Appeal
1. In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 and in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18087 of 2024, the challenge is to the judgment and order of the High Court in Crl.M.C.2833 of 2005 and Crl.M.C.3244 of 2005 dated 3rd September, 2024 whereby petitions seeking quashing of the order dated 1st July, 2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and the criminal proceedings pursuant to the FIR No.380 of 2005 were dismissed.
2. In Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18094 of 2024, Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18091 of 2024 and Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18095 of 2024, challenge is to the judgment and order of the High Court again dated 3rd September, 2024 whereby petitions seeking quashing of the order dated 3rd June, 2004 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and the criminal proceedings pursuant to the FIR No.326 of 2004 were refused on the same and identical grounds as contained in the above referred judgment passed in Crl.M.C.2833 of 2005 and Crl.M.C.3244 of 2005.
3. Since, in all the above SLPs, the facts and contentions are similar, they are being considered and decided by this Court vide common judgment by taking SLP(Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 as the lead case and by narrating the facts as stated therein.
Short question
5. The short question arising for consideration in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18084 of 2024 is whether the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is justified in refusing to quash the FIR No.380/2005 registered at Police Station, Defence Colony, Delhi, under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, directing for the registration of the aforesaid FIR.
Analysis
Points for determination
17. On the basis of the submissions of the parties, the following points crop up for determination:
(i) Whether an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC could have been filed without approaching the police authorities;
(ii) Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is an order passed without application of mind, irrespective of the fact that it states that the parties were “heard” and the documents were “perused”;
(iii) Whether the High Court can deny quashing of the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the FIR registered pursuant to it for the reason that the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed against the accused persons;
(iv) Whether the nature of dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature and there is no involvement of criminality when both sides have previously lodged FIRs originating from the same MoU dated 11.03.1995; and
(v) Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR based upon the same allegations as contained in an earlier FIR No.326/2004 and as such cannot be investigated independently.
18. Now, having outlined the points for determination, we consider it appropriate to deal with the above points serially/sequentially.
Point (i): Whether an application under Section 156(3) CrPC could have been filed without approaching the police authorities?
FIR ordinarily called as First Information Report: 19. It is a settled law that one of the modes for setting criminal law into motion is by giving information to the police authorities in accordance with Section 154 CrPC whereupon if a cognizable offence is prima facie made out to the satisfaction of the police, it may investigate into the offence even without the permission of the Magistrate. The information so given is ordinarily called the “First Information”, though this terminology has not been used under the CrPC.
Procedure to register the FIR: 20. Section 154 of CrPC, inter alia, provides that information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence can be given orally or in writing to the officer-in-charge of the police station and if it is given orally, it shall be reduced in writing, which shall then be read out to the person giving the information and shall be signed by him. A copy of the information so received and reduced into writing, upon being entered into the book kept for the purpose, shall be given forthwith to the informant.
FIR if not recorded by SHO then it may be sent to the S.P to register: 21. Sub-section (3) of Section 154 CrPC lays down that if the information of a cognizable offence given to the officer-incharge of the police station is not being recorded or is being refused to be recorded, the informant may send the substance of the said information to the Superintendent of Police concerned in writing and by post, who upon being satisfied that such information discloses a cognizable offence will either direct for the investigation of the offence or may himself investigate the same.
To register the FIR the informant to approach the police first: 22. A plain and simple reading of Section 154 CrPC as a whole makes it imperative upon the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for the purposes of lodging an FIR in respect of a cognizable offence and where the Police refuses to record such information, the remedy is to approach the concerned Superintendent of Police. It is only when no action is taken even by the Superintendent of Police and the information of commission of a cognizable offence is not being recorded by the officer-in-charge of the police station or even by the Superintendent of Police, that the person aggrieved or the informant may move the court of the Magistrate concerned to get the FIR registered and lodged with the concerned police station.
Magistrate may direct to order investigation: 23. Sub-section (3) of Section 156 CrPC simply empowers the Magistrate to order an investigation of a cognizable offence.
Cognizance: 24. Section 190 of the CrPC empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in three contingencies, namely: (i) upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting the offence; (ii) upon a police report of such facts; and (iii) upon information received from any person other than the police officer or upon his own knowledge that such an offence has been committed.
