Rejecting the petition filed under section 156(3) CrPC does not prevent the police to register FIR inasmuch the poser of registering FIR flows from section 154 CrPC

Total summary of the judgment

Appeal

The present appeal is filed by the appellant, Pramod Kumar Shukla, laying challenge to the impugned order dated 05.06.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.11886/2025. The impugned order dismissed the appellant’s writ petition which sought the quashment of the criminal proceedings emanating from F.I.R No.405/2024. [Paras 1, 2, 8, 9]

Factual Matrix

The criminal proceedings stem from a complaint filed by respondent No.4 on 24.12.2024, alleging that the appellant misrepresented his influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, promising to secure clerk appointments for the complainant’s son and grandson upon the payment of ₹20,00,000. Acting on this assurance, the complainant transferred various sums totaling ₹1,75,000 into the appellant’s bank account in January 2023, but no interviews were ever conducted. On 19.05.2024, when the complainant encountered the appellant and demanded the return of the funds due to the non-fulfilment of the promised appointments, the appellant allegedly verbally abused the complainant’s family and threatened to kill them or implicate them in a false case. Based on this incident and the submission of bank statements alongside a purported forged result sheet, FIR No.405/2024 was registered against the appellant under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. [Paras 3, 4, 5, 6]

Trial and Appellate Courts Verdicts

Prior to the registration of the impugned FIR, the complainant had filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Prayagraj, seeking directions for an FIR based on substantially similar allegations. The ACJM called for a Police Crime Branch report, which indicated the dispute was civil in nature and pertained to a land transaction, leading the ACJM to reject the Section 156(3) application on 11.09.2024; a decision subsequently affirmed in revision by the Sessions Court. Aggrieved by the later registration of the FIR by the police, the appellant invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, which ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling that the rejection of an earlier Section 156(3) application does not operate as a bar to subsequent FIR registration if the information discloses a cognizable offence, and noted that the appellant’s defence regarding the true nature of the monetary transactions fell within the domain of investigation. [Paras 7, 8, 9]

Core Legal Arguments and Ratio Decidendi

The appellant contended that the FIR amounted to an impermissible second round of proceedings barred by the doctrine of res judicata due to the unchallenged rejection of the prior Section 156(3) application, further arguing that the allegations lacked essential IPC ingredients and stemmed from a void transaction under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. Conversely, the respondent-State argued the FIR was validly registered upon the discovery of fresh incriminating material, such as audio recordings and forged admit cards not presented earlier, asserting that the courts should not interfere with the statutory investigative powers of the police. The Ratio Decidendi established by the Supreme Court is that an order rejecting a Section 156(3) Cr.PC application is merely a threshold refusal to issue a judicial direction for investigation, rather than a final adjudication on the merits, and therefore does not attract the doctrine of res judicata. Consequently, such a rejection cannot extinguish or curtail the independent, mandatory statutory obligation of the police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC to register and investigate an FIR when subsequently presented with information ex facie disclosing a cognizable offence. [Paras 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 34, 38, 39, 42, 43]

Analysis

Question arises for consideration

23) The question which arises for consideration before this Court, in casu, is whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the subject FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom, despite the rejection by the learned Magistrate of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC founded on substantially the same allegations.

Architecture of section 156(3) Cr.P.C

24) It would be useful, at the outset, to trace the statutory architecture within which an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC operates.

Section 154 Cr.P.C and the rights and duties of the informant and the concerned police officers

25) Section 154 of the Cr.PC prescribes the ordinary mode of setting the criminal law in motion. Information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, whether given orally or in writing to the officer-in-charge of a police station, is required to be reduced to writing, read over to the informant, and entered in the book maintained for the purpose, this is what is conventionally, though not statutorily, termed the First Information Report. Sub-section (3) of Section 154 provides a further safeguard, where the officer-in-charge refuses to record such information, or fails to do so, the informant may address the substance of the information in writing to the Superintendent of Police, who, upon being satisfied that a cognizable offence is disclosed, may either investigate the matter himself or direct investigation by a subordinate officer.

