did not convict the appellant for murder.
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC):
- Section 374 (2): The provision under which the appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Karnataka.
Party
Kotresh @ Kotrappa vs. State of Karnataka and Anr - Criminal Appeal No. 4590 of 2025 [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 16833 Of 2024] - 2025 INSC 1250 - October 17, 2025 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta J and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih, J.
