Appeal against the common judgment passed by Hon’ble High Court of Uttarakhand
Being aggrieved by the common judgment dated 12.09.2012 passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.254 of 2004, 258 of 2004, 259 of 2004 by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, the original appellant Khem Singh S/o Tarachand preferred these Special Leave Petitions before this Court. By order dated 06.07.2017, leave was granted by this Court and consequently, the Special Leave Petitions have been converted to these Criminal Appeals.
Facts in Brief
2. For ease of reference, the private respondents herein, namely, i) Anil @ Neelu; ii) Pramod; and iii) Ashok, who were accused Nos. 4, 3 and 2 respectively in S.T. No.133/1993 in the Court of Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Haridwar (henceforth “Sessions Court”), are henceforth referred to as ‘respondents-accused’. The other accused in S.T. No.133/1993, who were acquitted by the Sessions Court, are referred to as ‘other accused’.
Assault using by knifes and guns for some heated exchange leads to cause of death of victim
2.1 Briefly stated, the facts of the case according to the prosecution are that there was a long-standing previous enmity between the respondents-accused and other accused and the original informant and others. On 08.12.1992, there was some heated exchange between them. The next day, i.e. on 09.12.1992, at about 08.00 A.M., informant Tara Chand (P.W.1), his brother Virendra Singh, and P.W.1’s son Khem Singh (P.W.3) were attacked by the respondents-accused and the other accused using guns, sharp weapons, and bricks. As a result, Virendra Singh passed away, and P.W.1 and P.W.3 sustained injuries. On the arrival of villagers, all the accused managed to escape.
2.2 The specific roles attributed to the respondents-accused are that: i) Accused No.2, Ashok, fired on Virendra Singh using a gun; ii) Accused No.3, Pramod, fired on P.W.3 using a gun; and iii) Accused No.4, Anil @ Neelu, fired on Smt. Mithilesh, wife of P.W.3. On a complaint given by P.W.1 Tara Chand, Case Crime No.547/92 dated 09.12.1992 was registered at P.S. Jwalapur, District Haridwar against all the accused persons. The respondents accused were charged under Sections 148, 452, 302, 307, 149, 326, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”).
Trial court sentenced the respondents/accused
2.3 After examining all the material witnesses and after hearing both the parties, the Sessions Court, vide judgment and order dated 02.08.2004/04.08.2004 acquitted the other accused on the ground that the role assigned to them was not fully proved. However, the Sessions Court found that the case against the respondents-accused was fully proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The sentence passed against the respondents-accused is as follows:
“ …………… “
Hon’ble High Court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused
2.4 Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Sessions Court, the respondents-accused preferred Criminal Appeal Nos.254, 258 and 259 of 2004 before the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital. The High Court, vide common impugned judgment and order dated 12.09.2012, allowed the criminal appeals filed by the respondents-accused.
Points for Consideration: 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise for our consideration:
(a) Whether the applicant is entitled to be substituted in place of the original appellant so as to continue to prosecute these appeals?
(b) What order?
5. We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar in light of the provisions of the CrPC. It is noted that while Sections 377 and 378 CrPC were on the statute book even at the time of the enforcement of the CrPC, on the basis of the reports of the Law Commission, an amendment was made to Section 372 CrPC by insertion of the proviso thereto with effect from 31.12.2009. Consequently, the definition of ‘victim’ was also inserted to Section 2(wa) of CrPC which reads as under:
“2(wa)-“victim” means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression “victim” includes his or her guardian or legal heir;”
5.1 Simultaneously, proviso to Section 372 CrPC was inserted which reads as under:
“372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.- No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.”
The word ‘victim’ means not only who suffered any loss or injury it includes a guardian or legal heir of victim
5.2 A conjoint reading of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC in light of the definition in Section 2(wa) of CrPC, would lead to the conclusion that the expression ‘victim’ is not restricted to any person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged. It also includes a person who is a guardian or legal heir of a victim as defined above.
Whether legal heir of a legal heir could prosecute these appeals if the original appellant died?
5.3 In the instant cases, the legal heir of the injured victim and himself being an injured victim had preferred these appeals as he had every right to do so particularly having regard to amendment made to the CrPC with effect from 31.12.2009 by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. However, the contentious issue in these cases is, whether a legal heir of a legal heir, who had preferred these appeals, could also continue to prosecute these appeals as during the pendency of these appeals the original appellant has died. We are considering this issue irrespective of the fact that the applicant who seeks substitution as an appellant in these appeals is himself an injured victim in the incident and in his own right could have filed appeals against the acquittal of the accused. However, he has filed the applications for substitution in place of his father as a legal heir of an injured victim, the original appellant in these appeals.
Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) represented through Legal representatives vs. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752 case
6.3 This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali, speaking through Lokur, J. for himself and Nazeer, J. referred to the Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the 96th Plenary Session on 29.11.1985. It was observed in paragraphs 74, 75 & 76 as under:
“74. Putting the Declaration to practice, it is quite obvious that the victim of an offence is entitled to a variety of rights. Access to mechanisms of justice and redress through formal procedures as provided for in national legislation, must include the right to file an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case such as the one that we are presently concerned with. Considered in this light, there is no doubt that the proviso to Section 372 CrPC must be given life, to benefit the victim of an offence.
75. Under the circumstances, on the basis of the plain language of the law and also as interpreted by several High Courts and in addition the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is quite clear to us that a victim as defined in Section 2(wa) CrPC would be entitled to file an appeal before the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction. …
76. … The language of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted with the language of Section 378(4) CrPC. The text of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a complaint. The word “complaint” has been defined in Section 2(d) CrPC and refers to any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing to do with the lodging or the registration of an FIR, and therefore it is not at all necessary to consider the effect of a victim being the complainant as far as the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is concerned.”
6.4 Consequently, the appeals in the said case were allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the High Court to hear and decide the appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal once again.
Analysis of the Relevant Provisions of CrPC
Victim rights of appeal and engage a lawyer
7.1 Chapter XXIX of the CrPC deals with appeals. The said Chapter delineates the statutory framework governing appeals. Section 372 CrPC unequivocally declares that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by the CrPC itself or by any other law for the time being in force. In fact, Section 372 CrPC speaks of an embargo on the filing of an appeal from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by the CrPC or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 372 CrPC is couched in a negative language and it states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by the CrPC or by any other law for the time being in force. Section 372 CrPC is a preface to the chapter on appeals which in substance states that an appeal can be filed only in accordance with what has been stated in the provisions to follow Section 372 CrPC. The proviso to Section 372 was introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (Act 5 of 2009), which came into effect from 31.12.2009. By virtue of this amendment, a limited right of appeal has been conferred upon the victim of an offence. On a reading of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, it is apparent that a victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against: (i) any order passed by the court acquitting the accused; or (ii) convicting for a lesser offence; or (iii) imposing inadequate compensation. Such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such court. In fact, with effect from 31.12.2009 when clause (wa) to Section 2 CrPC was inserted to the definition of victim, proviso to Section 24 was also added which provides that the Court may permit the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution under the said sub-section.
Victim compensation
7.1.1 Further, with effect from 31.12.2009, Section 357A and Section 357B were inserted to the CrPC in the form of victim compensation scheme for providing compensation to the victim or his dependants who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation. The compensation payable by the State Government under Section 357A is in addition to the payment of fine to the victim of offences under Section 326A, Section 376AB, Section 376D, Section 376DA and Section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code. Also, Section 357C states that all hospitals, public or private, whether run by the Central Government, the State Government, local bodies or any other person, shall immediately provide first-aid or medical treatment, free of cost, to the victims of any offence covered under the aforesaid Sections.
Appeal against acquittal
7.2 While Section 374 CrPC deals with appeals from convictions with which we are not concerned in this case, what is of relevance is Section 378 CrPC which, inter alia, deals with an appeal in case of acquittal. The remedy of an appeal against an acquittal is couched in certain conditions which are evident on a reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 378 CrPC vis-à-vis an appeal that could be filed by a complainant. However, the Parliament in its wisdom amended Section 372 CrPC by adding a proviso thereto by virtue of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2008 (5 of 2009), (with effect from 31.12.2009). It is hence necessary to unravel the definition of victim in clause (wa) of Section 2 of the CrPC which was also introduced along with proviso to Section 372 CrPC. A victim is defined to mean a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused person has been charged and the expression ‘victim’ includes his or her guardian or legal heir.
7.3 The expression ‘injury’, as defined in Section 44 of the IPC includes: “Any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property.”
7.3.1 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines injury to include property damage, bodily harm, or violation of a legal right.
Article 2 of United Nation Law
7.3.3 Further, Article 2 extends the definition of victim to include immediate family members, dependents, or those who have intervened to assist a victim in crisis.