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C

26) Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC empowers a Magistrate to order investigation of a cognizable offence. Ordinarily, recourse to the Magistrate under this provision is engaged where the remedies contemplated under Section 154(1) and 154(3) have not resulted in registration of an FIR.

Section 190 Cr.P.C: Cognizance and process of taking cognizance

27) Section 190 of the Cr.PC empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in three distinct contingencies, such as (i) upon a complaint of facts constituting an offence; (ii) upon a police report of such facts; or (iii) upon information received from a source other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge. Read together, Sections 154, 156(3) and 190 disclose a graded statutory scheme, the ordinary and primary recourse of an informant lies with the Police under Section 154 Cr.PC, recourse to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is a step properly taken where that primary recourse has failed or been refused and cognizance under Section 190 is a distinct and subsequent stage, triggered by any of the three contingencies noted above, and not confined to a police report consequent upon a Section 173 of the Cr.PC direction alone.

Sakiri vasu judgment

28) This Court, in Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others delineated the statutory scheme governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. It was observed that where an informant is aggrieved by the refusal of the Police to register a First Information Report under Section 154 of the Cr.PC, the remedies contemplated under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the Cr.PC are required to be availed of before invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. The Court further explained that Section 156(3) operates as a statutory check upon Police inaction or an unsatisfactory investigation and empowers the Magistrate to direct registration of an FIR, ensure that a proper investigation is conducted, and, where the circumstances so warrant, monitor the investigation so as to secure compliance with the mandate of law. It was further clarified that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is independent of the power of the investigating agency to conduct further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.PC.

Order directing investigation under section 156(3) Cr.P.C does not mean taking cognizance of the offence

30) The aforesaid principle has been consistently followed by this Court. In SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another, it was reiterated that a Magistrate, while directing investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, does not take cognizance of the offence. Cognizance is taken only where the Magistrate, upon application of judicial mind, chooses to proceed under Chapter XV of the Code by resorting to the procedure contemplated under Section 200 of the Cr.PC.

Principles behind enacting section 156(3) CrPC

31) The principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions leave little room for doubt as regards the nature and scope of the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC. The provision is intended to secure the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII where the Police fail or refuse to discharge their statutory duty. An order passed thereunder is, in substance, a judicial direction requiring the Police to exercise the powers vested in them under Section 156(1) of the Cr.PC.

32) It follows that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, the Magistrate does not embark upon the procedure contemplated under Chapter XV of the Code, nor does he take cognizance of the offence. The order merely sets the investigative machinery under Chapter XII in motion, leaving the investigation to be conducted by the Police in accordance with law and to culminate in a report under Section 173 of the Cr.PC. The jurisdiction under Section 156(3), therefore, is confined to directing investigation.

33) Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice that the observations in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy (supra), insofar as they describe the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC as being exercisable only at the pre-cognizance stage, no longer represent the prevailing legal position. In Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another13 this Court, upon an analysis of Sections 2(h), 156(3) and 173(8) of the Cr.PC, held that the expression “investigation” occurring in Section 156(3) is of wide amplitude and includes further investigation under Section 173(8). It was accordingly held that the Magistrate’s power to ensure a fair and proper investigation continues until the commencement of trial and is not exhausted merely upon the taking of cognizance. The clarification in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra), however, concerns only the temporal ambit of the Magistrate’s jurisdiction and does not alter the essential character of an order under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC.

34) It is, therefore, evident that an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is not one rendered upon an adjudication on the merits of the allegations against the proposed accused but is confined to regulating the commencement of investigation in accordance with the statutory scheme of the Code. The question which therefore arises is whether rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same or substantially similar allegations by operation of the doctrine of res judicata.

35) The contours of the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings recently came to be comprehensively examined by this Court in S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another14, authored by one of us (Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.), wherein this Court undertook an exhaustive survey of the earlier authorities on the subject and reconciled the seemingly divergent lines of precedent. The discussion, being of direct relevance to the issue arising in the present case, is reproduced hereunder:

Whether an order rejecting section 156(3) crpc application possesses the character of a final adjudication to attract res judicata?

