Appeal
Appeal arises out of the judgment of Hon’ble High court dismissing the appeal preferred against his conviction under PC Act
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 348 of 2013 (“impugned judgment”) by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein and thereby affirmed the judgment and order dated 30.01.2013 passed by the Special Judge in Complaint Case No. 11 of 2009 holding the appellant herein guilty of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 respectively (for short, “the PC Act”).
Facts
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
As per the FIR appellant was a licensed stamp vendor who demanded the complainant extra 2 rupees for a stamp paper worth of rs. 10 and based on the trap appellant caught
3. As per the case of the prosecution, on 09.12.2003, the complainant went to the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri, Delhi to purchase a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-. The appellant, a licensed stamp vendor, made a demand of Rs. 12/- for a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-. Against the excess demand of Rs. 2/-, the complainant lodged a written complaint with the Anti-Corruption Branch (for short, “ACB”). Pursuant to the said complaint, a trap was laid by the ACB. The complainant was handed over one GC note of Rs. 10/- and one GC note of Rs. 2/-, smeared with phenolphthalein powder, by the Raid Officer. The complainant alongwith the raiding party left for the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri, Delhi. After reaching there, when the complainant asked for a stamp paper of Rs. 10/-, the appellant again made a demand of Rs. 12/-. The complainant gave the smeared GC notes to the appellant who accepted them with his right hand. At the signal of the panch witness, the raiding party arrived at the spot. The appellant was apprehended. The wash of his hand turned the solution of sodium carbonate pink and the notes were allegedly recovered from the register kept for maintaining the records of the stamp papers.
Trial and Framing of Charges
3.1 Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet was filed in the court of Special Judge (Anti-Corruption Brach), Delhi. The Special Judge framed charges against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act respectively. The appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried.
Witness
3.2 In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined nine witnesses, of whom four are crucial for the adjudication of the matter at hand:
i. Complainant (PW-1);
ii. Panch witness (PW-4);
iii. Raid Officer (PW-6);
iv. Investigating Officer (PW-9)
Trial court finds the appellant guilty under PC Act
3.3 The Trial Court, upon appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, held the appellant guilty of the offences with which he was charged and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act and rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs. 1000/- for the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
High Court view on appeal is the appellant found guilty properly by the Trial court
4.6 As regards the recovery of GC notes – whether those were recovered from possession of the appellant or from the register lying on his table, the Court observed that the wash of the appellant’s hand did turn pink, and both the GC notes were found, even if not directly from the appellant, then too certainly the notes were found placed on the register. Further, the testimony of the Raid Officer, that it was the panch witness who pointed out that money accepted by the appellant was lying on his register, was found to be reliable and trustworthy. The panch witness also stated that the accused made an entry in the register after accepting the money. The High Court was of the view that the evidence of the complainant corroborated by the evidence of the Raid Officer established the culpability of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
Issues for consideration
7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the following two questions fall for our consideration:-
a. Whether the High Court was right in holding that a licensed stamp vendor falls within the ambit of a public servant for the purposes of the PC Act?
b. If the answer to the aforesaid question is in the affirmative, then whether the conviction of the appellant herein on merits is sustainable?
Analysis
Legislative intent behind the definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c) of the PC Act
8. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, we deem it absolutely necessary to look into the backdrop of the PC Act. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that, the repealed Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, “the Act 1947”), was enacted with the avowed object and purpose of effectively preventing bribery and corruption. The PC Act which repeals and replaces the 1947 Act provides for a very wide definition of the term “public servant” in clause (c) of Section 2.
Why public servant is included in PC Act? Explained
11. Under the repealed 1947 Act, the definition of “public servant” was restricted to public servants as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “IPC”). In order to curb bribery and corruption not only in government establishments and departments but also in other semi-governmental authorities and bodies and their departments where the employees are entrusted with public duty, a comprehensive definition of “public servant” was introduced in Section 2(c) of the PC Act.
12. When the legislature has used such a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing growing corruption in government and semi-government departments, it would be appropriate not to limit the contents of the definition clause by a construction which would be against the spirit of the statute. The definition of “public servant”, therefore, deserves a wide and purposive construction. In construing the definition of “public servant” in Section 2(c) of the PC Act, the Court is required to adopt a purposive approach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature.
Whether Stamp Vendors are “Public Servants”? Yes
16. In light of the observations made by this Court in Ram Singh (supra) and Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai (supra), we now proceed to assess whether a stamp vendor comes within the purview of a “public servant” as defined under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. The provision reads thus:
“(c) “public servant” means, – (i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty;”
Public servant under PC Act defined
17. A person would be a public servant under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act if he is:
1. in the service of the Government; or
2. in the pay of the Government;
3. remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty.