Loss or Injury explained
7.4 On a reading of the definition of ‘victim’, it is clear that the said expression is initially exhaustive and thereafter inclusive. The expression ‘victim’ means a person who has suffered any loss or injury. The loss or injury could be either physical, mental, a financial loss or injury. The expression ‘injury’ could also be construed as a legal injury in a wider sense and not just a physical or a mental injury. The loss or injury must be caused by reason of an act or omission for which the accused person has been charged. Thus, it can be both by a positive act or negatively by an omission which is at the instance of the accused and for which such accused has been charged. Further, the expression ‘victim’ also includes his/her guardian or legal heir in the case of demise of the victim.
7.5 Thus, the expression ‘victim’ has been couched in a broad manner so as to include a person who has suffered any loss or injury. The expressions ‘loss’ or ‘injury’ themselves are of a very broad import which expressions also enlarge the scope of the expression ‘victim’. Further, the expression ‘victim’ includes not only the person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of any act or omission for which the accused person has been charged but also includes his or her guardian or legal heir which means that the definition of victim is inclusive in nature.
If complainant is victim he can invoke section 372 Cr.P.C but if the complainant is not victim he has to proceed under section 378 Cr.P.C
7.6 Having regard to the insertion of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, we find that in the case of a victim who seeks to file an appeal, he or she could proceed under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC in the circumstances mentioned therein and need not prefer an appeal by invoking Section 378(4) CrPC which is in respect of appeals to be filed by a complainant. It may be that the complainant is a victim in certain cases and therefore, the victim has the right to file an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC and need not proceed under Section 378(4) CrPC. However, if the complainant is not a victim and intends to file an appeal, in such a case a complainant would have to proceed under Section 378 CrPC which circumscribes the right to file an appeal by virtue of the conditions which are stipulated under the said Section.
Charge
7.7 Further, while analysing the expression ‘victim’, it is noted that it is with reference to an accused person who has been charged. Under the CrPC, the expression ‘charge’ is defined under clause (b) of Section 2 which reads as under: “2. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the context otherwise requires,—
xxx
(b) “charge” includes any head of charge when the charge contains more heads than one;
Not a mere abstraction but a concrete accusation against the accused is charge
7.7.1 Besides the omnibus meaning, the CrPC does not define what a charge is. However, judicial pronouncements tell us that a charge is actually a precise formulation of the specific accusation made against a person who is entitled to know its nature at the earliest stage. The charge is against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted in violation of penal law forbidding or commanding it. In other words, a charge is an accusation made against a person in respect of offence alleged to have been committed by him, vide Esher Singh vs. State A.P., (2004) 11 SCC 585. In Birichh Bhuian vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1120, this Court observed that a charge is not a mere abstraction but a concrete accusation against a person in respect of an offence and that joinder of charges is permitted under certain circumstances, whether joinder is against one person or different persons.
Section 378 Cr.P.C with speal leave within six months or 60 days is mandatory
8. Section 378 CrPC is a specific provision dealing with appeals. Sub-section (4) of Section 378 CrPC is pertinent. It states that if an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon a complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in that behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. The limitation period for seeking special leave to appeal is six months where the complainant is a public servant and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of the order of acquittal. Sub-Section (6) states that if, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) of Section 378 CrPC.
Victim appeals in conviction and acquittal – distinction explained
8.2 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and can be elaborated as follows:
Firstly, the victim of a crime must have a right to prefer an appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition precedent except as provided under the provision of the CrPC.
Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal under Section 374 CrPC. A person convicted of a crime has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374 CrPC as a matter of right and not being subjected to any conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the nature of the crime, must have a right to prefer an appeal as per the CrPC.
Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought it fit to insert the proviso to Section 372 CrPC without mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the victim of an offence, which expression also includes the legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer an appeal.
On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State, through the Public Prosecutor, can prefer an appeal even if the complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court. However, it is not always that the State or a complainant would prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim’s right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4) CrPC would be contrary to what has been intended by the Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC.
Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378 CrPC which deals with appeals against acquittal to circumscribe the victim’s right to prefer an appeal just as it has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the proviso to Section 372 CrPC so as to envisage a superior right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant.
9. The right to prefer an appeal is no doubt a statutory right and such a right in an accused against a conviction is not merely a statutory right but can also be construed to be a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. If that is so, then the right of a victim of an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with the right of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal unless the victim is also the complainant. Hence, the statutory rigours for filing of an appeal by the State or by a complainant against an order of acquittal cannot be read into the proviso to Section 372 CrPC so as to restrict the right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds mentioned therein, when none exists.
