Appeal
Appeal against the order setting aside the order and directed the trial to start afresh
2. The present Criminal Appeal arises out of the order dated 18.02.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, being Application No. 39342 of 2024. By the impugned order, the High Court allowed the application filed by Respondents 1 to 5 (accused persons), set aside the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 5 Aligarh in Sessions Trial No. 21 of 2008, and directed that the trial be proceeded afresh in accordance with the mandate of Sections 241 and 242 Cr.P.C.
Facts
3. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:
FIR registration: 3.1. An FIR being No. 5 of 2007 was registered on 04.01.2007 at Police Station Quarsi, District Aligarh on the complaint lodged by the first informant, Rao Singh, for offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932 against nine accused persons, namely, Tanuj (A1), Satish (A2 / Respondent No. 1), Bijendra Singh (A3 / Respondent No. 2), Omkar (A4 / Respondent No. 3), Nempal (A5), Subhash (A6 / Respondent No. 4), Preetam (A7), Mohkam (A8 / Respondent No.5) and Narendra Sharma (A9).
Illegal firearm shots: 3.2. As per the prosecution case, a dispute had arisen between the complainant party and Narendra Sharma (A9) relating to the sale of land. It was alleged that on 04.01.2007, the accused persons, sharing a common intention, arrived on motorcycles, armed with licensed as well as illegal firearms, and opened fire using pistols, rifles and double-barrel guns upon the informant and his brothers, namely Nahar Singh, Shripal Singh, Krishnapal and Kuldeep, resulting in serious injuries. One of the injured, Nahar Singh, later succumbed to his injuries. The appellant herein is his son.
Cognizance and committal: 3.3. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused persons. The jurisdictional Magistrate, after taking cognizance, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial.
Case reached section 313 Cr.P.C stage: 3.4. On 27.03.2009, the trial Court proceeded to frame charges, to which the accused pleaded not guilty. However, the order framing charges remained unsigned owing to the absence of one of the accused, namely, Bijendra Singh (A3). Thereafter, on 01.06.2009, all the accused persons, along with their counsel, were present before the court, and charges were framed, whereafter the matter was posted for recording of prosecution evidence on 15.06.2009. The trial thereafter proceeded in the normal course, with the prosecution examining its witnesses, and the matter eventually reaching the stage of recording statements of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
Formal charge against framed inasmuch as the charge was remained unsigned: 3.5. At that stage, it came to the notice of the learned Presiding Officer that the formal charge had inadvertently remained unsigned. In order to cure the said defect, the trial Court framed a formal charge afresh against all the accused persons on 11.09.2024.
Appellant moved an application not to examine further witness and consider the examination already done: 3.6. Subsequently, an application was moved by the appellant seeking that the evidence already recorded be taken into consideration and that the trial proceed from the existing stage. By order dated 07.10.2024, the trial Court allowed the said application, observing that the accused were fully aware of the charges framed against them and had extensively cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. The Court further noted that two prosecution witnesses had expired, one had turned hostile, and there existed a likelihood of other witnesses turning hostile; thus, recalling witnesses for fresh examination would seriously prejudice the prosecution. Accordingly, the matter was directed to proceed to the stage of recording statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
Accused preferred petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C and the same was pleased to allowed: 3.7. Aggrieved thereby, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 (accused persons) invoked the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, by the impugned order dated 18.02.2025, allowed the application and directed that the trial be conducted afresh.
Appellant preferred the present appeal: 3.8. Therefore, the appellant has preferred the present appeal challenging the direction issued by the High Court.
Analysis
9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned senior counsel and the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
Stay granted already
10. This Court, by order dated 23.05.2025, stayed the operation of the impugned order passed by the High Court. The said interim protection was extended from time to time and continued to operate until the matter was finally reserved for judgment.
