Section 175(4) BNSS: A guide for Judicial Magistrates

Appeal

1. This appeal, by special leave, calls in question an order of reversal of a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, whereby a writ appeal of the fifth respondent stood allowed and the judgment and order under challenge of a Single Judge was set aside. Important questions relating to interpretation of certain provisions of the recently enacted Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are involved in the appeal. Although the facts of the appeal are not too complicated and, hence, the same could have been decided by a short order, we thought it appropriate to consider the rival arguments in some depth since, by the time we reserved judgment and even thereafter, there has been no authoritative pronouncement of this Court on the interplay between subsections (3) and (4) of Section 175, BNSS, which creates a nuanced framework for determining the overall scope thereof. Having regard to the same, while concluding our judgment, we also wish to indicate in brief the considerations that ought to weigh in the minds of the magistrates, empowered under Section 210, BNSS, while they are seized of applications/complaints alleging commission of an offence by a public servant in course of discharge of his official duty as well as provide a guide for due exercise of the power to direct investigation.

Facts

Sexual assault of the appellant by three superior police officers

2. While pursuing a complaint relating to a property dispute, the appellant was, allegedly, sexually assaulted by three police officers on separate occasions. The first incident occurred in January 2022, when R-5 visited her residence under the pretext of discussing the matter (relating to the property dispute) privately and, allegedly, proceeded to rape her. The second incident followed in quick succession, also in January 2022, when a senior officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (not a party herein), to whom she had complained about the first incident, allegedly behaved inappropriately with her in her house. The third incident took place in August 2022, when another senior officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police (also not a party herein), to whom she had complained about the previous two incidents, under the guise of offering help, allegedly called her to an isolated location and raped her.

Second incident was informed to the DSP and reporting back as untrue

3. The second incident led the appellant to lodge a complaint with the office of the Superintendent of Police, in August 2022. This complaint was forwarded to the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police which on 11th October 2022 submitted a report stating that the allegations in the complaint filed by the appellant were untrue.

4. After the report in August 2022, there was not much of a development over the next two years.

Appellant informed to SHO and sought for directions

5. After change of incumbency in the office of the Superintendent of Police of the district in September 2024, the appellant submitted a written complaint before Station House Officer, Ponnani PS, on 6th September; a complaint under sub-section (4) Section 173, BNSS to the District Police Chief on 8th September; and on 9th September, she filed an application6 under “Section 210 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 read with Section 173(4)” before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ponnani seeking a direction for registration of a First Information Report against those police officials whom she perceived as offenders. Having regard to sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS, the JMFC vide order dated 11th September 2024 called for a report from the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. Two days later, while the appellant’s application was still pending before the JMFC, the appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court alleging unfair and unlawful investigation by the police. She sought directions for registration of an FIR and compliance with the directions made by this Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. Lastly, she implored the writ court to declare that the acts of the police officials, in sexually assaulting her, were not in the discharge of their official duties and, thus, subsection (4) of Section 175, BNSS was not required to be followed. The final prayer in the writ petition is reproduced below:

“3. The Petitioner respectfully prays before this Honourable Court to declare that the immunity provided under Section 175(4) of BNSS shall not extend to crimes committed by a public servant that are unrelated to their official duties. Specifically, the Court is requested to rule that the protection afforded to public servants does not apply to acts that constitute criminal offenses committed outside the scope of their official functions. This prayer is made to ensure that public servants are held accountable for any criminal acts they commit in their personal capacity, without the shield of immunity intended for their official duties.” (emphasis ours)    

Proceedings before the High Court

High Court allowed the writ by holding compliance with with Section 175(4)(a),  is not mandatory further JM ordered investigation: 6. A Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition vide order dated 18th October, 2024, holding that compliance with Section 175(4)(a), BNSS prior to registration of an FIR was not mandatory, as the alleged offence of rape could not be regarded as one committed by a public servant in the “discharge of official duties”. The Single Judge further observed that the use of the word “may” in sub-section (4) of Section 175 indicates that the provision is directory, not mandatory. Accordingly, the JMFC was directed to dispose of the appellant’s application as per the law declared by the Single Judge, within ten days of receiving the order. In compliance with this direction, the Magistrate, ordered registration of an FIR vide order dated 24th October, 2024.