18. All three categories are independent of each other. There may be cases where more than one of the aforesaid categories are applicable and “or” may be read as “and”, however, the present case does not warrant such reading.
19.In the present factual matrix, for the appellant to be a public servant under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, two conditions will have to be fulfilled:
1. First, whether he is remunerated by the Government through fees or commission; and
2. Secondly, whether such remuneration is for the performance or discharge of a public duty.
38. The heart of the definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act lies in the expressions “remunerated by the Government” and “for the performance of any public duty”, and not in the mode of remuneration, such as “fees or commission”. The ‘commission’ referred in “remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of public duty” is not analogous to the ‘commission’ in Section 194H of the 1961 Act. The terms “fees” and “commission” are merely indicative of the mode of remuneration and not determinative of the position held by a person. Their presence or absence does not alter the core question as to whether a person is remunerated by the Government for the performance of any public duty, which remains the central consideration under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.
39. The interpretation of a definition should not only avoid being repugnant to the context but it should also be interpreted to achieve the purpose which is sought to be served by the statute. A construction which would defeat or may likely defeat the purpose of the Act has to be ignored and not accepted. A definition, like any other word in a statute, has to be read in the light of the context and scheme of the Act.
40. The definition of “public servant” under Section 2(c)(i) can be said to have three parts, as they are disjunctive: first, a person who is in the service of the Government; secondly, a person who is in the pay of the Government; thirdly, a person who is remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty. The expression “remunerated” in the third part has to be read in context and in line with the expressions in the first and the second part i.e., “in the service” and “in the pay”. The three key expressions, “in the service”, “in the pay” and “remunerated” by the Government belong to the same genus and have the same flavour. In the first two parts, a person is rendering his services for the Government which implicitly means discharging a public duty. Whereas, in the third part, even though a person is not rendering his services for the Government but is being remunerated for discharging a public duty. In this context, the terms “fees or commission” must be construed so as to give full effect to the definition and the other provisions of the statute.
Definition of the term ‘commission’
41. Further, the term “commission” as used and understood in the context of Section 194H of the 1961 Act is not stricto sensu similar to its usage in Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act. When a person is in service of the Government, as is contemplated under the first part of Section 2(c)(i), he is said to be in a master-servant relationship where the employer employs the person on the basis of salary. Whereas, in the second part, a person may not be a regular employee but is receiving salary from his master. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, reported in (1979) 3 SCC 431, although in the context of Section 21, Twelfth, of the IPC, has interpreted the word ‘pay’ as implying that a person is getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount of money yet a relationship of master-servant need not exist in all cases.
Rule of interpretation
44. It is an important rule of interpretation that every interpretation of a statute must be undertaken by considering the statute in its entirety, the prior state of the law, other statutes in pari materia, the general scope and purpose of the legislation, and the mischief that the legislature intended to address.
Public Duty as the determinant of status of Public Servant
45. We now proceed to consider the case of the appellant on the second aspect of the definition of a public servant i.e., whether the remuneration received by a licensed stamp vendor is for the performance or discharge of a public duty. As we have discussed in the preceding section, it is the nature of duty which is the determining factor in deciding whether a person qualifies to be a public servant and not the manner of appointment or mode of remuneration. The primary test of qualification for inclusion in the definition of “public servant” in the third part of Section 2(c)(i) is whether the concerned person is performing any public duty. The commonality across the sub-clauses of Section 2(c) is that all the persons therein are performing a ‘public’ duty. Section 2(b) defines “public duty” as follows:
(b) “public duty” means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest.”
46.Once the nature of performance of duties gets crystallized, any person remunerated by the Government for the performance of any public duty or who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorized or required to perform any public duty, is a “public servant” within the meaning of the term defined under Section 2(c).
Facts
Mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from public servant is not sufficient to establish an offence
55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act
56. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the bribe-giver” where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of offer of bribe.
57. By applying the abovementioned principles to the evidence on record, we are of the considered view that, having regard to material inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant and the testimony of the panch witness, the allegation of demand by the appellant herein does not emerge clearly, let alone being proved beyond reasonable doubt.
58. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a wholly reliable witness, the court faces no difficulty in reaching a conclusion, it may convict or acquit solely on the basis of such testimony, provided it is free from any suspicion of interestedness, incompetence, or subordination. Similarly, in the case of a wholly unreliable witness, the court again faces no ambiguity in discarding the testimony. The real challenge arises when the witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In such situations, the court must proceed with caution and seek corroboration in material particulars, whether through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court’s duty to act on the testimony of a single witness arises when it is satisfied, upon a careful perusal of the testimony, that it is free from all taints and suspicions. [See: Vedivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390].
