Dhanraj vs. State of Rajasthan – Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 20Hon’ble Mr.26 – 2026 INSC 958 – 7th September, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Manmohan.
Analysis of the Judgment
Appeal and Impugned Order
The appeal is filed by the accused-appellant, Dhanraj, who assails the impugned judgment dated 20th August 2025 rendered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 338 of 2019. This High Court judgment affirmed the trial court’s earlier conviction and sentence dated 5th September 2019, which had found the appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault and related offences. [Para 2, 9, 10]
Factual Matrix
On 5th December 2016, a five-year-old child went missing after attending a function, and was later found bleeding from her genitals by two villagers. She revealed that an unknown boy had lured her to an isolated area near a school, pushed her into bushes, sexually assaulted her, and fled when she started bleeding. Due to societal apprehension, the family initially delayed informing the police, eventually filing an FIR against an unknown person on 7th December 2016. The accused-appellant was arrested nearly two months later based on a source informer’s tip and was subsequently identified by the victim in a Test Identification Parade (TIP). [Para 3, 4, 5, 6, 24, 30]
Subordinate courts Verdicts and Core Legal Arguments
The Special Judge (POCSO) convicted the appellant under Sections 376 and 376(2)(i)(j) of the IPC to life imprisonment, alongside other concurrent sentences, relying heavily on the TIP and medical evidence; the High Court subsequently upheld this verdict. The appellant argued that his implication was politically motivated, emphasizing that the FIR named no one, the victim failed to identify him in court despite claiming she could, a police sketch was deliberately withheld, and there was no DNA corroboration. Conversely, the State argued that the child’s testimony was reliable and her TIP identification was sufficient, dismissing the lack of dock identification and DNA evidence as minor discrepancies that did not overshadow the corroborated medical proof of the sexual assault. [Para 2, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 37, 44]
Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court established that identification in a Test Identification Parade (TIP) is solely corroborative and cannot substitute the substantive evidence of identifying the accused in court (dock identification), especially when the perpetrator was previously unknown to the victim. The Court further ruled that the failure of the trial court and prosecution to elicit such in-court identification—coupled with irreconcilable contradictions between medical evidence on the age of injuries and the alleged timeline, as well as the absence of forensic DNA linkage—creates a fatal infirmity that dismantles the prosecution’s case beyond a reasonable doubt, necessitating an acquittal. [Para 34, 35, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 55, 57]
Important paragraphs
FIR neither discloses the identity of the accused nor does it refer to any particular features of the accused
25. However, the significance of the contents of the FIR, to be specific, the omissions therein, cannot be overlooked while examining the subsequent theory about identification of the accused-appellant. The FIR neither discloses the identity of the accused nor does it refer to any particular features of the accused which could have assisted the victim to identify the accused in the TIP. The identity of assailant was admittedly not known at the time when the FIR was lodged. Consequently, the manner in which the identity of the accused-appellant came to be ascertained subsequently assumes considerable importance.
Appreciation of significance of omission
28. The Investigating Officer (PW-8) was cross-examined on behalf of the defence, and a specific suggestion was put to him with reference to the complaints made by the accused-appellant and his family members regarding false implication of the accused-appellant at the behest of the local MLA. The Investigating Officer admitted that the complaints made on behalf of the accused and his family members, supported by affidavits, had been received by him, but he did not make any inquiry into such complaints.
29. This omission assumes significance because the defence was not merely putting forth a bare suggestion of false implication. It had specifically brought to the notice of the Investigating Officer that the accused-appellant and his family members had approached the authorities alleging that the appellant was being falsely implicated and targeted on account of political rivalry. Once such complaints were admittedly received during the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer was expected to undertake at least some verification before completely discarding the same. His failure to conduct any inquiry on these complaints deprives the Court of an important circumstance which could have either fortified or dispelled the defence plea.
Informer’s identity or source of informer not proved
30. As the identity of the assailant was not known, a pertinent question was put to the Investigating Officer as to how he could confirm the fact regarding the accused-appellant being the assailant, to which, he replied that the accused-appellant was arrested on the basis of source informer’s report, but there was no foundation for this assumption.
Non-production of sketch prepared before the court deprives court opportunity to examine description furnished by the victim at the earliest state
31. The Investigating Officer further admitted that the victim and her father were taken to Jaipur, and that a sketch was prepared for the purpose of identifying the accused. However, he admitted that the said sketch was not available with him and had not been produced before the trial Court. This circumstance assumes considerable significance, as the sketch, having been prepared with the assistance of the victim at an early stage of the investigation, constituted an important corroborative material for ascertaining the identity and physical features of the then unknown assailant. The non-production of the said sketch deprives the Court of an opportunity to examine whether the description furnished by the victim at the earliest stage was consistent with the physical features of the accused-appellant.
32. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the Investigating Officer had no reliable evidence which could point the finger of suspicion towards the accused-appellant as being the perpetrator of the crime. Thus, there remains a serious doubt regarding the basis on which the accused-appellant came to be arrested and his subsequent identification as the assailant.
IO gathered suspects and asked the victim to identify them
39. The victim (PW-2) in her examination-in-chief stated that she knew the accused and that his name was Dhanraj. She further stated that she could identify Dhanraj if he came before her. However, in her cross-examination, she stated that after the incident, the police had gathered several persons, including Dhanraj, at the police station and asked her to identify them. More significantly, in response to a pertinent question put by the defence, she categorically admitted that the police had told her the name of Dhanraj.
Victim informed that the name of the accused was disclosed to her by the police only
40. The accused was admittedly not named in the FIR and the victim herself admitted that his name had been disclosed to her by the police. In this backdrop, the evidentiary worth of the identification made by the victim during the TIP has to be examined in light of the settled legal position governing the distinction between substantive and corroborative identification. We may note that the trial Court as well as the High Court seem to have been significantly swayed by the fact that the child victim (PW-2) correctly identified the accused in the TIP.
41. Law is well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the substantive evidence for establishing the identity would be that of identification of the accused by the witness in the Court and test identification proceedings conducted during investigation are merely corroborative in nature.
Difference between Tip vs Dock identification
43. The principle assumes particular significance in the facts of the present case. TIP is intended to test the memory and capacity of a witness to identify a person whom the witness claims to have seen during the occurrence and to lend corroboration to the identification subsequently made before the Court. The test identification proceedings undertaken during investigation cannot be treated as substantive proof of identity. Substantive proof would be the identification of the accused by the witnesses while testifying on oath or dock identification in common parlance.
44. In the instant case, the trial Court convicted the accused-appellant, inter alia, on the basis of the identification made by the victim during the TIP, totally ignoring the fact that no effort was made to get dock identification of the accused-appellant by the victim. This omission assumes even greater significance in the peculiar facts of the present case. The accused was not named in the FIR; the victim had admittedly been told his name by the police; the sketch allegedly prepared with the assistance of the victim was not produced on record; and the prosecution’s primary thrust for connecting the accused-appellant with the offence was the identification made by the victim during the TIP. In these circumstances, the absence of dock identification cannot be treated as a mere technical or insignificant omission. The prosecution was under an obligation to lead substantive evidence establishing that the person standing trial was indeed the person whom the victim claimed to have seen and identified as her assailant. Failure to undertake this exercise during recording of substantive evidence would completely demolish the prosecution case which is based on the sole testimony of the victim (PW-2).
46. Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Corresponding to Section 168 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023) confers wide powers upon the Court to put questions to witnesses and to direct production of documents or things in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, this Court held that Section 311 of the CrPC (Corresponding to Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) and Section 165 of the Evidence Act, 1872 confer vast and wide powers upon the Presiding Officer and that the Courts are not expected to function as mere recording machines, passively receiving whatever the parties choose to place before them. The Court is required to take a participatory role in the trial, evince active interest and elicit all material necessary for arriving at the truth.
48. Yet, owing to the sheer negligence on the part of the Public Prosecutor concerned and the gross ignorance exhibited by the learned Presiding Officer, no effort was made to have the accused-appellant identified by the victim during her deposition, so as to confirm the fact that the person standing trial was indeed the assailant. The omission was neither occasioned by any unavoidable circumstance nor beyond the control of the Court. It was a simple step that could readily have been undertaken in the course of recording the substantive evidence, particularly when the identity of the accused was itself a crucial issue in the case.
Conclusion
57. As a consequence of the above discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the trial Court as well as the High Court fell in grave error in convicting and affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant. The findings recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court holding that the prosecution case stands on credible and reliable evidence are ex facie untenable in facts and in law.
58. The judgment dated 5th September, 2019 passed by the trial Court and impugned judgment dated 20th August, 2025 passed by the High Court do not stand to scrutiny and are hereby set aside.
59. The appellant is acquitted of the charges. He is in custody and shall be released from prison forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
60. The appeal is allowed in these terms.
Judgments Cited
- Rameshwar Singh v. State of J&K, (1971) 2 SCC 715: The Court cited this precedent to establish that a Test Identification Parade (TIP) is not substantive evidence but merely corroborative in nature. The primary substantive evidence is the identification of the accused by the witness in Court.
- Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158: This case was used to emphasize that under Section 311 of the CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act, trial courts are equipped with wide powers and must not act as passive recording machines, but must rather evince active interest to elicit necessary material for arriving at the truth.
Acts and Sections
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Sections 323, 363, 366A, 376, 376(2)(i)(j)
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act): Sections 3/4, 5(m)/6
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC): Sections 311, 313
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Section 165
- Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005
- Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023: Section 168
- Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Section 348
- Constitution of India: Article 136