Charges remained unsigned due to the absence of an accused: 11. The incident dates back to 04.01.2007, pursuant to which an FIR was registered against nine accused persons. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 and 120B IPC and Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932. The present controversy arises from the manner in which charges were framed. Although an order purporting to frame charges was passed on 27.03.2009, it remained unsigned due to the absence of one accused, and a subsequent order was passed on 10.06.2009 to the effect that charges were framed. The trial thereafter proceeded without objection, with several prosecution witnesses being examined and cross-examined. Upon noticing defects in the earlier process of charge framing, including the absence of a valid order in terms of Section 228 Cr.P.C, charges were subsequently framed by the trial Court, vide order dated 11.09.2024.
11.1. The appellant, son of deceased Nahar Singh, sought permission for the trial to proceed on the basis of evidence already recorded. This application was allowed by the trial Court by order dated 07.10.2024, and the matter was fixed for recording statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Aggrieved, the accused approached the High Court, which by order dated 18.02.2025, set aside the order of the trial Court, and directed that the trial proceed afresh in accordance with Sections 241 and 242 Cr.P.C. This order is under challenge in the present appeal.
12. It is also pertinent to note that a counter-FIR being FIR No. 5A of 2007 dated 05.01.2007 arising out of the same incident, is pending before the Court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No. 05, Aligarh, and is stated to be at the stage of defence evidence.
Issues arise for consideration
13. On the basis of the pleadings and submissions advanced, the following issues arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirement of framing of charges in accordance with law?
(ii) Whether the defect, if any, in the framing or signing of the charges constitutes an illegality vitiating the trial, or a curable irregularity within the meaning of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C.?
(iii) Whether the High Court was justified in directing that the trial be conducted afresh, despite the fact that the trial had substantially progressed and prosecution evidence had already been recorded?
14. Issue No. 1
Whether there was substantial compliance with the requirement of framing of charges in accordance with law?
Purpose of Framing a charge
14.1. The purpose of framing a charge in a criminal trial is to provide the accused with clear and precise notice of the accusation so as to enable him to effectively prepare and present his defence. Sections 211 to 213 Cr.P.C. make it clear that a charge must disclose the nature of the offence and the essential particulars necessary to inform the accused of the case he is required to meet. The fundamental object of a charge is thus one of notice and not a mere ritualistic formality. Section 228 Cr.P.C. further contemplates that upon consideration of the record and hearing the parties, the Court shall frame a charge in writing.
Judgment analysis on scope of framing charges
14.2. The Constitution Bench in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), observed that criminal procedure is intended to advance the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by technicalities. It was further held that where there is substantial compliance with the requirements of law and the accused has had a fair trial with full knowledge of the case against him, mere procedural errors or omissions would not vitiate the trial unless prejudice is demonstrated. The following paragraph is pertinent:
“5. Before we proceed to set out our answer and examine the provisions of the Code, we will pause to observe that the Code is a code of procedure and, like all procedural laws, is designed to further the ends of justice and not to frustrate them by the introduction of endless technicalities. The object of the Code is to ensure that an accused person gets a full and fair trial along certain well established and well-understood lines that accord with our notions of natural justice. If he does, if he is tried by a competent court, if he is told and clearly understands the nature of the offence for which he is being tried, if the case against him is fully and fairly explained to him and he is afforded a full and fair opportunity of defending himself, then, provided there is substantial compliance with the outward forms of the law, mere mistakes in procedure, mere inconsequential errors and omissions in the trial are regarded as venal by the Code and the trial is not vitiated unless the accused can show substantial prejudice. That, broadly speaking, is the basic principle on which the Code is based.”
14.3. The settled position of law is that the validity of a charge must be tested on whether the accused understood the case against him and was afforded a fair opportunity to defend himself. In Main Pal v. State of Haryana, this Court explained that the object of framing a charge is to give the accused a clear idea of the accusations and the essential facts he must meet, and that courts must look to the substance rather than technicalities while assessing prejudice. The following paragraph is apposite:
“17. The following principles relating to Sections 212, 215 and 464 of the Code, relevant to this case, become evident from the said enunciations:
(i) The object of framing a charge is to enable an accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and of the essential facts that he has to meet. The charge must also contain the particulars of date, time, place and person against whom the offence was committed, as are reasonably sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.