Respondent-5/Accused preferred Writ appeal and the same was pleased to allowed: 7. Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, R-5 preferred the writ appeal which stands allowed by the Division Bench vide a judgment and order dated 13th November, 2024. While the Division Bench acknowledged that a substantial question of law did arise in the appeal, it declined to adjudicate upon the same as “the main question is whether it was appropriate to intervene at this stage under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the complaint was pending…”. The Division Bench proceeded to set aside the order passed by the Single Judge and also the order of the JMFC dated 24th October, 2024 directing registration of an FIR against the alleged offenders on the grounds that: (i) interference by the Single Judge with the order of the JMFC dated 11th September 2024 was unwarranted, when the complaint [read: application under Section 175(3), BNSS] before the JMFC was still pending; (ii) the Single Judge should not have issued directions to the JMFC when no order of the JMFC was under challenge; and (iii) owing to pendency of the application under Section 175 (4), BNSS before the JMFC, the remedy under Article 226 could not have been invoked without exhausting the remedy under the BNSS.

Questions & Analysis

Questions

13. In relation to interpretation of Section 175 read with Section 173, BNSS, the following two questions arise for determination:

I. Whether sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS is a stand-alone provision or is it to be read in continuation of / as a proviso to subsection (3) thereof?

II. What procedure should a judicial magistrate follow upon receiving a complaint against an accused, who happens to be a public servant, for his acts “arising in course of the discharge of his official duties”?

14. However, on facts of the present appeal, we are tasked to decide the following questions:

(A). Whether the Single Judge exceeded his jurisdiction by interpreting sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS while issuing consequential directions for the JMFC to pass an appropriate order on the appellant’s application without any prayer in this behalf and particularly in the absence of any challenge to the order of the JMFC dated 11th September 2024 calling for a report per sub-section (4) of Section 175?

(B). Whether the alleged acts of the public servants, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, fall within the discharge of their official duties?

Analysis

15. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties, we propose to answer the questions framed sequentially.

What is the law laid down in Lalita kumari?

16. Since the appellant’s claim before the High Court was based on the decision in Lalita Kumari (supra), it would not be inapt to remind ourselves of what the law declared therein is before proceeding with the task of answering the above formulated questions.

Question involved in Lalita Kumari case: 17. Lalita Kumari (supra) arose out of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Noticing divergent views, a three-Judge Bench ordered that the petition may be placed before a Constitution Bench of five Judges. The issue arising for an answer is noted in paragraph 1 of the decision authored by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, reading as follows:

The important issue which arises for consideration in the referred matter is whether “a police officer is bound to register a first information report (FIR) upon receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) or the police officer has the power to conduct a ‘preliminary inquiry’ in order to test the veracity of such information before registering the same”?

Observations in Lalita Kumari’s case: 18. The observations of this Court, relevant for the purpose of this discussion, are summarised in brief as follows:

18.1 If information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, the police has no discretion to refuse registration of an FIR or to conduct a preliminary inquiry. The word “shall” in Section 154(1), Cr. PC is used in a mandatory sense (Paragraphs 37.6, 54, 83 and 105).

18.2 The placement of Section 154 before 156 makes clear the legislative intent: that recording of first information is the starting point of investigation. The same acts as a safeguard against arbitrary police actions (Paragraphs 38 and 39).

18.3 Although Section 166-A18 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 provides for penal consequences of non-registration of FIR by a public servant for only certain kinds of offences against women, the same does not mean that a public servant (police officer) has discretion to register/not register FIR for other offences (Paragraphs 40–42).

18.4 The object of early registration of FIR is to ensure transparency, avoid embellishments and maintain judicial oversight through prompt reporting to the Magistrate (Paragraphs 93–97).

