Appeal
Appeal against the high court judgment
1. The present appeals have been filed challenging the common judgment and order dated 28th December 2011 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 405 of 2004 and Criminal Revision Case No. 2055 of 2004, whereby the criminal appeal filed by the Appellant-Accused and the criminal revision filed by the mother of the deceased were dismissed. By way of the Impugned Judgment, the High Court reduced the sentence for offence punishable under Section 306 IPC to two years but increased the fine to ₹ 50,000/.
2. It is pertinent to mention that the Criminal Appeal and Criminal Revision were filed against the judgment dated 23rd February 2004 in Sessions Case No.88 of 2003, whereby the Appellant-Accused was convicted for offences punishable under Sections 306 and 309 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years and fined ₹ 5,000/- under Section 306 IPC and one year simple imprisonment and fined ₹ 1,000/- under Section 309 IPC.
Facts
3. The deceased Ms. Pratyusha was an actress, who had acted as a heroine in a number of feature films in South India. The Appellant-Accused was an engineering student. They had known each other close to a decade and wanted to marry each other. Smt. Sarojini Devi (PW-1), mother of the deceased and Appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.894-895 of 2012 was initially opposed to the marriage but had subsequently agreed to it. However, the parents of the Appellant-Accused were opposed to the marriage and the mother of the Appellant-Accused had even threatened to commit suicide in the event the Appellant-Accused married the deceased.
4. In the morning of 23rd February 2002, the Appellant-Accused informed the deceased of the threat of suicide extended by his mother. At around 5:00 PM, the deceased along with her cousin Ms. Prafulla Sri (PW-2) went to a beauty parlour as the deceased had been engaged for a Kannada feature film and had planned to leave for Bangalore on the morning of 24th February 2002.
5. At the parlour, the deceased asked Ms. Prafulla Sri (PW-2) to call the Appellant-Accused to the parlour. Upon his arrival, PW-2 talked to the Appellant-Accused for a while and when the deceased came out of the parlour, the Appellant-Accused and the deceased started crying and left together in the car of the former.
Both deceased and the appellant consumed poison and upon admitted in the hospital appellant survived
6. Both the deceased and the Appellant-Accused were thereafter seen together at CARE Hospital, Banjara Hills, Hyderabad (‘CARE Hospital) at around 7:30 or 8:00 PM. Both of them had consumed poison and were admitted in the said hospital. The deceased could not survive and passed away the next day, i.e., 24th February 2002. The Appellant-Accused, however, survived and was discharged from the hospital on 09th March 2002.
FIR registered
7. Upon a complaint made by Sarojini Devi (PW-1), FIR No. 144 of 2002 dated 24th February 2002 was registered under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”) at Panjagutta Police Station, Hyderabad.
Post mortem report doctor was neither on duty at the mortuary nor on call duty as professor
8. On 25th February 2002 one Dr. B. Muni Swamy conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased. Even though one Dr. Krupal Singh was the doctor on duty at the mortuary, Dr. B. Muni Swamy, Professor, came to the mortuary on his own and conducted postmortem of the deceased. This is surprising as Dr. B. Muni Swamy was neither on duty at the mortuary nor on call duty as Professor. Further, Dr. Rajgopal Reddy, HOD, Department of Forensic Medicine informed the investigative agency subsequently that Dr. B. Muni Swamy did not intimate or seek permission for conducting the postmortem. The postmortem report dated 25th February 2002 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“report”
Post mortem doctor before giving report to the SHO gave TV interview as if the death of the deceased was due to gang rape and manual strangulation
9. It is to be noted here that Dr. B. Muni Swamy made his opinion public by giving an interview on Teja TV on 25th February 2002, even before giving the postmortem report to the SHO on 26th February 2002 and before receiving the AP FSL report on 27th February 2002. In the interview Dr. B. Muni Swamy stated that the deceased died of manual strangulation and that she was gang raped.
