Trial court cannot appreciate inconsistencies in witness testimonies while summoning additional accused under section 319 Cr.P.C

Appeal

Complainant is the appellant against the application rejected by the High Court to summon additional accused

2. The Appellant herein is the complainant in the First Information Report dated 22nd August 2017 registered at Police Station – Kotwali Nagar, District Muzaffarnagar under Sections 307, 302 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code, 1860 and PW-1 in subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. He takes exception to the Trial Court and High Court both refusing to allow his application to summon additional accused preferred under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Facts

FIR, Investigation and rejection of section 319 Cr.P.C

4. After completion of investigation, challan was presented against certain persons. In the list of witnesses presented by the two prosecution witnesses, who according to the complainant were necessary for the establishment of the case against the accused Dilshad and others, were not listed. An application was made to have the said people be examined as witnesses before the Trial Court which came to be rejected by Order dated 17th March 2021. The same was set aside by the High Court and the said witnesses namely Khalil and Tazeem were examined as PW-6 and PW-7 respectively. It appears that on the basis on his own statement under Section 161 CrPC and the testimony of PW-6 and PW-7, the complainant wished to have two additional persons, namely Rajendra and Mausam summoned as accused persons under the power granted to the Court under Section 319, CrPC.

Consideration and rejection of the application filed u/s 319 Cr.P.C

5. The Trial Court disposed of the application by order dated 30th November 2011, rejecting the same. A perusal thereof reveals that people already standing trial before the Court filed objections to having the two above named persons as co-accused. The Court considered the said objections along with the evidence as led by PW-1, PW-6 and PW-7. The Court first noted that the allegation of conspiracy was based primarily on the statements of the complainant (PW-1) and the witnesses PW6 Khalil and PW-7 Tazim. However, their accounts were materially inconsistent. While the complainant stated that Rajendra and Mausam had met three accused persons in jail, namely Gulshanawwar, Naushad and Jamshed, PW-6 stated that the meeting was with Gulshanawwar and Naushad who mentioned about a discussion with Jamshed. PW-7, on the other hand, stated that the meeting was only with Gulshanawwar. These inconsistencies created serious doubt regarding the alleged meeting and the existence of any conspiracy. The Court further observed that the witnesses did not specify any exact date or time of the alleged meeting and merely stated that it occurred about fifteen days before the incident. Ordinarily, the entry and exit of visitors in jail premises is recorded in official registers, yet the witnesses did not refer to any such record. This omission weakened the credibility of the claim that the meeting had in fact taken place. The investigation record also undermined the prosecution version. The case diary indicated that the accused Jamshed had earlier been transferred from the local jail to Saharanpur Jail and thereafter to Mirzapur Jail, following a quarrel among inmates. As a result, he was not present in the local jail at the relevant time. This circumstance cast further doubt on the allegation that Rajendra and Mausam had met him there shortly before the incident.

Still further, it was found the circumstances in which PW-6 and PW-7 allegedly overheard the conversation to be doubtful. According to their own statements, they heard the discussion while passing near the meeting place while returning home. However, their houses were situated between Rajwaha and the alleged meeting place, and there was no settlement beyond that point. In such circumstances the Court found it unlikely that they would have taken that route. The Court also noted that despite allegedly hearing about a plan to murder Ammar, the witnesses did not inform the deceased but reported the matter only to the complainant, who admittedly had prior enmity with the accused persons. The Court then examined the testimony of the complainant and found significant contradictions between his FIR and his statement before the Court. In the FIR he stated that four assailants arrived on two motorcycles and opened fire. During his testimony he introduced a new version stating that three additional persons had also arrived on another motorcycle. This fact had not been mentioned in the written report or in his earlier police statement. The allegation of a prior conspiracy was also absent from the FIR. Further inconsistencies were noted regarding the circumstances in which the injured Ammar was taken to the hospital. The complainant stated that he had taken the deceased to the hospital where he was declared dead. However, the general diary entry recorded that Ammar was brought to the hospital in an injured condition and died later, and that he had been brought there by a rickshaw puller named Farid Ahmad. These contradictions raised doubts about the reliability of the complainant’s account. The Court also considered the physical circumstances of the incident. The complainant claimed that he was seated behind the deceased on a scooter when the assailants fired multiple shots. The post-mortem report showed that the deceased sustained five gunshot injuries. Despite being in such close proximity during the attack, the complainant did not suffer any injury, even though he admitted that the accused persons had prior enmity with him. The Court regarded this circumstance as suspicious. The Court also found the alleged motive to be weak. The prosecution claimed that Ammar was targeted because he had been pleading strongly in another murder case involving the accused persons. However, the complainant admitted that Ammar was not a witness of fact in that case and had only been a witness for the seizure of blood-stained soil. The deceased had never testified against the accused persons. In fact, it was the complainant who had deposed against them.