18.5 While mandatory registration of an FIR is the rule, the Constitution Bench recognised a limited need for preliminary inquiry in exceptional categories of cases. Such exceptions include cases of medical negligence, corruption cases involving public servants, situations where the information received does not, on its face, disclose a cognizable offence. Even in such cases, the scope of preliminary inquiry is limited only to determine whether a cognizable offence is disclosed. If the information, ex facie discloses such an offence, the police is bound to register the FIR forthwith, and any inquiry into falsity or credibility must follow only during investigation (Paragraphs 115-119).

18.6 In brief, this Court held the registration of FIR to be mandatory in all cognizable offences, while permitting preliminary inquiry only in limited, exceptional situations.

18.7 The “Conclusion/Directions” in Lalita Kumari (supra) read as follows:

“paragraphs. 120 to 128”

19. In the present case, the appellant, however, having approached the JMFC with the application under Section 210 read with sub-section (4) of Section 173, BNSS upon the omission/neglect of the Station House Officer to register an FIR based on her complaint, it is obvious that the JMFC was required to follow the mandate of the law as in sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 175, to the extent relevant and applicable. The advisability or otherwise of any preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR, as explained in Lalita Kumari (supra) would, therefore, stricto sensu not arise in the present case.

Questions I & II: Section 175(4), BNSS – Whether standalone or not, and the procedure to be followed by a Judicial Magistrate?

20. The present appeal could have been disposed of on the basis of our finding on issue (A) (discussed in the later part of the judgment); however, having heard erudite submissions from learned senior counsel on either side and cognizant of the fact that Section 175, which necessarily would also include sub-sections (3) and (4) thereof, read with Section 173 and certain other provisions of the BNSS fall for a meaningful construction, which is of labyrinthine significance, we are inclined to observe how the law ought to be read upon undertaking an intrusive study of the relevant provisions.

22. In Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, this Court pointed out the difference between Section 156, Cr. PC and Section 175, BNSS, referred to what is the ordainment of sub-section (4) of Section 175 and thereafter noted that the changes therein can be attributed to the judicial evolution of Section 156, Cr. PC through numerous decisions of the Court including Priyanka Srivastava (supra). It was observed thus:

“paras. 28 – 32”

Examining the ingredients of section 175 BNSS

23. A bare reading of Section 175, BNSS reveals the marginal note as “Police officer’s power to investigate cognisable case”. While sub-section (1) confers power on any officer in charge of a police station to investigate a cognisable case and sub-section (2) provides the effect of investigation by a police officer not empowered under sub-section (1), sub-sections (3) and (4) relate to the power of a magistrate, empowered under Section 210, BNSS to order investigation as “above-mentioned”, i.e., an investigation that a police officer is required to undertake as in subsection (1) of Section 175. Reference to Section 210 in sub-sections (3) and (4) is for the purpose of drawing guidance as to the class of magistrate empowered to take cognisance of an offence.

Commenting on the poor drafting of BNSS

24. We are minded to hold that by the very nature of its contents, subsections (3) and (4) of Section 175 could have formed a different section of the BNSS altogether. Suffice it to record at the outset that the BNSS being a statute of recent origin, which has been enacted after exactly half a century of its precursor (the Cr. PC) governing the field of criminal procedure, one would have expected the legislative drafting thereof to be of the highest order with clear expression of the will of the people. Sadly, Section 175, BNSS is somewhat confusing and requires ironing out the creases in the legislation without altering the material of which it is woven.

25. As noticed, elaborate arguments have been advanced canvassing the different ways in which Section 175 and in particular sub-section (4) thereof should be/can be interpreted. One contention is that sub-section (4) must be read in continuity with sub-section (3). Per this interpretation, sub-section (4) is not an independent provision but operates subject to the procedural safeguards that sub-section (3) embodies, including the requirement that the application be supported by an affidavit. It was argued that any other reading would result in the affidavit requirement being rendered nugatory in cases under subsection (4), thereby weakening an important safeguard against possible frivolous or mala fide proceedings. In contrast, the contention is that sub-section (4) has to be viewed as a distinct and self-contained provision, not controlled by sub-section (3), starting with the words “Any Magistrate …” and not ‘Such Magistrate as referred to above …’. Also, the term “complaint” in sub-section (4) must be understood in light of clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 2, BNSS, which defines complaint as including an oral complaint as well. Concerns regarding abuse of process through oral complaints (without the support of affidavit) were countered by the submission that sub-section (4) itself contains adequate additional safeguards (report from superior officer and opportunity of hearing to the accused public servant), making the requirement of an affidavit unnecessary and unwarranted.