A.P FSL report revealed that the poison was found in the internal organs of the deceased
10. However, the Andhra Pradesh Forensic Science Laboratory (“AP FSL”) report dated 27th February 2002 revealed that organophosphate an insecticide poison was found in the internal organs of the deceased and the stomach wash of both the accused and the deceased. The AP FSL report dated 27th February 2002 is reproduced hereinunder:
“A.P FSL report”
Post mortem doctor even after AP FSL report stuck to his opinion
11. Even after the receipt of the AP FSL report dated 27th February 2002, Dr. B. Muni Swamy stuck to his opinion that the death was due to manual strangulation and that sexual assault could not be ruled out.
AP government constituted a three-member expert committee to submit a report
12. In view of the difference of opinion regarding the cause of death and the public outcry caused due to the sensation created by the interview given by Dr. B. Muni Swamy, the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.Rt. No. 174 dated 05th March 2002, constituted a three-member Expert Committee comprising Dr. M. Narayana Reddy (PW-31), Dr. P. Vijaya Kumar and Dr. K. Sathyavathi to conduct an enquiry and submit a report.
13. The three-member Expert Committee gave its findings vide report dated 09th March 2002 stating the following:
“Three-member committee report”
Writ petitions filed to transfer the case to CBI
14. Due to the interview given by Dr. B. Muni Swamy in a matter pending investigation regarding the cause of death of an actress and finding of sexual assault and the controversy arising therefrom, public interest litigations being Writ Petitions Nos. 4054 and 4329 of 2002 were filed before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh seeking an investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”).
Post Mortem doctor wrongly represented by filing affidavit that there was swelling in the neck and he had not mentioned these injuries in his postmortem report
15. Pertinently, Dr. B. Muni Swamy in his affidavit dated 20th March 2002 filed before the High Court wrongly represented that there was swelling of the neck of the deceased and that there were injuries on the back of the thighs even though he had not mentioned these injuries in his postmortem report dated 25th February 2002.
Investigation entrusted to CBI
16. The investigation was entrusted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to the CBI vide order dated 21st March 2002 passed in Writ Petitions Nos. 4054 and 4329 of 2002.
17. Accordingly, CBI registered an FIR dated 28th March 2002 in Crime No.RC-1/S/2002/CBI/SCB/Chennai for offences punishable under Section 302 IPC.
High Court of AP directed the CBI to conduct DNA test
18. On 26th March 2002, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh directed the Director, Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics (“CDFD”) to conduct a DNA test on the basis of swabs collected from APFSL and submit a report to the Court.
Upon examination none of the samples taken from the appellant and five other individuals matched with the male fraction of DNA found on the cotton swab
19. Accordingly, DNA tests were conducted on the basis of cotton swab collected from AP FSL and the samples submitted by the mother of the deceased and Appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.894-895 of 2012. Pertinently, the report dated 24th April 2002 revealed that cotton swab contained two fractions of DNA i.e. female fraction and male fraction. The female fraction matched with the DNA of the mother of the deceased and Appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.894-895 of 2012. However, to ascertain the source of the male fraction, samples were taken from the Appellant-Accused herein and five other individuals known to the Appellant-Accused. Upon examination, none of the samples which were taken from the Appellant-Accused and five other individuals matched with the male fraction of the DNA found on the cotton swab. The relevant portions of the CDFD reports dated 5th April 2002, 24th April 2002 and 13th May 2002 are reproduced hereinbelow: –
“report”
CBI sought expert opinion from the FSL AAIMS New Delhi
20. The CBI vide its letter dated 19th April 2002 (Ex. P-55) sought expert opinion from the Department of Forensic Medicine, All India Institute of Medical Sciences (“AIIMS”) New Delhi, inter alia, as to the exact cause of death and the finding of manual strangulation in the postmortem report dated 25th February 2002.
Internal organs of the deceased were sent for FSL
22. Meanwhile, the internal organs of the deceased, the stomach wash of both the deceased and the Appellant-Accused and a bottle labeled ‘Nuvacron’ were sent for forensic examination to Central Forensic Science Laboratory (“CFSL”), which gave two reports dated 16th May, 2002 and 20th May, 2002.