(ii) The accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy, the exact nature of the charge against him, and unless he has such knowledge, his defence will be prejudiced. Where an accused is charged with having committed offence against one person but on the evidence led, he is convicted for committing offence against another person, without a charge being framed in respect of it, the accused will be prejudiced, resulting in a failure of justice. But there will be no prejudice or failure of justice where there was an error in the charge and the accused was aware of the error. Such knowledge can be inferred from the defence, that is, if the defence of the accused showed that he was defending himself against the real and actual charge and not the erroneous charge.
(iii) In judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the courts must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to the technicalities, and their main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly, and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself.”
14.4. In Rafiq Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court reiterated that the purpose of framing of charge is to put the accused to notice regarding the offence for which he is being tried. It was further held that non-framing of a charge or defects therein would not ipso facto vitiate the trial and that the question must always be examined in the facts of each case to determine whether prejudice or failure of justice has been occasioned. The following paragraphs are apposite:
“39. During the conduct of the trial, framing of a charge is an important function of the court. Sections 211 to 224 of Chapter XVII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have been devoted by the legislature to the various facets of the framing of charge and other related matters thereto. Under Section 211, the charge should state the offence with which the accused is charged and should contain the other particulars specified in that section…
41. We have referred to these provisions primarily to indicate that the purpose of framing of a charge is to put the accused at notice regarding the offence for which he is being tried before the court of competent jurisdiction. For want of requisite information of the offence and details thereof, the accused should not suffer prejudice or there should not be failure of justice, as held by this Court in Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka [(2001) 2 SCC 577 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 358]. The requirements of putting the accused at notice and there being a charge containing the requisite particulars, as contemplated under Section 211 CrPC, has to be read with reference to Section 215 of the Code. Every omission would not vitiate the trial….
42. Dinesh Seth v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2008) 14 SCC 94 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 783] was a case where the accused was charged with an offence under Section 304-B read with Section 34 IPC but was finally convicted for an offence under Section 498-A. The plea of prejudice, on the ground that no specific charge under Section 498-A was framed and the court, while referring to the facts and circumstances of the case and the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses found that it was unmistakably shown that the defence had made concerted efforts to discredit the testimony alleging cruelty, was rejected and the accused was punished for an offence under Section 498-A. This clearly demonstrates the principle that in all cases, non-framing of a charge or some defect in drafting of the charge per se would not vitiate the trial itself. It will have to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a given case. Of course, the court has to keep in mind that the accused “must be” and not merely “may be” guilty of an offence. The mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions (Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : AIR 1973 SC 2622].
Contemporaneous proceedings indicate charges had been framed and explained after all the accused present
14.5. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the record indicates that on 27.03.2009, the trial Court prepared the formal charge and recorded that the charges had been typed but were not signed due to the absence of one of the accused. Subsequently, on 01.06.2009, the Court recorded the presence of all the accused along with their counsel and noted that the charges had been framed, after which the matter was fixed for prosecution evidence. These contemporaneous proceedings clearly indicate that the charge was read over and explained to the accused, thereby satisfying the substantive requirement that they must understand the nature of the accusations.
No objections raised regarding irregularity in framing of charges
14.6. The trial thereafter proceeded in the ordinary course and the prosecution examined several witnesses over a considerable period. The defence actively participated in the proceedings and extensively cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. The nature of such cross-examination demonstrates that the accused were fully aware of the prosecution case, including their alleged roles, the manner of commission of the offence, and the defence sought to be set up, including the plea of alibi. The continued participation of the accused in the trial without raising any objection to the alleged defect in the charge further reinforces that they were not misled in any manner.