Panch witness did not recollect about demand
60. The necessity and desirability of a panch witness is particularly to be aware of the transactions and to facilitate in carrying out the raid. On being questioned about a demand of Rs. 12/- being made by the appellant, the panch witness lacked recollection on whether he had informed the Raid Officer about any demand for Rs. 12/- instead of Rs. 10/-. Further, the Raid Officer deposed that he did not hear the conversation regarding the demand and acceptance of Rs. 2/-. The prosecution did not examine any other witness on the allegation of demand by the appellant.
61. Further, the panch witness, when confronted with a specific query regarding the demand, deposed that he could not recollect whether the appellant had demanded Rs. 12/- for a stamp paper valued at Rs. 10/-. He also did not indicate the presence of any implied demand.
Presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act
Proof of acceptance can follow only when the demand is proved
64. Insofar as the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is concerned, such presumption is drawn only qua the offence under Sections 7 and 11 respectively and not qua the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The presumption is contingent upon the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification to the effect that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated under Section 7 of the PC Act. Such proof of acceptance can follow only when the demand is proved.
65. In that case, the prosecution evidence alone cannot be considered for the purpose of coming to the conclusion. The evidence led by the prosecution and, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, are also required to be considered. It is then to be seen as to whether the total effect of the entire evidence led before the court is of a nature by which the only conclusion possible was that the public servant accepted the amount. If the answer is in affirmative, then alone it can be held that the prosecution established the case beyond reasonable doubt.
66. Undoubtedly, the presumption under Section 20 arises once it is established that the public servant accepted the gratification. However, in determining whether such acceptance occurred, the totality of the evidence led at the trial must be appreciated. The evidence led by the prosecution, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, the entire record is required to be considered. Only if the cumulative effect of all the evidence is such that the sole possible conclusion is that the public servant accepted the gratification can it be said that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
67. On examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the ACB. In such circumstances, there is no question of a presumption under Section 20. Consequently, we find ourselves compelled to conclude that it would be entirely illegal to uphold the conviction of the appellant under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.
Conclusion
68. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached the following conclusion:
68.1 The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing the growing menace of corruption. Keeping this intention of the legislature in mind, we are of the view that the definition of “public servant” as defined under the PC Act should be given a purposive and wide interpretation so as to advance the object underlying the statute.
68.2 It is the nature of duty being discharged by a person which assumes paramount importance when determining whether such a person falls within the ambit of the definition of public servant as defined under the PC Act.
68.3 Stamp vendors across the country, by virtue of performing an important public duty and receiving remuneration from the Government for the discharge of such duty, are undoubtedly public servants within the ambit of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.
68.4 In the case at hand, the appellant was eligible for receiving discount on the purchase of stamp papers owing to the license that he was holding. Further, the discount is traceable to and is governed by the 1934 Rules framed by the State Government. Thus, the appellant, without a doubt, could be said to be “remunerated by the government” for the purposes of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.
68.5 Further, the prosecution has failed in establishing the allegation of demand for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act cannot be sustained and is, thus, liable to be set aside.
Appeal allowed
69.In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The conviction and sentence of the accused, as awarded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is set aside.
70.Bail bond(s), if any, shall stand discharged.
Judgments involved or cited
State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, (2020) 20 SCC 360
Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors Association v. Union of India, 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 135
Commissioner of Income Tax, Ahmedabad & Ors. v. Ahmedabad Stamp Vendors Association, (2014) 16 SCC 114
State of M.P. v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183
Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64
M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 431
Roorkee Stamp Vendor Association v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 SCC OnLine Utt 3764
Kerala State Stamp Vendors Association v. Office of the Accountant-General, 2005 SCC OnLine Ker 672
C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India, (1997) 9 SCC 477
Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731
P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152
Vedivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390
G. Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka, 2021 SCC OnLine Kat 15332
Acts and sections involved
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act)
– Section 2(c) — Definition of “public servant”
– Section 2(b) — Definition of “public duty”
– Section 7 — Acceptance of gratification other than legal remuneration
– Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) — Criminal misconduct by public servant
– Section 20 — Presumption as to offences under Sections 7 and 11
Indian Stamp Act, 1899
– Section 3 — Imposition of stamp duty
– Section 5 — Combined duty on instruments dealing with several matters
– Section 6 — Charge of highest duty when multiple duties apply
– Section 13, 14, 15, 17 — Mode and effect of stamping
– Section 33 — Authority to impound unstamped instruments
– Section 35 — Inadmissibility of unstamped instruments
– Section 40 — Power to levy penalty
– Section 42 — Admissibility after payment of duty and penalty
– Section 62 — Penalty for non-compliance
– Section 69 — Cancellation of license
Income Tax Act, 1961
– Section 194H — Tax deduction on commission or brokerage
Party
Aman Bhatia vs. State (GNCT of Delhi) – Criminal Appeal No. 2613 of 2014 – 2025 INSC 618 – 2nd May 2025 – Hon’ble Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Hon’ble Justice R. Mahadevan.