In light of these factors, the Court held that the evidence of the complainant was inconsistent with the FIR and the documentary record, and that the statements of PW-6 and PW-7 were mutually contradictory and unreliable. The Court, therefore, concluded that the evidence did not reach the standard required for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC and that no sufficient ground existed to summon Rajendra and Mausam to face trial.   

Analysis

Assessing or appreciating of evidence in three levels by courts explained

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case record. The central question is the propriety of the exercise of power by the Trial Court under Section 319 Cr.PC and the justifiability of the imprimatur granted thereto by the Court below. Before proceeding to the merits of the matter, it is important to understand the scales on which the question of propriety will be adjudged. Courts generally assess evidence at three distinct levels, depending on the stage of proceedings and the nature of the relief prayed for. The lowest threshold, or prima facie standard, requires only a connection to proceed with formal charges. The middle threshold, which is often described as strong and cogent, applies when Courts consider summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC; the evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive, but proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. The highest threshold demands proof beyond reasonable doubt, the standard necessary for conviction, where the Court must be fully satisfied of the guilt of the accused. It is best illustrated through a hypothetical situation.

At night, a high-end jewelry store is robbed. Police investigation seizes CCTV footage showing a masked person fleeing on a motorcycle, statements from two eyewitnesses, and phone records linking certain suspects to the vicinity of the store at the time of the incident.

How to appreciate or assess the evidence at the first stage [i.e., during framing of charge(s)] is explained

At the first stage, the investigating officer submits a charge-sheet against Person ‘A’. The Magistrate reviews the evidence, including the CCTV footage, witness statements, and other investigative material. Based on this, the Magistrate finds that there is sufficient ground to believe that ‘A’ may have committed the offence and frames charges. This stage requires evidence indicating involvement beyond mere suspicion, but it does not demand full proof or trial-level examination thereof.

How to appreciate or assess the evidence at the second stage [i.e., during summoning of additional accused under section 319 Cr.P.C] is explained

During the trial of ‘A’, evidence emerges suggesting that Persons ‘B’ and ‘C’ may also have been involved in planning or executing the robbery. A witness reports seeing ‘B’ near the scene discussing the plan with ‘A’, while phone records and CCTV footage show interactions between ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’. The Court would examine whether this evidence is strong and cogent enough to summon ‘B’ and ‘C’ as additional accused under Section 319. Minor contradictions in witness accounts or timing are noted, but they do not automatically negate the overall reliability of the evidence. At this stage, the court is not determining guilt, only assessing whether a reasonable inference of involvement exists.

How to appreciate or assess the evidence at the third stage [i.e., during judgment] is explained

As the trial continues, forensic evidence reveals fingerprints of ‘B’ on the display case and DNA of ‘C’ on a glove left at the scene. Eyewitnesses place ‘B’ and ‘C’ at the time of the robbery, and phone messages show coordination among all the three. Cross-examination fails to provide credible alibis. Cumulative assessment of the evidence leaves no reasonable doubt regarding the participation of ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’, and the Court can convict all three. This represents the highest threshold, where minor inconsistencies are immaterial because the totality of the evidence conclusively establishes guilt.

Trial court rejected the application filed u/s 319 Cr.P.C is aligned with the Supreme Court judgments

8. The Trial Court’s reasoning in rejecting the Section 319 application, prima facie appears to be largely aligned with the principles laid down by this Court, such as the requirement that evidence must be strong and cogent rather than mere suspicion. Both Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab and Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP emphasize that the power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. The Court must assess whether the evidence on record, if unrebutted, reasonably indicates the involvement of the proposed accused.