23. A perusal of the report dated 16th May 2002 reveals that Monocrotophos, an organo-phosphorous insecticide was detected in the internal organs of the deceased and in the bottle labeled as ‘Nuvacron’. However, Monocrotophos an organo-phosphorous insecticide was not found in the stomach wash of the Appellant-Accused and the deceased. In another report dated 20th May 2002 submitted by CFSL, it was stated that no semen could be detected on the portion of cotton swab or the cloth belonging to the deceased. The relevant portion of the reports dated 16th May 2002 and 20th May 2002 are reproduced hereinbelow:-
“……………”
High Court closed the W.P and CBI filed charge sheet for offences under sections 306 and 309 IPC
25. The High Court after examining the entire record including the affidavit filed by Dr. B. Muni Swamy closed the public interest litigations vide its order dated 6th September 2002 and permitted the CBI to file its charge-sheet. Accordingly, CBI filed a chargesheet for offences punishable under Sections 306 and 309 IPC.
Case of the prosecution
34. The case of the prosecution was that due to opposition to the marriage proposal between the deceased and the Appellant-Accused by the family of the latter, both of them decided to commit suicide by consuming ‘Nuvacron’ pesticide mixed with coca-cola. According to the prosecution, it was the AppellantAccused who purchased the poison, i.e., ‘Nuvacron’ on the evening of 23rd February 2002 from G. Anil Kumar (PW-34) who was at that time a salesman in a shop called Revathi Agencies at Hyderguda, Hyderabad. Further, the AppellantAccused also procured chocolate and knife from Anand Rao (PW-35) who at the time was working in Foodworld Shop at Himayatnagar. Relevant portion of the testimonies of G. Anil Kumar (PW-34) and Anand Rao (PW-35) are reproduced hereinbelow:
“….”
Sessions court convicted the appellant-accused for sections 306 and 309
35. The Sessions Court vide judgment dated 23rd February 2004 convicted the Appellant-Accused of offences punishable under Sections 306, and 309 IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for five years and fined ₹ 5,000/- under Section 306 IPC and one year simple imprisonment and fined ₹1,000/- under Section 309 IPC. The relevant portion of the judgment dated 23rd February 2004 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“……”
Criminal appeal filed by the accused and the criminal revision filed by the complainant (both are appellant in the present SLP) were dismissed by the High Court
36. Vide the impugned judgment, the criminal appeal filed by the AppellantAccused and the criminal revision filed by the Appellant-Complainant, were dismissed. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“……”
Reasoning
MURDER BY STRANGULATION IS RULED OUT
Deceased was able to speak demonstrates beyond doubt that strangulation was not the cause of death
79. This Court is of the view that the allegation of homicidal death by manual strangulation is wholly unsustainable. The testimony of PW-1, the mother of the deceased and appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos. 894–895 of 2012, is particularly telling. She admitted that when she saw her daughter in the ICU of CARE Hospital, the latter was not only alive but also conscious, able to respond in a feeble voice to the doctor’s questions and her legs were trembling. Such a condition is medically inconsistent with strangulation. The fact that the deceased was able to speak and exhibit motor activity demonstrates beyond doubt that strangulation was not the cause of death.
PW.13 stated that deceased testified to her that she had consumed poison
80. This conclusion is further reinforced by the testimony of Dr. Laxmi Kanthaiah (PW-13), who stated that at the time of admission, the deceased was conscious and herself disclosed that she had consumed poison. Dr. Saraschandra (PW-10) corroborated this account, testifying that both the deceased and the accused informed him that they had consumed organophosphate poison. These statements, made contemporaneously by the deceased herself, carry great evidentiary weight and cannot be brushed aside.
No external injuries
81. Moreover, three witnesses namely, Dr. Kalyansundaram (PW-32), Dr. Saraschandra (PW-10) and A. Anitha (PW-16), all confirmed that they observed no external injuries on the deceased’s body. The absence of injuries is significant because strangulation ordinarily leaves tell-tale signs such as abrasions, bruises or hemorrhages.