38) The inquiry before this Court must, therefore, proceed on the same doctrinal footing. The issue is not whether an earlier application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC had been preferred or rejected. Rather, the determinative question is whether an order rejecting such an application possesses the character of a final adjudication on the merits so as to attract the doctrine of res judicata.

39) In our considered view, the answer must be in the negative. As already discussed, an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. Such an order neither entails an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or liability of the proposed accused. Applying the same principle, the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations.

Rejecting the petition filed under section 156(3) CrPC does not prevent the police to register FIR inasmuch the poser of registering FIR flows from section 154 CrPC

40) The above conclusion also receives direct affirmation from the order of this Court in Mahendri and Others v. State of U.P. and Another20, where the precise contention urged before this Court was that once an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC had been rejected, it was impermissible for the complainant to subsequently lodge an FIR founded on the same allegations. Repelling the said contention, this Court observed thus:

“We have given our thoughtful consideration to the solitary contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. As noticed hereinabove, it is apparent that the application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code was declined by the Court of competent jurisdiction at Deoband vide order dated 04.10.2007. The prayer made by the complainant in the aforesaid application was to order further investigation in the matter. The declining of the aforesaid prayer, would not affect the merits of the controversy, nor would it reflect the veracity of the allegations made by the complainant in the First Information Report which was subsequently lodged on 10.10.2007. …..it is not possible for us to say, that the order passed by the concerned Court on 04.10.2007 would have any effect on the veracity or the merits of the allegations made by the complaint on 10.10.2007 or the proceedings which would emanate therewith….” (emphasis supplied)

41) The reasoning in Mahendri (supra) is wholly consistent with the statutory scheme discussed hereinabove. The Court unequivocally held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC neither determines the merits of the controversy nor reflects upon the truthfulness of the allegations subsequently made in the FIR.

42) Independent of whether an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC has been allowed or rejected, the duty of the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC remains governed by the statutory mandate of the Code. The obligation to register and investigate a cognizable offence does not emanate from a direction issued by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) but flows directly from Sections 154 and 156 of the Cr.PC. itself. This position stands authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others22 wherein it was held that where the information furnished discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police officer cannot avoid that statutory duty and at the stage of registration, the enquiry is confined to whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence, the truthfulness, credibility or otherwise of the allegations being matters for investigation and not for refusing registration.

43) The consequence is self-evident. The rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC. If, notwithstanding such rejection, information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is subsequently furnished to the Police, the statutory duty recognised in Lalita Kumari (supra) continues to operate with full force.

44) At this juncture, it is necessary to address the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant upon the recent decision of this Court in Mohan Karthik (supra), in this case, the question before this Court was whether the learned Magistrate had the jurisdiction to invoke Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC for a second time, despite the earlier order whereby the learned Magistrate had dismissed the initial application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, as well as the subsequent closure report filed by the Police pursuant to the direction issued by the High Court to conduct a preliminary inquiry. This Court held that the second round of resort to Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC was nothing but an attempt to review the earlier order passed by the High Court. It was further noticed that the liberty granted by the High Court was only for the purpose of invoking Section 200 of the Cr.PC and that the complainant ought to have pursued that remedy instead of once again invoking Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, the parameters governing the two provisions being altogether different.

45) As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, the issue arising in the present case is entirely different. We are not concerned with the maintainability of a second application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC or the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to entertain the same. The question arising in the present case, therefore, bears no nexus to the dispute considered in Mohan Karthik (supra) and the said decision has no application to the controversy before us.

46) Having answered the principal question regarding the legal effect of the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, we may now examine whether the High Court was justified in declining to exercise its jurisdiction to quash the impugned FIR. The High Court has recorded that, on a plain reading of the allegations contained in the First Information Report, cognizable offences are prima facie disclosed and that the appellant’s defence regarding the true nature of the monetary transactions constitutes a matter requiring investigation. We find no error in the approach so adopted.