If accused understood the nature of allegations and defending themselves then the omission to frame a proper charge or defects therein are not fatal
14.7. This Court has consistently held that where the accused clearly understood the nature of the allegations and had a full opportunity to defend themselves, defects in the charge cannot be treated as fatal. In Soundarajan v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, Vigilance Anti-Corruption, Dindigul it was reiterated that omission to frame a proper charge or defects therein are not fatal unless it is shown that such omission has occasioned a failure of justice. The following paragraph is relevant:
“16. Under Section 464 CrPC, omission to frame a charge or any error in charge is never fatal unless, in the opinion of the court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. In this case, from the perusal of the cross examination of PW 3 and other prosecution witnesses made by the advocate for the appellant, it is apparent that the appellant had clearly understood the prosecution case about the first alleged demand made on 6-8-2004 and the subsequent alleged demand and acceptance on 13-8-2004. There is no doubt that this is a case of omission to frame a proper charge, and whatever charge has been framed is, per se defective. However, by reason of the said omission or defect, the accused was not prejudiced insofar as his right to defend is concerned. Therefore, in this case, the omission to frame charge and/or error in framing charge is not fatal.”
14.8. In the present case, the record affirmatively establishes that the accused were fully aware of the nature of the accusations and had an effective opportunity to defend themselves. No prejudice whatsoever has been demonstrated. Therefore, we are of the considered view that there was substantial compliance with the requirement of framing of charges in accordance with law.
15. Issue No.
(ii) Whether the defect, if any, in the framing or signing of the charges constitutes an illegality vitiating the trial, or a curable irregularity within the meaning of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C?
Section 215 and 464 Cr.P.C explained
15.1. Section 215 Cr.P.C. provides that no error or omission in the charge shall be regarded as material unless the accused was in fact misled and a failure of justice has been occasioned. Section 464 Cr.P.C. expressly stipulates the effect of omission to frame a charge or any error, omission, or irregularity therein. It makes it clear that no finding, sentence or order shall be deemed invalid merely on such ground unless in the opinion of the appellate or revisional court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned.
Even the absence of formally framed charge does not vitiate the proceedings
15.2. For ease of reference, the aforesaid provisions read as under:
“………..”
A plain reading of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. indicates that the legislative emphasis is not on the existence of a defect, but on its consequence. Even the absence of a formally framed charge does not vitiate the proceedings. The decisive test is whether the accused was misled in the conduct of his defence and whether a failure of justice has resulted.
Remedy for framing of charge explained
15.3. Significantly, Section 464(2) Cr.P.C. itself provides the remedial course where such failure is found, including framing of a charge and recommencement of trial from an appropriate stage, or directing a fresh trial. This clearly indicates that the legislative intent is to cure defects in a manner that preserves the proceedings to the extent possible, rather than to invalidate the entire trial on technical grounds.
Distinction between illegality and irregularity is explained
15.5. The distinction between an illegality and an irregularity is thus well established. An illegality is one that strikes at the root of jurisdiction or renders the trial fundamentally unfair, whereas an irregularity is a defect in procedure which does not vitiate the proceedings unless prejudice is demonstrated.
No illegality in the present case
15.6. Applying these principles to the present case, the defect complained of does not rise to the level of a jurisdictional illegality. The record indicates that the charge was substantively framed on 01.06.2009 in the presence of the accused, and the trial thereafter proceeded without objection from the defence.
Procedure lapse like omission of signature on the charge does not render the proceedings invalid
15.7. The omission of a signature on the charge, though a procedural lapse, does not render the proceedings invalid when the charge was in fact prepared, recorded, read over, and acted upon by the Court and the parties. The record affirmatively demonstrates that the accused had full knowledge of the accusations and effectively contested the prosecution case. The nature of cross examination and the defence adopted leave no manner of doubt that the accused were neither misled nor prejudiced.