82. Taken together, these facts conclusively establish that the deceased was conscious at the time of admission, bore no injuries consistent with strangulation and herself disclosed poisoning. The argument of death by strangulation is therefore ruled out.
OVERWHELMING OCULAR AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE PROVES DEATH DUE TO POISONING
83. Having ruled out strangulation, the Court turns to the actual cause of death. A wealth of ocular and medical evidence points to poisoning. The materials on record, when examined holistically, leave no room for doubt that the deceased died due to consumption of organophosphate poison, specifically Nuvacron.
84. Dr. Laxmi Kanthaiah (PW-13) of CARE Hospital has deposed that the deceased had informed her in the ICU that she had consumed poison which was some sort of pesticide. Dr. Kalyanasundram (PW-32) of CARE Hospital has deposed that when he was informed that the deceased and the Appellant-Accused had consumed poison he had asked his junior resident doctors to secure the container of the poison through the relative of the persons. Dr. Kalyanasundram (PW-32) has further deposed that after about two hours the friends of the Appellant-Accused had shown him the poison container which was marked as M.O.1 which contained Nuvacron poison. Dr. Saraschandra (PW-10) of CARE Hospital has deposed that Ex. P-17 & P-18 prepared at the time of admission mentioned that the deceased and the Appellant-Accused had consumed Organophosphate poison and the entire line of treatment in the hospital was on that basis. Even, Investigating Officer (PW-24) has deposed that the mother of the deceased and appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.894-895 of 2012 and the uncle of the deceased had informed him that the deceased had consumed poison.
Death summary and post mortem report led to poison in stomach
85. Also, the death summary prepared by CARE Hospital mentions the cause of death as Organophosphate poison. Even, the postmortem report dated 25th February 2002 prepared by Dr. B. Muni Swamy records that the stomach of the deceased contained 150 ml. yellowish brown liquid with thick consistency and an abnormal odor with the congested mucosa.
86. Additionally, the AP FSL upon a chemical analysis of viscera and stomach wash of the deceased had stated in its report dated 27th February 2002 that it had found Organophosphate, an insecticide poison, in all the body pieces and liquids forwarded to it for examination.
87. Further, Mr. R.K. Sarine (PW-26), CFSL Hyd., confirmed the presence of Monocrotophos in the items sent to FSL. Dr. M. Narayana Reddy (PW-31) reiterated his opinion given in three-member Expert Committee report dated 09th March 2002 that death was caused by poison. Dr. D.N. Baradwaj (PW-33), Additional Professor Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, AIIMS stated that considering all the documents provided, the observations recorded in PME report dated 25th February 2002 prepared by Dr. B. Muni Swamy did not appear to be indictive of manual strangulation as the congestion in the brain and abdominal organs, as found in the present case, is found in cases of Organophosphate poisoning.
88. Consequently, the convergence of multiple independent expert opinions lends overwhelming credibility to the conclusion that the deceased died of poisoning.
Injuries found on the neck and wrist of the deceased had been due to court of treatment
94. Also, Dr. Kalyanasundram (PW-32) of CARE Hospital has clarified to the Investigating Officer (PW-24) that injuries found on the neck and the wrist of the deceased had been caused during the course of treatment.
95. Consequently, in light of the deceased’s own statement, hospital records, forensic reports and expert opinions, allegations of rape or murder are devoid of legal or factual foundation.
CONSEQUENCES OF PREMATURE AND DELIBERATE PUBLICATION
Erroneous report and opinion through media far beyond individual misconduct
103. The premature and erroneous opinion of Dr. Muni Swamy unleashed a wave of public controversy. Media reports amplified his conclusions, leading to widespread suspicion of investigators and calls for immediate action against alleged perpetrators. This demonstrates how a single erroneous report, when publicised prematurely, can distort public perception and derail the course of justice.