Conclusion

47) It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, the Court is concerned only with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At that stage, the Court does not embark upon an enquiry into the correctness, reliability or probative value of the material relied upon by either side. This principle stands authoritatively settled in Bhajan Lal (supra) and has been consistently reaffirmed, in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd (supra). In the present case, the FIR alleges that the appellant induced the informant to part with substantial sums of money on the representation that he could secure public employment for the informant’s son and grandson, received such amounts in his bank account, furnished forged admit cards and examination results in furtherance of the deception, and thereafter threatened the informant when repayment was demanded. We are also conscious of the fact that the record indicates that the appellant is arraigned in five FIR’s with substantially similar allegations. These allegations, if accepted at their face value, unquestionably disclose the commission of cognizable offences warranting investigation.

48) The various submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant regarding the true nature of the monetary transactions, the police report obtained in the earlier proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, and the evidentiary worth of the audio recordings, bank transactions, admit cards and other documents, are all matters falling within the domain of appreciation of evidence in a trial. At this stage, Court cannot undertake an examination of such material or determine which of the rival versions is more probable.

49) Accordingly, finding no perversity in the findings rendered by the High Court warranting interference, the present Appeal is sans merit and is dismissed.

Resources

Cited Judgments and Brief Descriptions

1. Mohan Karthik and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another: Relied upon by the appellant to argue that once an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is rejected on merits, the complainant’s only remedy is a complaint under Section 200 of the Cr.PC, and a second application is an impermissible review.
2. State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others: Cited by the appellant to argue the FIR was actuated by mala fides and lacked essential ingredients, and relied upon by the Court to affirm that jurisdiction to quash requires looking only at whether FIR allegations at face value disclose a cognizable offence.
3. Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Others: Relied upon by the appellant to contend that the proceedings deserved to be quashed due to the absence of essential IPC ingredients.
4. Priyanka Srivastava and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others: Cited by the appellant to submit that indiscriminate resort to Section 156(3) proceedings results in an abuse of the criminal process.
5. V. Ravi Kumar v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar and Another, and Anju Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another: Relied upon by the respondent-State to submit that a subsequent complaint or FIR is not barred if founded upon fresh material or distinct facts not considered earlier.
6. M/s Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanyakumar and Another: Relied upon by the State to argue that investigation is a statutory police function and courts should not interfere absent compelling reasons.

7. Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others: Used to delineate that Section 156(3) operates as a statutory check on Police inaction, empowering the Magistrate to direct FIR registration and monitor investigations.
8. Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others v. V. Narayana Reddy and Others: Cited to explain that power under Section 156(3) operates at the pre-cognizance stage as a peremptory reminder for police to exercise their plenary investigation powers, distinct from Section 202.
9. SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Telangana and Another: Reiterated that a Magistrate directing an investigation under Section 156(3) does not take cognizance of the offence.
10. Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another: Clarified that the expression “investigation” in Section 156(3) is wide enough to include further investigation under Section 173(8) until the commencement of trial.
11. S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another: Comprehensively examined the doctrine of res judicata in criminal proceedings, concluding it only applies where earlier proceedings culminated in a final adjudication on the merits.
12. Pritam Singh and Another v. State of Punjab, Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, and State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain: Discussed within the S.C. Garg decision as precedents where res judicata applied because previous trials had resulted in acquittals and final adjudications.
13. Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Muskan Enterprises and Another v. The State of Punjab and Another: Discussed within the S.C. Garg decision as instances where res judicata did not apply because they arose from successive quashing petitions without merit adjudication.
14. Mahendri and Others v. State of U.P. and Another: Affirmed that the rejection of a Section 156(3) application does not affect the merits or veracity of allegations made in a subsequently lodged FIR.
15. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others: Relied upon to establish that registering an FIR is a mandatory statutory obligation of the police when information discloses a cognizable offence, regardless of prior Magistrate application rejections.

Acts and Sections Involved

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC): Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, and 506.
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC): Sections 2(h), 154, 154(1), 154(3), 156, 156(1), 156(3), 173, 173(8), 190, 190(1)(a), 200, 202, 202(1), 482; and Chapters XII, XIII, and XV.
3. Indian Contract Act, 1872: Section 23.
4. Constitution of India: Article 226.
5. Code of Civil Procedure: Section 11.

Party

Pramod Kumar Shukla versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others - Criminal Appeal No. 3931 of 2026 - 2026 INSC 887 - August 19, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, J. and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria, J.