15.8. This position is consistent with the principles laid down in Kamalanantha and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, where active participation in trial and full awareness of the prosecution case was treated as decisive indicators of absence of prejudice despite defects in the charge.
Objection at the belated stage does not affect the proceeding and it is a curable irregularity only
15.9. The conduct of the accused is also significant. The objection to the alleged defect was raised belatedly in the year 2024, after substantial progress of the trial and after the demise of key eyewitnesses. Such delayed challenge is a relevant circumstance indicating absence of genuine prejudice, as recognized in Willie Slaney (supra).
15.10. The record further shows that the defence had already availed full opportunity of cross-examination, as noted by the trial Court while rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. The attempt to reopen the proceedings at such a belated stage reinforces the conclusion that the objection is technical in nature.
15.11. Acceptance of such belated challenges founded on procedural irregularities would defeat the object of criminal procedure, which is to advance the cause of justice and not to frustrate it on technical grounds.
15.12. In view of the above, this Court holds that the defect relating to the absence of signature on the charge does not constitute an illegality. It is, at best, a curable procedural irregularity within the ambit of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. In the absence of any demonstrated failure of justice, such defect cannot vitiate the proceedings.
15.13. Accordingly, this issue is answered in favour of the appellant by holding that the defect is curable and does not invalidate the trial.
16. Issue No. (iii)
Whether the High Court was justified in directing that the trial be conducted afresh, despite the fact that the trial had substantially progressed and prosecution evidence had already been recorded?
16.1. A direction to conduct a trial afresh implies that the earlier proceedings are set aside and the case is reopened from the initial stage as if no trial had taken place. The law is well settled that such a course is an exceptional one and can be resorted to only where it is indispensable to avert a miscarriage of justice. This power cannot be exercised to enable the prosecution to fill lacunae or to rectify deficiencies in its case. The governing consideration must always be the ends of justice.
Retrial may be directed only in exceptional cases
16.5. Similarly, in Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab and another, this Court reiterated that retrial may be directed only in exceptional cases to avert miscarriage of justice, and not for mere procedural lapses or minor irregularities.
16.6. The settled test, therefore, is whether the earlier trial was so fundamentally flawed that it resulted in a complete failure of justice, or whether the defect is of such a nature that it cannot be cured without directing a fresh trial.
16.7. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, the direction of the High Court to conduct the trial afresh was clearly unwarranted.
Conclusion
16.10. As discussed, the defect in the charge was, at best, a curable procedural irregularity falling within the ambit of Sections 215 and 464 Cr.P.C. No finding has been recorded by the High Court that such defect had occasioned a failure of justice or that the accused were misled in the conduct of their defence.
Fresh trial cannot be ordered in a routine or mechanical manner
16.11. An order directing a fresh trial cannot be passed in a routine or mechanical manner. It must be supported by a clear and reasoned finding that the earlier proceedings were vitiated to such an extent that continuation thereof would result in miscarriage of justice. No such finding is discernible in the impugned order. In the absence of any demonstrated prejudice, the High Court was not justified in invoking its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to set aside the entire trial and direct that it be conducted afresh.
16.12. It must also be borne in mind that criminal proceedings cannot be prolonged indefinitely on account of curable procedural defects. The rights of victims and the interest of society in timely administration of justice are equally relevant considerations.
16.13. Accordingly, this issue is answered against the respondents, holding that the High Court was not justified in directing that the trial be conducted afresh after it had substantially progressed and evidence had already been recorded.
Appeal allowed direction to continue the matter from the stage prior to the passing of impugned order
18. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 18.02.2025 passed by the High Court is set aside and the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by the trial Court is restored. The trial Court shall proceed with the matter from the stage at which it stood prior to the passing of the impugned order and shall make an endeavour to conclude the proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law.
Resources
Judgments involved and cited
- Sandeep Yadav v. Satish & Others (2025): The impugned order dated 18.02.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Application No. 39342 of 2024, which directed a de novo trial.
- Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1956): A Constitution Bench judgment (AIR 1956 SC 116) establishing that procedural errors or the absence of a charge do not vitiate a trial unless substantial prejudice is demonstrated.
- Dinesh Seth v. State of NCT of Delhi (2008): Cited to show that only defects affecting fundamental fairness are fatal, whereas procedural irregularities are curable ( (2008) 14 SCC 94).
- Main Pal v. State of Haryana (2010): Used to explain that the object of framing a charge is substance over technicality and providing the accused with a clear idea of the facts they must meet ( (2010) 10 SCC 130).
- Rafiq Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011): Referenced regarding the principle that non-framing or defective drafting of a charge does not per se vitiate a trial ( (2011) 8 SCC 300).
- Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka (2001): Cited concerning the requirement of notice to the accused and the definition of “failure of justice” ( (2001) 2 SCC 577).
- Soundarajan v. State (2023): Reaffirmed that an omission to frame a proper charge is not fatal if the accused was not prejudiced in their right to defend ( (2023) 16 SCC 141).
- Kamalanantha and others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005): Cited to show that active participation in a trial indicates an absence of prejudice despite charge defects ( (2005) 5 SCC 194).
- State of M.P. v. Bhooraji and others (2001): Emphasized the limited scope for directing a fresh trial and the legislative mandate of Section 465 Cr.P.C. ( (2001) 7 SCC 679).
- Ajay Kumar Ghoshal and others v. State of Bihar and another (2017): Defined “de novo” trial and established that it should only be ordered in exceptional cases ( (2017) 12 SCC 699).
- Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra (1963): Quoted within the Ajay Kumar Ghoshal decision regarding the criteria for ordering a retrial (AIR 1963 SC 1531).
- Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab and another (2022): Reiterated that retrials are reserved for exceptional cases to avert a miscarriage of justice ( (2022) 2 SCC 89).
- Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973): Noted for the distinction between “may be” and “must be” guilty ( (1973) 2 SCC 793).
Acts and Sections
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)
- Section 211 to 213: Outline the requirements for the contents of a charge, including the nature of the offence and essential particulars like time and place.
- Section 215: States that errors or omissions in a charge are not material unless the accused was misled and it caused a failure of justice.
- Section 228: Mandates the framing of a charge in writing and requires the court to ask the accused if they plead guilty or claim to be tried.
- Section 241 & 242: Relate to the procedure for warrant cases, specifically regarding conviction on a plea of guilty and the evidence for the prosecution.
- Section 307: Relates to the tender of pardon to an accomplice (contextual to the original charges).
- Section 311: Governing the power to summon material witnesses or examine persons present; the accused’s attempts to use this section were previously rejected by the trial court.
- Section 313: Relates to the power to examine the accused to explain circumstances appearing in evidence against them.
- Section 317(2): Provision for inquiries and trials being held in the absence of the accused in certain cases.
- Section 464: A central provision of this case, stating that findings or orders are not invalid due to an absence of or error in charge unless a “failure of justice” occurred.
- Section 465: Provides that findings or sentences are not reversible due to errors or irregularities unless they occasioned a failure of justice.
- Section 482: Relates to the inherent powers of the High Court, which the respondents invoked to seek a de novo trial.
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
- Section 120B: Criminal conspiracy.
- Section 147: Punishment for rioting.
- Section 148: Rioting, armed with a deadly weapon.
- Section 149: Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.
- Section 302: Punishment for murder.
- Section 307: Attempt to murder.
Other Acts
- Section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1932: Relating to the punishment for molesting a person to prejudice of employment or business (applied in the original FIR).
Party
Sandeep Yadav and Satish & Others - Criminal Appeal No. 1617 of 2026 - 2026 INSC 301 - March 25, 2026 – Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah and Hon’ble Mr. Justice R. Mahadevan.