26. After a careful and considered examination of the arguments advanced, we find ourselves in respectful disagreement with the latter view [according to which sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS is a standalone provision].

Object of section 175

(4) 27. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 of the BNSS is a provision that was absent in the Cr. PC. It reads as follows:

(4) Any Magistrate empowered under Section 210, may, upon receiving a complaint against a public servant arising in course of the discharge of his official duties, order investigation, subject to—

(a) receiving a report containing facts and circumstances of the incident from the officer superior to him; and

(b) after consideration of the assertions made by the public servant as to the situation that led to the incident so alleged.

28. Sub-section (4) prescribes a special procedure to be followed before an order for investigation is made in cases involving offences committed by a public servant “in course of the discharge of his official duties”. Having regard to the modal verb “may”, appearing in sub-section (4), a judicial magistrate has the discretion to order an investigation upon (i) calling for a report regarding the incident from an officer superior to the accused public servant; and (ii) considering the version of the public servant concerning the incident. It is “subject to” these conditions, that “(A)ny Magistrate …, may, … ”, if satisfied of sufficient grounds existing, pass an order for investigation against the accused public servant.

29. The legislative intention behind insertion of sub-section (4) of Section 175 is clear: the Parliament intended it as an additional safeguard for public servants when a complaint is made against them. Cognizant of practical realities and to prevent false or frivolous allegations, it appears to us that the mandate is to obtain a report from the accused public servant’s superior officer and to extend to such public servant an opportunity to explain his side of the story. While society’s interest is served by prosecuting offenders, it is equally vital, if not more, to ensure that prosecution is not launched against individuals, including public servants, to settle a score or wreak vengeance or put them in such an awkward position that it becomes difficult for them to act in a similar future occasion. The responsibility, nay duty, after all, is not just to pursue the actual culprit, but also to protect the innocent from being falsely implicated, wrongly accused and unnecessarily victimised.

30. Having analysed sub-section (4) of Section 175, its scope, and the object it seeks to achieve, the question that now arises for consideration is the manner in which such provision has to be interpreted – whether sub-section (4) stands alone or serves as an adjunct to sub-section (3) or is it to be read as a proviso to sub-section (3)?

Summary of the discussion

42. Sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 175 are not isolated silos but must be read in harmony with sub-section (4) forming an extension of sub-section (3).

43. The power to order investigation is conferred upon a judicial magistrate by sub-section (3) of Section 175. Sub-section (4) of Section 175 too confers such power but prescribes a special procedure to be followed in case of a complaint against a public servant alleging commission of offences in the discharge of official duties.

44. The expression “complaint” in sub-section (4) of Section 175 does not encompass oral complaints. Having regard to the text of the provision and the context in which it is set, and in light of our conclusion that subsection (4) is not a provision which stands alone or is a proviso to subsection (3), the term must derive its meaning in sync with allegations of cognisable offence levelled in an application of the nature referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 175, i.e., an application supported by affidavit.

When must section 175 (4) be invoked – A guide for judicial magistrates

45. Having clarified the symbiotic relationship between sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 175, it is indispensable to indicate the circumstances in which the procedure under sub-section (4) could get activated. Significantly, sub-section (4) of Section 175 uses the modal verb “may” and not ‘shall’. In the context where it finds place and the object that is sought to be achieved, “may” has to be read as “may”, bearing an element of discretion, and not ‘shall’. The principles, discussed in the following paragraphs, are intended to guide judicial magistrates at the stage of considering applications under Section 175.

46. Upon receiving a complaint under sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS alleging commission of an offence by a public servant arising in course of the discharge of his official duties, the magistrate may do either of the following:

46.1 Reading the complaint, if the judicial magistrate is prima facie satisfied that commission of the alleged act giving rise to an offence arose in course of discharge of official duties by the public servant, such magistrate may not have any option other than following the procedure prescribed under sub-section (4) of Section 175 of calling for reports from the superior officer and the accused public servant.