25. In view of the provisions of Section 190 read with Section 156(3), the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of any offence not only on the basis of the police report submitted under Section 173 of the CrPC consequent to the investigation pursuant to the FIR but also upon receiving a complaint of facts from any person, other than the police officer or on his own motion.
26. On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR. However, if such an information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned. It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance in accordance with Section 190 of the CrPC.
Mere bald allegation without details as if informant approached the police authorities is not acceptable: 27. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the application filed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC dated 01.07.2005 would reveal that the informant therein had simply stated that an offence under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC have been committed and that the informant had approached the “police officials” several times but in vain, but the application is completely silent as to when did the informant approach the Police or the Superintendent of Police. The application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned. The mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable.
Discussing Sakiri vasu judgment: 28. In Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. it had been observed that if a person has a grievance that the police station is not registering the FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then he can approach the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing. Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or that even after registering it no proper investigation is held, it is open to the person aggrieved to file an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the Magistrate concerned. In other words, the court reiterated that the proper procedure has to be availed of and followed before moving the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC.
Aggrieved ordinarily cannot approach directly: 29. It is well recognized in law that the person aggrieved must first exhaust the alternative remedies available to him in law before approaching the court of law. In other words, he cannot ordinarily approach the court directly.
Magistrate ought not to have entertained the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C directly rather to direct him to approach the police station: 30. In the case at hand, the fact reveals that the informant had neither approached the officer-in-charge of the police station or the Superintendent of Police concerned as contemplated under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the CrPC but has directly gone to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. In such a situation, the Magistrate ought not to have ordinarily entertained the application under Section 156(3) so as to direct the Police for the registration of the FIR, rather, it ought to have relegated the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station and then to the Superintendent of Police.
31. The Magistrate while passing the order dated 01.07.2005, directing for the registration of the FIR in exercise of power under Section 156(3) has not considered the above aspect as to whether the informant had exhausted his remedies available in law before approaching him under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
Passing order directly in section 156 (3) Cr.P.C is mere procedural irregularity and not illegality: 32. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the informant had directly moved the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC without exhausting his statutory remedies, the Magistrate could have avoided taking action on the said application and could have refused to direct for the registration of the FIR. However, as entertaining an application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural irregularity and since the Magistrate in a given circumstance is otherwise empowered to pass such an order, the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or without jurisdiction.
33. To sum up, the Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, we are of the opinion that the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated on this count.
34. The Magistrate by the order dated 01.07.2005 has simply directed for the registration of the FIR so as to set the criminal law in motion but has not exercised his power under Section 190 of the CrPC of taking cognizance thereof. In such a situation, the order so passed by the Magistrate, though irregular, is of no prejudice to any party, much less to the VLS. Therefore, it is not appropriate for this court to interfere in the matter or with the order of the Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 or with the order impugned passed by the High Court.
Point (ii): Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is an order passed without application of mind, irrespective of the fact that it states that the parties were “heard” and the documents were “perused”?
35. Section 156 of the CrPC provides for the power of the police officer to investigate a cognizable offence. It inter alia vide sub-section (3) empowers the Magistrate to order an investigation in a cognizable case. No doubt, sub-section (3) does not specifically provide that the Magistrate in passing such an order of investigation has to pass a speaking order or has to apply his mind to the contents of the application or the material produced in support of it. Nonetheless, it is a well recognized principle of law that whenever any power is bestowed upon a judicial authority, it is incumbent that it should be exercised on the basis of sound legal principles by application of mind and by a speaking order. Therefore, a reasoned order upon application of judicious mind is inherent while passing an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
The interpretation made later would not mean that the provision had a different meaning prior to its interpretation: 38. The provisions of Section 156 (3) of the CrPC have subsequently been interpreted and it has been held that the Magistrate while directing for registering an FIR has to apply his independent mind based upon legal principles and the order so passed has to be a reasoned order. The provision so interpreted exists from its inception. Merely because a judgment by the Court has simply interpreted and reiterated the established principles of law that ought to have been into practice, it would not mean that such principles would be applicable prospectively only from the date of its interpretation. The interpretation made later on would not mean that the provision had a different meaning prior to its above interpretation. Therefore, the High Court manifestly erred in holding that at the relevant time there was no requirement of application of mind and for passing a speaking order, as the judgments of the higher courts holding otherwise have been penned down subsequently. In other words, the provision as it stands and interpreted, requires passing of the speaking order on application of mind from the very beginning. Moreover, a speaking order is a part and an essential component of the principles of natural justice, which are applicable to every judicial order. Therefore, it was but natural for the Magistrate to pass a reasoned order, irrespective of the interpretation of the provision subsequently which was in line with the principles of natural justice.