104. This Court is of the view that the impact of a doctor issuing an erroneous postmortem report and publicising it through the media goes far beyond individual misconduct. It spreads misinformation, erodes trust in investigative agencies and institutions such as the police and judiciary, prejudices public opinion, traumatises the victim’s family, and undermines the rule of law. Such misconduct does not merely harm one case; it corrodes public trust in medicine, law, and governance, destabilising peace and harmony in society. It also violates the sub judice rule, which restricts commentary on matters under judicial consideration to preserve fairness and integrity.
Justice should not be erved through pressure and public sentiment but on evidence only
105. The Court emphasises that justice is not served by following majority sentiment or public pressure. Justice is served by truth, established through evidence and impartial investigation. While public outrage is understandable in high-profile cases, it should never dictate the course of inquiry. Investigations require careful collection of evidence, impartial analysis, and conclusions grounded in fact. Allowing public sentiment to shape outcomes risks miscarriages of justice. A society committed to fairness must recognise that investigators and courts serve the truth, not popularity. Their independence is not a luxury but the foundation of justice itself.
106. Consequently, this Court holds that the conduct of Dr. Muni Swamy in furnishing an erroneous report, publicising it prematurely and thereby violating professional ethics and the sub judice rule constitutes contempt of Court. It also breaches medical ethics, which demand competence, honesty and diligence. However, in view of his demise, this Court refrains from imposing any further consequences.
Evidence Of Pw-34 Inspires Confidence and Is Trustworthy
107. The submission that Appellant-Accused is entitled to benefit of doubt merely because of a purportedly faulty TIP is untenable. In the present case, G. Anil Kumar (PW-34) and Anand Rao (PW-35) identified the accused in Court as the person who purchased Nuvacron as well as knife and chocolates. It is pertinent to mention that TIPs are primarily meant to give an assurance to the investigating agency that their progress with the investigation into the offence is proceeding in the right direction. TIP or identification in Court is not sine qua non in every case if from circumstances the guilt is otherwise established. The fact that a particular witness has been able to identify the accused at an identification parade is only a circumstance corroborative of the identification in Court.
Nothing on record to doubt the evidence of PW.34
108. This Court is of the view that the evidence of PW-34 with respect to identification of the Appellant-Accused as the person who bought ‘Nuvacron’ on 23rd February 2002 inspires confidence. There is nothing on record to doubt his deposition.
109. The contention of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant-Accused that Ex. P-42 is not a reliable document as the said bill shows sale of three items when allegedly the accused had purchased only a single item, is misconceived on facts. A perusal of the deposition of G. Anil Kumar (PW-34) shows that he has explained that all the three items mentioned in Ex. P-42 were not purchased by the same person and that Ex.P-42 bill reflected consolidated daily sales for accounting purposes, not a single transaction. His explanation is logical and consistent with business practice and therefore the objection is rejected.
ADVERSE INFERENCE AGAINST APPELLANT-ACCUSED
Appellant made total denial in his 313 Cr.P.C statement in fact he denied being admitted in care hospital and no explanation to this denial
110. Additionally, it is an admitted fact that both the deceased and the AppellantAccused consumed poison. It is also an admitted fact that both the deceased and Appellant-Accused were seen outside the beauty parlor and thereafter seen together in the hospital for their treatment. Since the deceased is no more, it was for the Appellant-Accused to explain the circumstances in which the poison was purchased and consumed. In his Section 313 CrPC statement, the response of the accused was that of complete denial. In fact, not only did the Appellant-Accused denied being in a relationship with the deceased, but he also denied being admitted in CARE Hospital, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. No explanation regarding the manner of purchase or consumption of pesticide was forthcoming from the Appellant-Accused. It was not his case that the deceased or some other person had purchased the poison for them or that either of them were in possession of the poison prior to the date of the incident. Consequently, in the circumstances, an adverse inference has to be drawn against the AppellantAccused. [See: Munna Kumar Upadhyay Alias Munna Upadhyaya vs. State of Andhra Pradesh Through Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 6 SCC 1741 ; State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 3822 ; RajKumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 5 SCC 3533 ; Munish Mubar vs, State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 4644 ]
DEFENCE OF ACCIDENTAL CONSUMPTION REJECTED
Since the accused is an engineering student he understands the lethal nature of pesticide
111. The accused’s contention that he consumed pesticide either accidentally or with intent to threaten family members is implausible. As an engineering student, he was expected to understand the lethal nature of pesticide. There is no evidence to suggest that he mistook pesticide for a harmless substance. His defence is therefore rejected as unbelievable.