Summoning a person under section 319 does not require establishing guilt or conducting a mini-trial

9. At the same time, the Court has highlighted certain limits to the Trial Court’s discretion at Section 319 CrPC stage. Hardeep Singh(supra) clarified that the Court need not establish guilt or conduct a detailed credibility assessment at this stage, while Neeraj Kumar (supra) held that pre-trial scrutiny should not resemble a mini trial. The Trial Court, in this regard appears to have misdirected itself. In evaluating minor contradictions between witness statements and plausibility issues such as whether the complainant could have avoided injury, effectively applied a stricter standard than necessary.

Trial court overstepped by relying the documentary corroboration while appreciating the evidence in summoning additional accused under section 319 Cr.P.C

10. Another instance is that higher than necessary standard being applied is reflected where the Court relied on the absence of jail records or highlighted minor discrepancies in hospital admission or FIR details. While these points raise valid questions about reliability, they are not points that can be gone into threadbare at this stage. Further, we find the Trial Court to have erred in taking a fragmented approach while appreciating evidence. The Trial Court treated each inconsistency in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of all testimonies and circumstances. Similarly, reliance on documentary corroboration is not required; oral evidence alone, if credible, may suffice. The Court’s emphasis on the lack of jail records and the physical plausibility of witness accounts could be seen as exceeding the threshold scrutiny expected at this stage. The Court overstepped the intended scope of pre-trial scrutiny, over-emphasized minor inconsistencies, and did not fully consider the cumulative force of the evidence. The law consistently balances caution against undue summoning with the need to ensure that potentially implicated individuals are brought to trial when the record, taken as a whole, reasonably supports it.

Conclusion

Inconsistencies in witness testimonies are for trial and not for the trial court to consider during summoning addition accused under section 319 Cr.P.C

11. Apart from the point of standard of review, it is also noticed that the proposed additional accused, namely Rajendra and Mausam, have been named as persons involved in the case by way of a larger conspiracy or otherwise, by PW-1, as noticed by the trial court itself and also PWs 6 & 7. It is a separate matter that, as found by the Trial Court, there are inconsistencies in the overall testimonies of these witnesses but, that is a matter of trial and not within the Court’s scope at the time of considering an application under section 319 CrPC. The testimony, on oath, by 3 witnesses, including the complainant no less, in our view, is sufficient in the facts of this case to meet the strong and cogent evidence standard.

Direction to produce the additional accused by setting aside the orders given by Trial & High Courts

12. In view of the above discussion, the judgments of the Courts below with particulars as described in paragraph 1, stand set aside. The persons who sought to be produced as additional accused are ordered to be produced as such, and proceeded with, in accordance with law. These appeals are accordingly allowed. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Trial Court for necessary action, through the Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.    

Resources

Judgment Cited or Quoted

• Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92: This case was cited to emphasize that the power under Section 319 CrPC is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It also clarified that the Court does not need to establish guilt or conduct a detailed credibility assessment at this stage.
• Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639: This judgment was used to support the principle that pre-trial scrutiny under Section 319 should not resemble a “mini-trial”.
• Mohammad Kaleem vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2026 INSC 251: The current judgment itself, which set aside the previous orders from the Additional Sessions Judge (Sessions Trial 414 of 2018) and the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (Criminal Revision No. 1687 of 2020).

Acts and Sections

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

• Section 302: Punishment for murder.
• Section 307: Attempt to murder.
• Section 120-B: Punishment of criminal conspiracy.

Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)

• Section 319: Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. This section was the basis for the Appellant’s application to summon Rajendra and Mausam.
• Section 161: Examination of witnesses by police. This relates to the statements recorded by the Investigating Officer during the initial probe.

Other Legal Procedures Referenced

• Section 482, CrPC: Referenced in the court documents regarding the High Court’s inherent powers.
• Special Leave Petition (Crl.): The procedural route used to bring the matter before the Supreme Court.

Party

Mohammad Kaleem vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors - Criminal Appeal No. 1430 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11085 of 2023) - 2026 INSC 251 - March 17, 2026 - Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Augustine George Masih.