9.1 As already noted, the proviso to Section 372 CrPC was inserted in the statute book only with effect from 31.12.2009. The object and reason for such insertion must be realised and must be given its full effect to by a court. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that the victim of an offence has the right to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, irrespective of whether he is a complainant or not. Even if the victim of an offence is a complainant, he can still proceed under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC and need not advert to sub-section (4) of Section 378 CrPC.
Right to prefer an appeal includes right to prosecute an appeal
9.3 The expression ‘right to prefer an appeal’ in the proviso to Section 372 CrPC cannot be limited to mean ‘only the filing of an appeal’. Mere filing of an appeal in the absence of prosecution of an appeal is of no avail. It does not fulfill the object with which the proviso has been added to Section 372 CrPC. Therefore, we interpret the expression ‘the right to prefer an appeal’ to also include the ‘right to prosecute an appeal’. Then, if during the pendency of an appeal, the original appellant dies, can it be said that his legal heir cannot be substituted so as to prosecute the appeal further? Any curtailing of the legal right to prosecute an appeal on the death of an original appellant by his legal heir would make the proviso to Section 372 CrPC wholly redundant and in fact may result in a situation which is contrary to the entire object with which the Parliament had inserted the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. In this context, it is also relevant to note that the Parliament has been conscious to expand the definition of the word ‘victim’ to not only include the victim himself who had suffered the loss or injury but also to include his legal heir. When a legal heir, who is not a complainant or an injured victim, can prefer an appeal then why not his legal heir on the death of the legal heir who had preferred the appeal be permitted to prosecute the appeal? We see no reason to curtail the right of a legal heir, who had preferred the original appeal, to be denied the right to prosecute the appeal. In the instant cases, the applicant, who is seeking substitution, is the legal heir of the victim who had preferred the appeal before this Court and is also an injured victim.
Section 256 Cr.P.C: Death of the complainant
10.2 In Chand Devi Daga vs. Manju K. Humatani, (2018) 1 SCC 71, the original complainant had died during the pendency of the criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court which was filed against the order of the Sessions Court rejecting the criminal revision against the order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint. The High Court allowed the interlocutory application filed by the legal representatives of the petitioner in the criminal miscellaneous petition. The respondent before the High Court, being aggrieved by the said order, had filed an appeal before this Court. Referring to Section 256 CrPC, this Court observed that even in case of trial of summons case, it is not necessary or mandatory that after the death of the complainant, the complaint has to be rejected. Under the proviso to the said Section, the Magistrate can proceed with the complaint. That a similar provision with regard to trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate is not provided for under the CrPC but the Magistrate has the power to discharge a case where the complainant is absent under Section 249 which is, however, hedged with a condition that “the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence”. Therefore, there is no indication that on the death of the complainant, the complaint has to be rejected in a warrant case. Referring to certain other judicial dicta, this Court observed that the High Court did not commit any error in allowing the legal heirs of the complainant to prosecute the criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court and consequently, dismissed the appeal.
11. We are conscious of the fact that the applicant who is seeking substitution in the instant case is not only the son and heir of the original appellant who preferred these appeals but is also an injured victim in the incident which occurred on 09.12.1992 in respect of which these appeals have been filed. Therefore, the applicant could have filed these appeals assailing the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court in his individual capacity as an injured victim. However, the applications for substitution have been filled in order to continue the prosecution of these appeals as the heir of the original appellant who was also an injured victim. Hence, the detailed discussion that we have made is in acceptance of the argument of learned counsel for the applicant that as heir of the original appellant, who was an injured victim, he can prosecute these appeals. Therefore, the applicant is being permitted to be substituted in place of the original appellant as heir of the original appellant (who was a victim in the incident). In other words, we observe that even if the applicant was not an injured victim in the said incident but has sought to prosecute these appeals as heir of the injured victim (original appellant), he is permitted to do so. We therefore say, coincidentally, the applicant is also an injured victim in the incident. In view of the above discussion, we do not accept the contention of learned senior counsel for the respondent accused that the applicant herein would have to separately file appeals before this Court as an injured victim and in that capacity only and not as heir of the original appellant.
