Facts
The appellant, Vinod Infra Developers Ltd., claimed ownership of agricultural land measuring 18 bighas 15 biswas in Village Pal, Jodhpur. In 2014, the appellant availed a loan of ₹7.5 crores from Respondent No. 1 and, as alleged security, executed an unregistered agreement to sell and unregistered power of attorney in favour of the respondent. These documents were revoked in May 2022. Nevertheless, Respondent No. 1 executed and registered sale deeds in July 2022 in his own name and in favour of Respondents 2 to 4. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a civil suit seeking declaratory reliefs, possession, and injunction.
An application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was filed by the respondents for rejection of the plaint, which was dismissed by the Trial Court but allowed by the High Court. The Supreme Court, while reversing the High Court’s order, undertook a meticulous analysis of procedural law and property jurisprudence.
Ratio and Reasonings
The Court reiterated the narrow and strict scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. It held:
“Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is permissible only when the plaint, on its face and without considering the defence, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred by any law, is undervalued, or is insufficiently stamped. At this preliminary stage, the court is required to confine its examination strictly to the averments made in the plaint and not venture into the merits or veracity of the claims.”
Importantly, the Court observed that even if one cause of action in the plaint survives, the entire plaint cannot be rejected:
“Even if one relief survives, the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The doctrine of severance does not apply to reject an entire plaint based on a partial defect.”
[citing Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain, 2025 INSC 95]
On the substantive issue of ownership and transfer of immovable property, the Court held that unregistered documents cannot confer title:
“Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 clearly state that unregistered documents required to be registered are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of conveying title or completing a sale transaction, and can only be admitted for collateral purposes or in a suit for specific performance.”
Relying on Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana [(2012) 1 SCC 656], the Court reiterated:
“Immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of ‘GPA sales’ or ‘SA/GPA/WILL transfers’ do not convey title and do not amount to transfer.”
Further, the Court decisively stated that execution of sale deeds on the strength of a revoked power of attorney is legally unsustainable:
“Respondent No. 1 cannot rely on the unregistered documents to assert any proprietary rights and had no valid authority to execute the impugned sale deeds. The subsequent revocation of authority further nullifies any claim to title based on such documents.”
It also relied on Muruganandam v. Muniyandi (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1067) to hold that:
“An unregistered agreement may be received as evidence of a contract only in a suit for specific performance. In the present case, Respondent No. 1 has not instituted any suit for specific performance… which renders his claim untenable.”
On the issue of jurisdiction of the civil court, the respondents contended that the dispute related to khatedari rights and fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts as per Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The Court dismissed this contention, observing:
“Issues relating to title of immovable property fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of civil courts and not revenue authorities. Revenue entries are administrative in nature and intended only for fiscal purposes.”
It relied on Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner [(2007) 6 SCC 186] and Jitendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reaffirming that mutation entries are not conclusive proof of title.
Addressing the contention of insufficient court fees, the Court held that a plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to cure such defects. Citing Tajender Singh Ghambhir v. Gurpreet Singh [(2014) 10 SCC 702], the Court noted:
“The scheme of the Act is clear. It casts duty on the court to determine whether or not court fee paid on the plaint is deficient and if so, to give an opportunity to the plaintiff to make up such deficiency within the time that may be fixed by the court.”
In conclusion, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had improperly interfered at the threshold, rejecting the plaint without proper legal justification. The Court emphasised that the appellant’s suit raised serious triable issues, including fraud, misuse of revoked authority, and invalidity of registered sale deeds.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding:
Party
2025 INSC 772 – Coram: Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan – Author: Justice R. Mahadevan – Date of Judgment: 23 May 2025 – Case No.: Civil Appeal No. 7109 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 4862 of 2025)