46.2 Or, on a consideration of the complaint, where the judicial magistrate entertains a prima facie doubt depending upon the circumstances as to whether the offence alleged to have been committed by the public servant arose in course of discharge of his official duties, such magistrate might err on the side of caution and proceed to follow the procedure prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 175.

46.3 Or, where the judicial magistrate is satisfied that the alleged act of offence was not committed in the discharge of official duties and/or it bears no reasonable nexus thereto, and also that the rigours of sub-section (4) of Section 175 are not attracted, the complaint may be dealt with in accordance with the general procedure prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 175.

47. It is hereby clarified that the judicial magistrate would continue to retain the authority to reject an application under sub-section (3) of Section 175, lodged against a public servant, where such magistrate finds that the allegations made therein are wholly untenable, manifestly absurd, or so inherently improbable that no reasonable person could conclude that any offence is disclosed. However, it is needless to observe, such an order of rejection ought not to be based on whims and fancy but must have the support of valid reasons.

48. A situation may arise where, in an appropriate case, the judicial magistrate has called for a report from the concerned superior officer under clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 175, but such officer fails to comply with the direction or does not submit the report within a reasonable period of time. What is the course open to the magistrate in such a situation? In the unlikely event of such a situation, we hold, the judicial magistrate is not obliged to wait indefinitely for compliance and may proceed further in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 175 after considering the version of the accused public servant under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 175, if on record. What would constitute ‘reasonable time’ cannot be determined in rigid or inflexible terms and must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case before the judicial magistrate who has to take the call.

Question (a) : Whether the single judge exceeded his jurisdiction?

51. As rightly held by the Division Bench, the Single Judge could not have granted relief that the appellant did not pray. We may profitably refer to the decisions of this Court in Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi where this Court held that the writ court will, normally, grant relief that is prayed; and, though discretion to grant relief under Article 226 is wide, the writ court cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, proceed to grant a relief not even prayed by the petitioner.

52. Having prayed for directions in the writ petition to register an FIR and to secure compliance with the directions made by this Court in Lalita Kumari (supra) and that too, at a stage, when the JMFC seized of the application under Section 210 read with sub-section (4) of Section 173, BNSS had called for a report in exercise of power conferred by subsection (4) of Section 175, there was no occasion for the Single Judge to interpret sub-section (4) and interfere with the proceedings that had been set in motion pursuant to the order of the JMFC. The Single Judge would have been justified in interpreting the law if the order of the JMFC, by which he had called for a report in accordance with sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS been challenged in a petition under Section 528 thereof or even under Article 227 of the Constitution – which is not the case here. The JMFC having called for a report from the superior police officer by his order, it was a judicial order passed in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 175. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath has held that a judicial order in a civil matter cannot be challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, the principle has been extended by this Court to judicial orders passed in criminal matters. Notwithstanding that such a judicial order could not have been challenged in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and despite the absence of any challenge to the JMFC’s order, the Single Judge directed the Magistrate to pass an order in accordance with the law that such Judge declared. This was plainly impermissible. Nevertheless, as directed by the Single Judge, the JMFC proceeded to direct registration of an FIR against the accused persons. In effect, the Single Judge directed the Magistrate to recall his own order – which again constitutes exercise of a power unknown to the law of criminal procedure.

53. We, thus, agree with the Division Bench that the facts before the Single Judge did not call for an interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 175, BNSS.

Conclusion

58. As a sequel to our foregoing discussion, we uphold the impugned order of the Division Bench.

59. After the order of the Single Judge was set aside by the impugned order, the JMFC has issued notice to the accused under Section 175(4)(b), BNSS, giving them a chance to state their side of the story. We leave it open to the appellant to participate in the proceedings before the JMFC and raise such points that are available to her in law, including that the actions of the accused police officers were not in discharge of their official duties and also that without considering the report that has been called for vide the order dated 11th September, 2024, an FIR should be directed to be registered by the jurisdictional police station. It is also clarified that the JMFC must first satisfy himself that the application under Section 175(3), BNSS is accompanied by an affidavit sworn or affirmed in accordance with the terms of Section 333 thereof.