Order of the learned Magistrate: 39. The order of the Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 clearly states that the Magistrate had “heard” the counsel on the application under Section 156(3) and had “perused” the complaint which reveals commission of a cognizable offence. The said order is reproduced below:
“Fresh Complainant received along with application U/s 156 (3) Cr.P.C. Be checked and registered. Heard on the application U/s 156(3) Cr. P.C. Ld. Counsel for the complainant has relied upon a judgement of Allahabad High Court which is reported as “2005 CRL L.J. 2028”. The perusal of the complaint reveals the commission of cognizable offence and the SHO Police Station Defence colony is directed to get the case registered and investigate the matter U/s 156 (3) Cr. P.C the compliance report be called for 05.10.2005.”
Though not mere heard the counsel but it is enough to recorded Magistrate’s satisfaction about the cognizable offence: 40. The mere stating in the order that the counsel has been heard and the application and the material produced have been perused, may not be indicative of the fact that the Magistrate had actually applied his mind to the controversy in issue. However, the fact that the perusal of the application and complaint attached to it, satisfied the Magistrate that it discloses a cognizable offence, is very material and relevant which proves the application of mind by him. Once such a satisfaction has been recorded by the Magistrate, even if wrongly, it is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent powers by the higher courts. The powers vested in the court either under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India are not for the purposes of appreciating the evidence or examining the correctness of the evidence collected during investigation to record a different conclusion other than recorded by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that a cognizable offence has been disclosed in the application/complaint. Moreover, when information disclosing commission of cognizable offence is conveyed to the police station, the officer-in-charge of the police station cannot refuse to register the FIR. Therefore, if an FIR has not been registered for any reason at the police station and the Magistrate is satisfied that the information discloses a cognizable offence, he can certainly direct for its registration obviously on compliance of the provisions of Section 154(3) of the CrPC. This is exactly what has been done by the Magistrate by way of his order dated 01.07.2005 though ignoring the remedy under Section 154(3) of the CrPC which, as said earlier, amounts to mere procedural irregularity.
Point (iii): Whether the High Court can deny quashing of the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the FIR registered pursuant to it for the reasons that the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed against the accused persons?
42. We are conscious of the fact that investigation pursuant to the impugned FIR and the submission of the chargesheets thereof would have no lawful existence if the FIR itself is bad or the order directing registration of the FIR is found to be illegal.
44. Once much water has flown down the bridge subsequent to the order of the registration of FIR and the registration of FIR, giving rise to a fresh cause of action to challenge the chargesheets, we are of the opinion that the High Court has rightly refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere with the FIR as the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed.
Point (iv): Whether the nature of dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature and there is no involvement of criminality when both sides have previously lodged FIRs originating from the same MoU dated 11.03.1995?
Inherent powers must be used sparingly: 46. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court, especially in State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal Singh & Ors., that the discretion to quash an FIR at a nascent stage has to be exercised with great caution and circumspection. In this connection, it would be beneficial to refer to an old case of Privy Council in King Emperor vs. Nazir Ahmad Khwaja wherein the law was well settled that the courts would not thwart any investigation or that the courts should be very slow in interfering with the process of investigation. It is only in rare cases where no cognizable offence is disclosed in the FIR that the court may stop the investigation so as to avoid the harassment of the alleged accused. Even in such exercise of power, the court cannot embark upon an inquiry as to the genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint which have to be examined only after the evidence is collected.
48. Thus, in the above facts and circumstances, we do not consider to go into detail as to the exact nature of disputes involved in the FIR and leave the same to be adjudicated 30 upon by the appropriate court where the chargesheets have been submitted.
Point (v): Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR based upon the same allegations as contained in an earlier FIR No.326/2004 and as such cannot be investigated independently?
Section 300 Cr.P.C explained: 52. Section 300 CrPC debars a second trial. This is based on the public policy that no one should be harassed twice for the same offence by putting him to trial again and again.