112. Pertinently, the pesticide Nuvacron is one of the highly toxic pesticides available for purchase. It is the evidence of PW-34 that the accused came to the shop and asked for Nuvacron, meaning thereby that the accused was likely aware of the toxicity of the said pesticide and had purchased it with the knowledge that ingesting the same will likely result in death.
ABETMENT BY PURCHASE OF NUVACRON
Abetment explained
113. The offence of abetment is defined under Section 107 of the IPC, the same is reproduced hereinbelow:-
“107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who—
First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.”
114. Also, in order to constitute abetment, the abettors must have intentionally aided the commission of offence. Aiding can be construed as an act of intentionally facilitating the commission of an offence.
115. In the present case, the Appellant-Accused has abetted the offence under Section 306 of the IPC by purchasing the pesticide with the knowledge of its lethal nature. Furthermore, in absence of any explanation by the accused as to why the deceased and the accused consumed poison would lead to an adverse inference that it was consumed with intent to commit suicide. Driving to the hospital is a natural human conduct in face of death.
INAPPLICABILITY OF VELLADURAI (SUPRA) TO THE PRESENT CASE
116. The judgment in Velladurai (supra) is not applicable to the present matter as in the said case, the accused-husband had harassed the deceased-wife to the extent that she was left with no option but to commit suicide. In the said case, there were no allegations of aiding the deceased wife in commission of suicide.
SURVIVING PARTNER IN A MUTUAL SUICIDE PACT IS LEGALLY CULPABLE
117. Notwithstanding the culpability of the act of purchasing pesticide, the Accused’s participation in a suicide pact renders him culpable under Section 107 IPC. A suicide pact involves mutual encouragement and reciprocal commitment to die together. The survivor’s presence and participation acts as a direct catalyst for the deceased’s actions. It is pertinent to mention that abetting as defined under Section 107 IPC is not limited to physical act of supplying means to commit suicide. Accordingly, any psychological assurance or instigation, as long as the same is intentional and directly related to the commission of offence, also constitutes abetment.
118. This Court is of the view that it is the reciprocal commitment of each party to commit suicide which provides necessary impetus/support to the other to go through with the act. In a suicide pact, it is implicit that each participant knows the intent of the other to commit the act knowing that their withdrawal from the pact will likely deter the other. Each party’s resolve to commit the act is, therefore, reinforced and strengthened due to the participation of the other party. Suicide in a suicide pact is conditional upon mutual participation of the other. In other words, if not for the active participation of both the parties, the act would not occur. The law treats such conduct as abetment because the State has a fundamental interest in preserving life. Any assistance in ending life is treated as a crime against the State.
Accused conduct of entering into the suicide pact falls squarely within section 107 IPC
119. Consequently, this Court holds that the accused’s conduct in entering into and acting upon the suicide pact falls squarely within all the three situations envisaged in Section 107 of the IPC. His participation directly facilitated the deceased’s suicide. Notably, it is not his defence that the deceased was the dominant personality who pressured him into the pact. His culpability therefore stands established.
CONCLUSION
120. Keeping in view the aforesaid reasons, the present Appeals being bereft of merits are dismissed, but with no order as to costs. The Appellant is directed to surrender within four weeks.
Reference
Directly Cited Supreme Court Precedents
- Abhinav Mohan Delkar vs. State of Maharashtra and Others (2025) SCC Online SC 1725 – Defines the essential ingredients of abetment of suicide.
- Patel Babubhai Manohardas and Ors. vs. State of Gujarat (2025) SCC Online SC 503 – Regarding the liability of an abettor present at the scene under Section 114 IPC.
- Velladurai vs. State (2022) 17 SCC 523 – Distinguished from the current case regarding active roles in suicide pacts.
- Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab (1996) 2 SCC 648 – Regarding the right to be released under the Probation of Offenders Act for Section 309 IPC offenses.
- Dana Yadav alias Dahu and Ors. vs. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 295 – Establishes that court identification is admissible even if a Test Identification Parade (TIP) was not held.
Precedents on Identification Evidence: Cited to address the reliability of witness identification in court:
- Umesh Chandra vs. State of Uttarakhand (2021) 17 SCC 616
- Amrik Singh vs. State of Punjab (2022) 9 SCC 402
- Ganpat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1997) 11 SCC 565
- Girja Shankar Misra vs. State of U.P. 1994 Supp (1) SCC 26
Precedents on Section 106 Evidence Act & Adverse Inference: Cited regarding the burden of proof for facts within the “exclusive knowledge” of the accused:
- Munna Kumar Upadhyay vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2012) 6 SCC 174
- Munish Mubar vs. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 464
- State of W.B. vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 382
- RajKumar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2014) 5 SCC 353
The legal history of this case:
- Trial Court: Judgment dated February 23, 2004, in Sessions Case No. 88 of 2003 (Conviction under Sections 306/309 IPC).
- High Court of Andhra Pradesh: Common judgment dated December 28, 2011, in Criminal Appeal No. 405 of 2004 and Criminal Revision Case No. 2055 of 2004.
- PIL/Writ Jurisdiction: Orders dated March 21, 2002, and September 6, 2002, in Writ Petitions Nos. 4054 and 4329 of 2002 (Transferring investigation to the CBI).
Acts and Sections
Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860
- Section 306 (Abetment of Suicide): The primary charge against the appellant. The Court held that purchasing lethal pesticide and participating in a “suicide pact” constituted intentional aiding and instigation.
- Section 309 (Attempt to Commit Suicide): Applied because the appellant also consumed the poison but survived. The Court noted that driving to a hospital afterward is a natural human conduct and does not negate the initial attempt.
- Section 107 (Abetment): Used to define the three ways abetment occurs: instigation, conspiracy, and intentional aiding. The Court found the appellant’s actions fell under all three.
- Section 114 (Abettor present when offence is committed): Cited to establish that an abettor present at the time of the act is deemed to have committed the act themselves.
- Section 302 (Murder): While the original FIR was registered under this section, the Court ruled out homicidal death by strangulation, confirming it was a case of poisoning.
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
- Section 106 (Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge): The Court drew an adverse inference against the appellant because he failed to explain facts exclusively known to him (the events leading to the poisoning) and instead offered a “complete denial.
- Section 32(1) (Dying Declaration): The deceased’s statement to the doctor at CARE Hospital—confirming she consumed pesticide—was treated as a relevant and heavyweight piece of evidence.
- Section 8 & 9 (Conduct and Facts): The appellant argued their conduct (going to the hospital) suggested accidental consumption, but the Court rejected this, viewing it as a natural reaction to the fear of death.
- Section 114 (Presumption of existence of certain facts): Discussed regarding the appellant’s awareness of the toxicity of the pesticide he purchased.
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), 1973
- Section 174 (Inquest): The initial investigation into the cause of death.
- Section 313 (Power to examine the accused): The Court highlighted the appellant’s false answers during his examination (denying even his relationship with the deceased) as a basis for drawing an adverse inference.
- Section 386(b) (Powers of the Appellate Court): Mentioned regarding the High Court’s power to set aside convictions or order retrials.
Other Statutes
- Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Section 4): The appellant sought release under this Act. While the Court noted precedents for Section 309 IPC, it ultimately dismissed the appeals, meaning the benefit was not extended for the Section 306 conviction.
- Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964: Cited in relation to the disciplinary action recommended against Dr. B. Muni Swamy for his “unprofessional” postmortem report.
Party
Gudipalli Siddhartha Reddy vs. State C.B.I – 2026 INSC 160 – Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2012 – February 17, 2026 – Justice Rajesh Bindal and Justice Manmohan.