60. The appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.    

References

Judgments cited or involved

• Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1
• Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287
• Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC 705
• Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora, (2018) 5 SCC 557
• Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372
• Subramanian Swamy, (2012) 3 SCC 64
• Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 238
• Ranjit Singh Bath v. Union Territory Chandigarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1479
• Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asstt. CST, (1955) 2 SCR 483
• State of Rajasthan v. Vinod Kumar, (2012) 6 SCC 770
• S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591
• Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd., (1990) 4 SCC 256
• Grasim Industries Ltd. v. State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 547
• Laxminarayan R. Bhattad v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 5 SCC 413
• IRDP v. P.D. Chacko, 2010 6 SCC 637
• CCE v. Hari Chand Shri Gopa, (2011) 1 SCC 236
• Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CTO, AIR 1966 SC 12
• Hiralal Rattanlal v. State of U.P., (1973) 1 SCC 216
• Union of India v. VKC Footsteps (India) (P) Ltd., (2022) 2 SCC 603
• Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) 1 SCC 307
• Om Prakash v. Ram Kumar, (1991) 1 SCC 441
• Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, (2010) 1 SCC 234
• Radhe Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423
• Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948

Acts and Sections involved

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)

• Section 2(1)(h): Defines “complaint”.
• Section 173: Relates to information of cognizable offenses, comparable to Section 154 of the CrPC.
  • Section 173(1): Information given to an officer in charge of a police station.
  • Section 173(3): Requirement of preliminary enquiry for certain offenses.
  • Section 173(4): Procedure for sending substance of information to the Superintendent of Police upon refusal by the officer in charge.
• Section 175: Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable cases, comparable to Section 156 of the CrPC.
  • Section 175(1): Power of officer in charge to investigate cognizable cases.
  • Section 175(2): Effect of investigation by a police officer not empowered.
  • Section 175(3): Power of Magistrate empowered under Section 210 to order investigation upon application supported by affidavit.
  • Section 175(4): Special procedure (receiving report from superior officer and considering assertions of the public servant) before ordering investigation against a public servant for acts in discharge of official duties.
• Section 210: Empowering Magistrates to take cognizance.
• Section 218(1): Requirement of prior sanction for cognizance of offences by public servants (formerly Section 197(1) CrPC).
  • Third Proviso to Section 218(1): Exclusion of sanction requirement for sexual offenses.
• Section 223: Safeguards when taking cognizance of complaints against public servants.
• Section 333: Authorities before whom affidavits may be sworn.
• Section 528: Cited in context of challenging judicial orders (though noted as not the case here).

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

• Sections 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 143, 199, 200: Sexual and other offenses listed in the proviso to Section 218(1) BNSS where sanction is not required.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)

• Section 154: Information in cognizable cases.
  • Section 154(1): Mandatory registration of FIR.
  • Section 154(3): Remedy of approaching Superintendent of Police.
• Section 156: Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable cases.
  • Section 156(1): Power to investigate.
  • Section 156(2): Proceedings not to be called in question on ground of empowerment.
  • Section 156(3): Power of Magistrate to order investigation.
• Section 197(1): Requirement of sanction for prosecution of public servants.
• Chapters XII & XIV: Relating to information to police/powers to investigate and conditions for initiating proceedings.

Constitution of India

• Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by Part III.
• Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.
• Article 227: Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.
• Article 235: Control over subordinate courts.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

• Section 166-A: Public servant disobeying direction under law.
• Sections 326A, 326B, 354, 354B, 370, 370A, 376, 376A to 376E, 509: Offenses against women listed under Section 166A(c).

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

• Section 19: Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.
  • Section 19(1): Requirement of sanction.
  • Section 19(3): Effect of absence of sanction.

Notaries Act, 1952

• Section unspecified: Mentioned in context of notaries appointed under the Act under section 333 BNSS., 2023.

Party

XXX vs. State of Kerala & Ors - Criminal Appeal No. 4629 of 2025 - 2026 INSC 88 - January 27, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manmohan.