53. In Jatinder Singh & Ors. vs. Ranjit Kaur, the issue was whether a first complaint having been dismissed for default, could a second complaint be maintained. This Court considered the matter and observed that there is no provision in the CrPC or any other statute which debars a complainant from preferring a second complaint on the same allegations if the first complaint did not result in conviction, acquittal or even discharge. However, when a complaint is dismissed on merits, a second complaint on the same facts cannot be made except in a very exceptional circumstance.
Successive FIRs not maintainable if the investigation in the earlier FIR is completed: 54. It has been well settled that successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused.
Information about same offence given in two different places by different people will be independent FIRs: 56. Further, in State of Bombay vs. Rusy Mistry, information of the commission of the same offence was given to the police at two different places, by different persons and at different times. The Court held that both the reports will be independent First Information Reports.
57. In the case at hand, as previously stated, FIR No.326/2004 was lodged at Police Station, Connaught Place, New Delhi, whereas the subsequent FIR No.380/2005 was lodged at Police Station, Defence Colony, New Delhi. Both the FIRs may be based on similar allegations but they are not virtually the same. The allegations are different and even the parties against whom the FIRs were filed are not the same. Therefore, such a subsequent FIR may be maintainable but we refrain ourselves from making any final comment on the above aspect as no such finding on this aspect has been returned by the court below.
Conclusion
58. Since in connection with FIR No.380/2005, investigations have been completed and the High Court has refused to quash the said FIR in exercise of its discretionary power, we do not deem it necessary to exercise our discretion to override that of the High Court and leave the matter to proceed further in accordance with law.
59. Thus, in the overall facts and circumstances of the case, we do not wish to interfere with the orders impugned and the petitions are dismissed with the observations as made above.
Judgments are involved or cited
* Sakiri Vasu vs. State of U.P. – (2008) 2 SCC 409
* Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor – (1973) 2 SCC 836
* Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. vs. Crabtree – 1974 ICR 120 (NIRC)
* State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal Singh & Ors. – 1992 SCC (CRI) 426
* King Emperor vs. Nazir Ahmad Khwaja – 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29
* Jatinder Singh & Ors. vs. Ranjit Kaur – 2001 (2) SCC 570
* State of Bombay vs. Rusy Mistry – AIR 1960 SC 391
Acts and Sections
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC):
* Section 482
* Section 120-B
* Section 154
* Section 154(1)
* Section 154(3)
* Section 156
* Section 156(3)
* Section 173
* Section 190
* Section 300
Indian Penal Code (IPC):
* Section 34
* Section 384
* Section 406
* Section 409
* Section 420
* Section 421
* Section 422
* Section 424
* Section 467
* Section 468
* Section 471
* Section 477
* Section 477-A
* Section 120-B
* Section 122-B
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996:
* Section 34
Party
Anurag Bhatnagar & Anr. versus State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr – Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 18084 of 2024 – 2025 INSC 895 – July 25, 2025 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Pankaj Mithal and Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti.
Author’s note
While dealing with ordering investigation directly under section 156(3) Cr.P.C on the complaint filed, this judgement did not consider the pronouncement of this Hon’ble Supreme Court Judgment delivered in Babu Venkatesh and others …Appellant (s) versus State of Karnataka and another …Respondent(s) – Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2022 – February 18, 2022 veryparticularly to the following paragraphs:
……………
“27. This court has further held that, prior to the filing of a petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., there have to be applications under Section 154 (1) and 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C. This court emphasizes the necessity to file an affidavit so that the persons making the application should be conscious and not make false affidavit. With such a requirement, the persons would be deterred from causally invoking authority of the Magistrate, under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. In as much as if the affidavit is found to be false, the person would be liable for prosecution in accordance with law.
28. In the present case, we find that the learned Magistrate while passing the order under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., has totally failed to consider the law laid down by this court.
29. From the perusal of the complaint it can be seen that, the complainant/respondent No. 2 himself has made averments with regard to the filing of the Original Suit. In any case, when the complaint was not supported by an affidavit, the Magistrate ought not to have entertained the application under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. The High Court has also failed to take into consideration the legal position as has been enunciated by this court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (supra), and has dismissed the petitions by merely observing that serious allegations are made in the complaint”.
……………………………………
Hence, in the aforesaid judgment it is clear even if the Magistrate is incumbent on directing the investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C directly if the complaint discloses the cognizable offence, the Magistrate must follow the srivatsava which includes whether the informant has gone to the police first or not.