Every other appeal means not filed under sections 377 or 378 Cr.P.C
11.1 Secondly, another contention of learned senior counsel for the respondent-accused is that under Section 394(2) CrPC, the expression “every other appeal” other than an appeal filed under Section 377 CrPC or Section 378 CrPC shall finally abate applies to an appeal filed by a victim. We do not think the same can be simply applied to an appeal filed by a victim or an heir of the victim. Although, sub-section (2) of Section 394 CrPC states that “every other appeal under this Chapter shall finally abate on the death of the appellant”, it cannot be related to an appeal filed by a victim or on the death of the victim/appellant. This is because Sections 377 and 378 CrPC respectively deal with an appeal filed by the State Government against sentence and an appeal in case of acquittal. Such appeals are filed against the accused and therefore, when the accused dies, such appeals would abate. The expression “every other appeal” must therefore, relate to an appeal which is not filed under Section 377 or Section 378 CrPC. Such an appeal is an appeal against a conviction such as under Section 374 CrPC and on the death of the appellant who is the accused, such appeal would abate. The proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 394 CrPC however, states, that even if the accused-appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may continue the appeal and the appeal may not abate. In other words, the heirs of the deceased accused-appellant have been permitted to continue the appeals so as to seek an acquittal and realise the fruits of such an acquittal which could be even in monetary terms despite the death of the accused-appellant.
11.2 If the same logic is to apply to the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, it would imply that the heirs of a victim can also pursue an appeal filed under that provision as the definition of victim under Section 2(wa) includes the heir of a victim.
11.3 The expression “prefer an appeal” in proviso to Section 372 CrPC has to be given an expanded meaning to include prosecution of an appeal or effectively pursue an appeal. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “prefer” means “to bring before; to prosecute; to try; to proceed with. Thus, preferring an indictment signifies prosecuting or trying an indictment; – Manik Lal Majumdar vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey, (2004) 12 SCC 448.
12. In the circumstances, the delay in filing the application for seeking setting aside of the abatement is condoned. The abatement is set aside. The application for substitution of applicant is allowed. Consequently, the applicant is permitted to be brought on record as the legal representative of the original appellant, apart from he being an injured victim also. Appellant’s counsel to file amended memo of parties.
9. We find that the High Court ought to have considered the evidence on record in light of the arguments advanced at the bar and thereafter ascertained whether the Sessions Court was justified in passing the judgment of conviction and imposing the sentence. The same being absent in the impugned judgment, for that sole reason, we set aside the same.
11. We allow the appeals filed on the aforesaid limited ground.
12. The matters are remanded to the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.
The following Acts and Sections are referenced in the case
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
* Section 2(b) – Definition of “charge”
* Section 2(d) – Definition of “complaint”
* Section 2(wa) – Definition of “victim”
* Section 20 – Cattle Trespass Act, 1871 (1 of 1871) (referenced within the definition of “offence”)
* Section 24(8) – Public Prosecutors (with proviso regarding victim’s advocate)
* Section 372 – No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided (with proviso for victim’s right to appeal)
* Section 374 – Appeals from convictions
* Section 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB, 376E – Indian Penal Code (referenced in CrPC Section 377(4))
* Section 377 – Appeal by the State Government against sentence
* Section 378 – Appeal in case of acquittal
* Section 386 – Powers of the Appellate Court
* Section 394 – Abatement of appeals
* Section 401 – Powers of revisional court (limited scope noted)
* Section 249 – Power of Magistrate to discharge in warrant cases
* Section 256 – Procedure when complainant does not appear (summons cases)
* Section 357A, 357B, 357C – Victim compensation scheme and medical treatment
—
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
* Section 44 – Definition of “injury”
* Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 326, 452 (charges against accused)
—
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946)
—
Constitution of India
* Article 14 – Right to equal opportunity before law
* Article 21 – Right to access to justice
* Article 32 – Remedies for enforcement of rights
* Article 136 – Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
The judgments involved or cited
* PSR Sadhanantham vs. Arunachalam (1980) 3 SCC 141
* Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) represented through Legal representatives vs. State of Karnataka (2019) 2 SCC 752
* Dr. Vimla vs. State (NCT of Delhi) AIR 1963 SC 1572
* Esher Singh vs. State A.P. (2004) 11 SCC 585
* Birichh Bhuian vs. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1120
* Manik Lal Majumdar vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey (2004) 12 SCC 448
* Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry AIR 1957 SC 540
* Chand Devi Daga vs. Manju K. Humatani (2018) 1 SCC 71
* M.R. Ajayan vs. State of Kerala 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3373
* National Commission for Women vs. State of Delhi (2010) 12 SCC 599
* Amanullah vs. State of Bihar (2016) 6 SCC 699
* State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ambarish (2021) 16 SCC 371
* Shakuntala Shukla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 20 SCC 818
* State Bank of India vs. Ajay Kumar Sood (2023) 7 SCC 282
Party
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs vs. State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc – Criminal Appeal Nos. 1330-1332 of 2017 – July 31, 2025 Hon’ble Mrs Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Hon’ble Mrs Justice K.V. Viswanathan.
